Towards a Model of Pragmatic Justification

Prof. Dr. Hameed Hassoon Al- Mas'udi
University of Babylon, College of Education- Human Sciences, Dept. of English

Mariam D. Saffah
University of Babylon, College of Education- Human Sciences, Dept. of English

Abstract
It is stated that justification may be a prerequisite for any claim that is made, whether the claim is about a weather forecast by a meteorologist, an accusation of negligence by an employee against his or her employers, or a doctor's diagnosis. Justification denotes a communicative event which is meant to compensate for the violation of a certain norm or to enable recipient to understand better something unpredicted or disputed.Although justification is ubiquitous in everyday life, it has so far remained relatively unexplored. This study provides the first investigation of justification as a communicative event and from a pragmatic point of view. It paper attempts to develop a model which can be used for the analysis of data in relation to pragmatic justification. Additionally, the workability of the model will be tested against data collected from political speeches produced by Tony Blair and Barack Obama.

1. Introduction

The concept of justification can be encountered in various fields of inquiry such as philosophy, law, religion and politics According to Audi (1999: 457), justification denotes a concept of wide scope that covers entire areas of epistemology and ethics. Hence, numerous things, of many different kinds, can be justified including beliefs and actions. To say that *X* is justified is to say something positive about *X*.

Swinburne (2001:1) mentions that justification is an essential notion in current epistemology in the analytic tradition. Epistemologists concentrate on the kind of justification that is indicative of truth. They have spent much time trying to analyze what is for a belief to be justified, and have come up with some very diverse accounts. The prominent division is that between internalist and externalist accounts.

Justification by faith signifies one of the several concepts that have been utilized within Scripture and the Christian tradition to articulate the reconciliation effected by God with the world through Christ (McGrath, 1986:6). It is the characteristic doctrine of the Protestant Reformation that sinful human beings can be justified before God through faith in Jesus Christ(ibid: 458).

Law is another area where justification prevails. While noticing that the term justification is often used interchangeably with excuse, Gordon (1978: 423) cited in Buchanan (2000: 23) believes that justification denotes factors which disassociate an act from its criminal nature, i.e., it renders lawful what would otherwise be regarded as unlawful. However, excuse simply turns the act unpunishable. In addition, a justification is only called for when an action appears wrong.

As for justification in political discourse, Wodak (1997: 152) believes that justification and legitimation basically denote debatable acts or events of the past which may affect the narrative design of issues of national history. That is, they try to justify a social status quo ante. For instance, Austria's doubtful treatment of crimes of the Nazi regime. Moreover, political decisions regarding the present and future can be justified and legitimized by the same token.

2. Approaches to Justification

As for this study, four approaches to justification will be discussed in this section.

2. 1 Argumentation

Schlesinger et al. (2001: 80) believe that when people engaged in argumentation, they regularly make statements, draw inferences, and make judgments, which they then defend and support via other statements. Such supporting statements are analyzed as justifications. Consider the following example where the second line includes a justification of the first:
Rosie is inquisitive.
Even her best friends say so.
According to Toulmin (2003: 12), justificatory arguments are those brought forward in support of an assertion. It could be argued that this is the primary function of arguments, and that the other uses, the other functions that arguments may have are subsidiary and sponging on this primary justificatory use

Johnson (2000: 12) mentions that argumentation functions to assist one to accomplish numerous different goals among them is that of justification.

Van Eemeren and Grootendorst (2004: 2) believe that argumentation includes one or more expressions in which a constellation of propositions is conveyed. In the case of a positive standpoint, the argumentation is employed to justify the proposition conveyed in the standpoint, whereas in the case of a negative standpoint, it is used to refute it.

At the sentence level, it is seen as consisting of elementary speech acts belonging to the category of assertives. Additionally, at the textual level, the complete constellation of elementary speech acts constitutes the complex speech act of argumentation (Henkemans, 2014: 43).

Freeman (2014: 213) says that justification may be required for any claim that is made, whether the claim is about a weather forecast by a meteorologist, an accusation of negligence by an employee against his or her employers, a doctor's diagnosis, a remark by a business man about dishonesty of a customer, or a critic's verdict on a painting.

2.1.1 Justification as Product and Process

According to Merriam Webster online dictionary, justification means:

1. Reasonable grounds, for complaint, defense, etc.
2. The act of justifying a proof, vindication, or explanation.

On the basis of the definition above , two aspects of justification can be identified. The first description deals with the product of justification

Lodder (1990: 8) states that when the product of justification is studied, general structures of support between sets of premises and conclusions are defined.

The second description of Merriam Webster online dictionary deals with justification as a process. According to Lodder (ibid.: 9), the process of justification is the exchange of information that is introduced step by step in order to justify a statement; each step corresponds to a stage in which a statement is either justified, or not. When the process of justification is studied, rules are defined that determine for each stage of the process whether a statement is justified.

2.2 Speech Acts

2.2.1 Introduction

Grein (2007: 95) suggests that language is the basis for communication and that communication can only be successful when the meaning of each utterance can be grasped. Nevertheless, the meaning of an utterance is not comprehensible by merely understanding the itemized words or the sentence as a whole. So as to understand the meaning of un utterance, the listener has to take into account the situation, in which the utterance is issued, the social distance between the speakers, the preceding utterances, nonverbal factors, the cognitive skills of the speakers, and their cultural imprint. Hence, the fundamental category of language usage is that of speech act.

According to Brandom (1994: 172), an essential element of the sense of asserting is defending, championing, or justifying. Additionally, the commitment involved in asserting requires the undertaking of a justificatory responsibility regarding what is claimed. Hence, when asserting a sentence, one warrants extra assertions besides commits oneself to justifying the original claim. Assertions play a double role in justification: as justifiers and as justified, i.e. premises and conclusions.

Goetz (2010: 403) states that in negotiating the social world, adults often make verbal justifications for their actions or thought while making inferences about the feelings and beliefs of others. One can make a claim such as *I didn't eat the last cookie*, but one is more likely to persuade one's interlocutor if one say, *I didn't eat the last cookie because I haven't been in the kitchen*.

According to Comparini (2013: 60), justifications are socially and culturally situated speech acts. They are a pragmatic device utilized at certain interpersonal junctures to accomplish certain interpersonal goals.

2.2.2 Speech Act Sequences

Van Dijk (1979: 447) says that speech acts do not occur alone. They may appear in ordered sequences of speech acts performed by one speaker or by subsequent speakers, i.e. in the course of a conversation. Much in the same way as sentences may occur in sequences which should satisfy a number of constraints, it should be expected that speech act sequences are not random.

According to Ferrara (1980: 234), speech acts do not usually occur in isolation in real life, rather they come in sequences and are performed by speakers who are engaged in rule-governed activities, such as debating, making conversation, proposing bills in parliament, testifying at trails, teaching in classrooms, preaching and praying in churches, and writing novels. Moreover, speech acts in sequences are normally related to one another, while sharing a different status in the flow of the speaker's action.

