The Impact of the Secular Traditions on the Development of the Turkish Political System

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Abstract
We have tried to led some light on the remarkable extension of the Ottoman model, secularism in Turkey which separates religion and the state, as well as the political party (Republican regime) exercised firm control on the religious establishment and monopolizing Islamic activities and gathering its symbols within the institution of the bureaucratic state.
Hence then we have discussed the Ottomans empire and how it had developed through their roots in Central Asia, the idea that the state will continue to maintain the so-called "Toro" or "Yasa", which is a set of laws placed directly by the Governor. The Sultans implementation of that principle required political power through the power of legislation.
Mustafa Kamal, the founder of the independent turkey, was heavily influenced by the French Revolution and the French tradition of the religious institution (laisiti) is a specific type of active paid strongly secular state given the sweeping effect of the French Enlightenment philosophy and revolutionary ideals to the Kemalist "Turkey Fatta ", it is not surprising to note that one Turkish secularism have developed their own profiles are similar to the early stages of the French allisiti.
 We also gave some points of views towards the theoretical "strategic depth", which translated into a policy of zero problems, transferred from Turkey a country surrounded by enemies to the country surrounded by friends. The intermediary role highlighted the successes of Turkey. Turkey also known as soft power and its example simulations aim to resolve problems through dialogue, not force.
Keywords: Ottoman Empire, secularism, political system, Sheikh al-Islam.

1.1. Introduction

Turkish Republic inherited from the Ottoman Empire an established tradition that t in many cases require to dedicate the principle interest of the state to upholding the state control on religion. In the Ottoman context, the political Highness on the religious school was possible because of joining the Islamic religious institution within the body of the administrative system of empire.

As a remarkable extension of the Ottoman model, secularism in Turkey did not try to separates religion and the state, but the Republican regime exercised firm control on the religious establishment and monopolizing Islamic activities and gathering its symbols within the institution of the bureaucratic state. Therefore, the analysis of this historic Extension will greatly facilitate the task of understanding secularism in the Turkish political system. According to the prestigious historians of the Ottoman history, Khalil Aanalhik, consolidating this tradition by the Ottoman Empire was due to two factors: First. Central Asia. Second. Middle East.

To summarize this idea, it could be argued that the Ottomans have developed through their roots in Central Asia, the idea that the state will continue to maintain the so-called "Toro" or "Yasa", which is a set of laws placed directly by the Governor. The Sultans implementation of that principle required political power through the power of legislation. As well as predecessors inherited from the Ottomans and the Seljuk - from Minor Asia - for the Sasanian Empire in Persia political concept which equals between the state and the absolute power of the ruler in keeping justice, making the degree of justice judgment depends finally on his moral qualities

Religion was in this context of political and economic role in the service of a legitimate state authority; When most of the Turkish tribes in Central Asia followed Islam in the ninth century ,the new religion played an important role in the consolidation of central authority. It was Islam which is based on the holy Quran and the interpretation of the heavenly message appropriate to the process of transition from nomadic to sedentary political centers. The most important factor that Islam created was the means of controlling the political beliefs and the social system, which has demonstrated the feasibility of a lot better than magic factor "shamanic" which was built upon the hereditary kingdoms in Turkey.

1.2. Historical back ground.

For the historical back ground, the Turkic Calcjawqah states and later the Ottoman Empire, strongly encouraged

to engage in Islam and began defending the authentic values. And played the spiritual and legal framework of Islam in that time and played an important role in strengthening the pillars of the state apparatus based on highness dictations. In other words, the faithful sultans considered that the Ottoman estate exceeded the stage of the family to turn into an Islamic institution that had governed justly.

But the family, which established Empire, has been reluctant to allow the report to Islam political boundaries and legal authority of the state. Given the power of religion in moving the public, even the scientists who are the guards of Sharia were of suspicion under Ottoman rulers. In this mental reaction, Ottoman reacts on the potential threats by developing a religious institution under the control of the bureaucracy of the state. The Ottoman sultans consider the regulatory authority on religious guards originality is a natural extension of Highness of the state. Whereas the religious symbols are the liaison between the state and society; it was not surprising that they are under the subject of central control.

But more than that, the loyalty of scientists to the Sultan was highly important to pre-empt any opposition to Royal rule to avoid political confrontation. Behind this façade authoritarian religion was the ethical framework derived from Islam protects the Ottoman nationals it has defined its features and codified their religious commitments and obligations to the State. Sheriff Mardin commented on this religious concept which was tantamount to an implicit social contract that is based on the concept of Hisba in Islam, with careful goodness and justice. Accordingly, the principle of doing well, which it calls Islam a kind of social economic order against injustice and protects the lives and property of ordinary citizens. And the security authorities that proper application of religion creates a kind of social harmony and acceptance that they were trying to avoid confrontation with the scientists. And in that direction was the political status conscious of the fact that the legitimate political system stands the Ottoman city in the presence of Islam, religion in such circumstances becomes a way to maintain political dominance without disrupting social harmony. Characteristic of the relationship included mutual benefits between the scientists and the State racial integration and subsidiary;

The great and true Islam represented by Sheikh al-Islam at the head of the organization was incorporated into the State apparatus. Either the vitality of Sheikh al-Islam – just like the rest of the religious class, the grant of State Sultan was determined the life path of Sheikh al-Islam in different phases. And Sheikh al-Islam took the Chief official of the judicial system and was a member of the Imperial Council, and despite the high position on the ladder of State functions but can be easily isolated to the Sultan, like all agents of the State – in the case of any serious conflict with him. Sheikh al-Islam is an incident in 1702 who tried to get to the center of the Prime Minister which cost his life, clear evidence of this.

