

Electoral Corruption: The Case of the 2005 Election in Liberia

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Abstract

There is a widespread public perception of corruption in Liberia's election process, yet little documentation exists on the characteristics of voters and their perceptions of electoral corruption. The purpose of this correlational study was to explore the relationship between gender, ethnicity, physical location, and perceptions about political activity during the 2005 national election. This is essential because election is the method citizens' use for removing incompetent leaders or retaining qualified leaders. Stated differently, democratic accountability is the only leverage citizens have to minimize leaders' corrupt behaviors, foster effective provision of public services, and ensure that leaders perform their responsibilities. These factors make it necessary for Liberia's electoral process to be free of patronage, corruption, and conflict of interest. Roderick Chisolm's conceptualization of the internalist view of justification served as the theoretical construct. Data were acquired from the Afrobarometer survey ($n = 1,200$), which used a representative cross-sectional sample design, and were subjected to cross-tabulation analysis, a chi-square test, and a correlation analysis. The results of the analysis indicated that elections were perceived as unfair and that gender was an important predictor of perception. The analysis revealed that 26.8% of women perceived the National Election Commission as untrustworthy and 79.0% reported that they did not feel completely free to choose their preferred candidate. A chi-square test of association confirmed that among males, the belief that elections are free and fair was statistically significant ($p = .002$), though not for females ($p = .151$). Gender was moderately correlated ($r = .088$) with corruption of government officials. The analysis also found that the theoretical construct may explain the behavior of elected officials, but was not predictive of voter engagement. Recommendations to remedy this problem include widespread election reform that focuses on combating negative perceptions of voters, particularly among women, and correcting technical irregularities in Liberia's electoral processes.

Keywords: Liberia's 2005 election, Government, Corruption, Election commission, democracy

1. Introduction

The corrupt behavior of Liberia's public officials has led to political disenfranchisement, social injustice, and economic distress for a majority of citizens, a problem existing since the inception of the nation (Boas, 2009; Pham, 2004; Sawyer, 1992). Corruption persists in the Liberian government today because Americo-Liberians, the nation's founders, proposed to establish a democratic nation but instead implemented nepotism, patriarchy, and indirect rule to maintain political supremacy (Clower et al., 1966; Liebenow, 1987). This deviation from the stated constitutional principles undermined basic and critical functions of governmental institutions in protecting self-determination, providing due process, and ensuring checks and balances among the branches of government (Crocker, 2003; Rotberg, 2002). This system of public governance has allowed Liberian presidents to misuse resources, abuse power, and reward supporters with government jobs. Specifically, the use of presidential power to appoint partisans as election commissioners has had an adverse impact on the conduct of elections. This systemic and institutional failure is the underpinning to respondents' (voters) disenchantment and perception of corruption. An initial review of the literature reveals that this dichotomy has resulted in widespread distrust, especially in the electoral process, which is the pillar of a democracy. This factor has transformed Liberia into a near-failed state (Hope, 2010; Pham, 2010).

The Liberian president is required by law to appoint nonpartisan members of society to serve as commissioners to supervise elections (The Liberian Constitution, Chapter X, Article 99, Section A, 1983). In practice, past and current administrations have usually circumvented this rule and ensured that their partisan candidate is named chairman of the Election Commission (Liebenow, 1969; Pham, 2004, Sawyer, 1992). This action compromises the commission because of the inherent conflict of interest, undermines its legitimacy, and weakens the government's ability to foster democratic qualities in Liberia's electoral process (Elklit, 1999). Such biased commissioners are prone to institute complex registration standards, enact extreme financial requirements for voting, and permit fraudulent ballot counting in favor of the president (incumbent) in recognition of their appointments. This was the situation in 1985 when President Samuel Doe rigged the election, only one of many such instances (Berkeley, 2001; Pham, 2004). Furthermore, the reelection of the appointing president gave commission members an opportunity to acquire positions in the new government at all levels, irrespective of qualifications or civil service merit criteria. These practices and an unfair campaign standard have made voters, independent candidates, and opposition parties lack confidence in the equity of the electoral process (Sawyer, 1992). For example, President Samuel K. Doe hand-picked the Special Election Commission's chairman, Emmett Harmon, who stopped the vote-counting process in the 1985 Presidential Election when it appeared that Jackson

F. Doe (the Liberian Action Party candidate) was ahead in 13 counties and winning there with about 60% (Harris, 2012). Mr. Harmon later appointed a committee with 50 members that pronounced President Samuel Doe elected by 50.9 % of the vote (Berkeley, 2001; Harris, 2012).

The Liberia Media Center conducted a study about election issues in 2011, which revealed that Liberia lacks “participatory democracy” because of state-controlled political elites. In addition, 53% of the study’s participants indicated that it was difficult to access election information (LMC Summary Report—2011 Election Issues Mapping, 2011). This problem was due to media format, production language, and program presentation. Furthermore, the 2011 elections media monitoring report, “Because Accountability Matters,” found that Liberia’s ruling Unity Party received favorable media coverage about its activities, programs, and progress while its competitors (28 other parties) received negative or no coverage. For example, the Unity Party accounted for 88% of all political parties’ advertising in newspapers during the campaign season (Because Accountability Matters, 2011). This gave the Unity Party leverage and other advantages over its opponents, thereby making the election uncompetitive.

This article explores the level of corruption in Liberia’s 2005 Presidential election based on demographics and locations of voters. Furthermore, an examination of opposition parties’ complaints about technical irregularities in the process (voter registration, vote count, precinct establishment, availability of election information, etc.) and nongovernmental organizations’ documented evidence of the ruling party’s corrupt practices (mismanagement of public resources, control of the media, and misuse of power) during the election was used to validate the perceptions of corruption expressed by respondents to the Afrobarometer Round 4 Survey. A correlation between respondents’ (voters’) perception of corruption and physical evidence about existing corruption gave authenticity to actual corruption in Liberia’s electoral process. This information is critical because voters’ perception of corruption in an election commission can have real consequences for the conduct of an election. Pastor (1999) stated that “Mexico’s EMB was traditionally viewed as an instrument of the PRI/government, and whether true or not, the perception was widespread and contributed to popular distrust with the process” (p. 13).

The level of corruption in Liberia’s 2005 election provides a baseline in the gap between Liberia’s stated goal of democracy and the autocracy that the majority of its citizens characterize as the aim of its government. This was revealed by measuring the relationship between Afrobarometer survey respondents’ (voters’) perceptions of corruption as it changed with their gender, ethnicity, and residential location during the 2005 presidential election. In other words, the hypothesis was that voters’ (Afrobarometer survey respondents’) perception of corruption varies according to their demographics and ethnicity.

A quantitative finding to test this hypothesis resulted from analyzing the Afrobarometer Round 4 survey that was conducted in 2008. This population-based survey involved interviews of voting-age Liberians to assess corruption in Liberia’s National Election Commission, to rate the administration’s performance in the electoral process, and to establish national priorities in administering future elections (Tokpa et al., 2008). The analysis of these data along with the electoral institution responsibilities (inadequate opposition media coverage [biased media]), incumbents’ abused of public resources (vehicles, facilities, deployment of civil servants, etc.), harassment of opposition candidates and their supporters, manipulation of election results, fraudulent voting processes, and inaccessibility of precincts provided additional insights on the inequality of voters’ participation and parties’ competition in Liberia’s 2005 election. The Afrobarometer Round 4 survey offered the best data to analyze because its questionnaire focused on voters’ participation in the 2005 election process. This information was critical to identify the existence of corruption in the electoral bureaucracy. In addition, the data gathered were analyzed to determine factors that influence the persistence of corruption in presidential elections. That influence appears to include the method of appointing election commissioners and dispensing positions and patronage in each new government.

2. Literature Review

This section draws upon an in-depth review of existing scholarly knowledge about corruption in the Liberian government, exploring how Liberia’s corrupt origin has led to its institutional failure, fostered dysfunctional electoral processes, and ensured uncompetitive national elections. A lack of a competitive election process risks accelerating Liberia’s transition into autocracy.

Public corruption in Liberia (and corrupt nations around the globe) is perpetrated by individuals at all hierarchies of government, including elected and appointed officials and civil servants. Therefore, corruption is a way of life for public servants and tolerated by government, making most Liberians (and Africans) believe that it is acceptable social behavior (Berkeley, 2001; Moyo, 2009; Reno, 2008). These public servants use their office or power to commit specific kinds of crimes, or corruption. For example, police and military officers will commit street-level corruption, such as setting up road blocks to demand bribes from motorists (Harford, 2006). A survey conducted in rural Liberia (Lofa, Nimba, and Grand Gedeh Counties) by Innovation for Poverty Action found that 43% of respondents believe the Liberia National Police is corrupt (Innovation for Poverty Action, 2010). This

finding is supported by the Berkeley Human Rights Center's survey of the entire adult Liberian population, which revealed that 63% of respondents believe that corruption was the primary reason for Liberia's civil war (Human Rights Center, 2011).

In addition, executive and legislative officials usually commit more serious corruption. For example, the Dunn Commission validated that senior government officials were abusing their authority to promote private interests and recommended them for disciplinary action to the Liberian Anticorruption Commission, but no action was taken. Justice is constantly denied in all aspects (political, personal, and business) of ordinary Liberians' lives, because the judicial system lacks adequate public defenders and investigation resources, and is plagued with corrupt judges or public officials (Freedom House, 2010). This situation has led to cases being backlogged, prolonged pretrial detention, and prisons' being overcrowded (Berkeley, 2001; Clower et al., 1966; Freedom House, 2010; Innovation for Poverty Action, 2010). Moreover, the publisher of the *Plain Truth* newspaper was charged and imprisoned for a story about the National Security Agency, which is headed by President Johnson-Sirleaf's son, supplying ammunition to Guinean dissenters (Freedom House, 2010). Elite citizens receive efficient adjudication for their cases, while ordinary citizens cannot get judicial hearings (Freedom House, 2010).

These situations make corruption in the Liberian government both a management and a political issue; both need to be addressed simultaneously. The past anticorruption initiatives (GEMAP, etc.) focused on revenue and expenditure in specific agencies but did not address patronage and clan relationships among government officials (Boas, 2009; Reno, 2008). Therefore, the culture of corruption remains in the Liberian government. A governance survey conducted by Liberia Democracy Watch in 2010 revealed that 64% of respondents trust the Liberia Anticorruption Commission's effort in fighting resource mismanagement and abuses. However, the survey also uncovered that respondents "bear a high distrust" for the executive, the legislative, and the judiciary branches' commitment to fight corruption by 75%, 81%, and 81% respectively. In addition, the survey revealed that respondents believed Liberia's judiciary belongs to the "highest bidder," which means that ordinary citizens do not have access to a fair judicial process (Governance Monitoring Report II, 2010). This study is corroborated by international watchdog organizations on public governance that listed Liberia as either a corrupted or a failed state. For example, Transparency International's Corruption Perceptions Index for 2011 gave Liberia a score of 3.2 on a scale of zero (highly corrupt) to 10 (very clean) among 183 countries and territories (Transparency International, 2011). This rating ranked Liberia as a highly corrupt nation, a dilemma that makes corruption in the Liberian government a primary challenge that requires resolution.

