Patronage Culture in the Middle of Bureaucratic Reform Efforts in Indonesia

Rustan Amarullah and Lina Maulana

1. Researcher, Center of Research and Education and Training Apparatus III, National Institute of Public Administration, JL. H. M. Ardans (Ring Road III), Samarinda, 75124 East Kalimantan, Indonesia
2. Training and Development Administrator, Center of Research and Education and Training Apparatus III, National Institute of Public Administration, JL. H. M. Ardans (Ring Road III), Samarinda, 75124 East Kalimantan, Indonesia

Abstract
This study attempts to verify whether patronage culture and interrelated factors (including weak accountability, hegemonic political regime, high and legitimate power distance, low wages, and bureaucratic dysfunction) is still fairly entrenched in the midway of bureaucratic reform efforts launched by the Indonesian government. Through a desk research-qualitative method, the analysis demonstrates that Patronage culture is still present in the Indonesian bureaucracy though the decreases level, which indicates that it is relatively successful bureaucratic reform efforts. As for other factors that inhibit the bureaucratic reform includes weak accountability, hegemonic political regime, high and legitimate power distance, and bureaucratic dysfunction are still found in the current Indonesia bureaucratic reform. Nevertheless, the low wages factor that impede reform did not occur in the Indonesian bureaucracy because the civil servant income nowadays is relatively high. This study provides several policy recommendations that can be implemented to minimize the influence of patronage culture and other interrelated factors.

Keywords: Patronage culture, interrelated factors, Bureaucratic reform

1. Introduction
It is generally known that culture affects how people act and behave, and similar condition occurs in an organization or bureaucracy. Unfavorable organizational culture will result in inadequate elements. In connection with this, the government bureaucracy is now relatively still requires a serious move to reorganize the bureaucratic culture that is still often perceived as negative, too hierarchical, slow, unprofessional, and others. In general, experts agree that the pattern of relationships found in Indonesian society is patronage, which is strongly influenced by the pattern of the relationship between leaders and followers (especially developed in Javanese culture) (Mulyawan, 2015: 2-3), where the higher position 'nurturing' the lower, while lower-level officials provide services (Priyono, 2014). Strong patronage culture is the main cause of the difficulties and the failures of bureaucratic reform in the Asia countries (Turner, 2013: 276).

As the occurrence of patronage culture, society relatively will not trust government because patronage, (as mentioned David Rosenbloom (1990) also Roback and Vinzant (1994) cited by Bearfield, 2009), definitively will encourage the public to believe that the government is corrupt. Patronage was mainly associated with poor personnel policies that result in fewer qualified people, useless, and corrupt. Lastly, the bureaucrats see the service users are not the people they serve, but people who need their help. Thus, it allowing the emergence the crevices of transactional for the flourishing of corruption, collusion and nepotism; even lead to pathology of bureaucracy, namely paternalistic, swelling budgets, excessive procedures, swelling bureaucracy, and fragmented bureaucracy (Adnan, 2013: 198). Therefore, the historical legacy of Indonesia construct patterns of political culture that is created in the reform era (Winarni, 2014: 95-96).

The President Joko Widodo and the Vice President Jusuf Kalla administration (2015-2019) realized that the Indonesia bureaucratic reform was running very slow. Various bureaucratic pathologies, such as the poor quality of public services, the low capacity of public servants, and the lack of accountability and supervision, were the main problems faced by the bureaucracy (Strategic Planning Report Kemenpan RB, 2015). Therefore, the President Joko Widodo brought the spirit of change through “revolusi mental” (mental revolution). This revolution was performed to change the mind set and culture set of civil servants that had been set as behaving like a king (Saputra: 2016). Mental revolution become the foundation to strengthen the commitment on implementing bureaucratic reform policy both at national and regional levels.