Besides the actual dependency, integration between the State and religion had been achieved at the judicial level, that was due to the extensive work of administrative and judicial posts filled local judges have been trained on the basis of Sharia law. From the standpoint of the religious establishment, the legitimacy of the State were the result of its ability to protect the Muslim community and that it was threatening the State means to publicize the movement astray, in that the political framework was very rare that opposes religious class secular laws concerning State administrative activity.

The final and supreme authority within the Ottoman Sultan Palace and Palace officials. As Mardin mentioned, the scientists that are marked in the religious school had to go hands-on experience to ease the trauma experienced when found that the ruling did not cover all the cases before them, and that there is a high interest in working independently from Islamic values. This was the Supreme interest of the Ottoman Empire as an extension to the above referenced from understanding of Central Asia and Turkey to "Alyssa", which dates back to pre-Genghis Khan and the Sultan to put rules and enact laws to rely entirely on his initiative and idea. These laws are independent of the Sharia and called the law, was based on rationality and not on religious principles and applied mainly in the areas of public and administrative law, criminal, as well as in the area of public finances. Some Muslim jurists consider such laws published only at the Royal Decree that , is not necessary since they stand to resolve all legal issues on the basis of Sharia law. However, the principle of law firm became a force in the territory of the Ottoman Empire, where the majority of Islamic jurists in the service of the State emphasize the need for the law and legitimacy. Sheikh al-Islam was creative in mental practice of harmonizing law within the Islamic framework. And these laws are called at a later stage "edicts or decrees of the sultan , it is surprising that these laws contained version provided they conform to the law and to the laws, and this integration of Islam and the State in a single provision were expressed in the official sign which describes the Ottoman Empire, religion and State. The message was carried by this term is the one not only the other; the State is the embodiment of religion and religion is the soul of the nation. Thus the Ottoman has achieved the Quranic ideal that the unity of the State and religion. Acquired this functional integration of religious authority and political legitimacy of the Sultan Salim (1512-1520) on the Caliphate and the Ottoman sultans were allowed to wear the mantle of the succession of the Prophet Muhammad. In this framework of the unity of the State religion was Islam into narrow fundamentalist to configure the type of opposition, with the result that-contrary to what was going on in Western Europe-there was no equivalent to Ottoman relations between religion and the Church

The Ottomans succeeded in creating a strong State in which power was concentrated in the hands of the Sultan

and a small loyal to him, in any case, stressing the value of stability and central control resulting in a political conservative base so that any change in the social or economic system, followed by negative consequences. The State had to take control of all sectors of society, and left no room for social or economic challenges may disturb its Governor. Social and economic structures have tended to stay in remission because it was not allowed for any sector in society, whether agricultural or commercial – that holds enough power to challenge the political system. In these circumstances only the external factors that pose a serious challenge to the stability of the Ottoman, and appeared in the 16th century when the price revolution occurred because of the flow of gold and silver from the new world to the Mediterranean basin. The economic situation grew worse when the Ottoman Empire proved unable to compete with new ways of trade and global economy is concentrated-increasingly-in Western Europe.

The Ottomans failed to create a stable currency of the Empire after the devaluation of the currency, also failed to maintain a tax system that guarantees them the largest share of surplus rural areas. Starting in the late 17th century, following a series of military defeats in Europe, the West's superiority in military tactics and organization it is undeniable

Ottoman and degradation effect of modernization efforts on contemporary Turkey European military superiority was a legitimate justification to launch attempts to emulate the achievements of the West, where the Ottoman Empire facing mounting internal and external challenges, leading to the adoption of the reform programs focused in particular on the military side. And did not make up these reforms only with weapons, but also to adopt European ways of teaching Sciences, opening the way for new ways of thinking is difficult to understand based. Since the Ottoman modernization efforts extended to administrative and cultural life of Western academies blazed her way to take its place alongside former military academies in existence. As a result, aggravate the gap between the political elites and religious elites, where each different vision of the world which irritated scholars where those developments paved the way for the concept of implied that Islam is from the forces of reaction .we Couldn't really understand the ease with legal reforms, education and management in the movements(Tanzimat)period (1839-1876) only through the ideological context of the higher interest of the State. These movements or organizations included the gradual shift to secularism in administration, justice and education institutions, which led to the weakening of social scientists and body position. And through this body dimensions in a sustained manner from the centers of decision-making there, by the second half of the 19th century, depriving them of the central role that they play in the areas of Justice and education. The primary purpose of the work of these organizations is to restore the authority of the Central Government, and the important objective of curbing the process of feudalism, which began in the seventeenth century, through the process of law enforcement organizations, State officials of central direction in modernization armed with authority to punish, they can get rid of extra strong central authority and developed during the previous centuries. These actions included mainly the following:

1. Restoration of the central tax collection system by limiting the authority of the elders, and they are rich of tax collectors, who had become dangerously feudal class in the Balkans and Anatolia.
2. Abolition of tax exemptions for scholars and returns their endowments.
3. Resolve the Janissaries because of the problems it made ., strengthen the central authority with a sophisticated control and subjugation and intellectual control of rooting, and suggests the timing of the issuance of official organizations of the importance of a European diplomatic pressure as a catalyst for the implementation of this administrative and legal reforms. The first sets of decrees were issued in 1838 after the military challenge of the Empire survived by Muhammad Ali, who would not have been possible only through external support. The reform decrees were issued in a second time at the outbreak of the Crimean War in 1856 in circumstances that seemed like a good opportunity for the Ottoman Empire to its acceptance as a European power. And on those occasions the Ottoman administration was concerned in particular with the Declaration on the equality of the Christian minorities of Muslims to the Ottoman law.

In this way such organizations could be considered reform is a further step towards secularism in relation to the treatment of non-Muslims, for example among numerous administrative and legal reforms, said Imperial Decree of 1839 on the equality of all citizens before the law and for the first time in Ottoman history. Then a new Penal Code was passed in 1840 and then Shahani Decree in 1856 stressed the same point, which means that basis of acceptance of Christians, Jews and Muslims all schools and administrative functions was one. At the same time, the special tax on non-Muslims-poll tax-was cancelled, leading to non-Muslims are subject to military service but had the option to pay a tax allowance to be exempted from them. The increased volume of regulations and rules of the secular in nature and occurred in the heart of this change is the shift in the nature of the work of the administrative work of the traditional judge to administrative staff. Gradually arose the system of secular courts competent for issues that arise from the application of the new regulations, the handful that have become part of religious law private law applied by courts and deals primarily with the personal status such as marriage and inheritance. The practicality of the Ottoman bureaucracy in 1870 to support this positive Outlook, however, the Islamic resistance was therefore continues as pay influential clergy that State authority to establish social

institutions based on denial of the leading role of Islam. And within similar but deeper thought there were a group of Ottoman intellectuals, a window to the culture and history of the West, is opposed to the reformist direction of the monarch of the statesmen of the authors and their point was adopted by Ottoman political youth movement is that each community culture that protects them from decay, the Ottomans abandoned the religious dimension is very important in the culture to emulate them West in a superficial way.

The Ottoman youth movement began to publish their ideas in the 1860s, and the ideological elites consisted mainly of young employees of the translation department at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of writers and journalists affected by the romantic nationalism, and other elites sympathetic repairs with spirit. Besides ideological differences were the Ottomans youth agree on constitutional principles include the need to modernize the State apparatus while preserving Islam as the central element of the social fabric. Thus it is not surprising that they were one of the most vocal supporters of the deployment of the first Constitution in Ottoman History issued under the new reign of Sultan Abdul Hamid II (1876-1908). On the other hand was Sultan Abdul Hamid of the young Ottomans, and sympathizer with the parliamentary system were they support him; but in essence on the contrary authority does not want to share power in a framework of a constitutional monarchy so that soon after the promulgation of the Constitution in a new war with Russia that found an excuse for suspending the Constitution. The Abdul Hamid II Ottoman Sultan is likely first to understand the exact nature of the threat to national cohesion of the Empire, it has been overshadowed by ethnic secessionist movements – like many of the young Ottomans, to see the future of the Empire lies in greater cohesion of Ottoman society. Abdel Hamid was strongly aware of emerging models in Turkish national spirit, but it was believed that the Imperial solidarity cannot rely on any ethnic group, but against Islam. In this he seems to have understood that the Western model of the nation State has gained strong impetus not only through its ethnic nationalism, but by mobilizing citizens on the basis of identified through institutions and values are supported by the State. Therefore, in order to put an end to regional and national fragmentation of the Ottoman Empire, he created the idea of Islamic unity and called, but when the Sultan adopted the idea of Muslim unity were the majority of the population in the land Christendom lost it and began a heavy influx of Muslim refugees to Istanbul and Anatolia. Not a message Abdul-Hamid Islamic unity bid unrealistic for the unification of all Muslims, as it was a genuine effort to unify the Division over symbols and institutions of the Empire as the Caliphate. Although Abdul Hamid's system, which shed almost forty years but did not stop the update process. Witnessed the rule of Abdul Hamid, in various ways, continuing what has been launched at the time of Governors regulations, public education was the largest of his conquests.