2.1 Electoral Corruption in General

A study of electoral processes suggests that assessing elections can be made comprehensive by factoring in relationships between citizens (political elites and regular citizens) and not judging elections based on polling day activity (Elklit & Reynolds, 2005). This method of assessment can provide insight about the disenfranchisement citizens experience due to political inequities that, in turn, influence their perception of election process quality. Such a method also allows researchers to operationalize "political illegitimacy" and measure it to provide empirical evidence of electoral manipulation or fraud (Elklit & Reynolds, 2005). In assessing Liberia's electoral process quality, this approach is valuable in determining the effects of Americo-Liberians' (political elites) domination of the indigenous population (the majority of the citizen) for the past 133 years. In other words, a comprehensive assessment will identify previous or existing biases in "the playing field of electoral competition" in favor of the political elites or the ruling parties (Elklit & Reynolds, 2005), a goal consistent with this study's objective.

The elections conducted in Africa between 1989 and 1999 totaled 109, of which 45 were classified as flawed, 15 were boycotted, and eight were protested (Pastor, 1999). In all, 62% of Africa's elections in that decade were seriously compromised, undermining citizens' choices and threatening democratic processes across the continent (Pastor, 1999). To resolve such problems, effective administration including voter registration, elimination of multiple voting, and efficient counting of votes, along with assessment of elections, is critical. These processes underlie the success or failure of democracy. There is a higher probability of achieving full democracy when a nation has an election commission that its citizens perceive as independent, impartial, and competent (Pastor, 1999). In addition, these factors increase the likelihood of avoiding flawed elections in fragile democracies in Africa (Pastor, 1999). On the other hand, an election commission is insignificant if it lacks the ability to provide crucial administrative functions. This was the situation in Nigeria's December 1998 to February 1999 elections that brought Olusegun Obasanjo into power, re-establishing patronage rule, and re-instituting widespread corruption in government (Lewis, 2003).

2.2 Electoral Corruption in Liberia

For much of Liberia's history, the electoral process was a key strategy that Americo-Liberians used to maintain their supremacy in Liberia. They accomplished this goal by establishing a one-party state, disenfranchising indigenous citizens, appointing partisan election commissioners, banning opposition parties, and amending election laws (Clower et al., 2001; Harris, 2012; Liebenow, 1987; Sawyer, 1992). These kinds of authoritarian

practices allowed Americo-Liberians to monopolize presidential and legislative elections for 133 years, between 1884 and 1980, a faux democracy with effects that persist to this day (Berkeley, 2001). The single party system contradicts the selection of leaders through multi-party contests in which candidates freely compete for citizens' votes, thereby recognizing voters as the source of authority for the Liberian government (Huntington, 1991). In other words, even though regular elections have been held in Liberia since 1847, between 1884 and 1980 the True Whig Party (TWP) had no effective opponent (Harris, 2012). The TWP was the Americo-Liberians' political organization, which control power and govern the nation for ninety six years. However, this history of constitutional misrepresentation and disenfranchisement of the indigenous population has made Liberian citizens less confident and less interested in the electoral system (Harris, 2006; Sawyer, 1992).

Most egregiously, the three hinterland provinces with predominately indigenous people continued to have disparities in political representation after they were transformed into four interior counties in 1964. The provinces were later transformed into counties; four of those counties (54% of the population) were given 8 senators while the coastal counties (Americo-Liberians residents) were given 10 senators (Liebenow, 1987). In addition, the Tubman administration, during the 20th century, repealed the law imposing one term on Presidential incumbents, banned opposition parties, and instituted a police state to maintain single party rule (Liebenow, 1987; Pham, 2004). This strategy of doctoring election rules to disqualify principal rivals is still implemented by most African regimes (Bratton, 1998). The TWP (the state's single party) also used a patronage system to select faithful members, nominate them at a convention, and elect them into office. In other words, the TWP candidates automatically won the election (Liebenow, 1969). Kieh (2011) stated that "Even if free and fair elections are held within an authoritarian state construct, they cannot have the desired effect of promoting democratization" (Kieh, as cited in Saine et al., 2011).

The TWP used various tactics for eliminating opposition parties that were determined to get their candidates on the ballot. Most opposition parties (disenchanted TWP members in the beginning) were confronted with multiple litigations for insignificant violations, subjected to unfair standards, and banned for false allegations, which exhausted their minimal resources (Harris, 2011). Any opposition party that persevered until Election Day would experience fraudulent acts like ballots not being counted or victories not being recognized (Liebenow, 1969; Pham, 2004). These corrupt practices were adapted by the Doe, Taylor, and Johnson-Sirleaf administrations in the 1985, 1997, and 2005 elections (Berkeley, 2001; Kieh, as cited in Saine et al., 2011; Pham, 2004).

As just one example, the Liberian President is required by law to appoint nonpartisan members of society to serve as commissioners to supervise elections (The Liberian Constitution, Chapter X, Article 99, 1983). But past and current administrations usually circumvented this rule and ensured that their partisan was named as chairman of the Election Commission (Liebenow, 1969; Pham, 2004, Sawyer, 1992). In addition, the National Election Commission's failure to penalize the ruling Unity Party for using state resources to run its 2011 election campaign reinforced opposition parties' and voters' belief that the commissioners and the electoral process were biased (Bratton, 1998; International Crisis Group, 2012). The institution's inability to adhere to its constitutional mandate can be attributed to its commissioners' loyalty to the incumbent party, a conflict of interest that compromises the commission, undermine its legitimacy, and weaken its ability to foster democratic qualities in Liberia's electoral process (Elklit, 1999). This was the situation, for instance, in 1985 when President Samuel Doe rigged the election (Berkeley, 2001; Pham, 2004).

This practice and an unfair campaign standard have made voters, independent candidates, and opposition parties lack confidence in the equity of the electoral process (Sawyer, 1992). As indicated earlier, the Liberia Media Center conducted a study about election issues in 2011, which revealed that Liberia lacks "participatory democracy" because of state controlled political elites. In addition, 53% of the study's participants indicated that it was difficult to access election information (LMC Summary Report—2011 Election Issues Mapping, 2011) due to Liberia's underdeveloped media infrastructure which fails to publicize political activities and voting processes that are critical to making decision about candidates (Mvukiyehe & Samii, 2013). This situation gives the political elites an opportunity to manipulate uninformed citizens to acquire their votes. Since elites benefit, they have little incentive to improve the situation (Mvukiyehe & Samii, 2013). The 2011 election media monitoring report "Because Accountability Matters" found that Liberia's ruling Unity Party received favorable media coverage about its activities, programs, and progress while its competitors (28 other parties) received negative or no coverage. For example, the Unity Party had 88% of all political parties' advertising in newspapers during the campaign season (Liberia Media Center, 2011), giving it leverage over its opponents, rendering the election uncompetitive.

Even though the Americo-Liberian government was an oligarchy during the 20th century, it wanted the international community to accept Liberia as a democratic state where citizens exercise self-determination in competitive elections. So the government hosted political activities like party conventions, nomination of candidates, and elections, using deceptive political tactics (Clower et al., 1966; Sawyer, 1992). In some cases, the TWP, specifically Tubman's administration, used token opposition candidates in the campaigns and elections of 1955, 1959, and 1963 (Liebenow, 1969). This strategy not only presented Liberia as a democratic state, it also helped Americo-Liberians and modern governments to legitimize their rule in Liberia. The International Crisis

Group recommends that Liberia's election laws be revised to give the National Election Commission authority to effectively regulate campaign financing, party incorporation, party advertisement, and party use of government resources (International Crisis Group, 2012). This transformation will give the commission a responsibility for teaching election rules to competing parties, conducting voters' education, and administering disciplinary action to noncompliant political parties. In addition, the autonomy will make the National Election Commission independent of government manipulation and establish the institution's authenticity. This kind of accountability and transparency will enhance the commission's democratization.

There have been four competitive Presidential elections in Liberia since 1985. These elections resulted in an increasing number of political parties, accompanied by allegations of corruption by opposition candidates. The number of parties and coalitions participating in these elections was as follows: (1) 1985--four parties; (2) 1997--13 parties; (3) 2005--22 parties; and (4) 2011--26 parties (Africa Election Database, 2012; Liberia National Election Commission, 2012). This pattern reflects a surge in citizens exercising their franchise and participating in selecting national leaders, as well as competition among parties indicative of improved democratization (Soderstrom, 2012). However, holding multiparty elections within an authoritarian state structure does not guarantee a fair and equitable electoral process (Kieh, as cited in Saine et al., 2011). Despite multiple party elections, the president's authority to appoint election commissioners and the National Election Commission's dependence on the ruling regime for authenticity makes Liberia effectively an authoritarian state.

Any advancement towards democracy was also been jeopardized throughout Liberia's history by incumbents including Samuel K. Doe (a dictator), Charles Taylor (a warlord), and Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf, whose strategies resulted in manipulation of the National Election Commission. These nepotistic and patronage strategies were established and perfected by the Americo-Liberian oligarchy more than a hundred years earlier (Berkeley, 2001, Sawyer, 2008). For example, the Congress for Democratic Change Party alleged that the National Election Commission was biased in favor of Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf during the 2011 elections (Soderstrom, 2012). This accusation was partly based on the commission approving President Johnson-Sirleaf's candidacy for the 2011 election, even though the Truth and Reconciliation Commission had barred her from holding public office for thirty years for responsibilities associated with Liberia's civil war (Harris, 2012). International Crisis Group (2012) stated that "Some Liberians told Crisis Group they feel uneasy, even unsafe, knowing that those responsible for extreme violence during the civil war remain free" (p. 1). Further challenging Liberia's status as a functioning democracy, a study of ex-combatants revealed that they perceived the Liberia National Election Commission as biased in governance during the 2011 election. For instance, the Congress for Democratic Change Party was widely seen as providing faulty tallies "at a polling centre in Fiamah (Monrovia)" of election results for their political party, which resulted in the commission chairman's resignation (International Crisis Group, 2012). The episode was critical in validating the commission's bias after a recount witnessed by civil organizations, participating party representatives, international observers, and election commissioners revealed that the Congress for Democratic Change Party had more votes than the Unity Party. International Crisis Group (2012) stated that "While voting was peaceful, there were many invalid ballots: 82,074 (6.4 per cent of total) in the first round and 24,587 (3.5 per cent) in the run-off" (p. 3). In response to this fraudulent behavior, the ex-combatants classified the electoral process as illegitimate and supported their party's call to boycott the second round of the 2011 Presidential election (International Crisis Group, 2012; Soderstrom, 2011). However, Sawyer argues that in the 2005 elections the National Election Commission was free from manipulation because there was no incumbent candidate contesting for the office of president (Sawyer, 2008). Overall, these assertions put into question the extent of democracy reflected in Liberia's electoral process.

