Analysis of Disbursement and Management of the Capitation Grant to Primary Schools in Morogoro Region, Tanzania

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Abstract
In Tanzania, the management of capitation grant in Government primary schools is under school committees with expectation that the capitation grant would be well managed so as to give intended outcomes. However, there are incidents of inadequate allocation and mismanagement of the grant, and little is known on the functioning of school committees in terms of their coping strategies, decisiveness and financial management skills. Hence, based on this problem, the study was conducted in Morogoro Region from August, 2014 to March 2015, and used qualitative and quantitative data to analyse management and disbursement of the grant in Government primary schools. The study found that some schools borrowed money and sent home pupils whose parents failed to contribute for their education as their coping strategies. Also most members of the school committees depended much on school heads in their capitation spending decisions. Furthermore, most school committee members were not skilled in financial management. The results demonstrate the need for allocating adequate capitation grant, improving monitoring of capitation spending and committing extra funds for training education actors in grant management at local level.

Keywords: Capitation Grant, School Committees, Financial Management Skills

1. Introduction
The Government of Tanzania strives to achieve the National Development Vision 2025. This effort also entails meeting objectives of the Primary Education Development Programme (PEDP) of 1999 in order to attain development goals such as Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) adopted in 2015. The second phase of PEDP (2007/08 – 2011/12) had strategies including the allocation of the capitation grant (CG) of TZS 10 000 per pupil per year nationwide (TZS means Tanzanian shillings), the strengthening of financial management capacities of School Committees (SCs), and ensure accurate accounting, reporting and auditing of PEDP fund. The CG is a recurrent mechanism targeting at provision of teaching and learning materials to Government primary schools (GPSs) (URT, 2012). Ideally, GPSs are not required to charge school fees to parents. In fact, the school fees and other related costs to households represent an obstacle to the poor and vulnerable households. Through the Local Councils (LCs) the CG is disbursed to CG Accounts of GPS (URT, 2010). The SCs manage CG accounts and are free to determine their needs and set priorities (Manara and Mwombela, 2012). The SCs are mandatory independent governing bodies operating in GPSs within Tanzania and which is composed of the school head as secretary and elected members among parents, and a teacher responsible with academics.

Nevertheless, the CG is reported to be inadequately and untimely disbursed, and mismanaged in GPSs (Manara and Mwombela, 2012). Moreover, there is limited empirical evidence on the functioning aspect of the school committees in terms of the coping strategies, their decisiveness in school committees meetings, and their financial skills in terms of accounting, recording and reporting of education funds. According to Dossing et al. (2011), decisions at the school level can be hampered either deliberately by violating written rules or lack of capacity of officials or both. Hence, with reference to meeting PEDP II strategies between 2007/08 and 2011/12, the study from which this paper originates, examined the disbursement and management of the CG. The study answered three questions: how do SCs cope with inadequately disbursed CG? How decisive are SCs in capitation spending? Do SCs have financial skills to manage the CG?

2. Literature Review
2.1 Theoretical framework
Theoretically, the study is guided by the Open System Theory (OST). The OST posits that organizations as systems are surrounded and draw certain inputs from the environment, transform them, and discharge the outputs to the external environment in the form of goods and services and responds to the environment through the procedure of feedback (Bertalanffy, 1950 in Haque and Rehman, 2014). Ayeni and Ibukun (2013) state that the financial resources such as the capitation grant (CG) are the key inputs for school development. The CG undergoes a transformation process through the School Committees (SCs). The SCs have various roles including preparing and submitting accurate and timely physical and financial progress reports to LGAs (URT, 2012). Negative feedback indicates a potential for failure and the need to change the way things are being done
(Haque and Rehman, 2014). The deficiencies in the disbursement of the CG or the management of the CG, or both or failure to attain intended goals can be corrected. According to Eicher (1984) cited by Mlozi et al. (2013), in any productive processes, the quality of the output depends upon that of inputs.

