The Demolition Exercise in the Cartesian Methodic Doubt and Husserlean Phenomenological Epoche: A Metaphysical Interpretation

George Uzoma Ukagba, Emmanuel Jerome Udokang


The search for knowledge that is true and certain has been fervent from time immemorial. Since it is the nature of man to know, to cogitate and to understand, it becomes imperative to set out the conditions under which one can properly say that this is the foundation of knowledge, this is the route to knowledge, this is knowledge per se, and this is how we `ought’ to benefit from knowledge. This paper therefore seeks to periscope knowledge in the light of Descartes methodic Doubt and Husserl`s phenomenological Epoche. It is important to point out that both Descartes and Husserl were involved in a demolition exercise of previously acquired knowledge in order to establish a firm foundation for certain true, indubitable knowledge. I shall expose their views and hermeneutically subject them to serious metaphysical lashing in the light of a better interpretation of human cognition comprehended within a metaphysical frame-work. It is pertinent to observe that the problem of skepticism arises from the method of science and not from the structure of reality. For knowledge to be knowledge in strictu sensu, it must be in line with the structure of reality and its ultimate support.

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