3. Theoretical Framework

The corruption of Liberian and African officials is equivalent to a criminal act; indeed, their mismanagement of resources, embezzlement of funds, application of tyranny, abuse of power, and institution of wars has placed the continent in a deplorable condition. This has created economic hardship and denied civil rights for citizens beyond colonialism and Western imperialism (Ayittey, as cited in Powell, 2008). African and Liberian government officials usually rationalized their behavior by blaming the international aid structure or global economic conditions, a theoretical concept referred to as "internalist" (Ayittey, as cited in Powell, 2008). The internalist rationalization holds that "Africa's condition has been made immeasurably worse by internal factors" such as systemic corruption and economic mismanagement, yet "African leaders refused to take responsibility for their failure." Instead, they used external elements to conceal their incompetence (Ayittey, as cited in Powell, 2008).

This was the situation in Liberia on April 12, 1979, when riots ensued due to President Tolbert raising the price of rice, Liberians' staple food, to gain higher profit on his investment in the commodity. This behavior is also called a "stationary bandit" by Tim Olson, a term used to describe African officials who establish or occupy a government to continuously steal resources, such as taxes, aid funds, and natural resources, and abuse citizens' rights while providing minimum public good (Olson, 1993). In order to expropriate maximum wealth, Americo-Liberians and contemporary administrations deny education, healthcare, adequate infrastructure, and economic

opportunity to Liberian citizens. These officials understand that the more resources allocated to providing public welfare, the less they will pocket (Olson, 1993).

4. Methodology

This study used data collected and compiled by Afrobarometer Round 4: The Quality of Democracy and Governance in Liberia, 2008, a population-based survey of voting-age Liberians conducted from December 9, 2008 to February 8, 2009. The Afrobarometer Round 4 survey, which was administered by a nongovernmental agency, provided a means for measuring voters' perceptions about corruption in Liberia's electoral process. The survey respondents also answered operationalized interview questions about government inclusiveness, citizens' participation in national elections and community affairs, personal economic conditions, and inequities experience by war victims. In this study, the 1,200 participants' answers were analyzed to gather data about their perception of electoral administration in Liberia. This information was then measured to determine the level of corruption in Liberia's electoral process and to test the hypothesis that "voters perceive corruption based on their ethnic, residence, and gender status" for acceptance or rejection. This analysis was achieved by adopting a significance level of 5 out of 100, computing a degree of freedom, and acquiring a critical value from the frequency distribution. In other words, the respondents' perception of corruption was operationalized by measuring their answers to the Afrobarometer survey questions.

This was accomplished by quantifying, rating, and correlating Afrobarometer Survey respondents' answers to questionnaires that reflect indicators of this study's independent variables. The variables used in the study were as follows:

Independent Variables

1. Ethnicity
2. Residence location
3. Gender

Dependent Variables

1. Question 71—Election freeness and fairness
2. Question 49C—Trust National Election Commission
3. Question 15C—Freedom to choose preferred candidate
4. Question 50D—Corruption, government officials
5. Question 50E—Corruption, police officers
6. Question 50G—Corruption, judges and magistrates

The data gathered from the analysis were used to compute a relationship between the six variables. The approach determined whether demographic subgroups of voters living in different residential areas perceived corruption differently or similarly in Liberia's electoral process. In addition, the result was used to perform statistical correlations among the variables. For example, survey questions Q71, Q49C, and Q15C provided valuable measures for determining respondents' experience with corruption in Liberia's electoral process.

Cross Tabulation Analysis

Table 1, which contains data on "election freeness and fairness," reveals that 15.1% of urban respondents and 18.2% of English speakers perceived the election as more "free and fair with major problems" compared to 10.0% of rural respondents and 9.9% of Kpelle-English speakers, respectively. In addition, more male English speakers (20.8%) and fewer female Kpelle-English speakers (8.4%) perceived the election as "free and fair with major problems," while more male (38.5%) and female (38.7%) Kpelle-English speakers and fewer male English speakers (23.5%) perceived the election as "completely free and fair." Overall, urban residents and English speakers perceived the elections as less free and fair than did rural residents and nonnative English speakers. This contradicts the research hypothesis that "Voters' (respondents') ethnicity is related to their perception of corruption in Liberia's election processes, with the Kpelle speakers perceiving corruption more than the English speakers." Similarly, it contradicts the hypothesis that rural residents perceive more corruption than urban residents do.

Urban or Rural Primary Sampling Unit * Q71. Elections free and fair * Q101. Gender of respondent Crosstabulation ^a				Q71. Elections free and fair							
Q101. Gender of respondent				Missing	Not free and fair	Free and fair, with major problems	Free and fair, but with minor problems	Completely free and fair	Do not understand question	Don't know	Total
Male	Urban or Rural Primary Sampling Unit	Urban	Count	1	47	51	100	83		2	284
			% within Urban or Rural Primary Sampling Unit	0.4%	16.5%	18.0%	35.2%	29.2%	0.7%	100.0%	
			% of Total	0.2%	7.8%	8.5%	16.7%	13.9%	0.3%	47.4%	
	Rural	Count	0	43	34	110	120		8	315	
		% within Urban or Rural Primary Sampling Unit	0.0%	13.7%	10.8%	34.9%	38.1%	2.5%	100.0%		
		% of Total	0.0%	7.2%	5.7%	18.4%	20.0%	1.3%	52.6%		
	Total	Count	1	90	85	210	203		10	599	
		% within Urban or Rural Primary Sampling Unit	0.2%	15.0%	14.2%	35.1%	33.9%	1.7%	100.0%		
		% of Total	0.2%	15.0%	14.2%	35.1%	33.9%	1.7%	100.0%		
	Female	Urban or Rural Primary Sampling Unit	Urban	Count	1	41	35	98	101	1	7
% within Urban or Rural Primary Sampling Unit				0.4%	14.4%	12.3%	34.5%	35.6%	0.4%	2.5%	100.0%
% of Total				0.2%	6.8%	5.8%	16.3%	16.8%	0.2%	1.2%	47.3%
Rural		Count	2	49	29	96	120	1	20	317	
		% within Urban or Rural Primary Sampling Unit	0.6%	15.5%	9.1%	30.3%	37.9%	0.3%	6.3%	100.0%	
		% of Total	0.3%	8.2%	4.8%	16.0%	20.0%	0.2%	3.3%	52.7%	
Total		Count	3	90	64	194	221	2	27	601	
		% within Urban or Rural Primary Sampling Unit	0.5%	15.0%	10.6%	32.3%	36.8%	0.3%	4.5%	100.0%	
		% of Total	0.5%	15.0%	10.6%	32.3%	36.8%	0.3%	4.5%	100.0%	
Total		Urban or Rural Primary Sampling Unit	Urban	Count	2	88	86	198	184	1	9
	% within Urban or Rural Primary Sampling Unit			0.4%	15.5%	15.1%	34.9%	32.4%	0.2%	1.6%	100.0%
	% of Total			0.2%	7.3%	7.2%	16.5%	15.3%	0.1%	0.8%	47.3%
	Rural	Count	2	92	63	206	240	1	28	632	
		% within Urban or Rural Primary Sampling Unit	0.3%	14.6%	10.0%	32.6%	38.0%	0.2%	4.4%	100.0%	
		% of Total	0.2%	7.7%	5.3%	17.2%	20.0%	0.1%	2.3%	52.7%	
	Total	Count	4	180	149	404	424	2	37	1200	
		% within Urban or Rural Primary Sampling Unit	0.3%	15.0%	12.4%	33.7%	35.3%	0.2%	3.1%	100.0%	
		% of Total	0.3%	15.0%	12.4%	33.7%	35.3%	0.2%	3.1%	100.0%	

a. From Afrobarometer Round 4 Survey Conducted in 2008

Ethnicity of Respondent * Q71. Elections free and fair * Q101. Gender of respondent Crosstabulation ^a				Q71. Elections free and fair							
Q101. Gender of respondent				Missing	Not free and fair	Free and fair, with major problems	Free and fair, but with minor problems	Completely free and fair	Do not understand question	Don't know	Total
Male	Ethnicity of Respondent	English	Count	1	31	38	69	43		1	183
			% within Ethnicity of Respondent	0.5%	16.9%	20.8%	37.7%	23.5%	0.5%	100.0%	
			% of Total	0.2%	5.2%	6.3%	11.5%	7.2%	0.2%	30.6%	
		Kpelle and English	Count	0	59	47	141	160		9	416
			% within Ethnicity of Respondent	0.0%	14.2%	11.3%	33.9%	38.5%	2.2%	100.0%	
			% of Total	0.0%	9.8%	7.8%	23.5%	26.7%	1.5%	69.4%	
	Total	Count	1	90	85	210	203		10	599	
		% within Ethnicity of Respondent	0.2%	15.0%	14.2%	35.1%	33.9%	1.7%	100.0%		
		% of Total	0.2%	15.0%	14.2%	35.1%	33.9%	1.7%	100.0%		
	Female	Ethnicity of Respondent	English	Count	1	28	29	63	60	0	4
% within Ethnicity of Respondent				0.5%	15.1%	15.7%	34.1%	32.4%	0.0%	2.2%	100.0%
% of Total				0.2%	4.7%	4.8%	10.5%	10.0%	0.0%	0.7%	30.8%
Kpelle and English			Count	2	62	35	131	161	2	23	416
			% within Ethnicity of Respondent	0.5%	14.9%	8.4%	31.5%	38.7%	0.5%	5.5%	100.0%
			% of Total	0.3%	10.3%	5.8%	21.8%	26.8%	0.3%	3.8%	69.2%
Total		Count	3	90	64	194	221	2	27	601	
		% within Ethnicity of Respondent	0.5%	15.0%	10.6%	32.3%	36.8%	0.3%	4.5%	100.0%	
		% of Total	0.5%	15.0%	10.6%	32.3%	36.8%	0.3%	4.5%	100.0%	
Total		Ethnicity of Respondent	English	Count	2	59	67	132	103	0	5
	% within Ethnicity of Respondent			0.5%	16.0%	18.2%	35.9%	28.0%	0.0%	1.4%	100.0%
	% of Total			0.2%	4.9%	5.6%	11.0%	8.6%	0.0%	0.4%	30.7%
	Kpelle and English		Count	2	121	82	272	321	2	32	832
			% within Ethnicity of Respondent	0.2%	14.5%	9.9%	32.7%	38.6%	0.2%	3.8%	100.0%
			% of Total	0.2%	10.1%	6.8%	22.7%	26.8%	0.2%	2.7%	69.3%
	Total	Count	4	180	149	404	424	2	37	1200	
		% within Ethnicity of Respondent	0.3%	15.0%	12.4%	33.7%	35.3%	0.2%	3.1%	100.0%	
		% of Total	0.3%	15.0%	12.4%	33.7%	35.3%	0.2%	3.1%	100.0%	

a. From Afrobarometer Round 4 Survey Conducted in 2008

Table 1: Q71—Election Freeness and Fairness

It may be that urban residents and English speakers are more educated and aware of corruption, so this counteracts their self-interest. In any case, perceptions of corruption are high enough to leave intact this study's primary hypothesis, that the gap between democracy in theory and autocracy in practice remains large in Liberia.