The bureaucratic reform of the local government started to give a visible result, although not comprehensive, through the constant improvements. Many district heads emerge as their applicable innovative programs succeed. However, there are still numerous local governments that experienced a different result even though they have implemented the bureaucratic reform. Public services as the spearhead of the current reform could be considered as far from expectation. The phenomenon of a convoluted bureaucracy and corruption sill occurs in many public services. In 2014, the Ombudsman of Republic of Indonesia noted 6.150 hindrances on public services from all over region that has been reported, excluding the unreported incidents (Bengkulu
Local government services are regarded as the poorest in quality, followed by Police Department, the Judiciary, the National Land Agency, and State/District Owned Enterprise (Kemenpan and RB, 2013). This data represents the low performance of local government aside from the bureaucratic reform process. Regional autonomy also relatively has not been able to develop a high level of accountability and transparency, as well as effectiveness and efficiency (Kristiansen and Santos, 2006) which resulted in the unchanged situation of corruption in some regions. This is proven by the official data from the Corruption Eradication Corruption (KPK) indicating cases of corruption are still dominated by the involvement of regional heads, legislators, and private sectors. Moreover, the data in 2014 also showed an increase in the number of corruption cases at local government level compared to 2013. The findings of Indonesia Corruption Watch (ICW) stated that a number of corruption cases in districts were due to the high cost of the regional head elections. As a result, the elected regional heads organized corruption to cover expenses during the election campaign. Type of corruption completed by the head of the region is by selling the business license, embezzling local budgets, as well as providing goods and services.

Studies of bureaucratic reform in Asian countries conclude that the difficulties and failures or the slow progress of public administration reform as a result of a strong patronage culture, that is well-known in Asia (Scott, 1972; Blunt, Turner, and Lindroth, 2012), surrounded by interrelated factors including weak accountability, hegemonic political regime, high and legitimate power distance, low wages, and bureaucratic dysfunction (Turner, 2013:275). The chances of reform success increase with the removal or absence of these inhibiting factors. As well for Indonesia, this culture has been rooted for many years and has been an obstacle to overcome. At the time of change from the New Order Era under Soeharto that is laden with corruption, collusion, and nepotism (as part of patronage culture) to the current Reform Era, there is a big concern whether there has been a significant change in the Indonesia local government bureaucracy.

Departing from the research conducted by Turner (2013), this study tries to verify whether patronage culture and interrelated factors (including weak accountability, hegemonic political regime, high and legitimate power distance, low wages, and bureaucratic dysfunction) is still fairly entrenched in the midway of bureaucratic reform efforts launched by the Indonesian government? And how local governments manage the patronage culture and simultaneously attain better quality of public services?

2. Method
This paper will attempt to answer the research questions through desk research-qualitative method, which is a form of qualitative research that object of the study is the literature data. It contains ideas or thoughts that are supported by the literature data which the sources may include journals, thesis, dissertation, research reports, textbooks, papers, seminar reports, solutions of scientific discussions, official documents from the government and other institutions (STAIN, 2015 cited by Yahya, 2016: 2). Literature study is required as a preliminary study to have better understand a phenomenon that is growing in the field or in the community.

This study focus on local governments and data collected by reviewing sources such as, government statements and reports, previous researches, surveys, papers, and academic literatures in order to have a big picture of bureaucratic reform concept associated with Indonesia context. Furthermore, the local government strategic plans and performance reports, public interviews, public opinions, will be the next documents to look over with the purpose of discovering the local government policies and approaches to perform high quality governance that is vulnerable with the patronage issue.

3. Results and Discussion
3.1 Patronage Culture in The Bureaucratic Reform Era
Nugroho (2013: 55) on “Leaders and Bureaucratic Reform” book explained that a number of studies observing Indonesia’s bureaucratic reform performance during 1998-2012 fundamentally provide general direction with similar conclusion. These deducted that most of the bureaucratic reform process has not been successful, some small part success, and the rest did not work at all. Dwiyanto research in 2002 and 2010 also provide a clear basic understanding that paternalism culture is still interfere the public bureaucracy in Indonesia. The bureaucracy paternalistic behavior was developed because of the excessive implementation of hierarchy within public bureaucracy and compounded with the lack of political and public control capacity.

In Scientific Journal of KPPOD Brief edition January – March 2014, the Regional Autonomy Implementation Monitoring Community (KPPOD) wrote the key issues that have always become a challenge to do business in Indonesia is the inefficient of governance permits process and vulnerable to malpractice (corruption). In fact, as many as 85 percent of the investment licensing process are executed by local government (Media Praja, 2015). Values and cultural heritage of the old bureaucracy remain persistent and transformed in a new form even though the power has been shifted to reformation era. This gives a valuable experience of how the bureaucracy reform is not as easy as turning the palm of the hand (Kurniawan, 2013).