However, the thinking of additional organisational theories which can provide a theoretical lens to clarify how organisational contexts affect the practice of quality assurance in GPSs is necessary. The OST does not explain much on the role of decision-making capacity, and the importance of the internal environment to the organization's efficiency and effectiveness. This necessitates the thinking of the Agency Theory (AT), Institutional Theory (IT) and Cognitive Theory (CRT) as additional organisational theories. These theories are used with expectation that they will contribute in informing practice in Government primary schools (GPSs). According to Boer et al. (2015), the value of any theoretical contribution will be determined by its utility in informing practice and/or future research.

The AT posits that there is an asymmetry of information between principals and agents and the agent, in the pursuit of his/her official duties, has great discretion and monopolistic power, and when accountability of agent to the principal is weak, he may take that opportunity to betray the principal’s interests for his/her own including corruption (Klitgaard, 1988; Keng’ara, 2014). The AT is applied to the Tanzania context where the management of GPSs finances is delegated to SCs. Citizens, as principal, select members of SCs to represent them as governing bodies in GPSs. In this context SCs are supposed to be accountable in capitation spending. As accountability requires the conformity to rules, the IT can be a good supplement to OST in the analysis of accountability of SCs.

Because of information asymmetries and self-interests, principals lack the bases to trust their appointed agents and will seek to mitigate these concerns by putting in place mechanisms to align the interests of agents with principals and to reduce the scope for information asymmetries and opportunistic tendencies (Walker, 2003 in Keng’ara, 2014). The institutional perspective is about conforming to the rules and norms of the institutional environment (Scott, 2007 in Glover et al., 2014). Generally, as conformity to rules also requires one’s capability to comply, the Cognitive Resource Theory (CRT) can be an important complementary analytical lens as well.

The CRT, by Fiedler and Garcia (1987) as further explained by Kiprono et al. (2015), assumes that intelligence and experience and other cognitive resources are factors in leadership success. Cognitive resources refer to the leaders’ intelligence, ability and technical competence. According to this theory training leads to improved job performance. The CRT is relevant to the current study on the management of the CG as SCs need to have financial skills necessary for their work. According to Kiprono et al. (2015), by being competent, it means that the SMCs, in this case the SCs, can adequately perform their management functions (Kiprono et al., 2015).

2.2 An Overview of educational funds and their management in schools
Public schools need inputs, both financial and human resources, from the Government and the community in order to implement education policy. In addition there is a need for inputs, such as the capitation grants (CG), to be managed well in order to give intended results (Manara and Mwombela, 2012; Kiprono et al., 2015). For effective management of financial resources in schools, as observed by Uguru and Ibeogu (2015), financial accountability is important. Uguru and Ibeogu (2015), studying the effects of bureaucratic corruption and lack of public accountability on grass root transformation, established that accountability is one of the most important ethical values that is required of all bureaucrats for good governance. They further established that bureaucratic corruption and lack of public accountability has negative effect on the effective grass root transformation in Nigeria.

However, accountability in spending is challenged by inadequacy of financial resources disbursed to schools in terms of criteria for allocation, grant amount and delays in its disbursement (Manara and Mwombela, 2012; Nampota and Chiwaula, 2013), inflation (Manara and Mwombela, 2012), and their uncertainty and unsustainability (Mwinjuma and Baki, 2012). Nampota and Chiwaula (2013), studying the processes and outcomes of Direct Support System (DSS) in the schools in Malawi, found that the impact of the grant was negatively affected by criteria for allocation, grant amount and delays in its disbursement. Earlier, Manara and Mwombela (2012), looking at the state of the governance of the CG in GPSs from the civic engagement (demand side) and school autonomy (supply side) perspectives in Tanzania, pointed out that the CG allocation of TZS 10 000 per pupil per year had been devaluated by inflation and there were chronic delays and insufficiency of CG disbursement. Likewise, Mwinjuma and Baki (2012), examining the observations of parents on head teachers’ financial management skills in Government primary schools in Tanzania, found that the funding mechanisms were both uncertain and unsustainable. The inadequacy can results into an institutional decoupling problem as described in Konstantinos et al. (2012). This means organisations never implement adopted policies and structures.