Table 2, for "Trust National Election Commission," shows that 20.8% of urban males, 27.6% of rural males, 15.3% of male English speakers, and 28.4% of male Kpelle-English speakers perceived that

the commission is trusted “a lot” compared to 15.1% of urban females, 18.6% of rural females, 8.6% of female English speakers, and 20.7% of female Kpelle-English speakers. These measurements reveal that female respondents perceived the National Election Commission as “not at all” trusted by 26.8% and trusted “a lot” by 17.0% compared to male respondents by 24.4% and 24.4% respectively. In other words, fewer female respondents perceived the commission as trusted “a lot” and more perceived it as “not at all” trusted compared to their male counterpart, validating this study’s initial hypothesis.

Urban or Rural Primary Sampling Unit * Q49c. Trust national electoral commission * Q101. Gender of respondent Crosstabulation^a

Q101. Gender of respondent				Q49c. Trust national electoral commission					
				Not at all	Just a little	Somewhat	A lot	Don't know	Total
Male	Urban or Rural Primary Sampling Unit	Urban	Count	63	107	54	59	1	284
			% within Urban or Rural Primary Sampling Unit	22.2%	37.7%	19.0%	20.8%	0.4%	100.0%
			% of Total	10.5%	17.9%	9.0%	9.8%	0.2%	47.4%
	Rural	Count	83	98	43	87	4	315	
		% within Urban or Rural Primary Sampling Unit	26.3%	31.1%	13.7%	27.6%	1.3%	100.0%	
		% of Total	13.9%	16.4%	7.2%	14.5%	0.7%	52.6%	
	Total	Count	146	205	97	146	5	599	
		% within Urban or Rural Primary Sampling Unit	24.4%	34.2%	16.2%	24.4%	0.8%	100.0%	
		% of Total	24.4%	34.2%	16.2%	24.4%	0.8%	100.0%	
Female	Urban or Rural Primary Sampling Unit	Urban	Count	78	114	46	43	3	284
			% within Urban or Rural Primary Sampling Unit	27.5%	40.1%	16.2%	15.1%	1.1%	100.0%
			% of Total	13.0%	19.0%	7.7%	7.2%	0.5%	47.3%
	Rural	Count	83	99	60	59	16	317	
		% within Urban or Rural Primary Sampling Unit	26.2%	31.2%	18.9%	18.6%	5.0%	100.0%	
		% of Total	13.8%	16.5%	10.0%	9.8%	2.7%	52.7%	
	Total	Count	161	213	106	102	19	601	
		% within Urban or Rural Primary Sampling Unit	26.8%	35.4%	17.6%	17.0%	3.2%	100.0%	
		% of Total	26.8%	35.4%	17.6%	17.0%	3.2%	100.0%	
Total	Urban or Rural Primary Sampling Unit	Urban	Count	141	221	100	102	4	568
			% within Urban or Rural Primary Sampling Unit	24.8%	38.9%	17.6%	18.0%	0.7%	100.0%
			% of Total	11.8%	18.4%	8.3%	8.5%	0.3%	47.3%
	Rural	Count	166	197	103	146	20	632	
		% within Urban or Rural Primary Sampling Unit	26.3%	31.2%	16.3%	23.1%	3.2%	100.0%	
		% of Total	13.8%	16.4%	8.6%	12.2%	1.7%	52.7%	
	Total	Count	307	418	203	248	24	1200	
		% within Urban or Rural Primary Sampling Unit	25.6%	34.8%	16.9%	20.7%	2.0%	100.0%	
		% of Total	25.6%	34.8%	16.9%	20.7%	2.0%	100.0%	

a. From Afrobarometer Round 4 Survey Conducted in 2008

Ethnicity of Respondent * Q49c. Trust national electoral commission * Q101. Gender of respondent Crosstabulation^a

Q101. Gender of respondent				Q49c. Trust national electoral commission					Total
				Not at all	Just a little	Somewhat	A lot	Don't know	
Male	Ethnicity of Respondent	English	Count	40	73	42	28	0	183
			% within Ethnicity of Respondent	21.9%	39.9%	23.0%	15.3%	0.0%	100.0%
			% of Total	6.7%	12.2%	7.0%	4.7%	0.0%	30.6%
	Kpelle and English	Count	106	132	55	118	5	416	
		% within Ethnicity of Respondent	25.5%	31.7%	13.2%	28.4%	1.2%	100.0%	
		% of Total	17.7%	22.0%	9.2%	19.7%	0.8%	69.4%	
	Total	Count	146	205	97	146	5	599	
		% within Ethnicity of Respondent	24.4%	34.2%	16.2%	24.4%	0.8%	100.0%	
		% of Total	24.4%	34.2%	16.2%	24.4%	0.8%	100.0%	
Female	Ethnicity of Respondent	English	Count	53	80	35	16	1	185
			% within Ethnicity of Respondent	28.6%	43.2%	18.9%	8.6%	0.5%	100.0%
			% of Total	8.8%	13.3%	5.8%	2.7%	0.2%	30.8%
	Kpelle and English	Count	108	133	71	86	18	416	
		% within Ethnicity of Respondent	26.0%	32.0%	17.1%	20.7%	4.3%	100.0%	
		% of Total	18.0%	22.1%	11.8%	14.3%	3.0%	69.2%	
	Total	Count	161	213	106	102	19	601	
		% within Ethnicity of Respondent	26.8%	35.4%	17.6%	17.0%	3.2%	100.0%	
		% of Total	26.8%	35.4%	17.6%	17.0%	3.2%	100.0%	
Total	Ethnicity of Respondent	English	Count	93	153	77	44	1	368
			% within Ethnicity of Respondent	25.3%	41.6%	20.9%	12.0%	0.3%	100.0%
			% of Total	7.8%	12.8%	6.4%	3.7%	0.1%	30.7%
	Kpelle and English	Count	214	265	126	204	23	832	
		% within Ethnicity of Respondent	25.7%	31.9%	15.1%	24.5%	2.8%	100.0%	
		% of Total	17.8%	22.1%	10.5%	17.0%	1.9%	69.3%	
	Total	Count	307	418	203	248	24	1200	
		% within Ethnicity of Respondent	25.6%	34.8%	16.9%	20.7%	2.0%	100.0%	
		% of Total	25.6%	34.8%	16.9%	20.7%	2.0%	100.0%	

a. From Afrobarometer Round 4 Survey Conducted in 2008

Table 2: Q49C—Trust National Election Commission

Table 3 for “freedom to choose preferred candidate” reveals that 80.3% of urban males, 89.5% of rural males, 74.3% of male English speakers, and 89.9% of male Kpelle-English speakers perceived themselves as being “completely free” to choose their preferred candidate compared to 75.0% of urban females, 82.6% of rural females, 69.7% of female English speakers, and 83.2% of female Kpelle-English speakers. These measurements showed that urban respondents (77.6%) and English speakers (72.0%) perceived themselves as being less “completely free” to choose their preferred candidate than rural respondents (86.1%) and Kpelle-English speakers (86.5%). However, female respondents (79.0%) perceived being less “completely free” to choose a preferred candidate than male respondents (85.1%). In addition, female English speakers (69.7%) perceived being the least, while rural males (89.5 percent) and male Kpelle-English Speakers (89.9%) perceived being the most “completely free” to choose a preferred candidate. Generally, all the subgroups have a low perception of being “not at all free” to choose a preferred candidate.

Urban or Rural Primary Sampling Unit * Q15c. Freedom to choose who to vote for * Q101. Gender of respondent Crosstabulation^a

Q101. Gender of respondent				Q15c. Freedom to choose who to vote for					Total
				Not at all free	Not very free	Somewhat free	Completely free	Don't know	
Male	Urban or Rural Primary Sampling Unit	Urban	Count	2	17	34	228	3	284
			% within Urban or Rural Primary Sampling Unit	0.7%	6.0%	12.0%	80.3%	1.1%	100.0%
			% of Total	0.3%	2.8%	5.7%	38.1%	0.5%	47.4%
	Rural	Count	3	5	24	282	1	315	
		% within Urban or Rural Primary Sampling Unit	1.0%	1.6%	7.6%	89.5%	0.3%	100.0%	
		% of Total	0.5%	0.8%	4.0%	47.1%	0.2%	52.6%	
Total	Count	5	22	58	510	4	599		
	% within Urban or Rural Primary Sampling Unit	0.8%	3.7%	9.7%	85.1%	0.7%	100.0%		
	% of Total	0.8%	3.7%	9.7%	85.1%	0.7%	100.0%		
Female	Urban or Rural Primary Sampling Unit	Urban	Count	6	14	50	213	1	284
			% within Urban or Rural Primary Sampling Unit	2.1%	4.9%	17.6%	75.0%	0.4%	100.0%
			% of Total	1.0%	2.3%	8.3%	35.4%	0.2%	47.3%
	Rural	Count	5	9	40	262	1	317	
		% within Urban or Rural Primary Sampling Unit	1.6%	2.8%	12.6%	82.6%	0.3%	100.0%	
		% of Total	0.8%	1.5%	6.7%	43.6%	0.2%	52.7%	
Total	Count	11	23	90	475	2	601		
	% within Urban or Rural Primary Sampling Unit	1.8%	3.8%	15.0%	79.0%	0.3%	100.0%		
	% of Total	1.8%	3.8%	15.0%	79.0%	0.3%	100.0%		
Total	Urban or Rural Primary Sampling Unit	Urban	Count	8	31	84	441	4	568
			% within Urban or Rural Primary Sampling Unit	1.4%	5.5%	14.8%	77.6%	0.7%	100.0%
			% of Total	0.7%	2.6%	7.0%	36.8%	0.3%	47.3%
	Rural	Count	8	14	64	544	2	632	
		% within Urban or Rural Primary Sampling Unit	1.3%	2.2%	10.1%	86.1%	0.3%	100.0%	
		% of Total	0.7%	1.2%	5.3%	45.3%	0.2%	52.7%	
Total	Count	16	45	148	985	6	1200		
	% within Urban or Rural Primary Sampling Unit	1.3%	3.8%	12.3%	82.1%	0.5%	100.0%		
	% of Total	1.3%	3.8%	12.3%	82.1%	0.5%	100.0%		

a. From Afrobarometer Round 4 Survey Conducted in 2008

Ethnicity of Respondent * Q15c. Freedom to choose who to vote for * Q101. Gender of respondent Crosstabulation^a