Patronage culture in the middle of bureaucratic reform is relatively still exist and entrench (although
the intensity decreases), particularly in public service sector. This is verified by the KPK Integrity Survey, where respondents admitted to giving additional charge to the public service officers (40.2%) and most of them are aimed to speed up the processing time (KPK, 2014). A survey conducted by the Research Division of Kompas (30 November 2015) on 716 respondents in 12 major cities in Indonesia suggests that the public as much as 29.7% are still incur additional costs to access the public service.

The Ombudsman RI research in 2015 also mentioned that at the provincial level by 56.59% of services in Public Service Unit from 33 provinces do not include information of costs/tariffs. As for sample of 114 districts/cities on their services in Public Service Unit, by 66.17% at district level and 57.47% at city level are also exclude this cost information. The least number of Public Service Unit that inform the service cost becomes an important concern. It is because the cost information enables service users to determine the tariffs to be incurred to complete the services. Therefore, the transparency of fees is expected to eliminate extortion (Ombudsman, 2015: 12-18).

In Indonesia, political interests are still very dominant and it is due to the patronage of democracy, the relationship between those who hold political position with those who have assets and business interests. Businesspersons provide funds to public officials in order to use their authorities and influences to benefit businesses. Political corruption is the basis of all corruption because it diffuses another corruption by civil servants and bureaucrats in the form of bribery (Tribunnews, 2014).

Harjanto in his research in Jakarta (2014: 86-101) found that in the midst of modernity, openness and rationality in electing, the phenomenon of patronage politics (the practice of giving away money, goods, service or economic opportunity) become unique in terms of electoral dynamics in Jakarta in 2014. Political recruitment system brings advanced effects for all positions in the bureaucracy. This happened because when the top positions obtained by transactional, then the lower position will have the same pattern. Therefore, bureaucracy tend to serve more the rulers rather than to the interest of the people/society. Indonesia’s paternalistic society strengthened the bureaucrats position upon people, people delightedly accept any treatment that is not supposed to be in bureaucracy (Widyastuti, 2012: 36-37).

Similar conclusion was discovered by Shin (2015) in his research that utilized data from over 550 participants in Jakarta, Indonesia. He found that when politician offer the voters for patronage and policy, the poor and less educated constituents will prefer to patronage, while for wealthy and better educated voters will favor policy. Hence, the socioeconomic of voters can be regarded as the basic rationalization for the continuation of patronage politics.

Based on various explanations before, it can be concluded that the patronage culture still pervades Indonesian bureaucracy, but with the level of a downward trend. Thus, bureaucratic reform efforts have been relatively successful to suppress the growth of patronage culture, although other influences such as the increase of public socioeconomic status also affect the reduction in patronage culture in Indonesia.

3.2 Weak Accountability and Corruption

The first of the inhibiting factors associated with patronage is weak accountability. Where this occurs, so does the corruption associated with patronage, which can thrive unchecked. The chances of detection and punishment are low, thus providing the ideal environment in which to make personal gain from state position and resources (Turner, 2013:278).

Concerning the accountability, Indonesia local governments in general relatively resulted in low level of accountability though gradually began to show a significant progress over the acceleration of the bureaucratic reform second phase since 2010. This can be proven by the improvement in the Government Agencies Performance Accountability (AKIP) assessment conducted by Kemenpan and RB, as well as the local government financial report assessed by the Audit Board (BPK).

The assessment of AKIP published by Kemenpan and RB within 34 provinces in 2015 has shown significant improvement. As the bureaucratic reform implemented, the provincial government AKIP were improved, and by 2015 approximately 88.24% of the total provincial governments have reached the category of CC (enough), B (good), BB (very good), and even A (satisfying). While the result of AKIP assessment within regencies/cities Year 2014 (Table 1) shows dominantly in category C or less (52.17%). This situation would indicate that at the level of regencies/cities, the accountability scores are still low and need more improvement in performance management structure.
In addition, the result of local government finance report assessment conducted by BPK (Table 2) still found an excess, inefficiency, and ineffectiveness in the utilization of local government’s budget, consequently affected the level of financial report accountability. Nevertheless, the tight internal and external monitoring has encouraged most of the local governments to manage their budget properly and transparently. The decreasing number of local governments that receive TMP opinion (Disclaimer Opinion) from BPK verifies this. The progress in opinion of 504 LKPD experienced a significant increase compared with the previous year (BP K, 2015: 69).