Moreover, accountability is challenged by failure of school committee members to attend their meetings (Ayeni and Ibukun, 2013). They also lack capacity to execute financial accountability as they are not skilled in
various aspects of financial management (Mwinjuma and Baki, 2012; Ayeni and Ibukun, 2013). Ayeni and Ibukun (2013), studying the School-Based Management Committee’s (SBMC) involvement and effectiveness in school governance, curriculum implementation and students’ learning outcomes in Nigerian secondary schools, found that ineffective school management and low level of students’ academic achievement was caused by poor attendance of SBMCs members at meetings and low capacity of key members of the SBMCs. Earlier, Mwinjuma and Baki (2012), examining the observations of parents on head teachers’ financial management skills in Government primary schools in Tanzania, found that head teachers had insufficient financial management skills. Financial management skills are about planning, budgeting and monitoring the use of funds (Kiprono et al., 2015).

Hence understanding accountability mechanisms and financial management is important. The knowledge helps to improve factors affecting accountability and management such as financial management capacity of school committees (Uguru and Ibeogu, 2015 in Ibeogu and Nkwede, 2016). Nevertheless, there is limited empirical evidence on the functioning aspect of the school committees in terms of the coping strategies, their decisiveness in school committees meetings, and their financial skills. Generally, on the basis of the Open System Theory (OST), Agency Theory (AT), Institutional Theory (IT) and Cognitive Resource Theory (CRT), it can be presumed that for school funds to give intended results, they must be managed well in Government primary schools (GPSs), particularly in Morogoro Region, Tanzania.

2.3 Conceptual framework
This study adapts the conceptual framework by Kiprono et al. (2015) to conceptualize that the accountability in capitation spending is influenced by the capacity of the school committee and external control factors. The capacity of the SCs is affected by external control factors. According to Kiprono et al. (2015), school governing bodies are challenged by limited education and lack of training on relevant skills pertaining to their management functions, added roles without proper preparations to undertake the responsibilities, and insufficient resources to carry out their designated responsibilities. The PEDP II (2007/08 - 2011/12) had strategies including building capacity for head-teachers and Ward Education Coordinators (WECs) to enable them to handle management issues in schools within their areas of jurisdiction and to maintain accountability and transparency in the use of public funds. The capacity entails understanding of budget processes as well as to have the skills to plan and make decisions about education expenditure (Kiprono et al., 2015).

3. Research Methodology
3.1 Description of the study area
The study from which this paper originates was conducted in Morogoro Region in Tanzania Mainland from August, 2014 to March, 2015. The region is administratively divided into seven districts namely Gairo, Kilombero, Kilosa, Morogoro, Mvomero, Ulanga and Malinyi. The region had 829 Government primary schools (GPS) in the year 2012. The region was selected purposively based on poor pass-rate and number of rural-based primary schools. The Morogoro Regional PSLE pass-rate of 2012 dropped to 28% from 56.1% in 2008 (URT, 2014), meaning that 72% of standard VII leavers in the region failed the PSLE. Also, in 2012, the region had the largest number of 404 rural-based primary schools located at a distance equal or more than 76 km from councils head office. According to URT (2010), the more remote a school is located from the council headquarters, the lower is the quality of facilities. In addition, like in many other regions in Tanzania mainland, all GPS in the region were recipient of capitation grant (CG) (URT, 2012).