The French model ll grand Ecole (large school) is still affecting higher education system in the Ottoman reign, the military and technical schools-even during the rule of compulsory political system-important cultural centers to prepare the soil for future transactions with national background. Received invitation to Ottoman Islamic unity rust very limited among the growing number of better educated groups of State employees and military officers, which is not surprising in view of the foregoing, the positive education and professional skills and philosophy developed by the French education systems have made their political elite of the new line with the secular nationalism. The militants have begun to question the utility of maintaining the link between the State and Islam, although their love of Abdul Hamid's system, most of the officers and servants of secularists who believe in Islam means necessary to maintain the coherence of the various ethnic groups that make up the Ottoman Empire. Dive into this generation of learners nationalists in the 1890s known as "Turkey fattaa" in clandestine opposition movements and opposition newspapers to promote the principle of constitutional Government. The Committee of Union and progress ", founded by four medical students become rapidly more popular Turkish youth organizations, having acquired the force of weight and the accession of Turkish army officers. In those days, developed into an umbrella organization to represent different communities but unites them all to restore constitutional Government. In any case, that in the era of national disintegration was the fate of Abdel Hamid's dream on Islamic unity, the national project for "Turkey Fatta " in Ottoman solidarity is disappearing. Although military officers in the Union and progress "managed to overthrow Abdel Hamid and constitutional Government in 1908, but they soon realized that the ideals of patriotism and democracy did not stop the Albanian nationalist movements, Arabs and Armenians. In short, ethnic nationalism have proved more able to spread all the perceptions of the Ottoman bureaucracy, Abdelhamid himself and "Turkey fatta". In these circumstances the frustrated appeared last wave of nationalism in the Ottoman Empire in Turkish; in other words, the Albanian and nationalities showed Arabic Islamic Empire unity message limits and opened the way for unionists to engage in more secular ethnic nationalism with tendencies tend to Turkish unit. But more than that, in the wake of the Islamic revolution failed in 1909 became highly suspicious of federal action,

1.3. The Creation of new republic of Turkey 1921.

The most secular reforms in an era of "Union and progress" (1908-1918) are:

1. Isolation of Sheikh al-Islam from the Ministry.
2. Start putting secular courts under the control of the Ministry of Justice.
3. Combine the Foundation school to the jurisdiction of the Ministry of education.

4. Create a new Ministry for religious institutions.

Although the secular reforms undertaken by the Committee of Union and progress was well under way, such as those made by alkmalion after a decade, there is a remarkable degree of continuity among the young Turkish Republic era. Unlike blasted formal writing of the history of Kemalism, there were important factors of continuity between perfectionism and Ottoman traditions. This continuity was particularly evident during the single-party period from 1923-1946 when the Government took over the political tradition in luxury bureaucratic domination in the Republic. Part alkmalion of the founding fathers of the Republic of Turkey with reformers and the Committee of Union and progress "in the common understanding of the role of the State as the main factor in the updating process; it was central to the perception of progress, burdened by the bureaucratic tradition of the Ottoman Imperial tradition and modernization from the top and the engineering community was being followed by a kind of doctrinal enthusiasm to build a secular national State. It is not surprising therefore that the Kemalist were interested primarily in the establishment of a central authority and is not a democratic Government. The international climate in the 1920s was difficult to generate any liberal. However, the concept of the secular Kemalist reforms there are significant ideological continuity between the "Union and progress" (1908-1918) and the single-party period (1923-1946), secular reforms that Ataturk's Party's (Republic party) was certainly more inclusive federal policy, but in order to understand the Turkish secular better and must be stressed that the secular Kemalist was the culmination of a wave of Western culture began almost 100 years earlier reforms and continued with the young Ottomans and Turkey fatta

2.1. Impact of the French Jacobins on the secular Turkish

The political experience played and acquired by Mustafa Kemal as a military commander during the war of independence a crucial role in Formation of the social influence of religion in society, in order to establish a secular Republic on the Western theme was to abolish the Ottoman, and gets rid of the Caliphate and the Islamic education and Arabic characters and Sufi brotherhood. Kamal was heavily influenced by the French Revolution and the French tradition of the religious institution (laisiti) is a specific type of active paid strongly secular state given the sweeping effect of the French Enlightenment philosophy and revolutionary ideals to the Kemalist "Turkey Fatta ", it is not surprising to note that one Turkish secularism have developed their own profiles are similar to the early stages of the French allisiti. In the context of French revolutionary , Renee Raymond, gained great dimension (allaisiti) of the religious establishment. Raymond suggests that trend against the religious establishment was an important feature of the political traditions lliaakobh and properties (allaisiti), the radical party, which ruled France during the first three decades of the third Republic (1871-1940)

At the concept (allaisiti) of the religious establishment one can explore the similarities between Jacobi and perfectionism in their understanding of secularism, in both cases you selected centralized debt became for her a byword for counterrevolution in the community practice of allaisiti as a State policy is extreme in its commitment to guarding the revolutionary gains. The political positions of the Kemalist waliaakobh claim a progressive role against reactionary enemies, and as a result turned out (allaisiti). in the context of the polarization surrounding the Kemalist and aliaakobh alike-to the line between progressives and conservatives, between the traditional and the new, between the enlightened and dark, between revolutionaries and reactionaries and so on.