### Table 2. Opinion on Local Governments Finance Report 2010-2014 Based on Government Level

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>WTP</th>
<th>WDP</th>
<th>TW</th>
<th>TMP</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>WTP</th>
<th>WDP</th>
<th>TW</th>
<th>TMP</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>WTP</th>
<th>WDP</th>
<th>TW</th>
<th>TMP</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>254</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>396</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>93</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>268</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>399</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>92</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>256</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>401</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>90</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>241</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>398</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>93</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>188</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>379</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>91</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Audit Board of Republic of Indonesia (2015:69)

Kemenpan and RB in corporation with Indonesia Sigma Research in 2015 also conducted Public Perception Survey Toward Bureaucratic Reforms taken a sample of 12 cities. In this study, the parameter of “public perception” focused on the eight areas of change.
vulnerable to corruption in the form of bribery, extortion, graft or abuse of authority (KPK, 2014).

Another study is integrity survey managed by KPK (Figure 2) covered 60 regencies/cities with the range of score between 0-10. This value indicates that the approaching 10 means the service integrity is getting better and vice versa when it is close to 0 means the service integrity is getting worse. In the aggregate, the national integrity index shows a relatively progress which reflected that efforts to eradicate corruption in Indonesia has been quite successfully improved on all levels of government.

![Figure 2. Result of Integrity Survey Conducted by KPK (2014: 14)](image_url)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Integrity Index</th>
<th>National Integrity Index</th>
<th>Integrity Potency</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>5.34</td>
<td>5.23</td>
<td>6.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>7.21</td>
<td>6.84</td>
<td>5.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>6.71</td>
<td>6.00</td>
<td>5.87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>5.70</td>
<td>5.12</td>
<td>4.86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>6.48</td>
<td>6.31</td>
<td>5.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>6.89</td>
<td>6.37</td>
<td>5.34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>7.19</td>
<td>6.80</td>
<td>6.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 3.3 Hegemonic Political Regime
Labolo (2013: 163) explained that in the Indonesian context, bureaucratic reform need to mainly consider about the local culture after regional autonomy was promoted. This is because local culture has a strong influence to the bureaucratic organization characteristic. Commonly bureaucracy organization represented the family interest rather than as a government organization. These are reflected in the process of recruitment that susceptible to ethnic issue, thus, the bureaucracy will tend to be a small kingdom. Moreover, the upward service orientation is developed as a result of nepotism culture. This character continuously occur as the previous head area is produced with that tradition.

Another consideration is the extent of the autonomy managed by the local government to meet the society interests. When the fully decentralized autonomy is operated, then the bureaucracy design will follow to satisfy the regime interest that have won the elections. These will be dismissed the merit mechanism in promotion, demotion, and transfer. Moreover, the obesity of bureaucracy structure is likely to occur and make it more ineffective and inefficient (Labolo, 2013:169; Hermawan, 2013). Problem of political bureaucracy is also associated with the use of the assets and infrastructure of public bureaucracy to satisfy political interests of the group outside the bureaucracy or the interests of the bureaucracy itself (power-seeking politicians and rent-seeking bureaucrats). These created difficult circumstances for bureaucratic reform to maintain bureaucracy as a public service delivery and positioned citizens as consumers.

The number of civil servants that reached 4,458,280 in 2014, which approximately 79.63% of them were in local area (provincial and regency/city), are frequently become a political commodity to preserve the power of the head region. In many cases, the government officials often show a close relationship with the head of the region to gain a strategic position (Ida, 2014: 183). These happened because based on the regulation, regional head has the highest authority in human resource development and will strengthen the political transactions between the apparatus and thriving the patron-client culture in the middle of the current bureaucratic reform.

Political dynasty in Indonesia is also still occurring and affecting both public and bureaucracy. Political dynasty generally defined as an attempt to preserve the power over public office by put in family or relative within the ruling circle. Data from Internal Affairs Ministry (2013) revealed that the percentage of political dynasty previously only 3%, but in 2013 increased to 11% or 58 out of 524 district leaders and has a tendency to continue to rise. This dynasty spread evenly in almost all regions, such as Banten, West Java, East Java, Central Java, Sumatera, West Nusa Tenggara, Sulawesi, Lampung, Maluku, and Kalimantan. The kinship
between public offices will have an impact on the misuse of authority when it is not relying on the principles of ethics and professionalism (Kemenpan and RB, 2015).

