Do Punishment Schemes Induce Fairplay? Exploring the Hidden Decision Science of Booking in Spanish Premier League

Abstract

Economic analysis of sport suggests punishments schemes are designed to induce fairplay. We provide an alternative explanation to that by assessing the law of market efficiency which holds across most of the social interactions involving the inherent mechanisms of exchange. To accomplish the claim, we construct an alternative method of testing our idea through borrowing and simulating a logically analogous setting from professional football leagues. We perform a lucid econometric analysis of our model with pertinent data. Then, we make further usage of statistical and quantitative techniques to throw more light on the problem. In line with our evidence, we argue that with presence of product sophistication and service superiority, market is left best without regulatory schemes. Similarly and finally, we alliterate that punishment scheme does not necessarily stimulate the emergence of fair-play.

Keywords: Incentives, Spanish Premier League, punishment schemes, fairplay.

DOI: 10.7176/EJBM/11-24-16

Publication date: August 31^st 2019