In that regard, the (allaisiti) Turkish and French acquired characteristics of the ideological concept of politically charged went away of secular Anglo-Saxon selectors. The French Jacobi roots represented the ancient philosophical and military confrontations of the 1789 revolution very tough Central model for social change, so it is not surprising that in the presence of the radical nature of the cultural revolution Kemalism aimed at catching up with Western civilization people update from Turks find their identity easily among the Jacobins and not among the Anglo-Saxon liberalism, those that believe in social change by evolution. In that sense, the term (allaiklik) in Turkish is derived from (alleik), French philosophical tendency reveals its roots deeper than mere linguistic derivation, that is Turkish terminology reflects a sense of message of civilization the alkmalion and Turkish youth French counterparts. (Allaisitih) became in the political lexicon ,Kamali auditioned for modernity, to be an enlightened Turkey citizen and nationally, Republican; that definition must be secular. Alkmalion engaged in the dominant secular politics where they believe in Islam as a way of life hinder positive transformation of the individual. This aspect of the so-called (allaiklik) Turkish is similar in many important qualities with evolution (allaisiti) as a political ideology in France after the revolution. The Jacobins, for example, believe firmly that the Catholic Church was exempt from laws of the French Revolution, so they adopted a radical and extreme (allaisizm) on the lines of political control and extensibility, it was one of the difficult tasks facing the elite of the French Republic is the ideological battle against the conservative direction of the Catholic Church. In the view of those in the Catholic institutional authority and reactionary force hinder the formation of a secular democratic society citizenship, in other words, the process of Catholic education and Catholic social networking for French people were viewed as incompatible with the ideals of rationality and democracy, citizenship and progress, and in these circumstances there was an alternative to war, political, economic, cultural

and spiritual status against Catholic in the Vatican. This phase of the secular French named Emil Polat (laisitih fight) that characterized the years between the revolution and the "alkonkorda agreement" signed by Napoleon with the Vatican in 1801.

During those years, the State policy of revolutionary offensive intended to control the Catholic Church, which cut ties with Rome, and the nationalization of their property, and the imposition of the Civil Constitution. According to the Civil Constitution of the French Church had become a democratic institution with members of the Church elected wire paid the Government, but that bid on the separation of Church and State was a Republican project in the years that followed the French Revolution meaningful to establish full rule against the tutelage of Rome, and that was (laisiti fight) necessarily interested in expansion and hegemony. A tension in the relationship between State and religion Church of standards of the Republic of the new system, for example, a Canon service must accept the supervision of political power that was involved in the nomination of bishops. On the other hand, however, it was recognized as a Catholic religion that condemns the majority of the French, and the Church was allowed to play a role in the area of public services, particularly in education. Continued recognition of the Catholic Church as a legitimate party in the social sphere, the triumph of the third Republic. The transition from (laisiti fight) (laistei live)-that took Bulat-terminology has become possible in the early twentieth century. The chapter has been selected between Church and State in 1905 by the new law declares that the French State does not recognize and does not favor and do not support any religion, in other words, a policy of separation and secular French State entirely abandoned religion and pledged not to exercise any pressure on religious education and religious institutions. This led to a new phase of what is known as (allaisiti), a kind of democratic tolerance between Church and State, and thus it can be said that the separation of Church and State has been facilitated by a parallel process of secularization of French society. It can analyze the transition from (laisiti fight) across the stage (laisiti live) down to the stage (laisiti tolerance) in the framework of the policy of conversion or secularization of political culture. However, it is important to note that (allaisiti) reflect the revolutionary confrontation in French history;

Therefore a small number of countries of the Western world has developed its concept of secularism through a constitutional principles requiring rigid separation between State and religion. For example, the Anglo-Saxon and Protestant concepts of secularism is very different from (allaisiti) because of the application of the second chapter rigid between State and Church. The Turkish understanding is similar to secular ideology with (allaisiti), which is not surprising in light of the spiritual Shepherd role France culturally and politically for the Turkish reformers since the beginning of the Tanzimat era. Despite the important differences between the two models of varying levels of political awareness and tolerance of Turkey and France share the Republican system in view of the (allaisiti) as the backbone of the revolutionary project. This (allaisiti) has become for these countries is an integral part of creating and maintaining the Republican ideology. In that context, the Kemalist ideology, both have adopted a waliaakobh forms of anti-Semitism, but the religious establishment (Turkish allaisiti) has turned into a kind of authoritarian engineering project or community. And lines similar to the secular left-wing in France see alkmalion of the founding fathers that religion should remain limited to personal conscience, while retaining his marginal role in public life. In order to apply that concept to follow both models (laisiti fight) which is a remnant of the French republics and parties of the third Republic of France,

The common denominator between these two models is (allaisiti) radical targeted both the social role of religion. For example, both keen (allaisiti) French and Turkish on the exclusion of religion and religious symbols on public service, and signed the transfer of debt to individual space. Despite this philosophical harmony, some important differences between (allaisiti) French and Turkish, evolution (French allaisiti) was coronation by complete separation between Church and State in 1905, while still worship in contemporary Turkey is governed by the State. Although most French citizens are Catholic, but that the French State had no organic connection or founders of a religious sect. In Turkey, the State is not neutral among religious groups, that Sunni Islam is a practical religion of the State, which is critical of top minority which constitutes between 15 and 20% of the total population. In the end the most important differences between (allaisiti) Turkish and French is an ideological difference. In Turkey is (allaisiti) a condition of the process towards the West, while in France stressed the secular shift toward democracy and this very important point, because there is an overall sense that the Turkish secular prevailed at the expense of the transition process towards democracy. Due to the (laisiti) Turkey is a liberal democracy with unchecked could lead to Islamist takeover. As a result, the (allaisiti) in the Turkish context become politically alert to principle around legitimize the State religious space in the name of modernization and progress. Not surprising that this concept (allaisiti) does not lead to the separation of State and religion, on the contrary, radical intervention ever by the State religious affairs produces political backlash on the basis of religion. As will be discussed in the framework of political Islam in Turkey, the unintended consequence of this understanding of secularism may be turning into a vicious cycle of polarization between political Islam and the Turkish version (laisiti live) and (laisiti tolerance).