3.4 Societal Conceptions of Power and Hierarchy

Public Perception Survey toward Bureaucratic Reform undertaken by Kemenpan and RB found that the level of society awareness on bureaucratic reform is still low. Only 32.1% of urban respondents (1,200 respondents) that have ever heard/knew about this reform. Moreover, people are still likely to be permissive by giving reward as long as the public services can be completed quicker. The development of bureaucracy paternalistic behavior is because of the excessive hierarchy within the bureaucracy and compounded by the lack of capacity from political control and society (Nugroho, 2015:55).

Corruption Perception Survey in 2015 by Transparency International Indonesia mentioned that among the 11 elements of competitiveness are assessed; there are three elements that have the highest percentage of respondents who answer bad-very bad. Those three elements are inflation, bureaucracy, and infrastructure. Poor control on these three elements could potentially become the reason on the declining of regional economic growth (TII, 2015: 14).

![Figure 3. Government Effectiveness in Indonesia Year 1996-2014 (World Bank, 2014:4)](image)

The development of government effectiveness demonstrated by Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) published by the World Bank as in Figure 3 above. Government effectiveness covered the quality of public services, the quality of civil servant and the scale of their neutrality upon political tensions, the quality of policy formulation and implementation, as well as the government’s integrity to such policies. These results reveal that the governance effectiveness is still considered as low with a slow rate of improvement. Bureaucracy viewed as constrains attributable to hierarchical, inefficient, inflexible, ineffective, and dependent system. Those constrains will eventually decrease the public trust concerning the bureaucracy performance when it is acceptable to continue by the society (Haniah, et al., 2015:41).

3.5 Low Wages for Public Officials

Turner’s study (2013:278) has proved that the widespread of corruption in Cambodia’s public service was consequently of the remuneration for public servants, which is not based on merit system. Thus, low wages for public officials become one of inhibiting factors in bureaucratic reform. This circumstance is quite different from Indonesia where the civil servant’s salaries currently is quite high and has increased relatively each year. In 2015, the policy will also be pursued to maintain the civil servant prosperity through increasing the basic salary by an average of 6.0% (Ministry of Finance, 2015). Minister of State Apparatus Empowerment and Bureaucratic Reforms, Chrisnandi (2016) even said that civil servants currently are fairly a lucrative career option because their earnings have increasing significantly compared to 10 years ago.

The conclusion related to the relatively high income of local government officials today can also be demonstrated by comparing the earnings of the lowest grade of civil servants (high school education background) with the regional minimum wage set at the private sector for general category, as well as to compare with decent living needs in these areas. Complete comparison can be seen in the following table:
Table 3. Comparison of Civil Service Income with UMR (Regional Minimum Wage) and KHL (Decent Living Needs) 2014 (in Rupiah)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Information</th>
<th>Samarinda City</th>
<th>West Kalimantan Province</th>
<th>Paser Regency</th>
<th>DKI Jakarta Province</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Additional Income (Lowest Grade of Civil Servants)</td>
<td>1.500.000-2.500.000</td>
<td>1.400.000–1.700.000</td>
<td>1.400.000</td>
<td>4,700,000 – 2,900,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Basic Salary of Civil Servants (Grade II)</td>
<td>1.816.900</td>
<td>1.816.900</td>
<td>1.816.900</td>
<td>1.816.900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Revenue of Civil Servants (Minimum)</td>
<td>3.316.900</td>
<td>3.216.900</td>
<td>3.216.900</td>
<td>6,516.900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UMR</td>
<td>1.999.000</td>
<td>1.380.000</td>
<td>2.011.000</td>
<td>2.441.301</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KHL</td>
<td>2.156.899</td>
<td>1.701.665</td>
<td>2.223.638</td>
<td>2.538.174</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Ministry of Labor (2015) and Regulations related to Regional Incentive (TPP) 2009-2014

Table 3 shows that when the standard is only based on basic salary of civil servants, the income of government officials is still below the UMR and the KHL. This condition is change as local governments are given the authority to provide additional income for their personnel corresponding the financial capabilities. As a result, the minimum wage obtained by civil servants working in local government is very high and even above the UMR and KHL. This striking difference makes profession as a civil servant can compete with occupations in the private sector, where previously, working as a civil servant was not the target for many job seekers because of the low income.