Q101. Gender of respondent				Q15c. Freedom to choose who to vote for					Total
				Not at all free	Not very free	Somewhat free	Completely free	Don't know	
Male	Ethnicity of Respondent	English	Count	2	15	28	136	2	183
			% within Ethnicity of Respondent	1.1%	8.2%	15.3%	74.3%	1.1%	100.0%
			% of Total	0.3%	2.5%	4.7%	22.7%	0.3%	30.6%
	Kpelle and English	Count	3	7	30	374	2	416	
		% within Ethnicity of Respondent	0.7%	1.7%	7.2%	89.9%	0.5%	100.0%	
		% of Total	0.5%	1.2%	5.0%	62.4%	0.3%	69.4%	
Total	Count	5	22	58	510	4	599		
	% within Ethnicity of Respondent	0.8%	3.7%	9.7%	85.1%	0.7%	100.0%		
	% of Total	0.8%	3.7%	9.7%	85.1%	0.7%	100.0%		
Female	Ethnicity of Respondent	English	Count	4	13	38	129	1	185
			% within Ethnicity of Respondent	2.2%	7.0%	20.5%	69.7%	0.5%	100.0%
			% of Total	0.7%	2.2%	6.3%	21.5%	0.2%	30.8%
	Kpelle and English	Count	7	10	52	346	1	416	
		% within Ethnicity of Respondent	1.7%	2.4%	12.5%	83.2%	0.2%	100.0%	
		% of Total	1.2%	1.7%	8.7%	57.6%	0.2%	69.2%	
Total	Count	11	23	90	475	2	601		
	% within Ethnicity of Respondent	1.8%	3.8%	15.0%	79.0%	0.3%	100.0%		
	% of Total	1.8%	3.8%	15.0%	79.0%	0.3%	100.0%		
Total	Ethnicity of Respondent	English	Count	6	28	66	265	3	368
			% within Ethnicity of Respondent	1.6%	7.6%	17.9%	72.0%	0.8%	100.0%
			% of Total	0.5%	2.3%	5.5%	22.1%	0.3%	30.7%
	Kpelle and English	Count	10	17	82	720	3	832	
		% within Ethnicity of Respondent	1.2%	2.0%	9.9%	86.5%	0.4%	100.0%	
		% of Total	0.8%	1.4%	6.8%	60.0%	0.3%	69.3%	
Total	Count	16	45	148	985	6	1200		
	% within Ethnicity of Respondent	1.3%	3.8%	12.3%	82.1%	0.5%	100.0%		
	% of Total	1.3%	3.8%	12.3%	82.1%	0.5%	100.0%		

a. From Afrobarometer Round 4 Survey Conducted in 2008

Table 3: Q15C—Freedom to Choose Preferred Candidate

Overall, a comparison of the subgroups based on the dependent variables validates that respondents' demographics have an effect on their perception of corruption in Liberia's 2005 national election. However, the study's expectations about rural and female respondents were not fully accurate. For example, urban males and male English speakers rather than rural females and female Kpelle-English speakers were expected to perceive the election as more "completely free and fair" and being more "completely free" to choose a preferred candidate

because they are the most privileged in Liberian society. However, the analyzed data produce an opposite result. On the other hand, females more frequently perceived the National Election Commission as “not at all” trusted and felt less “completely free” to choose a preferred candidate, which was anticipated because they are the least privileged. It seems likely that privilege is one factor in perception of corruption and freedom, but other factors are probably at play. The nature of these factors, however, is beyond the scope of this study.

4.1 Analysis of 2011 Election Data

The study performed an additional cross-tabulation analysis and produced three contingency tables on the 2011 election data (Afrobarometer Round 6 Survey administered in 2015) to verify if Liberia’s political climate has changed (due to new policy implementation) since 2008, when the 2005 election data (Afrobarometer Round 4 Survey) was collected for the finding reported in my dissertation. A comparison of both results reveals that Liberia’s political situation has not changed.

Table 4, which contains data on “election freeness and fairness” (from Afrobarometer Round 6 Survey) reveals that 17.5% of urban men, 15.6% of rural men, 18.3% of male English speakers, and 15.7% of male Kpelle speakers perceived the 2011 election as “completely free and fair,” compared to 19.3% of urban women, 23.0% of rural women, 18.4% of female English speakers, and 22.6% of female Kpelle speakers. Furthermore, 35.4% of urban respondents and 30.8% of English speakers perceived the 2011 election as less “free and fair with major problems” compared to 43.1% of rural respondents and 43.1% of Kpelle speakers, respectively. In addition, more rural men (25.5%) and fewer female English speakers (14.1%) perceived the 2011 election as “free and fair with major problems,” while more rural women (23.0%) and fewer rural men (15.6%) and male Kpelle speakers (15.7%) perceived the election as “completely free and fair.” Even though urban respondents (45.9%) and English speakers (50.7%) had a high perception of the election as “not free and fair” those who perceived the least and most fairness were rural men (12.4%) and female English speakers (28.1%), respectively. Overall, urban residents and English speakers perceived the 2011 election as less free and fair than did rural residents and nonnative English speakers. This result is consistent with the 2005 survey (Afrobarometer Round 4) data analyzed in my dissertation.

Urban or rural Primary Sampling Unit * Q22. Freeness and fairness of the last national election * Q101. Gender of respondent Crosstabulation^a

Q101. Gender of respondent				Q22. Freeness and fairness of the last national election						Total	
				Missing	Not free and fair	Free and fair, with major problems	Free and fair, but with minor problems	Completely free and fair	Do not understand the question		Don't know
Male	Urban or rural Primary Sampling Unit	Urban	Count	0	64	52	103	50	1	16	286
			% within Urban or rural Primary Sampling Unit	0.0%	22.4%	18.2%	36.0%	17.5%	0.3%	5.6%	100.0%
			% of Total	0.0%	10.7%	8.7%	17.2%	8.3%	0.2%	2.7%	47.7%
		Rural	Count	4	39	80	122	49	3	17	314
			% within Urban or rural Primary Sampling Unit	1.3%	12.4%	25.5%	38.9%	15.6%	1.0%	5.4%	100.0%
			% of Total	0.7%	6.5%	13.3%	20.3%	8.2%	0.5%	2.8%	52.3%
	Total	Count	4	103	132	225	99	4	33	600	
		% within Urban or rural Primary Sampling Unit	0.7%	17.2%	22.0%	37.5%	16.5%	0.7%	5.5%	100.0%	
		% of Total	0.7%	17.2%	22.0%	37.5%	16.5%	0.7%	5.5%	100.0%	
	Female	Urban or rural Primary Sampling Unit	Urban	Count		67	49	79	55	3	32
% within Urban or rural Primary Sampling Unit					23.5%	17.2%	27.7%	19.3%	1.1%	11.2%	100.0%
% of Total					11.2%	8.2%	13.2%	9.2%	0.5%	5.4%	47.7%
Rural			Count		43	55	112	72	4	27	313
			% within Urban or rural Primary Sampling Unit		13.7%	17.6%	35.8%	23.0%	1.3%	8.6%	100.0%
			% of Total		7.2%	9.2%	18.7%	12.0%	0.7%	4.5%	52.3%
Total		Count		110	104	191	127	7	59	598	
		% within Urban or rural Primary Sampling Unit		18.4%	17.4%	31.9%	21.2%	1.2%	9.9%	100.0%	
		% of Total		18.4%	17.4%	31.9%	21.2%	1.2%	9.9%	100.0%	
Total		Urban or rural Primary Sampling Unit	Urban	Count	0	131	101	182	105	4	48
	% within Urban or rural Primary Sampling Unit			0.0%	22.9%	17.7%	31.9%	18.4%	0.7%	8.4%	100.0%
	% of Total			0.0%	10.9%	8.4%	15.2%	8.8%	0.3%	4.0%	47.7%
	Rural		Count	4	82	135	234	121	7	44	627
			% within Urban or rural Primary Sampling Unit	0.6%	13.1%	21.5%	37.3%	19.3%	1.1%	7.0%	100.0%
			% of Total	0.3%	6.8%	11.3%	19.5%	10.1%	0.6%	3.7%	52.3%
	Total	Count	4	213	236	416	226	11	92	1198	
		% within Urban or rural Primary Sampling Unit	0.3%	17.8%	19.7%	34.7%	18.9%	0.9%	7.7%	100.0%	
		% of Total	0.3%	17.8%	19.7%	34.7%	18.9%	0.9%	7.7%	100.0%	

a. From Afrobarometer Round 6 Survey Conducted in 2015

Ethnicity of Respondent * Q22. Freeness and fairness of the last national election * Q101. Gender of respondent Crosstabulation^a