2.2. Turkey and the justice and development party.
Justice and Development Party is a Turkish political party that described or classified itself as it follows a path,

moderate, non-hostile to the West, adopting market of capitalism, seeks Turkey's accession to the European Union, some say it is the roots of Islamic and secular Islamic orientation but denies that it is an "Islamic party" and doesn't use religious slogans in political speeches and it is the Governor now and classified by some as a "moderate Islam is the ruling party in the country, now headed by Recipe Tayyip Erdogan. The party came to power in Turkey in 2002, the party was formed by dissident deputies from the Islamic virtue party, which was led by Necmettin Erbakan and dissolved by a decision of the Turkish Constitutional Court on 22 June 2001, and were renewed in the virtue party suite.

Some have called on the party and its title is new Ottomans passed by the party through one of its leaders, Foreign Minister Ahmed Dawood Oglu said on 23 November 2009 at a meeting with deputies of the party: that we have the heritage of the Ottoman Empire. They say there are the new Ottomans. Yes we are Ottomans. And we find ourselves obliged to focus on the States in our region. We open ourselves up to the world, even in North Africa. And the great powers reconsider our party with amazement and exclamation. Especially France which searched behind us to learn why we want to open ourselves up to North Africa. I have been given my orders to the Turkish Foreign Ministry that Sarkozy finds more lifted his head in Turkish Embassy and the Turkish flag, and stressed that the embassies in the best locations within African States. Came under Customize oglu of France and Sarkozy, the French President has strongly rejected the accession of Turkey to the European Union.

The party accused secular Turkey by applying what they called: "a secret plan for Islamization of the country", and the appointment of senior officials in the State, "loyal to it and are generally graduates of schools for imams.

On 30 July 2008 the Constitutional Court in Turkey ruled by refusing a slim majority suit to close the justice and development party, for "leading the country away from its secular towards Islamization of society", the Court decision sent a warning to the party with a substantial financial penalties through deprivation of half of everything from funding from the Turkish Treasury, State Party Chairman and Prime Minister Recipe Aurdghan "that the ruling party would continue on the path of protecting the values of the Republic including secularism.

On 12 June 2011 the party won the legislative elections after winning 59.4 percent of the vote, ahead of the Republican people's Party and nationalist movement party, and the party won 327 seats in the 550-seat Parliament, however, was not empowered by the implementation made in amending the Constitution without opposition, which requires two-thirds of the seats in Parliament which 367 seats.

2.3. The main goals of the justice and development party.

• The justice and Development Party states that "Republican" is the most important asset of the Turkish nation, and that sovereignty is in the hands of people unconditionally, recognizes that national will become the decisive force and advocated the need for the institutions and the people who use the sovereign power on behalf of the nation for the principle of the rule of law. It accepts reason and science and experience as tour guides. Stresses that national will rule of law, reason and science experience, democracy, fundamental rights and freedoms of the individual and the moral are essential references for the concept of political management.

• The justice and development party defended the Turkish nation as a single indivisible unit with its homeland and nation. And accept appropriate activities and general assumptions outlined in article 2 in order to reach the level of contemporary civilization that guided by the Republic's founder Mustafa Kemal Ataturk and even upgrade them, while maintaining the Turkish values, culture as a platform for political life.

• The justice and development party is a political focus party. And believes that better service is the human service. Its efforts are aimed at happiness, safety and security, and human health. It emphasizes that all our people are great family fall under the name of "State of the Republic of Turkey" in the land of "Turkey", and that other States all in the families of his neighbor. And believes that through the value given to a human can live in lasting peace.

• The justice and development party is aware that the people enjoy rights such as: different doctrines, thought, and race, language, expression, organization, living since birth, respects and accepts that the difference is not due to the force task but is reinforcing our culture.

• The justice and development party rejects all forms of discrimination that are not compatible with the foundations of a democratic society in the relations of the individual State. View state service effective institution formed by individuals for individual servers.

• The justice and Development Party believes that the free use of all political national rights will to prevail, either use free of political rights can be restored under a free democratic system is characterized by pluralism and participation.

• The justice and development party affirms that all persons, institutions and bodies – which work with the public service within the structure of the State, through legislative, Executive and judicial authorities which use sovereignty as a nation bearing in their use of powers and the performance of tasks that match the criteria of the rule of law in the documents mentioned in article 2 and comply with these necessary basis for legitimacy.

• The justice and development party affirms the right of individuals to life as they think, and what they think is can accept, the right and the power of advertising on belief and thought the consent law, are the property of

individuals and civil society institutions, and that everyone has the same equal rights and shared in each and in all areas of life, and so that the State must not take a stand alongside or against any belief or ideology, and that the principles of equality before the law and secularism in the Constitution a guarantee For the concept and point of view. And recognizes the need for the task that can be borne by the State and the legal personality of the party are preparing a free environment and ensure that rights. And defend the fundamental rights and freedoms cannot be the subject of a vote.