The high-income need to be combined with the better bureaucratic performance in serving the public. However, this relatively high income turns out not able to give a significant effect on the improvement of public service performance. Therefore, there is no guarantee that the high salaries of the public servants will be correlated to the success of bureaucratic reform (Haniah, et.al, 2015:44). Numerous cases show that most of the public servants understand the bureaucratic reform more about the additional income (remuneration), whereas bureaucratic reform contextually aimed at changing the character (attitudes and behaviors) of government officials to act as a real public servant and have the competencies needed in the era of globalization (Dwiyanto, 2015).

3.6 Bureaucratic Dysfunction

The Ombudsman of Republic of Indonesia’s (Ombudsman RI) assessment on the local government adherence upon the public service standards in accordance with Law No. 25 Year 2009 on Public Service shows that in provincial category, there are three provinces categorized as green zone (high levels of adherence), 17 provinces were in the yellow zone (mid-level of adherence), and 13 provinces classified in the red zone (low level of adherence). While at the level of regency/city, out of 50 cities and 64 regencies assessed, there are three cities and three regencies were in green zone, 20 cities and 13 regencies categorized as yellow zone, and 27 cities and 48 regencies labelled as red zone. This condition may cause as much as 42.4% of the public contend a bad image on bureaucracy, as mentioned on survey result from Research Division of Kompas (30 November 2015).

The low adherence to the public service standards have a direct impact on maladministration in the form of legal uncertainties, service inaccuracies, and practices of extortion in the public service from the center to the regions. Waiver of the standards resulting in poor quality of public services and will also encourage the potential of maladministration behavior and eventually lead to bureaucratic inefficiency and corrupt behavior (Ombudsman, 2015).

The weak of society bargaining positions as well as the strong culture of bureaucratic patrilineal and very procedural have been inhibit the public service process. Furthermore, the absence of legislation governing the working system between political officials, government officials, and the bureaucratic career officials in Indonesia is another constraint that influence the quality as well as the existence of bureaucracy in Indonesia.

3.7 Successful Reforms in Small Number of Regions

From various studies that have been analyzed, some local governments have successfully implementing bureaucratic reform. In the context of leadership on bureaucratic reform, that although the society paternalistic culture creates bureaucracy paternalistic culture as well, but it turned out that a successful reform is a reform that led by bureaucracy reformist leader (Dwiyanto, 2011). In paternalistic society, bureaucratic reform likely to succeed if the leaders are capable in leading the reform. Hence, the the role of the leader is not only important, but also decisive. The leader is the prime mover. From the various description above, it can be concluded that leader is a key success of bureaucratic reform (Nugroho, 2013: 57). Patronage culture effects (along with the other inhibiting factors) has been controlled and minimized due to the ability of local leaders to reform in some major dimensions, such as (Minister of State Apparatus Empowerment and Bureaucratic Reforms, 2015; Dwiyanto, 2015; PKP2A III LAN, 2014):
1. Work Culture
Some regional leaders create a breakthrough on the previous work culture along with new mindset that emphasizes discipline and excellent public service. They instill some insight to their personnel to work optimally and encourage the work unit head to perform “blusukan” or impromptu visit frequently to ensure public services run optimal.

2. Open Promotion
In order to eliminate the negative stigma on the political fringe or political transaction, which is one of the characteristic of patronage culture, several regional leaders perform changes to the placement mechanism of public servants through open-bidding or open recruitment. This mechanism allows competition to all employees in a fair and transparent manner. Moreover, this method could broaden the opportunities to acquire a competent employee for a certain position.

3. Regional Regulation
Associated with the improvement of employee discipline, where this discipline will affect the public service improvement, some regional leaders issued several rules related to employee discipline. Violation of this discipline rules will influence additional income cut even to dismissal. Thus, the employee will serve the public properly in accordance with the public service standards.

4. Tight control over bureaucracy through the digitalization of bureaucracy (E-government, smart city, direct complaint to the regional leader through social media or Short Message Service (SMS), complaint center).
Another major factor that triggers changes in bureaucracy work culture at local governments is transparency and monitoring through the utilization of Information Technology (IT) in public service process. In addition, the use of IT also helps to speed up the public servants work in serving the public. Moreover, local governments are trying to minimize the existed patronage culture and illegal fees that may arise in the public service sector where public can monitor the local government openly.