Q101. Gender of respondent			Q22. Freeness and fairness of the last national election								
			Missing	Not free and fair	Free and fair, with major problems	Free and fair, but with minor problems	Completely free and fair	Do not understand the question	Don't know	Total	
Male	Ethnicity of Respondent	Kpelle	Count	4	61	101	159	65	4	20	414
		% within Ethnicity of Respondent	1.0%	14.7%	24.4%	38.4%	15.7%	1.0%	4.8%	100.0%	
		% of Total	0.7%	10.2%	16.8%	26.5%	10.8%	0.7%	3.3%	69.0%	
	English	Count	0	42	31	66	34	0	13	186	
		% within Ethnicity of Respondent	0.0%	22.6%	16.7%	35.5%	18.3%	0.0%	7.0%	100.0%	
		% of Total	0.0%	7.0%	5.2%	11.0%	5.7%	0.0%	2.2%	31.0%	
	Total	Count	4	103	132	225	99	4	33	600	
		% within Ethnicity of Respondent	0.7%	17.2%	22.0%	37.5%	16.5%	0.7%	5.5%	100.0%	
		% of Total	0.7%	17.2%	22.0%	37.5%	16.5%	0.7%	5.5%	100.0%	
Female	Ethnicity of Respondent	Kpelle	Count		58	77	141	93	5	38	412
		% within Ethnicity of Respondent		14.1%	18.7%	34.2%	22.6%	1.2%	9.2%	100.0%	
		% of Total		9.7%	12.9%	23.6%	15.6%	0.8%	6.4%	69.0%	
	English	Count		52	26	50	34	2	21	185	
		% within Ethnicity of Respondent		28.1%	14.1%	27.0%	18.4%	1.1%	11.4%	100.0%	
		% of Total		8.7%	4.4%	8.4%	5.7%	0.3%	3.5%	31.0%	
	Total	Count		110	103	191	127	7	59	597	
		% within Ethnicity of Respondent		18.4%	17.3%	32.0%	21.3%	1.2%	9.9%	100.0%	
		% of Total		18.4%	17.3%	32.0%	21.3%	1.2%	9.9%	100.0%	
Total	Ethnicity of Respondent	Kpelle	Count	4	119	178	300	158	9	58	826
		% within Ethnicity of Respondent	0.5%	14.4%	21.5%	36.3%	19.1%	1.1%	7.0%	100.0%	
		% of Total	0.3%	9.9%	14.9%	25.1%	13.2%	0.8%	4.8%	69.0%	
	English	Count	0	94	57	116	68	2	34	371	
		% within Ethnicity of Respondent	0.0%	25.3%	15.4%	31.3%	18.3%	0.5%	9.2%	100.0%	
		% of Total	0.0%	7.9%	4.8%	9.7%	5.7%	0.2%	2.8%	31.0%	
	Total	Count	4	213	235	416	226	11	92	1197	
		% within Ethnicity of Respondent	0.3%	17.8%	19.6%	34.8%	18.9%	0.9%	7.7%	100.0%	
		% of Total	0.3%	17.8%	19.6%	34.8%	18.9%	0.9%	7.7%	100.0%	

a. From Afrobarometer Round 6 Survey Conduct in 2015

Table 4: Q22-Election Freeness and Fairness

Table 5 for “trust National Election Commission” shows that 25.9% of urban males, 28.6% of rural males, 24.3% of male English speakers, and 28.4% of male Kpelle speakers perceived that the Liberia National Election Commission is trusted “not at all” compared to 25.3% of urban females, 30.6% of rural females, 24.3% of female English speakers, and 29.6% of female Kpelle speakers, showing that overall females mistrust the National Election Commission more than males. On the other hand, 14.3% of urban males, 11.7% of rural males, 13.0% of male English speakers, and 13.0% of male Kpelle speakers perceived that the commission is trusted “a lot” compared to 11.9% of urban females, 13.7% of rural females, 11.4% of female English speakers, and 13.3% of female Kpelle speakers. These measurements reveal that female respondents perceived the National Election Commission as “not at all” trusted by 28.0% and trusted “a lot” by 12.9% compared to male respondents by 27.3% and 13.0% respectively. In other words, fewer female respondents perceived the commission as trusted “a lot” and more perceived it as “not at all” trusted compared to their male counterpart, validating (once again) this study’s initial hypothesis. Even though, the difference in percentage of perception among both groups is small and not statistically significant..

Urban or rural Primary Sampling Unit * Q52c. Trust national electoral commission * Q101. Gender of respondent Crosstabulation^a

				Q52c. Trust national electoral commission					
				Not at all	Just a little	Somewhat	A lot	Don't know/ Haven't heard enough	Total
Q101. Gender of respondent	Urban or rural Primary Sampling Unit	Urban	Count						
Male	Urban or rural Primary Sampling Unit	Urban	Count	74	114	54	41	3	286
			% within Urban or rural Primary Sampling Unit	25.9%	39.9%	18.9%	14.3%	1.0%	100.0%
			% of Total	45.1%	48.9%	44.6%	52.6%	60.0%	47.6%
	Rural	Count	90	119	67	37	2	315	
		% within Urban or rural Primary Sampling Unit	28.6%	37.8%	21.3%	11.7%	0.6%	100.0%	
		% of Total	15.0%	19.8%	11.1%	6.2%	0.3%	52.4%	
	Total	Count	164	233	121	78	5	601	
		% within Urban or rural Primary Sampling Unit	27.3%	38.8%	20.1%	13.0%	0.8%	100.0%	
		% of Total	27.3%	38.8%	20.1%	13.0%	0.8%	100.0%	
Female	Urban or rural Primary Sampling Unit	Urban	Count	72	109	64	34	6	285
			% within Urban or rural Primary Sampling Unit	25.3%	38.2%	22.5%	11.9%	2.1%	100.0%
			% of Total	12.0%	18.2%	10.7%	5.7%	1.0%	47.6%
	Rural	Count	96	109	59	43	7	314	
		% within Urban or rural Primary Sampling Unit	30.6%	34.7%	18.8%	13.7%	2.2%	100.0%	
		% of Total	16.0%	18.2%	9.8%	7.2%	1.2%	52.4%	
	Total	Count	168	218	123	77	13	599	
		% within Urban or rural Primary Sampling Unit	28.0%	36.4%	20.5%	12.9%	2.2%	100.0%	
		% of Total	28.0%	36.4%	20.5%	12.9%	2.2%	100.0%	
Total	Urban or rural Primary Sampling Unit	Urban	Count	146	223	118	75	9	571
			% within Urban or rural Primary Sampling Unit	25.6%	39.1%	20.7%	13.1%	1.6%	100.0%
			% of Total	12.2%	18.6%	9.8%	6.3%	0.8%	47.6%
	Rural	Count	186	228	126	80	9	629	
		% within Urban or rural Primary Sampling Unit	29.6%	36.2%	20.0%	12.7%	1.4%	100.0%	
		% of Total	15.5%	19.0%	10.5%	6.7%	0.8%	52.4%	
	Total	Count	332	451	244	155	18	1200	
		% within Urban or rural Primary Sampling Unit	27.7%	37.6%	20.3%	12.9%	1.5%	100.0%	
		% of Total	27.7%	37.6%	20.3%	12.9%	1.5%	100.0%	

a. From Afrobarometer Round 6 Survey

Ethnicity of Respondent * Q52c. Trust national electoral commission * Q101. Gender of respondent Crosstabulation ^a			Q52c. Trust national electoral commission					Total	
Q101. Gender of respondent			Not at all	Just a little	Somewhat	A lot	Don't know/ Haven't heard enough		
Male	Ethnicity of Respondent	Kpelle	Count	118	151	89	54	3	415
			% within Ethnicity of Respondent	28.4%	36.4%	21.4%	13.0%	0.7%	100.0%
			% of Total	19.7%	25.2%	14.8%	9.0%	0.5%	69.2%
	English	Count	45	82	32	24	2	185	
		% within Ethnicity of Respondent	24.3%	44.3%	17.3%	13.0%	1.1%	100.0%	
		% of Total	7.5%	13.7%	5.3%	4.0%	0.3%	30.8%	
	Total	Count	163	233	121	78	5	600	
		% within Ethnicity of Respondent	27.2%	38.8%	20.2%	13.0%	0.8%	100.0%	
		% of Total	27.2%	38.8%	20.2%	13.0%	0.8%	100.0%	
	Female	Ethnicity of Respondent	Kpelle	Count	122	142	82	55	11
% within Ethnicity of Respondent				29.6%	34.5%	19.9%	13.3%	2.7%	100.0%
% of Total				20.4%	23.8%	13.7%	9.2%	1.8%	69.0%
English		Count	45	76	41	21	2	185	
		% within Ethnicity of Respondent	24.3%	41.1%	22.2%	11.4%	1.1%	100.0%	
		% of Total	7.5%	12.7%	6.9%	3.5%	0.3%	31.0%	
Total		Count	167	218	123	76	13	597	
		% within Ethnicity of Respondent	28.0%	36.5%	20.6%	12.7%	2.2%	100.0%	
		% of Total	28.0%	36.5%	20.6%	12.7%	2.2%	100.0%	
Total		Ethnicity of Respondent	Kpelle	Count	240	293	171	109	14
	% within Ethnicity of Respondent			29.0%	35.4%	20.7%	13.2%	1.7%	100.0%
	% of Total			20.1%	24.5%	14.3%	9.1%	1.2%	69.1%
	English	Count	90	158	73	45	4	370	
		% within Ethnicity of Respondent	24.3%	42.7%	19.7%	12.2%	1.1%	100.0%	
		% of Total	7.5%	13.2%	6.1%	3.8%	0.3%	30.9%	
	Total	Count	330	451	244	154	18	1197	
		% within Ethnicity of Respondent	27.6%	37.7%	20.4%	12.9%	1.5%	100.0%	
		% of Total	27.6%	37.7%	20.4%	12.9%	1.5%	100.0%	

a. From Afrobarometer Round 6 Survey Conducted in 2015

Table 5: Q52C-Trust National Election Commission

Table 6 for “freedom to choose preferred candidate” reveals that 84.9% of urban males, 73.4% of rural males, 87.1% of male English speakers, and 75.4% of male Kpelle speakers perceived themselves as being “completely free” to choose their preferred candidate compared to 83.2% of urban females, 67.8% of rural females, 87.6% of female English speakers, and 69.5% of female Kpelle speakers. These measurements showed that rural respondents (70.6%) and Kpelle speakers (72.4%) perceived themselves being less “completely free” to choose a preferred candidate than urban respondents (84.0%) and English speakers (87.4%). However, female respondents (75.1%) perceived being less “completely free” to choose a preferred candidate than male respondents (78.9%). In addition, rural females (67.8%) perceived being the least, while male English speakers (87.1%) and female English speakers (87.6%) perceived being the most “completely free” to choose a preferred candidate. Generally, all the subgroups have a low perception of being “not at all free” to choose a preferred candidate. That is, all groups believe they have a high degree of personal autonomy in casting their vote, although significantly less so among rural females, a result that strongly supports my initial hypotheses.