3.2 Research design and sampling
The study adopted a cross-sectional research design whereby data were collected at one point in time. According to Mlozi et al. (2013), the design is relatively feasible and economical. In particular, the study was conducted within the qualitative interpretative paradigm based on semi-structured interviews guide as described in Creswell (2012). The interviews on CG disbursed between 2007/08-2011/12 were held with 11 key informants (six Chairpersons of the school committees, three Ward Education Officers (WEOs), one officer from the District Education Office, and one officer from the Municipal Education Office) from September, 2014 to March 2015. The key question was “what do you know about the disbursement and management of the CG to Government primary schools (GPSs) in Tanzania or to your school”? Qualitative data analysis involved comparison and contrasting of key-informants’ arguments based on data reduction and interpretation; observed themes of the discussions, and agreement and disagreement in responses given, and quoting their words (Chombo and Kayunze, 2013). Descriptive texts were used to present the analysed findings. The results were rated as depicted in Table 1 (URT, 2012).
Table 1: Capitation grant performance rating

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Performance</th>
<th>Decision (Rating)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. CG objective achieved and no shortcomings</td>
<td>Highly Satisfactory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. CG objective achieved and a few shortcomings</td>
<td>Satisfactory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. CG objective achieved and significant shortcomings</td>
<td>Moderately unsatisfactory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. CG objective not achieved and major shortcomings</td>
<td>Unsatisfactory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. CG objective not achieved and no worthwhile results</td>
<td>Highly Unsatisfactory</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Modified from PEDP II evaluation report (URT, 2012)

The qualitative data were supplemented with quantitative data collected through 102 copies of a questionnaire administered to school heads from August, 2014 to November, 2014. In addition, the 2007/08-2011/12 records of the CG disbursed to the selected GPSs were sought from the respective local councils and GPSs. The quantitative data collected were analyzed using computer programme software, the Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS) version 16 and descriptive statistics. The findings were presented in frequency tables and bar chats, and the results were then interpreted (Table 1).

4. Results and Discussion

The study attempted to answer three questions: how do school committees cope with inadequately disbursed capitation grant? How decisive are School Committees (SCs) in capitation grant spending? And do school committees have financial skills to manage the capitation grant?

4.1 Disbursement of capitation grant to primary schools

Results of key-informant interview analysis show that the functions of the school committees (SCs) were perplexed with the untimely and inadequately disbursement of the capitation grant (CG). When asked to evaluate the trend of budgetary disbursement of the CG to primary schools in Tanzania, key informants admitted that apart from sending home the pupils as one of the coping strategies, the school heads opted to borrow with interests so as to get money to run their schools. For instance some of the key-informants had these to say:

“The capitation grant is disbursed less than the budgeted amount... and it does not come on time...a school has been receiving less than Tanzania shillings 5000 per pupil per annum as capitation grant...we used to accumulate it before spending...when we run out of money, we borrow with interests so as to get money to run the school such as for taking care of school visitors... as a result the school succumbs to debts and parents are overburdened with contributions as they are paying more for primary education for such small items like papers for letter writing... Nowadays there is the problem of sending home the children whose parents fail to contribute... in order to improve the effectiveness of the capitation grant, the Government needs to disburse at least TZS 25 000 per pupil per year... in order to compensate for the inadequacy due to inflation and variation in exchange rate...because, for instance, the books were sold at TZS 1 200 per piece in 2002 while the same books were sold at the minimum of TZS 6 000 per piece in 2010”

This situation can be interpreted as caused by the allocation of the CG based on the number of pupils without considering other socio-economic factors. In addition, the strategy of the second phase of PEDP to disburse the CG on per capita basis, which still continues in the third phase of PEDP, has an effect on the funds that are available to GPSs (URT, 2012). As a result, with escalating prices of educational materials and the dissimilarities in school needs, it becomes a problem with schools having a small number of pupils. The analysis of the CG disbursement records shows that the CG per pupil per year for a five years period from 2007/08 to 2011/12 did not exceed TZS 8000 (Figure 1).
The largest gap occurred in the fiscal year 2011/12. However, based on the official average exchange rates by the World Bank – WB (2016), the real gap could be larger than this, had exchange rate and inflation been considered during budgeting. According to URT (2001), the unit cost of USD 10 per pupil per year was computed in 2001 based on 1999 prices (USD 1=TZS 900) as enough to meet the costs of training a pupil. The breakdown of this cost is USD 2 (for facility repairs), USD 4 (for textbooks, teaching guides, supplementary reading materials), USD 2 (for chalk, exercise books, pens and pencils), USD 1 (for administration materials) and USD 1 (for examination paper purchase and printing). The increase in exchange rate, from USD 1=TZS 900 in 1999 to USD 1=TZS 1600 in 2012, requires that the unit cost of training a pupil per year be at least TZS 16000 with inflation on board. This is due to variations in inflation rates: 7.0 in 2007; 10.3 in 2008; 12.1 in 2009; 5.5 in 2010; 12.7 in 2011; and 16.0 in 2012 (National Bureau of Statistics – NBS, 2013).

