Theory and Practice of Humanitarian Intervention: The Case of 2011 NATO Intervention in Libya

Abstract

Decades of Colonel Gaddafi’s rule in Libya came to an end after 2011 North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) led military intervention. The intervention was propagated as a humanitarian mission intended to rescue Libyans’ from illegitimate force of the regime and prevent the civilian suffering. On contrary the country went down to large scale collapse and devastation. It became divided among various armed groups, serving as one of the major routes of illegal migrants to Europe, safe haven for terrorists and fundamentalist Islamists such as the Islamic State and no truly capable and legitimate national government has been constituted in the country to this date. On this background, this article tries to examine the extent of compatibility of the 2011 NATO-led military intervention viz-a-viz the doctrine of humanitarian intervention. Specifically, how the uprising in Libya facilitated external intervention and whether the military intervention was humanitarian were discussed. In nutshell, NATO’s intervention in Libya contradicts the basic tenets of the doctrine of humanitarian intervention and primarily represents the vested interests of the western countries.

Keywords: Humanitarian Intervention, NATO, Libya