Urban or rural Primary Sampling Unit * Q15c. Freedom to choose who to vote for * Q101. Gender of respondent Crosstabulation ^a				Q15c. Freedom to choose who to vote for							
Q101. Gender of respondent				Missing	Not at all free	Not very free	Somewhat free	Completely free	Don't know	Total	
Male	Urban or rural Primary Sampling Unit	Urban	Count	0	2	4	32	242	5	285	
			% within Urban or rural Primary Sampling Unit	0.0%	0.7%	1.4%	11.2%	84.9%	1.8%	100.0%	
			% of Total	0.0%	0.3%	0.7%	5.3%	40.3%	0.8%	47.4%	
		Rural	Count	6	7	10	57	232	4	316	
			% within Urban or rural Primary Sampling Unit	1.9%	2.2%	3.2%	18.0%	73.4%	1.3%	100.0%	
			% of Total	1.0%	1.2%	1.7%	9.5%	38.6%	0.7%	52.6%	
	Total	Count	6	9	14	89	474	9	601		
		% within Urban or rural Primary Sampling Unit	1.0%	1.5%	2.3%	14.8%	78.9%	1.5%	100.0%		
		% of Total	1.0%	1.5%	2.3%	14.8%	78.9%	1.5%	100.0%		
	Female	Urban or rural Primary Sampling Unit	Urban	Count	0	6	6	28	237	8	285
				% within Urban or rural Primary Sampling Unit	0.0%	2.1%	2.1%	9.8%	83.2%	2.8%	100.0%
				% of Total	0.0%	1.0%	1.0%	4.7%	39.6%	1.3%	47.6%
Rural			Count	1	12	20	54	213	14	314	
			% within Urban or rural Primary Sampling Unit	0.3%	3.8%	6.4%	17.2%	67.8%	4.5%	100.0%	
			% of Total	0.2%	2.0%	3.3%	9.0%	35.6%	2.3%	52.4%	
Total		Count	1	18	26	82	450	22	599		
		% within Urban or rural Primary Sampling Unit	0.2%	3.0%	4.3%	13.7%	75.1%	3.7%	100.0%		
		% of Total	0.2%	3.0%	4.3%	13.7%	75.1%	3.7%	100.0%		
Total		Urban or rural Primary Sampling Unit	Urban	Count	0	8	10	60	479	13	570
				% within Urban or rural Primary Sampling Unit	0.0%	1.4%	1.8%	10.5%	84.0%	2.3%	100.0%
				% of Total	0.0%	0.7%	0.8%	5.0%	39.9%	1.1%	47.5%
	Rural		Count	7	19	30	111	445	18	630	
			% within Urban or rural Primary Sampling Unit	1.1%	3.0%	4.8%	17.6%	70.6%	2.9%	100.0%	
			% of Total	0.6%	1.6%	2.5%	9.3%	37.1%	1.5%	52.5%	
	Total	Count	7	27	40	171	924	31	1200		
		% within Urban or rural Primary Sampling Unit	0.6%	2.3%	3.3%	14.3%	77.0%	2.6%	100.0%		
		% of Total	0.6%	2.3%	3.3%	14.3%	77.0%	2.6%	100.0%		

a. From Afrobarometer Round 6 Survey Conducted in 2015

Ethnicity of Respondent * Q15c. Freedom to choose who to vote for * Q101. Gender of respondent Crosstabulation ^a				Q15c. Freedom to choose who to vote for							
Q101. Gender of respondent				Missing	Not at all free	Not very free	Somewhat free	Completely free	Don't know	Total	
Male	Ethnicity of Respondent	Kpelle	Count	6	8	12	69	312	7	414	
			% within Ethnicity of Respondent	1.4%	1.9%	2.9%	16.7%	75.4%	1.7%	100.0%	
			% of Total	1.0%	1.3%	2.0%	11.5%	52.0%	1.2%	69.0%	
		English	Count	0	1	1	20	162	2	186	
			% within Ethnicity of Respondent	0.0%	0.5%	0.5%	10.8%	87.1%	1.1%	100.0%	
			% of Total	0.0%	0.2%	0.2%	3.3%	27.0%	0.3%	31.0%	
	Total	Count	6	9	13	89	474	9	600		
		% within Ethnicity of Respondent	1.0%	1.5%	2.2%	14.8%	79.0%	1.5%	100.0%		
		% of Total	1.0%	1.5%	2.2%	14.8%	79.0%	1.5%	100.0%		
	Female	Ethnicity of Respondent	Kpelle	Count	1	16	25	66	287	18	413
				% within Ethnicity of Respondent	0.2%	3.9%	6.1%	16.0%	69.5%	4.4%	100.0%
				% of Total	0.2%	2.7%	4.2%	11.0%	47.9%	3.0%	68.9%
English			Count	0	2	1	16	163	4	186	
			% within Ethnicity of Respondent	0.0%	1.1%	0.5%	8.6%	87.6%	2.2%	100.0%	
			% of Total	0.0%	0.3%	0.2%	2.7%	27.2%	0.7%	31.1%	
Total		Count	1	18	26	82	450	22	599		
		% within Ethnicity of Respondent	0.2%	3.0%	4.3%	13.7%	75.1%	3.7%	100.0%		
		% of Total	0.2%	3.0%	4.3%	13.7%	75.1%	3.7%	100.0%		
Total		Ethnicity of Respondent	Kpelle	Count	7	24	37	135	599	25	827
				% within Ethnicity of Respondent	0.8%	2.9%	4.5%	16.3%	72.4%	3.0%	100.0%
				% of Total	0.6%	2.0%	3.1%	11.3%	50.0%	2.1%	69.0%
	English		Count	0	3	2	36	325	6	372	
			% within Ethnicity of Respondent	0.0%	0.8%	0.5%	9.7%	87.4%	1.6%	100.0%	
			% of Total	0.0%	0.3%	0.2%	3.0%	27.1%	0.5%	31.0%	
	Total	Count	7	27	39	171	924	31	1199		
		% within Ethnicity of Respondent	0.6%	2.3%	3.3%	14.3%	77.1%	2.6%	100.0%		
		% of Total	0.6%	2.3%	3.3%	14.3%	77.1%	2.6%	100.0%		

a. From Afrobarometer Round 6 Survey Conducted in 2015

Table 6: Q15C-Freedom to Choose Preferred Candidate

5. Chi-Square Test

The chi-square test result is used to confirm whether the relationship between respondents' gender, residence, and feeling that the election is "free and fair" are statistically significant. The chi-square value for males is 18.777 with a *p*-value of 0.002, while the Chi-Square value for females is 9.422 with a *p*-value of 0.151. This male *p*-value

(0.002) is less than the study's "two tailed" confidence level of 0.05. Therefore, this is strong evidence against the null hypothesis that among males, residence, and "election free and fair" are not associated within the sample population. However, the *p*-value (0.151) for females indicates insufficient evidence against the null hypothesis that residence and "election free and fair" are associated within the sample population. In other words, at the study's 0.05 percent significance level it fails to reject the null hypothesis that residence and "election free and fair" are related among female respondents, while among male respondents the null hypothesis can be confidently rejected.

The study's control for gender creates a partial association in which the relationship between residence and "election free and fair" is not significant overall. However, a partial association remains for male respondents. In conclusion, respondents' gender does appear to have an impacted on their perception of fairness in Liberia's 2005 national election. In other words, residence seems to affect male respondents.

Correlation Analysis

A correlation analysis of the Afrobarometer Round 4 survey data reveals that gender, residence, and ethnicity have a "two tailed" statistical significance at alpha level of "0.05" in association with respondents' perception of corruption of fairness of "Q71," "Q49C," and "Q15." These results satisfy the study's confidence level of 95 degrees and contribute to the independent variables' discrete nature.

		Correlations ^c					
		Urban or Rural Primary Sampling Unit	Q101. Gender of respondent	Ethnicity of Respondent	Q71. Elections free and fair	Q49c. Trust national electoral commission	Q15c. Freedom to choose who to vote for
Spearman's rho	Urban or Rural Primary Sampling Unit	Correlation Coefficient	1.000	.002	.702**	.091**	.052
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.	.956	.000	.002	.071
		N	1200	1200	1200	1200	1200
Q101. Gender of respondent		Correlation Coefficient	.002	1.000	-.003	.061*	-.042
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.956	.	.931	.034	.142
		N	1200	1200	1200	1200	1200
Ethnicity of Respondent		Correlation Coefficient	.702**	-.003	1.000	.129**	.089**
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.931	.	.000	.002
		N	1200	1200	1200	1200	1200
Q71. Elections free and fair		Correlation Coefficient	.091**	.061*	.129**	1.000	.322**
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.002	.034	.000	.	.000
		N	1200	1200	1200	1200	1200
Q49c. Trust national electoral commission		Correlation Coefficient	.052	-.042	.089**	.322**	1.000
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.071	.142	.002	.000	.
		N	1200	1200	1200	1200	1200
Q15c. Freedom to choose who to vote for		Correlation Coefficient	.101**	-.086**	.166**	.104**	.114**
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.003	.000	.000	.000
		N	1200	1200	1200	1200	1200

** . Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

c. From Afrobarometer Round 4 Survey Conducted in 2008

Table 7: Correlation Matrix

A significant "two tailed" test at .05 confidence level for gender produced *p*-values of 0.034 for "Q71" and 0.003 for "Q15C," and the same test for residence produced *p*-values of 0.002 and 0.000 respectively. In addition, ethnicity also produced *p*-values of 0.000 for "Q71," 0.002 for "Q49C," and 0.000 for "Q15C." These *p*-values are all less than the study's "two tailed" confidence level of 0.05. This means that there is statistically significant evidence (the strength of relationship is sufficient enough) of a relationship between respondents' gender, residence, and ethnicity and their perception of corruption or fairness in Liberia's 2005 electoral processes. Therefore, the study rejects its Null hypothesis that "respondents' demographics are not related to their perception of corruption in Liberia's election process" and accepts the alternate hypothesis that they are related.

Overall, the used of a chi-square test and a correlation analysis produces a validation of association among the variables in two ways. First, the chi-square test reveals how subgroups like urban females and rural males individually influenced respondents' perception of election quality and their level of significance. Second, the correlation analysis shows the nature and direction of relationships among all six variables and their statistical significance. These approaches produce evidence that supports a rejection of the study's Null hypothesis.