Generally, the results are consistent with the Open System Theory (OST), the Agency Theory (AT) and the Institutional Theory (IT) as described in Boer et al. (2015). In fact, late disbursement of the CG and their meagre arrivals can provide favourable condition for institutional decoupling problem; the CG policy is only adopted and not implemented in practice (Konstantinos et al., 2012). School Heads might violate the capitation spending formula as a coping strategy to the small amount of money received. This act can be a breeding ground for the misuse of the CG and might result into the imperfect link between the CG Policy and the actual capitation spending actions or practice.

4.2 Decision making capacity of school committees

Results of key-informant interview analysis show that there were differences in the level of education between the school heads and other members of the SCs which could hinder making of democratic decisions at their meetings. The key informants admitted that most members of the SCs were standard seven leavers and thus they depended much and agreed on whatever is or was presented by the school heads. For instance, one key-informant said:

“...there is a wide gap between teachers and school committee members with regard to their levels of education....most members of the school committees are standard seven leavers; the head of school, who is the secretary to the school committee, his/her understanding over things is higher than that of the other members of the school committee; as a result the school committees only approve budgets which they do not know....what the school committee members normally do, after presentation of expenditure reports which were prepared by the teachers, is only to clap their hands”.

This would imply that most of the decisions of the SCs were to a greater extent made by the school heads alone. This might be lowering accountability in capitation spending, which would be exacerbated by the turn-up failure for meetings by members of the SCs. For instance, one key-informant gave this statement:

“...some school committee members do not show up for school committee meetings unless they get paid...”

This is consistent with the findings by Ayeni and Ibuken (2013) in their examination of the School-Based Management Committee’s (SBMC) involvement and effectiveness in school governance, curriculum implementation and students’ learning outcomes in Nigerian secondary schools. They identified poor attendance of SBMC’s members at meetings due to lack of incentives and financial support from the Government as one of the challenges facing effective operation of SBMCs as ineffective school management and low level of students’ academic achievement. In fact the failure to show up in the meetings could essentially be viewed as creating loopholes for dishonest members including the school heads to defraud or mismanage the CG. For instance, the
evaluation done by the Government of the United Republic of Tanzania - URT (2012) on PEDP revealed that some school heads failed to justify their expenditures. However, this contrasts the Nampota and Chiwaula’s (2013) results which showed that the mechanisms of grant administration in Direct Support System (DSS) in the schools in Malawi were conducive to accountability.

Furthermore, much can be deduced from the school heads’ responses. They were asked a question, how democratic is the school committee in decision-making process? Their responses in Table 2 show that many head teachers (64%) rated the decision-making process as good, 18% considered it very good, and 12% considered it as excellent. Only 6% of the head teachers considered it either poor (3%) or unsatisfactory (3%).