Trosborg (1995: 194) says that so as to felicitously issuing a request, the speaker needs to be able to motivate or justify his wish/demand, as in:

Close the door, please. It's cold in here.
Get me a drink, will you? I'm so thirsty.
Would you do the dishes? The kitchen in a total mess.
Can I borrow your car? I'm to be at the airport in half an hour, and my car has just broken down.

According to Trosborg (ibid), reasons generally assume the form of causal clauses supporting a request. Via advancing the reason behind producing the request, the speaker predicts likely questions on the part of the hearer, while he simultaneously supply a justification for asking. Moreover, such opening statements of reasons assist the speaker to discover whether the hearer considers his reasons for inquiring satisfactory.

2.3 Politeness

According to LoCastro (2012: 137), the most prominent work in politeness theory is that of Brown and Levinson (1987). It provides a framework to describe and explain diverse linguistic resources that can be utilized to signify politeness in face-to-face interactions. Central to their theory is the notion of face.

Brown and Levinson (1987: 61) mentions that their notion of face is based on that of Goffman (1967) and the English folk term which associates face with the notions of being embarrassed or humiliated. Face is the public self-image that every person wishes to mantain for himself. It is broken down into two facets: positive and negative.

Negative face: the want of every 'competent adult member' that his/her actions be unimpeded by others.

Positive face: the want of every member that his/her wants be desirable to at least some others.

According to Geyer (2008: 16), for Brown and Levinson, politeness is the incarnation of respect of the interlocutor's face. Hence, participants in interpersonal communication incline to maintain each other's face, and they wish to defend it in case it is threatened. The underlying assumption is that face is vulnerable. As such, most speech acts can be regarded as being inherently face-threatening acts either to the speaker, the hearer, or both. Consequently, these face-threatening acts (FTAs) require some mitigation to alleviate the threat with proper doses of politeness. To satisfy this requirement, speakers resort to utilize politeness strategies to make their intention be polite while issuing (FTAs).

Brown and Levinson (1987: 68-71) suggest a set of five possibilities for the speaker to accomplish this ranging from the best case (strategy type 5) to the worse (strategy type 1). These will be briefly explained below:

1. **Bald on record**: A face-threatening act goes on record when it is clear to participants the communicative intention that led the speaker to perform the act in question.

2. **Positive politeness** refers to the use of strategies intended to partially satisfying the addressee's positive face wants

3. **Negative politeness** signifies the use of strategies intended to partially satisfying the addressee's negative face wants.

4. **Off record**: An act goes off record when there is more than one attributable intention. Hence, the speaker cannot be held to have committed himself to one specific intention.

5. **Withhold the face-threatening act**.

Brown and Levinson (ibid: 128) state that giving reasons by the speaker is another aspect of including the addressee in the activity, Via including the addressee in this practical reasoning and assuming reflexivity, he is led to see the reasonableness of the speaker's FTA. Put differently, giving reasons is a way of implying *I can help you* or *You can help me*. Hence, cooperation is assumed; a way of showing that help is needed as in:

We will shut the door, ma'am. The wind's coming in.

2.4 Fallacy

According to Walton (1995:1), fallacies refer to kinds of errors or deceptive tactics of argumentation that are intended to trick or trip up partakers in argumentation in various types of everyday discussions.

In his approach, Walton (ibid: 7) regards a fallacy as an infringement of a rule of critical discussion or a breach of a rule of a sort of dialogue other than that of a critical discussion. Furthermore, he attaches fallacies to illicit dialectical shifts from one type of dialogue to another. That is, an argument that seems correct is likely to turn incorrect when a shift has occurred in the kind of dialogue that is conducted which causes the argument to be no longer proper or even obstructive.

Van Eemeren et al. (2009: 1) suggest that fallacies are possible to be considered as erroneous moves in argumentative exchanges. The concept of fallacy is at the heart of each comprehensive theory of argumentation and the treatment of the fallacies can be considered as the acid test of any specific approach to argumentation.

It is stated that the pragma-dialectical approach to fallacies developed by Van Eemeren and Grootendorst (1984, 1992, 2004) is not only wider than that of the standard treatment, it is also more specific. In this approach, a fallacy is taken as "a speech act that counts as a violation of one or more of the rules for a critical discussion, which frustrates efforts to resolve a difference of opinion." Hence, the use of the term fallacy is analytically associated with the rules for critical discussion.

3. The Model
This section will be devoted to the development of the pragmatic model that will be adopted for data analysis of the current work. To achieve this goal, it is essential to review other relevant models because the eclectic model will borrow much from such diverse models.

3.1 Models of Justification
It has been mentioned earlier that justification is a topic with a wide coverage that pertains to various fields of study (See 2.1). Hence, It has been investigated by different scholars who have developed various models for analyzing justification in a way that serves their goals best.

For realizing the aims of the current work and developing its model, only the models which can get these aims fulfilled will be reviewed.
3.1.1 Toulmin's (1958) Justificatory Argument
Hitchcock and Verheij (2006: 1) say that in *The Uses of Argument*, Toulmin concentrates on a solitary use of argument that of defending a claim made by asserting something. Throughout the process of rational justification, Toulmin suggests a field-invariant criteria of analysis intended to do justice to the process of defending a specific claim counter to a challenger.

Toulmin (2003: 15) tries to draw a parallel between judicial process and rational process via which arguments are set out and performed to support an initial assertion. In this regard, he states that specific phases are possible to be identified as common to the procedures for handling many kinds of law- case. These include:
An initial stage: At which the charge or claim is clearly stated.
A subsequent stage: In which evidence is set out or testimony given in support of the charge or claim, and
A final stage: At which a verdict is given, and the sentence or other judicial act issuing from the verdict is pronounced. There may be variations of detail.

As regards this study, the name and the numbers of the stages will be incorporated into the eclectic model with some modification.
3.1.2 Schelgoff and Sacks (1973) Adjacency Pairs
According to Fritz (1995: 474), numerous dialogue forms are structured around specific essential sequences of speech acts. Actually, such sequences are the crucial building block of dialogues rather than solitary speech acts. In this regard, Schelgoff and Sack (1973: 73) introduce the notion of adjacency pairs. They propose that there is a class of closely interrelated sequences of turns that they labeled adjacency pairs. These are kinds of paired utterances of which question-answer, greeting-greeting, offer-acceptance/refusal are archetypical.

Examples of first pair parts include question, greeting, challenges, offer, request, invitation, and announcement. Regarding some pairs, the second part is reciprocal while with others there is one proper second. Additionally, for some pairs, more than one constitute an appropriate second (Coulthard, 1985: 71).

Adjacent pairs are used for initiating and concluding conversation. However, in this study, the researcher is interested in the first use. Hence, What will be adopted from this model is the members which belong to the first pair parts. This is not an exhaustive list in the sense that other strategies will be added based on the requirements of the study.
3.1.3 Van Dijk's (1977) Speech act Sequences
According to Felix-Brasdefer (2008: 323), the term *speech act sequence* was pioneered by Van Dijk to account for the coherence and function of speech act sequences in conversation.