6. Electoral Corruption and the 2005 Liberian Election

Overall, this study shows the persistent results of a culture of corruption embedded deep in Liberia's history, and that this corruption effects women, rural people, and indigenous tribes. The culture of corruption that exists in the Liberian government is fostered by a constitutional mandate that concentrates power in the presidency (Kumar, 1998; Sawyer, 1992). This presidential power to make appointments creates ethical and institutional issues in a

nation with few elective positions—only president, vice president, senator, representative, city mayor, and paramount chief—no standard civil servant laws, and a government as the largest employer (Ellis, 1911; Jahr, 2006; Liebenow, 1987; Pham, 2004). This system allows Liberian presidents to reward their supporters (friends, families, cronies, and ethnic groups) with political positions and punish their opponents (critics, competitors, and challengers) by denying them government employment. In addition, these individuals have exclusive rights to lucrative benefits such as iron ore stocks, land along new roads, government contracts, and compulsory farm labor (Clower et al., 1966; Harris, 2012; Liberia Media Center, 2011). In describing presidential power in Liberia's first and second republics (1847-1989), Sawyer (1992) asserted that "In all matters, the role of the president was more prominent than a rule of law" (p. 301).

A corrupt and unequal society was instituted from the beginnings of the Liberian nation. For example, the three hinterland provinces that are predominately indigenous people (95% of the population) had no representative in the legislature prior to 1944. The constitution was amended in 1944 to give those provinces only 6 out of 39 members of the House but no senators (Berkeley, 2001; Carrington, 2007; Clower et al., 1966; Liebenow, 1987). The patronage relationship between Liberian presidents and their appointees gave Americo-Liberians political and economic control of the nation while undermining administrative structures in public institutions (Boas, 2009; Harris, 2012).

This corrupt and unequal practice continues today through the denial of election information, voter education, and access to voting machines precincts for rural voters (mostly indigenous people), which limits their ability to fully participate in elections (Elklit, 1999). The behavior is also perpetuated by police officers and tribal chiefs (public officials) who usually manipulate and intimidate rural citizens to cast their vote for candidates of the ruling party (Rand Corporation, 2007; Mvukiyehe and Samii, 2010). These administrative and political problems make it difficult for rural voters to support their preferred candidates, which skew's election results in favor of incumbent candidates. In other words, the corrupted presidential power of appointment, a constitutional mandate, impedes the conduct of elections (Pastor, 1999).

Pastor (1999) recognized that Liberia's election system is plagued with administrative (election commission) and political (coercive power) problems that exist simultaneously. However, the issue of focus here is electoral administrative failure that originates from public corruption. Specifically, the electoral administration's technical irregularities were the main issue inhibiting the fairness of Liberia's 2005 Presidential election, even though voters, candidates, and opposition parties assumed it was the Election Commission's bias toward incumbents (Harris, 2012; Pastor, 1999). This occurred because during elections, voters are functioning in an intensely politicized atmosphere. For example, the lack of recent census data during the 2005 Presidential election was responsible for irregularities in the registering of voters, establishment of precincts, and notification of voters about election activities (Harris, 2012; Pastor, 1999).

The effective administration of elections is a prerequisite to transitioning Liberia into a democracy. Therefore, the legislature should enact a policy that places the Election Commission outside of government and establishes a professional civil servant system for recruiting bureaucrats (Pastor, 1999). Such a policy will ensure that Liberia's Election Commission is beyond the control of governmental regimes and help to hire competent individuals as commissioners. The appointment of qualified election officials will minimize corruption (bribery for votes) and technical irregularities in Liberia's electoral processes through ensuring voter registration, enforcement of campaign rules, qualification of parties, fair counting of votes, and legitimate establishment of precinct. A good start would be a policy that institutes Pastor's (1999) third model for electoral management bodies, which suggested that "An independent election commission manned by experts and directly accountable to the parliament" (p. 12) will be effective at conducting elections.

Legislation to place the Liberian Election Commission outside of government is a strategy that will eliminate presidential power of appointment, insulate corruption, enhance election quality, and decrease voters' perception that the conduct of elections is manipulated (Pastor, 1999). For example, in 1990 the Mexicans wrote a new constitution that limited presidential succession to prevent election fraud (Pastor, 1999). A similar approach was also used in Costa Rica in 1948, where the Supreme Electoral Tribunal was made a fourth branch of government whose administrators (magistrates) are elected (Pastor, 1999).

The existence of laws that provide suffrage for Liberian citizens and the implementation of multiparty elections do not ensure full voter participation, which is critical in establishing and maintaining democracy in a political system (Bollen, 2009; Moon et al., 2006). For example, the 2005 election record revealed that 90% of eligible voters registered to vote. However, only 74.1% participated in the first round of elections and 61% participated in the runoff presidential election (Liberia National Election Commission, 2005; Soderstorm, 2008). These low turnout rates can be attributed to barriers like inaccessible election information, patronage arrangements, and purchase of citizens votes (Berkeley, 2001; Elklit, 1999; Pham, 2004; Soderstorm, 2008), obstacles that make it difficult for opposition parties to campaign effectively and restrict citizens from exercising their civil rights. This situation had an adverse impact on voter participation and party competition in the 2005 presidential elections. A low turnout of 74% (first round of election) in the 2005 election indicates disaffection with the process (Bollen,

2009). Therefore, Free House's classification of Liberia as "partly free" is subject to question because the nation appears to have a minimum level of democracy.

The decline in participation measured by the differential between voter registration and voter turnout in the 2005 (first and second rounds) Presidential elections can be attributed to citizens' discontent with corruption in Liberia's electoral process. This argument is supported by a governance survey, which indicates that respondents "bear a high distrust" for the executive, legislative, and judiciary branches' commitment in confronting corruption by 75%, 81%, and 81% respectively ratings (Liberia Democracy Watch, 2010). Therefore, the classification of Liberia as an "Electoral Democracy" is inaccurate. Liberia's current governmental regime suggests that the political system is in transition and moving toward democracy because it holds regular, free, fair, and competitive elections. In addition, the elections are genuinely conducted with some democratic qualities (Freedom House, 2010; Howard & Roessler, 2006; Lindberg, 2007). However, such a political condition will usually apply to nations with independent election commissions, which is lacking in Liberia. The independence of an election institution will allow it to promote "prodemocratic" ideas and a mindset among citizens (Lindberg, 2007).

7. Result and Discussion

These findings provide sufficient evidence to prove that voters' demographics are related to their perception of quality regarding Liberia's election processes. They are also validated by a chi-square test and a correlation analysis, which reveal respondents' demographic influence on their perception of election quality and the relationships among all six variables. Moreover, the findings confirm that voters perceived Liberia's electoral processes as corrupt.

The underlying cause for this problem is not only political, but also administrative. In other words, the nation's dysfunction stems from a lack of coordination between its administrative and governing systems that has resulted in weak public institutions (Weber, as cited in Tompkins, 2005). The administrative institutions existed in the form of nepotism, patrimonialism, and indirect rule, which have fostered Americo-Liberians' and contemporary regimes' abuse of authority (Liebenow, 1987; Pham, 2004; Sawyer, 1992). Moreover, these autocratic governments have used regular elections as a means of publicizing their ostensible democratization while in actuality evolving into a one-party state, disenfranchising voters, and banning political parties during the 20th century (Crowder et al., 1966; Harris, 2012; Liebenow, 1987; Sawyer, 1992). This has happened even though it is known that holding elections in an "authoritarian state construct" does not enhance democratization (Kieh, as cited in Saine et al., 2011). In addition, the administration of a constitutional government through patronage relationships has given Liberian presidents enormous power. This authority is then used to appoint relatives, supporters, and partisans as leaders of election management institutions such as the National Election Commission, the National Police Force, and the Supreme Court. The qualifications or competencies of such appointees are not important as long as they are the president's favorites.

An autocratic state has long existed in Liberia because nepotistic or patriarchal institutions are incapable of providing effective oversight for election management organization, thereby making public officials susceptible to mismanaging resources, rigging elections, and demanding bribes to perform their responsibility (Fukuyama, 2004; Rand Corporation, 2007; Moyo, 2009). These problems have made it difficult for Liberia's electoral management institution to administer an equitable election, in turn creating citizen distrust in the National Election Commission and lack of confidence in the election process. The Afrobarometer survey of voting-age Liberians revealed that 78% of respondents trusted the National Election Commission "some," "just a little," or "not at all," whereas 92%, 91%, and 90% of them perceived "some," "most," or "all" government officials, police officers, and judges and magistrates, respectively, as being corrupt (Tokpa et al., 2009). As a result, the study concludes that Liberia's election process is corrupt because it lacks an independent and a competent electoral administration. This has made Liberia a predominantly autocratic state, despite being classified as an "electoral democracy," in a "warning status" of failure, or a "partly free" nation (Freedom House, 2012; The Fund for Peace, 2011).

8. Conclusion

The appropriate way to transform Liberia's corrupt political and economic systems is to enact new legislation that mitigates public corruption. The effective administration of elections is a prerequisite to transitioning Liberia into a democracy. Therefore, the legislature should enact a policy that establishes a professional civil servant system for recruiting bureaucrats and places the Election Commission outside of government (Pastor, 1999). Such a policy will ensure that Liberia's Election Commission is beyond the control of governmental regimes and help to appoint competent individuals as commissioners. Qualified election officials will then minimize technical irregularities and corruption in Liberia's electoral processes through ensuring voter registration, enforcement of campaign rules, qualification of parties, fair counting of votes, and legitimate establishment of precinct. As indicated earlier, a good start would be a policy that institutes Pastor's (1999) third model for electoral management bodies, which suggested that "an independent election commission manned by experts and directly accountable to the parliament" will be effective at conducting elections (p. 12). Legislation to place the Liberian Election Commission outside of

government is a strategy that will eliminate presidential power of appointment, enhance election quality, insulate the commission from corruption, and decrease voters' perception that the conduct of elections is manipulated (Pastor, 1999).

Such a structural reform initiative will revitalize the election management institutions, including the national election commission, police force, judicial system, and government officials, and foster effective governance in Liberia's electoral processes (Crocker, 2003; Rotberg, 2002). In other words, this transformation will help Liberia's government adhere to democratic principles, thereby allowing it to successfully implement policies through appropriate coordination between its bureaucracy and its constitutional government (Weber, as cited in Tompkins, 2005). Moreover, a continuous assessment of Liberia's election process is essential, as democracy takes time to evolve in autocratic systems. The consolidation of democracy in Liberia can be determined by observing electoral turnovers in presidential elections. The "two turnover test" requires three multiparty presidential contests resulting in opposition candidates' winning each election and the defeated incumbents all relinquishing power to the winning parties without conflict (Huntington, 1991). In addition to this test, ongoing research about administrations, processes, and the legitimacy of Liberia's elections is needed to determine the country's authenticity as an electoral democracy. Achieving such a political system would resolve the inequities that indigenous people have long encountered and restore Liberia's ability to enforce laws that keep its politician and privileged groups in compliance (Fukuyama, 2004).

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