• The justice and development party gives particular importance to the concept of the social State, which is an approach to restoring human life.

• The justice and development party ensures the main source and goal of economic development. It aims to establish a market of economy with all its institutions and rules. Defines the role of the State in the economy as a regulator and controller. The inequitable distribution of income and unemployment is the most important economic and social problem. And structural transformations complete defends needed to take advantage of the opportunities created by globalization, and the protection of the negatives that brought with it.

• The justice and Development Party believe that the family is the basis of Turkish society. And the family that the bridge between the past and the future are the basic social institution indispensable to transfer our values and our feelings and our thoughts and our customs and traditions to new generations

• The justice and development party is concerned that everyone especially young confident and advanced and sophisticated in the welfare, associated with their Turkey which enjoy security, peace, and with the values of high morale. For this reason the party tries to apply the concept of training, teaching and learning with modern scientific methods and data to create a free information society at all levels.

• The justice and development party is representative democracy based on pluralism, participation and competition. And believes in the importance of civil society institutions that are indispensable for the application of these characteristics

• the justice and development party Accepts referendum as an effective way in order to ensure the contribution of its people in the governance process.

• The justice and development party, believes that it can stand up to challenges at home and abroad with justice and the conviction that power derives from the law and not contrary to eliminate obstacles to the sovereignty of the people and achieving equitable and search to each image, and make the country fit for life for its people, protect the homeland and the independence of the State and its infrastructure in all areas.

3.1. Arab-Turkish relations between reality and aspiration:

The foreign policy of the justice and development party is one of the most contentious areas of pride and an indication of the success of the party in power. The "tale" developed the theoretical founder Ahmed Dawood Oglu "strategic depth", which translated into a policy of zero problems, transferred from Turkey a country surrounded by enemies to the country surrounded by friends. The intermediary role, highlighted the successes of Turkey. Turkey also known as soft power and its example simulations aim to resolve problems through dialogue, not force.

For nearly a century, Arabic-Turkish ties in Department history, the Turks since the abolition of the Caliphate and the construction of Ataturk's secular State national service rush imposed by the sword protected by the military, Arab in orbits of cultural colonialism after they concluded apparently from colonialism, and indulge in slogans for every individual Qatar failed attempts with Michel Aflaq and cries of Gamal Abdel Nasser, and make sure they have the option of national public option, but not It was a choice imposed authoritarian rule conditions and tendencies and gusts of some politicians and internationalist Islamic option still impose itself Despite all distortion and trivialization and warrior.

In the last decade, and in the last year particularly, the idea of reviving the Arabic, Turkish relations has excited some political and media circles and academic circle in its orbit, and held symposiums and TV episodes etc, personally invited to one of them in the Arab doctors Union and I was not being able to participate.

The fact that this issue or this orientation does not need to bother in the realization that it is intelligence game done by Americans and their followers in Europe, driven by the Zionists and even Turks themselves. While some Arab community are aware of this dimension, but others remain in effect as at many events. If some want to return to the idea of a conspiracy that dominate obsession on many Arab minds

The Turkish secular Islamic model appearance preferred by the Americans and Zionists in the Arab and Muslim world to help them escape from pivoting around the idea of Jihad against the West and Zionism by political Islam in the Arab world as it is when the Muslim Brotherhood and Hamas, Hezbollah and Islamic Jihad, the groups in Pakistan and Afghanistan Taliban and Al-Qaida, Iran and Sudan among others. This gave the intelligence event or scenario clash between Erdogan and Peres at Davos, then further inflamed the convoy freedom and the legacy of victims and martyrs for Palestine and the Gaza blockade and the sacrifice is not similar to the others.

The Turks if they were the first who sacrificed martyrs for Palestine and the Gaza blockade and not

Ahmadinejad and Hassan Nasrallah, Turkish Sunni form defending Palestinian Arabs and Muslims and the Shia who form not to monopolize the political arena in recent times brought sympathy with Iran which has become a symbol for the extorter, and shank to the sympathy of a huge sector of Arabic peoples with the legendary hero, Hassan Nasrallah, who overcame Israel's army and became hope any future whatever equation Religious origins. Turkish Sunni form refers to the possible introduction of secular West as Ataturk introduced secularism or imposed in a few years to scrap Islamic culture and reality has long historical roots. Model strengthens the advocates of liberal Arabs at the expense of those clinging to heritage and inspiring reasons progress of Islamic cultural paradigm that hard digestion on the US plan to dominate the world, and the task of the Zionist interests and Jewish world domination

Turkish model of an intelligence game to Turkish interests in increased economic exchanges with the Arab world and the support of the Americans and Israel in Europe, and maintains a strong Turkey in the South Russian and Iranian ambition or reckless attempts to converge European competitor.

It is not reasonable that turns suddenly to the Turks their back to Israel, upset American pursuit of victory in Gaza, Palestine, who open their bases to American planes to monitor Iraq and Syria and Iran. And let Israel in making the planes at airports in Erbil and Sulaymaniyah, and Iraq's Kurds support guarding oil pipelines going through Turkey to America and Europe

It is not reasonable that this shift occurs in the Turkish military alliance with Israel works on joint weapons development and exchange of military exercises and to allow dealers and Turkish companies to trade in arms. And thus did not meet an Israeli Minister with Turkish Minister finally only reflect the strength and depth of these relationships.