Van Dijk (1977a: 213) states that speech acts usually occur in sequences such as an assertion followed by an explanation or addition, an assertion followed by a correction or alternative, or an assertion followed by a denial or contradiction, as in
I need money. Can you lend me a thousand dollars?
In the example above, the first speech act is executed to establish conditions for the following speech act. It provides a reason for the it. Hence, it may alter the context of communication in a way that the speech act of request becomes not only appropriate but also a normal act (Van Dijk, 1980:185).

Van Dijk (1977a: 215) states that in order to make their requests appropriate, speakers resort to specify a justification for them and hence make them sound more acceptable. In other words, for requests to be appropriate, they must be sensible in the sense that they are motivated. That is, satisfaction of the requested action by the hearer at the same time satisfies a desire of the speaker. As such, the probability that the hearer will comply with the request may be enhanced.
3.1.4 Fritz's (2005) Accusation Responses
In his study *On Answering Accusations in Controversies*, Fritz (2005: 151-162) suggests a model of accusation responses which comprises four moves.

Broadly speaking, when one accuses a person of having done something wrong, or blame him/her regarding a particular action, the latter is probable to react to this accusation via utilizing some agreed upon responses including denying the charge, excusing the action by citing extenuating conditions, justifying such action by

giving reasons, and finally apologizing (1995: 475)

As an illustration of his model, Fritz (2005: 153) portrays a situation where a speaker accuses a hearer of having smoked a cigarette. The hearer may respond to the speaker's accusation by means of one of four moves:
(i) The hearer may deny that he smoked a cigarette.
(ii) He may justify his action by saying that there is no reason why he should not have smoked.
(iii) He may cite an excuse by saying that he is not totally answerable for his action.
(iv) He may apologize for having smoked.

As far as this study is concerned, some of the foregoing reactions to accusation represented by the three moves: denial, justification and apology will be incorporated into the eclectic model. Moreover, other moves will be added by the researcher in order enrich and increase the comprehensiveness of the very model.

3.1.5 Eemeren and Grootendorst's Model of Critical Discussion

Broadly speaking, and since justification generally occurs in argumentative discourse, it is essential to shed light on the pragma-dialectic theory of argumentation proposed by Van Eemeren and Grootendorst (1984).

According to Van Eemeren and Houtlosser (2002: 134), in a pragma-dialectic approach, argumentative discourse is reconstructed as a try at eliminating a difference of opinion. This causes a depiction of the discourse in terms of a critical discussion. Such model elucidates the dissimilarity of views and the stance of the participants.

Van Eemeren and Houtlosser (2015: 157-8) suggest that the discussion begins with a *confrontational stage* where the difference of opinion is revealed. In the *opening stage*, the commitments of the parties are established and the roles of protagonist and antagonist are assigned. In the *argumentation stage*, the protagonist defends his standpoint against the antagonist's criticism. Finally, in the *concluding stage*, the outcome of the discussion is identified.

3.1.6 Strategic Maneuvering

Originally, the pragma-dialectic analysis focused merely on the dialectical facet. In argumentative discourse, arguers aim at winning the discourse and at the same time executing it in a reasonable way. Hence, it becomes possible to integrate rhetorical insights into a dialectical framework of analysis through the notion of *strategic maneuvering*. It is proposed to eliminate the tension between chasing dialectical and rhetorical goals simultaneously (Van Eemeren and Houtlosser, 2002: 135).

Strategic maneuvering refers to the continual efforts made in all moves that are carried out in argumentative discourse to keep the balance between reasonableness and effectiveness

(Van Eemeren, 2010: 40)

Van Eemeren and Houtlosser (2002: 139) identify three inseparable aspects of strategic maneuvering: topical potential, audience demand, and presentational devices. Considering each of these aspects, the two participants attain the chance to affect the outcome of the discourse in a way the suit them best. All of these are connected to specific kind of options made in the maneuvering (Van Eemeren, 2010: 93).

As for this study, what will be adapted from the three aspects of strategic maneuvering outlined above is *audience demand*. This pole of strategic maneuvering performs a strategic function in the justification executed by British and American decision-makers.

Adaptation to audience demand signifies a try in each stage at creating the necessary communion, wherever possible with those whom the argumentative discourse is directed at (Van Eemeren, 2009: 6).

According to Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca (1969: 19), for rhetorical purposes, it is favourable to identify an audience as the collaborative of those whom the speaker wants to effect by his argumentation. Whether conscious or not, every speaker considers those he is trying to persuade. These people constitute the audience to whom he is directing his speech.

Van Eemeren and Garssen (2011: 6) suggest that the arguer may wish his argumentation to exert an influence on other people besides an immediate recipient. Those people do not partake in the discussion, but they happen to be there. For example, listeners to a radio broadcast of a speech produced to a different audience or television bystanders viewing a debate between politicians.

3.2 The Eclectic Model
3.2.1 The Pragmatic Structure of Justification

Justification is not be understood as a single speech act performed in isolation, but as a situated activity, interactionally managed by interlocutors. This indicates that justification exhibits a well-organized structure which is based on pragmatic ingredients. This structure involves three stages, the initial stage, the elaboration stage, and the final stage. Each is characterized by a number of different components resorted to by interlocutors in order to achieve justification.

3.2.1.1 The Initial Stage

The initial stage comprises two pragmatic components: speech acts and presuppositions.

3.2.1.1.1 Speech Acts

As far as speech act is concerned, Kauffeld (1998: 3) says that the performance of numerous illocutionary acts do not force the speaker to supply a reason and evidence. Nevertheless, it is merely in some types of illocutionary acts, speakers are not able to overlook an addressee request for proof. In this regard, Van Eemeren (2009: 227) states that the execution of specific speech acts provide the speaker with a certain probative obligation. These include accusing, proposing, refusing, complaining, compliment, criticizing, warning, and telling

3.2.1.1.2 Presuppositions

Greco (2002: 5) states that the use of presuppositions proven to be vital for human communication in everyday conversations. Actually, interlocutors requires taking something for granted at every phase of a conversation in order that it is possible to continue. Or else, if they repeatedly question what is previously known, nothing new could be communicated.

According to Yule (2000: 25), a presupposition signifies something the speaker assumes to be the case before producing an utterance. Similarly, Crystal (2008: 410) says that presupposition refers to what a speaker thinks when uttering a certain sentence in opposition to what is in fact asserted.

Archer et al., (2012: 30) state that presupposition are normally created by lexical items or linguistic constructions. These are referred to as presupposition triggers. Such linguistic forms can only become actual presupposition in contexts.

According Yule (2000: 28), presupposition triggers can be classified into three broad types: existential, lexical and structural.

As far as this study is concerned, existential, lexical and structural presuppositions all play a role in triggering justification.

3.2.1.2 The Elaboration Stage

The elaboration stage encompasses several pragmatic components: the co-operative principle and the politeness principle. Additionally, this stage also includes conversational implicatures resulting from the exploiting of the conversational maxims, speech acts, pragma-dialectical strategies, Aristotle's argumentative appeals, and finally pragma-rhetorical tropes.