Table 2: Response on the process of decision-making in the school committee (n=102)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Items</th>
<th>Response of school heads</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Per cent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Unsatisfactory</td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poor</td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Good</td>
<td></td>
<td>65</td>
<td>63.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very good</td>
<td></td>
<td>18</td>
<td>17.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Excellent</td>
<td></td>
<td>12</td>
<td>11.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No answer</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td>102</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Generally, due to undemocratic decision making in some GPSs (6%), the findings simply suggest that there was room for violating the PEDP financial and procurement guidelines. As a result, according to TI (2009), funds that reach schools might not be used according to their intended purpose, illegal payments might be made by school authorities using falsified receipts or the quantity of goods purchased might be inflated, and textbooks might be of poor quality and insufficient quantity. The undemocratic atmosphere might be caused by the knowledge gap, as stated by key informants, between the head of schools and other members of the school committees. This problem could be solved by electing only well-educated parents, but it would not be practical especially in remote areas. In addition, it is demonstrated by Kiprono et al. (2015) in Kenya that the level of education of the school management committees (SMCs) does not matter. They observed that 82.6% of the SMCs had ordinary level certificate and they were not very effective in managing the funds. According to them, what was required was the financial management training.

The results confirm the Agency Theory (AT) as described in Boer et al. (2015). In this context, the failure of the SCs to meet shows that their accountability was weak which created an opportunity to betray the principal’s interests for their own including corruption. This might be possible because the school committee work is one of the team-oriented jobs in which evaluation of behaviours is difficult (Eisenhardt, 1989). According to Walker (2003) in Keng’ara (2014), reduction of the scope for information asymmetries and opportunistic tendencies was necessary by putting in place mechanisms to align the interests of agents with principals. This is necessary because in the education sector there are different principals (citizens, employees, the officials of the related ministry and politicians) who might have different views about outcomes and agents’ tasks (Besley and Ghatak, 2003 in Hossain, 2013).

4.3 Financial management capacity of a school committee

Results of key-informant interview analysis show that key informants affirmed that members of the school committees (SCs) were incompetent in the field of financial management. For instance, one key informant had this to say:

“The school committees lack financial management skills as members have got no training on financial management.....this calls for a need to train them so that they perform their work effectively.... but there are no funds for seminars.....these negatively affect Primary Education Development Programme”.

As schools in Tanzania have been given autonomy over the use of their financial inputs and yet they lack financial management skills, the mismanagement of the CG would be possible. This is because, regardless of autonomy of SCs to procure school needs, members of school committees could not do much without capacity building in funds management (URT, 2012). Recognizing the need of ensuring proper management and accountability in the use of funds at all levels, PEDP II had strategies to strengthen the capacities of SCs to manage public funds disbursed to GPSs, and adherence to mechanisms and procedures for accurate accounting, reporting and auditing of PEDP funds. In order to implement these strategies, the Government planned to allocate USD 500 per school for financial management training in record keeping, reporting, information and data management. However, training was not done as planned. The school heads had the responsibility of preparing school budget (income and expenditure) which were submitted to the school committee for approval (Msabila and Dossa, 2012). This is consistent with the findings by Kiprono et al. (2015) in Kenya as they found that the SMCs were not effective as they ought to be due to inadequate skills. They argued that management of
school finances can be one of the most challenging activities of the school committees’ responsibilities. Likewise, Msabila and Dossa (2012) observed poor financial management in schools as one of the challenges facing education service delivery. Moreover, Mwinjuma and Baki (2012) found that school heads had insufficient financial management skills. Similarly, Manara and Mwombela (2012) found that the majority of school heads did not have bookkeeping skills.

This situation might put at risk the implementation of the CG Policy in the study area because there were few assurances that the CG would be used as intended. In this case it would be equally important to monitor functions of the SCs. However, asked whether the GPSs were visited for monitoring purposes, the key informants interviewed admitted that there had been minimum monitoring of capitation spending in GPSs. For instance, one key-informant said:

“The primary schools were not regularly visited …… for monitoring purposes”.

This is in line with Rajkumar and Swaroop (2008) findings that one of the possible reasons for the ineffectiveness of public spending is weak institutional capacity. The institutional capacity reflects how public funds are managed and monitored. Table 3 shows the responses of the school heads on the question, how responsible the different levels of primary school governance in ensuring correct budget spending in GPSs were. Their responses show that SCs were rated as the most responsible followed by school heads, while the Regional Education Officer and District/Municipal Education Officer were the least rated. This would imply that the duty to monitor and control capitation spending was largely left to SCs.