But the observer and analyst of the nature of the events that lead to this role is the role of the Americans and share them in a game of interest in the arrival of the Turkish justice and development party, to the political arena without provoking the military coup and as the altitude with Necmettin Erbakan, leader of welfare party before, it is true that popular will has brought them to power, but Americans know when to use the secular arm of the military dimensions of the opponents and when they benefit from the will and enhance their interests, not democracy as they claim but interest The democracy or dictatorship or the devil.

While acknowledging that many of the Arabic community is aware of the dimensions of this game but it is difficult to advertise or announce a deal with rejection of us and focus on trying to benefit from the positive side, the academics of Muslims and Arabs who see things objectively to identify people how the dimensions of this issue and only leave the field open to educators and advocates for equity Analytics albrob agenda who interact with the surface with visible things, or who are rushing to meet the trends of political systems in the American Zionist domination of astronomy And to seek to meet Arab intellectuals on payment of Arab systems to be more realistic.

Conclusion

Understanding the real Islam as a connecting factor, the common denominator between all the dangers of counter-revolution and threats against the Republic to make chapter between politics and religion is unreal, secularism is therefore understood as being unresolved result. Neither the State dominates religion nor will religious conservatives seize power. Either a secular chapter was naturally absent in conditions of polarization surrounding the Kemalist revolution. What distinguishes the secular Kemalist Ottoman roads, not enter the religious establishment to the State apparatus, it is a system design to establish the legitimacy of the Turkish secular nationalism. The Sultanate and succession were to repeal them for they were institutions of the Islamic Empire of the nationalist Turkish national identity development which was to be found. But more than that, in trying to find a collective sense of national identity in Turkey did not want the founding fathers depriving themselves of the potential role and that it is possible to do some kind of civilized Islam within the scope of the reform. Since the likely masses of Anatolia will stand in the face of the secular Kemalist reforms, alkmalion took a position on religion cited by Ottoman ways has attractive practical Kemalist. In practice this meant that civilized Islam within the reform of the citizenship building service, so it was not surprising that the plan made it realistic separation between State and religion are more difficult.

From here we can say we have departed from a neutral country, Turkey, which is at the same distance from everyone to stand in regional and international conflicts. And now stick to Turkey of all these pictures, as "sectarian policies and as part of a regional Sunni" axis contained literally days before a report of the Center for economic and political studies (TESEV), making some in the Arab world and the West, describing Turkish foreign policy in the region as "ottomanism" and seek to establish a Commonwealth, like the Ottoman-Commonwealth English, as reported in the Washington Post

This called a others to ask for the progress on European route since 2005 and the absence of the European Union, even only word, Erdogan's speech at the fourth Conference of the justice and Development Party on September 30, 2012 and invited a Minister to throw the recent European report on Turkey "in the trash" (literally so) and rate of popular support for joining the European Union to very low levels, and what all of the options of

Turkey in the direction of a leader of the Islamic world, with all its This ambitious risks to Turkey itself, to keep waiting forever at the door of the European Union.

Turkish policy, although some variation in the number of files, the full harmony with united states policy in the region, and automatically with the Atlantic. The policy of double standards also appeared in more than one case. Turkey has supported the Syrian opposition. Also refused to oust Muammar Gaddafi early for economic reasons, before participating in the invasion of the (NATO). The reaction to the situation in Syria, fully engaged in the conflict, as was the reaction of Turkey killing Israel Turks in Marmara incident "shy and disciplined". And did not leave the question on the minds of all reasons for Turkey to sacrifice their policies and previous earnings.

Foreign Minister Dawood Oglu, was frank in his speech, described by a prominent Turkish thinker and not far from the justice and development party "Ottoman", in front of Parliament in 2012, when he said that "a new Middle East, and Turkey would be its commander, which features", Perez aside all other regional components, Persian, Arabic, Kurdish.

Mavi Marmara ship incident has brought about a radical shift in the direction of giving Ankara ties with the West and the United States, the priority in its foreign relations, and this will be at the expense of relations with Iran and Russia among them. And while burst mode in Syria, seemed opportune for Ankara to break regional partnership with Iran's powerful, autocratic management to be the "leader" of the Middle East and the only player in it (apart from Israeli workers), charged with the arrival to power of political Islam in the Arab world .

Turkey lost its Gates of Arab Turkey, Syria, Iraq, Iran, Asian Portal and its relations with Russia and China. Lost all power to regional Western policies in the region-Atlantic, lost the confidence of key social component, the component is the Shiite sense of Turkish policy objectives. Turkey could not avoid the risk of such policies on national security over the wake of Wolf this time Kurdish at home and extend the Kurdish north of Iraq ring to northern Syria, as well as deepen sectarian tensions between Sunnis and Alevis.

The recent years of successes and failures to resolve confusion, unable to conceal what is fixed that Turkey continues to suffer from the fundamental question, it is a question of identity between, with secularists and Islamists, between past and present and between East and West and between close and stretching.

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