3.2.1.2.1 Cooperative Principle

At this stage of justification, the argumentative discourse should be adapted to audience demand in order to increase their adherence for the speaker's opinion. This is achieved by observing the cooperative principle supported by four conversational maxims.

It is believed that the philosopher H. P. Grice proposes a co-operative principle which motivates successful verbal communication. That is, it is assumed that in normal conditions, these are the ground rules that interactants noticed when speaking and interpreting utterances (Black, 2006: 34).

According to Grice (1989: 26), people's conversations are not random strings of separate remarks, but rather they are somehow cooperative efforts, where each party identifies in them a shared purpose or set of purpose, or a reciprocally acknowledged direction. Therefore, it is possible to propose a general principle that interactants are supposed to notice:

Make your conversational contribution such as is required, at the stage at which it occurs, by the accepted purpose or direction of the talk exchange in which you are engaged.

To this Grice (ibid: 26-28) proposes four maxims, which elucidate how the co-operative principle functions. The conversational maxims supporting the cooperative principle include the maxim of **quality**, the maxim of **quantity**, the maxim of **relevance**, and the maxim of **manner**

It can be suggested that the cooperative principle comprises two ingredients: hedge of the cooperative principle and implicature.

3.2.1.2.2 The Politeness Principle

As for the politeness principle, it is realized by means of Brown and Levinson's politeness strategies which have been discussed in section (2.2.3).

3.2.1.2.3 Speech acts

As regards this stage, there are eight speech acts that play a role in the justification process. These include: stating, claiming, denial, justification apologizing, telling, criticism and compliment.

3.2.1.2.4 Aristotle Argumentative Appeals

According to Tindale (1999: 7), Aristotle's *Rhetoric* is introduced as an art of persuasion. That is, a handbook to aid speakers in influencing an audience. By the same token, Demirdogen (2010: 192) mentions that Aristotle defines rhetoric " as the faculty of observing in any given case the available means of persuasion."

Hence, rhetorical argumentation developed by Aristotle is distinguished via its interest in the arguer's striving to obtain or enhance the devotion of an audience for an idea. As such, argumentation becomes a cooperative undertaking as it engages both arguer and audience in its advancement and consequence (Tindale, 1999: 69).

Larson (2007: 20) proposes that according to Aristotle persuasion is grounded on three essential types of proofs: **ethos**, **pathos**, and **logos**. These forms of persuasion are the resultants of the factors in each speech situation (Kennedy, 2006: 20).

According to Amossy (2001:1), in Aristotle's terminology, ethos indicates the self-image constructed by the orator in his speech so as to exercise an influence on his audience. Similarly, Zmave (2012, 183) suggests that rhetorical ethos is a strategy of building a trustworthy image of the speaker. It is illustrated as a representation of the speaker's **phronesis** (good sense)**, arête** (excellence)**,** and **eunoia** (good will). For Aristotle, this is the most efficient mode of persuasion.

Kennedy (2006: 20) states that pathos refers to the emotional influence exerted via both the speaker and text on the audience or reader. Similarly, Larson (2007: 75) states that pathos designates emotions that come into being when appeals are made to issues highly regarded by people. Usually, speakers estimate the emotional state of their audience and formulate their appeals accordingly.

According to Huber and Snider (2006:3), while persuasion can be identified as the process of affecting others' attitudes, argument is likely to be designated as the logical means of persuasion. Within rhetoric, this is referred to as *logos*. Larson (2007: 75) says that logos indicates appeals to people intellectuality or reasonableness. It depends on the audience's capacity to analyze evidence logically and come up with a certain conclusion.

3.2.1.2.5 Pragma-Rhetorical Tropes

According to Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca (1969: 169), figures of speech can be regarded as argumentative when they result in a totally different new viewpoint. Their vision is reflected in the following lines:

We consider a figure to be argumentative, if i t brings about a change of perspective, and its use seems normal in relation to this new situation. If, on the other hand, the speech does not bring about the adherence of the hearer to this argumentative form, the figure will be considered an embellishment, a figure of style. It can excite admiration, but this will be on the aesthetic plane, or in recognition of the speaker's originality

(Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, 1969: 169)

McQuarrie and Mick (1996: 424) mentions that rhetoricians make the point that any propositions is possible be conveyed in numerous ways. Additionally, in any given instance, one of these ways will be the most influential in convincing an audience. One of these ways is the use of figures of speech. When persuasion is the ultimate goal, the rhetorical perspective proposes that the way in which a statement is conveyed can be more significant that its propositional content.

As far as this study is concerned, the pragma-rhetorical tropes can be utilized as strategies to achieve justification when their purpose is to emphasize or to clarify. These include **hyperbole**, **rhetorical question**, **simile**, **metaphor**, **personification** and **amplification**

3.2.1.2.6 Pragma-Dialectical Strategies

As far as this study is concerned, the pragma-dialectical strategies that play role in justification fall into two categories: support strategies and fallacies

3.2.1.2.6.1 Support Strategies

From a pragma-dialectical perspective, it can be inferred that justification is embedded in the notion of *support*. This is reflected in the following definition:

Justification refers to the degree of support that an argument is able to confer to its claim.

Bermejo-Luque (2006: 1)

According to Huber and Snider (2006: 54), in order to alter their listeners' perspective speakers need to detect those examples, statistics, and opinions of authorities that will best reinforce their advanced arguments.

Mayberry (2009: 44) believes that it is worthwhile to think of supporting material as distinct components or building blocks that buttress a claim through diverse means and to various degrees. Some forms of argumentative support are listed below.

3.2.1.2.6.1.1 Secondary claims

Toulmin et al., (1984:29) state that claims refer to assertions publically suggested for the purpose of general approval. They indicate that there are underlying reasons that could demonstrate them to be well grounded. Actually, a claim is the first element identified in any argument.

Mayberry (2009: 44) mentions that irrespective of their class, all claims are buttressed by supplementary claims, which in turn will demand their own support. These secondary claims may belong to the very class as the main claim, or to another class. For instance, the claim *This university should offer a pass-fail grading option to its students* may contain as support the secondary casual argument: *Removing the traditional evaluative system of letter grads will facilitate learning by reducing pressure*. Actually, the causal claim above will need further support and one way of doing this is advancing a third factual claim. Whereas certain arguments rely more heavily on facts than others, no argument is expected to be persuading unless it denotes verified facts.

3.2.1.2.6.1.2 Comparisons

According to Fahnestock and Secor (1982: 107-8), certain arguments buttress direct claims, but another way of

Journal of Education and Practice
www.iiste.org
ISSN 2222-1735 (Paper)   ISSN 2222-288X (Online)
Vol.8, No.28, 2017

strengthening something is to state what it looks like. This statement is referred to as a comparison. Arguable comparisons are those in which the two things compared look less similar to the audience as in A m*odern shopping mall is like a medieval cathedral.*

Mayberry (2009: 45) suggests that it is possible to buttress certain claims by means of mentioning a comparable claim with a widespread approval. Nevertheless, it should be remembered that such supporting strategy will not work unless the two claims in question are really comparable and not just loosely alike. For example, if someone is arguing against suggested reduction in state money for scholarships, one can mention what another state has done to evade minimizing its educational budget. For such comparison to work, the financial situation of the state in question should be truly comparable to that of the speaker's.