Table 3: Response on the responsibility to ensure correct budget spending (n=102)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Items</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Per cent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Head Teacher</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>14.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>School Committee</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>79.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>District/Municipal Education Officer</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional Education Officer</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do not know</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

According to Boer et al. (2015), these results are in support of the Cognitive Resource Theory (CRT) by Fiedler and Garcia (1987) as explained by Kiprono et al. (2015). Based on CRT, the performance of the SCs in the management of the CG was dependent on the ability and technical competence of their members, which were supposed to be enhanced by financial management training. The SCs, as were clearly outlined in PEDP II, have various roles (United Republic of Tanzania - URT, 2012). They have obligations to operate bank accounts and efficiently and effectively manage funds received for implementation, while guaranteeing maximum accountability and transparency. The utilisation had to be authorised by the Chairperson of the School Committee, the Chairperson of Village/Hamlet Executive Officer and the Ward Education Coordinator (WEC). They were also required to publicise their deliberations and school budgets and approve Whole School Development Plans (WSDPs) and budgets and submit them to relevant authorities such as Ward Development Committees (WDCs) for scrutiny, consolidation and approval. The lack of financial management skills also questions the level of accountability in CG spending for primary schools because the school committees are supposed to observe good governance principles in capitation spending. These principles include attributes such as transparency and accountability (Klitgaard, 1988).

5. Conclusion and Recommendations

The study sought to analyse the disbursement and management of the capitation grant (CG) in primary schools in Morogoro region, Tanzania. The study attempted to answer three questions: how do school committees cope with inadequately disbursed capitation grant? How decisive are school committees in capitation spending? Do school committees have financial skills to manage the capitation grant? On the basis of key findings, it is concluded that there were violations of PEDP financial and procurement guidelines in capitation grant spending. The violation was caused by the inadequacy of the capitation grant disbursed to primary schools, failure of members of school committees to attend meetings and lack of financial management skills. The study has generally shown that accountability in capitation grant spending relates to amount of CG, knowledge/skills and monitoring/control with reference to Open System Theory (OST), the Cognitive Resource Theory (CRT) and the Institutional Theory (IT), respectively. The results are important in the implementation of Primary Education Development Programme (PEDP). In view of the above conclusion, education stakeholders in Morogoro Region are urged to rectify the situation. This can be done by disbursing adequate capitation grant (CG) as well as improving its management through control and training. The local councils in Morogoro Region are urged to allocate the minimum of TZS 25 000.00 per pupil per year as CG to cater for inflation, locality and relative needs such as pupils weights, and administrative costs. This also requires adequate and timely budgetary disbursement of the CG to Government primary schools (GPSs). Additionally, given the tight fiscal constraints
under which the local councils operate, the sustainability of the CG can be ensured by attracting donations through regular fund-raising campaigns. This will revitalize the capitation grant policy’s objective of compensating the abolition of school fees by ensuring adequate disbursement of the CG in GPSs. The local councils, through School Quality Assurance Officers (SQAOs), are urged to strengthen control in capitation spending by ensuring regular follow-ups of capitation spending in all primary schools. In addition, they are urged to devise mechanisms to attract attendance and persistence of school committee members at school committees (SCs) meetings. The local councils are urged to budget for training funds for SCs, teachers, and Ward Education Officers (WEOs). Also, they are urged to ensure that training funds for SCs are disbursed to GPSs and they, in collaboration with CSOs, provide financial management training to respective education actors. This would curb-up violation of financial rules since such practice and others make the intention of CG not be realised in GPS. On the other hand, further research is recommended to examine disbursement and management of capitation grant in public secondary schools in Morogoro Region and other areas with similar conditions. This is because the sample for this study was limited to Government primary schools and thus the findings may not reflect the state of affairs in secondary schools. Furthermore, secondary schools also depend on Government allocations and their spending is governed by school boards.

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