Improvements on the above dimensions then becomes the trigger to the success of bureaucratic reform in Indonesia. Based on the analysis of various studies regarding Indonesia bureaucratic reform, it is noticed that the main driving force of bureaucratic reform in local government level is a reformist leader (Dwiyanto, 2011; Chrisnandy, 2015). Some regional heads can actually take advantage of paternalistic culture in both society and bureaucracy and turn it into a better direction through bureaucratic reform because all the leaders are reformist leader (Syukur, 2015). Strong figure of leadership then encourages the changing of mindset and culture set of the bureaucracy to become more discipline, public service oriented, responsive to a better quality of public service. They also tend to use the persuasive approach and public dialogue to resolve the problems without the turmoil and “resistance” of society (Budi, 2013; PKP2A III LAN, 2014:203; Haniah, et al., 2015:41).

To perform public service innovation, budget capacity tends to be considered as the main determining factor, but through the budget constraints reformist leader are still able to produce high performance of bureaucracy. Of course, the critical factor for a successful bureaucratic reform is not only supported by the budget, political support from DPRD, number of civil servants, as well as the education level of its personnel, but more important is the ability and commitment of the regional leaders, as a policy maker, to expediting the implementation of bureaucratic reforms. The ability of local leaders in changing the work culture and mind set of public officials to be more innovative, responsible, and discipline are a trigger to the emergence of bureaucratic superior performance (Dwiyanto, 2015; Haryono and Khalil, 2011: 70). Even mental revolution proclaimed by the President Joko Widodo, also emphasized the need for an excellent and transparent service culture orientation, and have an impact on improving the efficiency and satisfaction of the people (Kemenpan RB, 2015).

4. Conclusion
Number of recent studies have confirmed that although bureaucratic reform was launched, there are still patronage culture that attached on the local government bureaucratic reform though the intensity is as not many as the era of President Suharto. Some regional leaders who are innovative and highly committed to the public service improvement have proven success in managing the patronage culture. These efforts resulting in an excellent public service for the society in particular and significant performance improvements for local government bureaucracy in general.

As for the inhibiting factors of bureaucratic reform that associated with patronage including weak accountability, hegemonic political regime, high and legitimate power distance, and bureaucratic dysfunction are still found in the current Indonesia bureaucratic reform. Nevertheless, the low wages factor that impede reform did not occur in the Indonesian bureaucracy because the civil servant income nowadays is relatively high. Therefore, either low income or high income earned by civil servants does not guarantee that bureaucratic reform can take place smoothly.

4.1 Recommendation
Conventional explanation about the failure of the reforms are likely due to lack of capacity or inadequate
development capacity. So, that the relative solution offered is to train more people, provide special education, introduced a new system, providing more equipment, and building more infrastructure. Nevertheless, the center of the constellation is the institution of patronage (Turner, 2013: 276-277). Consequently, the efforts to suppress the culture of patronage and interrelated other factors need to be done with specific approaches including:

1. The local government that has successful in organized the bureaucratic reform can be encouraged to become coach for other local governments that are in the process of reforming the bureaucracy or improving the public service quality. Thus, the success of this bureaucratic reform can also be transmitted to other region in a sustainable manner.

2. On the internal aspect of bureaucracy, it should be encouraged to replicate the model of “leadership in the middle” or “blusukan” (impromptu visit), not only to all regional heads, but also to the leaders of the working unit (SKPD) as the technical operator and policy executors. Blusukan relatively is the best method for assessing the quality of public services, as well as absorb the public aspiration toward bureaucratic service.

3. To control and eliminate the existing patronage culture, it is necessary to apply:
   a. Open promotion system/ open-recruitment in an occupation characterized with transparent and competitive, so that there will be competition among employees which eventually obtained competent personnel. In year 2013-2014, there are still only 15 local governments that implement this open promotion system (Kemenpan and RB, 2015). Open recruitment will prevent the transactional politics that are characteristic of patronage cultural.
   b. Maximizing the use of technology and information (Electronic Government) in order to build a working system that is effective, efficient, including in controlling the public officials discipline (“going digital policy”). Application of E-Government in every process of bureaucratic works will make it easier to portray the bureaucratic performance in serving the public in a fair and excellent ways.

4. On the external aspects, the effects of socioeconomic status also affect the growth of the patronage culture. Therefore, efforts to improve socio-economic conditions of society need to be considerate of local government. Increasing the socio-economic, public would be more intelligent to oversee and participate in improving the performance of local governments.

Acknowledgement
The earlier article was a paper of Policy Report topic at Public Policy Studies, National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies, Japan. I would like to express my gratitude to Prof. Hirofumi Takada for his comments to the earlier paper

References


Kebijakan Publik, 1 (2), 81-102.