3.2.1.2.6.1.3 Appeals to Authority

Walton (1997: 1) says that, in fact, most of the things people accept are certainly accepted on the ground of authority. For instance, if someone gets a diagnosis of sickness from a physician, he may get a second opinion. Nevertheless, even that opinion has been proposed by a proficient expert. It can be said the almost everything people believe to be reliable is grounded on the opinions of experts.

Hence, Mayberry (2009: 45) suggests that speakers can support some claims by pointing to a similar opinion held by an acknowledged authority in the field. For example, an argument claiming that *Camello Anthony is the most gifted professional basketball player* can be supported via citing Michael Jordan uttering that very judgement.

3.2.1.2.6.1.4 Addressing the Counterargument: Refutation

Apotheloz et al. (1993: 25) define argument as a discursive chain encompassing a conclusion and one or many reasons produced in support of that conclusion. However, it is possible to use an argument to argue against the conclusion of another one. Such argument is called a counter-argument because it comes from an argument, but counter to.

Van Eemeren et al. (2002: 38) suggest that the goal of argumentation is usually to support a standpoint. Thus, in case the standpoint is positive, defending it includes justifying the proposition to which it relates, as in:

It's true that TV makes life more fun, because since we 've had television, we don't play card games any more.

Additionally, if the argument is utilized to support a negative standpoint, then it is projected to refute the proposition:

It's not true that TV makes life more fun, because since we 've had television, we don't play card games any more (ibid).

According to Ilie (2009: 38), refutations is likely to have diverse forms depending on many factors, like the specific situational constraints, the type of discourse, the disputed issue, the speaker's personality and goals, etc. Moreover, speakers frequently make use of refutation so as not only to criticize their opponents and to attack their arguments, but also to defend their own arguments from the opponents' attack.

O'Keefe and Amjarso (2011: 222-3) suggest that the commitment to defend a standpoint involves defending it against counterarguments. A counterargument signifies an argument that can be advanced as a probable defense of an adversarial standpoint.

3.2.1.2.6.1.5 Definitions

Stevenson (1944: 71) introduces the notion of the *persuasive definition*. The basic assumption behind such notion is that in a persuasive definition, the term identified has both a descriptive and emotive meanings. The purport of the definition is to change the descriptive meaning of the term in question through granting it more accuracy while retaining its emotive meaning without any considerable change. Such definition is employed, consciously or unconsciously, in the pursuit of securing a redirection of people's attitude.

Fahnestock and Secor (1982: 68) say that solitary examples do not constitute a satisfactory support for arguable claims. Thus, definitions are required as well. Actually, when an audience is inexperienced and the subject is technical, definitions are resorted to from the outset. Hence, a definition is not merely a brief clarification but it can govern the structure of the argument.

Walton (2001: 126) mentions that in several cases, the purpose of advancing a definition is not to supply an explanation, but to issue or buttress an argument. For example, if **A** and **B** are arguing about the abortion issue, and **A** defines abortion as *the murder of unborn babies*, it is obvious that **A** is advancing an argument. Hence, via defining abortion as murder, **A** has already proposed premises that can be utilized to show that abortion is wrong. In this case, the offering of the definition should be taken as an argument.

According to Fahnestock and Secor (1982: 74), numerous techniques of definition are offered. Moreover, it is possible to use several techniques on the very word and attack it from different sides.

3.2.1.2.6.1.6 Disassociation

According to Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca (1969: 411), disassociation designates the technique of violating connections between concepts. It consists in asserting that the components which must be kept distinct and independent have been inappropriately associated.

Walton (2001: 119) mentions that the function of a persuasive definition in influencing audience members relies on how they respond passionately to the word being redefined and whether they observe the meaning shift.

According to Van Rees (2009: 3), in disassociation a single notion that is considered by the audience as a conceptual whole and that is referred to by a single term, is split up by the speaker into two distinct notions referred to by two diverse terms. For example, the notion of law is possible to be broken by disassociation into two different notions: the letter and the spirit of the law.

Miller-Tutzauer and Tutzauer (2014: 366) mention that disassociation is likely to function efficiently as a way to redefine a key term. Briefly, an apparently unitary concept is spilt in two by coupling it with two philosophically contrasting terms, one of them has preference over the other. The former unitary meaning is linked with the negatively valued term, while one's own position is connected with the positively valued term.

According to Van Rees (2009: 31), dissociation has three distinct properties. First, dissociation is marked by the performance of two speech acts: a distinction and a definition of one term or more. Second, the resulting two terms are evaluated hierarchy in the sense that one of them is taken to be more crucial, or significant than the other. Third, dissociation is intended to settle an incompatibility or contradiction.

As regards the present study, only the last three support strategies, namely, refutation, definition, and dissociation will be incorporated into the model due to the role that they can play in the justificatory process.

3.2.1.2.6.2 Fallacies

According to Van Eemeren and Grootendorst (1987: 284), and from pragma-dialectical perspective, fallacy is a term reserved for speech acts that in any way hamper the resolve of a dispute in a critical discussion. In such conception, committing a fallacy is not synonymous with unethical conduct, rather is wrong in the sense that it thwarts efforts to attain a resolution of a dispute.

To categorize fallacies, it is first crucial to formulate the rules that have to be adhered to in a critical discussion. Hence, Van Eemeren and Grootendorst (2004: 190) suggest a code of behaviour for rational discussants who wish to resolve their differences of opinion via argumentation grounded on critical insights. This code comprises ten fundamental requirements for rational conduct termed the *ten commandments*. These include merely prohibitive moves found in argumentative discourse that hamper or thwart the resolve of a dispute. These rules are: **Freedom** rule, **obligation- to- defen**d rule, **standpoint** rule, **relevance** rule, **unexpressed-premise** rule, **starting-point** rule, **validity** rule, **argument scheme** rule, **concluding** rule and **general language use** rule (Van Eemeren and Grootendorst 2004:190-6)

Wodak (2006: 60) suggests that many fallacious argumentative moves can be made in a justification discourse. These vary from attacking the opponent personally (argumentum ad hominem), or threatening the opponent's freedom of expression (argumentum and baculums) to undermining the opponent's credibility by indicating that he/she does not stick to the standpoint that he/she publically supports (tu quoque), a variant of the ad hominem.

3.2.1.3 The Final Stage

The final stage of the pragmatic structure of justification comprises a solitary pragmatic ingredients, speech acts.

3.2.1.3.1 Speech Acts

This stage comprises the speech acts of explaining, promising, thanking, advice, warning, stating, and telling. The eclectic model of justification designed in this section is illustrated in Figure (1) below:

SAs: Speech Acts
PP: Politeness Principle
CP: Cooperative Principle
PRSs: Pragma-Rhetorical strategies
PRTs: Pragma-Rhetorical Tropes
PDs: Pragma Dialectical strategies
Ss: Support strategies

Figure (1) The Eclectic Model for the Pragmatic Analysis of Justification

4. Illustrative Examples :

To show the validity of the model developed by this study, the pragmatic structure of justification and its different strategies will be investigated. The analysis of a sample of the situations quoted from political speeches produced by Tony Blair and Barack Obama demonstrates that **speech acts**, **Aristotle's argumentative appeals**, **presuppositions**, **CP** and **Pragma-rhetorical tropes** dominate the data. The following examples of the situations analyzed will be an illustration.

Example (1)

   And yet when that fact is so obvious that it is staring us in the face, we are told that any resolution that authorizes force will be vetoed. Not just opposed. Vetoed. Blocked. The tragedy is that had such a resolution issued, he might just have compiled. Because the only route to peace with someone like Saddam Hussein is diplomacy backed by force. And now the world has to learn the lesson all over again that weakness in the face of a threat from a tyrant, is the surest way not to peace but to war. Looking back over 12 years, we have been victims of our own desire to placate the implacable, to persuade towards reason the utterly unreasonable, to hope that there was genuine intent to do good in a regime whose mind is in fact evil.

(Blair, 2003).

Pragmatic Structure

Initial Stage

Speech Acts

As regards this instance, justification starts with an assertive speech act which functions as an indirect speech act of complaint. Here, Tony Blair expresses his dissatisfaction to the addresses about an existing state of affairs. That is, he shows his disapproval of the determination of France, Russia and China to veto any resolution that permits the use of force against Iraq.

Presuppositions

The initial stage also includes other pragmatic components. First, an existential presupposition is assumed to be present in the definite noun phrase *that fact*. It presupposes the existence of a certain fact known to both the speaker and the addressees. Additionally, a structural presupposition is associated with the adverbial clause *When that fact is so obvious*. This presupposes that that fact is so obvious.

Elaboration Stage

Speech Acts

The elaboration stage is triggered by an assertive speech act of claiming. The Prime Minster argues that it is possible that Saddam will abide by rules if a resolution authorizing force is issued. In order to strengthen his claim the speaker produces a speech act of justification. He asserts that a resolution of this sort is very necessary because the sole way of achieving peace with   Saddam Hussein is to resort to diplomacy supported by force.

Pragma-Rhetorical Tropes

The current stage also includes a pragma-rhetorical trope of metaphor. This is exemplified in: The only **route to peace**. Tony Blair uses a journey metaphor which constitutes evidence of the conceptual metaphor that all long-term purposeful activities are journeys. In this regard, **route** refers to the process of making peace with Saddam Hussein. It implies that achieving peace with such a person is not expected to happen overnight.

Moreover, so as to increase rhetorical effectiveness, the speaker resorts to another metaphor, as in: diplomacy **backed** by force. Here, the necessity of using force against Saddam Hussein is emphasized and exploited in order to enhance an argument against the objection to such course of action.

   In addition, this very stage includes a pragma-rhetorical trope of personification. This exemplified in *a regime whose mind is in fact evil*. Here, evil is presented as a human with mind of its own. Personification is used for the purpose of clarification and amplification.

   According to Charteris-Black (2011: 257), personification conveys an intense expressive power as it evokes the feelings and beliefs regarding people and applies them to intangible political matters.

   Also, the Prime Minster employs a pragma-rhetorical scheme of amplification which requires a series construction, as in

   To placate the implacable, to persuade towards reason the utterly unreasonable, to hope that there was genuine intent to do good in a regime whose mind is in fact evil.

   As for this, the speaker mentions the wrongdoings of the international community in a way that they formulate an ascending series. Each mistake is more terrible than the previous one and the last mistake is the most terrible of all.

Fallacy

Additionally, Blair commits an *abusive* variant of the *argumentum ad hominem* fallacy by violating the freedom rule of critical discussion. He performs a direct personal attack on Saddam Hussein depicting him as an evil man.

Aristotle's Argumentative Appeals

Furthermore, Tony Blair also utilizes Aristotle's persuasive appeals. As for **ethos**, being able to categorize specific political leaders as evil, as in *a regime whose mind is in fact evil* implies moral authority on the part of

the speaker. Hence, Tony Blair is portrayed as an agent of good engaged in a conflict against the forces of evil. This depiction has the effect of creating a positive ethos.

As regards **Pathos**, the speaker depends on arousing the feelings of the audience for persuasive goals. He adapts himself to audience when he says that over 12 years, the international community has been patient in the pursuit of a false hope that Saddam will do some good and abide by rules. He attempts to make the audience feel impatient and desperate for a change Additionally, metaphors resorted to by the Prime Minister serve to construct appeals to pathos.

Concerning **logos**, which has to do with the clarity and integrity of the argument. The speaker claims that issuing a resolution authorizing force against Iraq is critical because this represents the only way to settle the dispute with Saddam Hussein. Most people wants to achieve peace, therefore power should be used to force Saddam to yield .

Final Stage
Speech Acts

As for the final stage, justification is concluded by an assertive speech act of stating. Tony Blair asserts that for years the international community has been victimized by its own drive to expect good from such evil regime as Saddam's. The speaker uses the assertive speech act as a mobilization strategy. He longs for a change to this situation and wants the audience to believe and support him.

Example (2):

Tonight, I can report to the American people and to the world that the United States has conducted an operation that killed Osama bin Laden, the leader of al Qaeda, and a terrorist who's responsible for the murder of thousands of innocent men, women, and children. It was nearly 10 years ago that a bright September day was darkened by the worst attack on the American people in our history. The images of 9/11 are seared into our national memory— hijacked planes cutting through a cloudless September sky; the Twin Towers collapsing to the ground; black smoke billowing up from the Pentagon; the wreckage of Flight 93 in Shanksville, Pennsylvania, where the actions of heroic citizens saved even more heartbreak and destruction. And yet we know that the worst images are those that were unseen to the world. The empty seat at the dinner TABLE. Children who were forced to grow up without their mother or their father. Parents who would never know the feeling of their child's embrace. Nearly 3,000 citizens taken from us, leaving a gaping hole in our hearts. Over the last ten years, thanks to the tireless and heroic work of our military and our counterterrorism professionals, we 've made great strides in that effort

(Obama, 2011).

Pragmatic Structure

This speech is delivered by President Obama after the assassination of Osama bin Laden through an operation launched in cooperation with Pakistan. Hence, he tries to justify and enhance the position of the United States.

Initial Stage
Speech Acts

In the situation above, justification is triggered by an informative speech act of telling. President Obama informs the audience that Osama bin Laden, the leader of al Qaeda, was assassinated through an operation conducted by the United States in cooperation with Pakistan. The speaker resorts to an informative speech act in order to provide the audience with information and to assure them that Osama bin Laden no longer represents a potential threat to the American people.

Presuppositions

The initial stage also comprises pragmatic presuppositions of various types. First, existential presuppositions are triggered by the proper name *Osama bin Laden* and the definite *the American people*. Second, a lexical presupposition is associated with the verb *kill*. Thus, K*illed Osama bin Laden* involves the presupposition that Osama bin Laden was alive. This is due to the conventional meaning of the verb kill.

Finally, a structural presupposition is also resorted to by President Obama. This is associated with the nonrestrictive relative clause W*ho's responsible for the murder of thousands of innocent men, women, and children.* This involves the presupposition that Osama bin Laden is responsible for the murder of thousands of innocent people.

Elaboration Stage
Support Strategies

As for the elaboration stage, it comprises a panorama of strategies. It is triggered by a supportive strategy of definition, as in:

Osama bin Laden, the leader of al Qaeda, and a terrorist who's responsible for the murder of thousands of innocent men, women, and children

By defining Osama bin Laden as a terrorist who has murdered thousands of innocent people, Obama is putting forward an argument. Thus, the purpose of the definition is not merely to provide an explanation.

Speech Acts

The current stage also includes a speech act of stating. President Obama asserts that on 9/11 the United States witnessed the worst attack in its history. That was caused by a gang of terrorists who hijacked planes to smash the Twin Towers of the World Trade Centre, attack the Pentagon and murder innocent people.

Actually, this speech act is put forward in order to justify the operation launched by the United States against Osama bin Laden. Via this assertive, the speaker tries to arouse the feelings of the audience and swayed them towards his intended goal.

Pragma-Rhetorical Tropes

In this stage, pragma-rhetorical strategies are also utilized by President Obama. These include hyperboles as in:

The **worst** attack on the American people

The **worst** images

Who would **never** know

In this context, hyperboles are resorted to in order to enhance a certain state of affairs for rhetorical ends. Additionally, these hyperboles violate Grice's quality maxim by selecting a point on a scale higher than the actual situation. Here, Obama may implicate an indirect complaint regarding the heavy loss of lives and properties caused by the attacks above.

Moreover, in order to adapt himself to audience, the speaker also uses metaphors as in

The images of 9/11 are **seared** into our national memory

Nearly 3,000 citizens **taken** from us

Leaving a **gaping hole** in our hearts

The metaphorical use of these words is proven to rhetorically effective. By saying that *the images are seared into our national memory*, an intense, burning pain is emphasized in order to enhance an argument against the objection to the assassination of Osama bin Laden. Similarly, when the speaker says that the victims leave a hole in their hearts, he emphasizes that their places will never be filled and that they will never be forgotten. Finally, through the use of *taken from us*, the speaker indicates that innocent people are murdered after being kidnapped by terrorists.

A further pragma-rhetorical scheme of amplification is used in this stage. It requires series construction as in:

Hijacked planes cutting through a cloudless September sky; the Twin Towers collapsing to the ground; black smoke billowing up from the Pentagon; the wreckage of Flight 93 in Shanksville, Pennsylvania.

President Obama lists the images of 9/11 in such a way that they formulate an ascending series. That is each image is more painful than the previous one and the last is the most painful of all.

CP

A further implicature is generated by a quantity hedge, as in *It was nearly 10 years ago*. In this context, the speaker implicates that the information provided is not as exact as should be. Through the use of a hedge, President Obama indicates that he is not only conscious of the quantity maxim but is attempting to observe it.

Aristotle's Argumentative Appeals

Furthermore, in this very stage Aristotle's persuasive appeals are also used by President Obama. As for **ethos**, the United States is portrayed as a warrior who defends his country and his people against terrorist attacks launched by Osama bin Laden and his organization. Such depiction helps to create a positive ethos. Another appeal to ethos comes in the form of the pronouns *I*, *our* and *us* which serve to create an impression of unity and harmony between the speaker and the audience.

As regards **pathos**, President Obama adapts himself to audience when he tries to show sympathy for those children and parents who are affected by the death of their beloved ones. Hence, a connection with the audience is made. Besides, metaphors and other tropes used by the speaker serve to construct appeals to **pathos**

Concerning **logos**, President Obama puts forward the argument that the United States is forced to declare war on terrorists because they make it a prime target for their attacks. The speaker tries to justify the acts of the United States and to defend it against criticism so as to convey the idea that the United states is not to be blamed for conducting the operation to assassinate Osama bin Laden.

Final Stage

Speech Acts

As for the final stage, justification is concluded by an assertion. President Obama states that in the last ten years the United States achieves some successes in its effort to protect its citizens against terrorist attacks. This is due to the indefatigable and epic work of the military and counterterrorism professionals.

5. Conclusions

On the basis of the analysis conducted in the previous section, the following conclusions can be introduced:

1. Justification should not be understood as a single speech act but as a communicative event, interactionally managed by interlocutors. Regarding the pragmatic structure of justification, the analysis indicates that justification comprises three stages: initial stage, elaboration stage and final stage. Each stage holds a number of pragmatic components which constitute the pragmatic structure of justification.

2. it has been confirmed that justification strategies are used all over the pragmatic structure in each component. The analysis of the data shows that speech acts and pragma-rhetorical strategies are the most commonly used strategies.

3. It can inferred that the eclectic model of justification developed by the study has proven to be successfully workable in analyzing the data of this work.

References

- Archer, D., Aijmer, K. and Wichmann, A. (2012). **Pragmatics: An Advanced Resource Book for Students**. Oxon: Routledge.
- Audi, Robert (ed.). (1999) **The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy**. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Bermejo-Luque, L. (2006). The Normativity of Argumentation as a Justificatory and as a Persuasive Device. University of Murcia, Spain.
- Black, E. (2006) **Pragmatic Stylistics**. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.
- Brandom, R. (1994). **Making it Explicit: Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment**. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- Brown, P. and Levinson, S. (1987). **Politeness**: **Some Universals in Language Use**. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Buchanan, Alec. (2000) **Psychiatric Aspects of Justifications**, **Excuses**, **and Mitigations**. London: Jessica Kingsley Publishers.
- Chilton, P. (2004). **Analysing Political Discourse**. London: Routledge.
- Comparini, L. (2013). The Use of Justification in the Linguistic Construction of Agency and Social Connection in Latina Mother-Child Conflict. **Journal of Pragmatics**, 57, 57-67.
- Crystal, D. (2008). **A Dictionary of Linguistics and Phonetics**. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing.
- Demirdogen, Ülkü. (2010). The Roots of Research in Political Persuasion: Ethos, Pathos, Logos, and the Yale Studies of Persuasive Communication. **International Journal of Social Inquiry**, Vol. 3, No.1, 189-201.
- Fahnestock, J. and Secor, M. (1982). **A Rhetoric of Argument**. New York: McGraw Hill Companies, Inc.
- Ferrara, A. (1980). An extended theory of speech acts: appropriateness   conditions for subordinate acts in sequence. **Journal of Pragmatics** (4). 233 – 252 .
- Felix-Brasddefer, J. (2008). **Politeness in Mexico and the United States**. Amsterdam: John Benjamins publishing Company.
- Freeman, J. (2014). Toulmin's Model of Argumentation. In Van Eemeren, F., Garssen, B; Krabbe, E; Henkemans, F; Verheij, B; and Wagemans, H. (Eds.) **Handbook of Argumentation Theory**. Amsterdam: Springer Science and Business Media Dordrecht.
- Fritz, G. (1995). Topics in the History of Dialogue Forms. In Jucker, Andreas (ed.) **Historical Pragmatics**. Amsterdam: John Benjamins Publishing Company.
- _____(2005) On Answering Accusations in Controversies. **Argumentation in Dialogic Interaction**, 151-162.
- Greco, S. (2002). When Presuppositions Become Dangerous. University of Lugano.
- Grein, M. (2007) The Speech Act of Refusal within the Minimal Action Game. In Grein, M. and Weigand, E. (eds.) **Dialogue and Culture**. Amsterdam: John Benjamins Publishing Company.
- Geyer, N. (2008). **Discourse and Politeness: Ambivalent Face in Japanese**. London: Continuum.
- Grice, P. (1989). **Studies in the Way of Words**. Harvard University Press.
- Henkemans, F. (2014) Speech Act Theory and the Study of Argumentation. **Studies in Logic**, **Grammar and Rhetoric**, 36 (49).
- Huber, R. and Snider, A. **Influencing Through Argument**. New York: International Debate Education Association.
- Ilie, C. (2009). Strategies of Refutation by Definition: A Pragma-Rhetorical Approach to Refutation in a Public Speech. In Van Eemeren, F. and Garssen, B. (eds.) **Pondering on Problems of Argumentation**. Amsterdam: Springer.
- Jonson, R. (2000). **Manifest Rationality: A Pragmatic Theory of Argument**. New Jersey: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates Inc.
- Kauffeld, F. G. (1998). Presumptions and Distribution of Argumentative Burdens in Acts of Proposing and Accusing. **Argumentation**, 12 (2), 245-266.
- Kennedy, G. (2006). **Aristotle on Rhetoric: A Theory of Civic Discourse**. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Larson, C. (2007). **Persuasion: Reception and Responsibility**. Boston: Wadsworth Cengage Learning.
- Lodder, A. (1999) **Dialaw**: **on Legal Justification and Dialogical Models of Argumentation**. Madrid: Springer Science and Business Media.
- LoCastro, V. (2012). **Pragmatics for Language Educators: A Sociolinguistic Perspective**. New York:

Routledge.
- Mayberry, K. (2009). **Everyday Argument**. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company.
- Miller-Tutzauer, C. and Tutzauer, Frank. (2014). Reagan's Safety Net for the Truly Needy: The Rhetorical Uses of Definition. In Zarefsky, D. (Ed.) **Political Argumentation in the United States**. Amsterdam: John Benjamins Publishing Company.
- McQuarrie, E and Mick, D. (1996) Figures of Rhetoric in Advertising Language. **The Journal of Consumer Research**, Vol. 22, No. 4, 424-438.
- O'Keefe, D. and Amjars, B. (2011). Handling Counterarguments: The Intersection of Pragma-Dialectical Normative Concerns and Practical Persuasive Success. In Feteris, E., Garssen, B. and Henkemans, F. (Eds.) **Keeping in Touch with Pragma-Dialectics**. Amsterdam: John Benjamins Publishing Company.
- Perelman, C. and Olbrechts-Tyteca, L. (1969). **The New Rhetoric: A Treatise on Argumentation**. Notre Dame: Notre Dame University Press.
- Schlesinger, I, Keren-Portnog, T. and Parush, T. (2001) **The Structure of Arguments**. Amsterdam: John Benjamins Publishing Company.
- Schegloff, E. and Sacks, H. (1973). Opening up Closings. In *(web.stanford.edu/~eckert/PDF)*
- Stevenson, C. (1944). **Ethics and Language**. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Swinburne, Ritchard. (2001) **Epistemic Justification**. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Tindale, Christopher. (1999). **Acts of Arguing**. New York. State University of New York Press.
- Toulmin, S; Rieke, R; and Janik, A. (1984) **An Introduction to Reasoning**. New York: Macmillan Publishing Company.
- Toulmin, S. (2003) **The Uses of Argument**. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Trosborg, A. (1995). **Interlanguage Pragmatics**: **Requests** , **Complaints and Apologies**. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter.
- Van Dijk, Teun A. (1977) **Text and Context**. London: Longman.
- _____ (1979). Pragmatic connectives. **Journal of Pragmatics** (3), 447-456.
- _____(1980) **Macrostructures**: **An Interdisciplinary Study of Global Structures in Discourse**, **Interaction**, **and Cognition**. New Jersey: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates
- Van Eemeren, F. and Grootendorst, R. (1984) **Speech Acts in Argumentative Discussions**. Dordrecht: Foris Publications.
- _____(1987). Fallacies in Pragma- Dialectical Perspective. **Argumentation**, 1 (3), 283-301.
- _____(2004) **Systematic Theory of Argumentation**. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Van Eemeren, F. and Houtlosser, P. (2002). Strategic Maneuvering: Maintaining a Delicate Balance. In Van Eemeren, F. and Houtlosser, P.(Eds.) **Dialectic and Rhetoric: The Warp and Woof of Argumentative Analysis**, 131-159.
- Van Eemeren, F., Grootendorst, R. and Henkemans, F. (2002). **Argumentation, Evaluation, Presentation**. New Jersey: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc.
- Van Eemeren, F. and Houtlosser, P. (2009) Examining Argumentation in Context. In Van Eemeren, F. (Ed.) **Examining Argumentation in Context: Fifteen Studies on Strategic Maneuvering**. Amsterdam: John Benjamins Publishing Company.
- Van Eemeren, F. (2010). **Strategic Maneuvering in Argumentative Discourse**. Amsterdam: John Benjamins Publishing Company.
- Van Eemeren, F. and Garrsen, B. (2011). Exploiting the Room for Strategic Maneuvering in Argumentative Discourse: Dealing with Audience Demand in the European Parliament. **OSSA Conference Archive**, 1-41
- _____. (2015). The Case of Pragma-Dialectics. In Van Eemeren, F. and Houtlosser, P. (eds.) **Reasonableness and Effectiveness in Argumentative Discourse**. Amsterdam: Springer.
- Van Rees, M. A. (2009). **Dissociation in Argumentative Discussions: A Pragma-Dialectical Perspective**. Amsterdam: Springer.
- Walton, D. (1995). **A Pragmatic Theory of Fallacy**. Alabama: The University of Alabama Press.
- _____ (1997). **Appeal to Expert Opinion: Argument from Authority**. Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania State University Press.
- _____. (2001) Persuasive Definitions and Public Policy. **Argumentation and Advocacy**, 37, 117-132.
- Wodak, R.. (2006). Blaming and Denying: Pragmatics. In Brown, Keith (ed.), **Encyclopedia of Language and Linguistics**. Vol. (5), 59-64. Oxford: Elsevier.
- Yule, G. (2000) **Pragmatics**. Oxford: Oxford University Press.