Incentive Scheme and Job Performance, a Bivariate Relationship

With Institutional Development among Secondary Schools

Teachers

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ABSTRACT
This research study is designed to determine whether work incentive scheme was job performance have any significant relationship with job performance of secondary school teachers in Degema (Delga) local Government Area, Rivers State, Nigeria. Five research questions and five null hypotheses were posed to guide the study to a logical conclusion. A structured research questionnaire was administered on a sample size of seventy six (76) secondary school teachers in Degema. Data generated from the research questions and null hypotheses were collated and analyzed using the Pearson Product Moment Correlational Statistics (Pearson r). The results of the data analysis indicated that work incentives have a significant relationship with job performance, involvement in school discipline, and the coverage of scheme of work of secondary school teachers, while teachers class attendance, evaluation of students assignments, and participation in school decision making have no measurable significant relationship with work incentives of secondary school teachers. Recommendations were proffered based on the findings to improve teachers work incentives and to enhance the job performance of secondary school teachers in Degema Local Government Area, Rivers State, Nigeria.

INTRODUCTION
Every organization including educational organization is concerned with what should be done to achieve and sustain high performance through academic and non academic staff. This means giving close attention to how teachers can be adequately motivated through such means as incentives, rewards, leadership and more importantly the work they do and the organizational context within which they carry out that work. The aim of course is to develop incentive schemes and a work environment that will help ensure that teachers deliver result in accordance with the expectation of the school management.

The establishment of secondary schools by both the government and the communities is just to bring about growth in our children's character, skills and knowledge, which will enable them to be functionally independent in the society. There is a general belief that these changes can be achieved through the teachers. The way the teachers perceive, how they are motivated by way of incentive towards the work attitude and hence the level of performance towards these achievement of set objectives. There is also a general belief that each teacher goes to work with a variety of needs to be satisfied. It is the duty of the school administration to identify and satisfy these needs. Once these needs are not attended to, there is bound to be frustration and job dissatisfaction, which will ultimately lead to a decline in productivity.

An incentive is an additional compensation to employees for a continuous job performance, structured to provide direct motivation to employees to encourage them to achieve organizational objectives, improve their performances, enhance their competence and skills by focusing on specific targets and priorities. Incentive could be classified into two major categories; non financial, which include recognition, achievement, feeling of participation and pride in superior performance. These tend to encourage better performance. The second category is the financial incentive plan; this involves money which could be indirect or direct. Indirect incentive include such things as equitable pay structures, merit increases, pension and profit sharing plans and other benefits that are financial in nature but are not directly dependent upon the contribution of an individual or group. Direct financial plans provide an opportunity for higher pay through increased productivity or effectiveness. They are based upon the concept of
It is important to state that identifying items valued by employee is a requirement in establishing effective incentive scheme. Massie and Douglas (1977) said that an administrator has much effort, control and influence over external forces which comprises rewards environment and equipment in the person’s internal forces work world; some influence over the person’s genetic (socio-biological) genes and parental forces. Nealy (1964) found out that the application of one set of incentives or incentive system to all employees in a given job class may not be best from environmental standpoint.

The Harvard University Hawthorne experiment led by Elton Mayo (1880-1949), showed among other findings that the morale of workers and their productivity increased when attention is paid to work environment. Their findings did not only provide a framework for increasing industrial efficiency and productivity, but also implied that the worker can be motivated to achieve better results and that this motivation can result from incentives. The role of managers and school administrators are not always that of setting goals for their subordinates alone but instead effectiveness may be increased by providing environment in which subordinates can play a role in setting their goals (Hersey and Blanchard, 1982).

Studies have shown that improved productivity cannot be achieved simply by persuading individuals to work harder. It is more a question of looking carefully at the way in which activities are performed and deciding what changes can be made to promote efficient performance. According to Edward (1991) one of the ways of improving workers productivity is by providing some form of incentive scheme, so that workers are rewarded for more production. Including changing performance and production methods to make jobs more interesting, and giving workers greater control over their own work techniques.

Incentives influence behaviour by offering pay as an inducement. Rewards systems can be structured in varied forms and employer typically will use more than one form. Promotion serves as a form of reward for performance; it is an incentives for better performance. The aims of the promotion exercise of a company according to Armstrong (2004) should be to enable management obtain the best talents available within the company to fill more senior posts and to provide employees with the opportunity to advance their careers within the company, in accordance with the opportunity available (taking into accounting equal opportunity policies) and their own ability. A good promotion policy ensures an efficient organization, boosts the morale of employees, and enhances employees’ professional satisfaction.

Performance incentives are payments made to an employee or a group of employees based on the amount of output or results achieved or payments made for the purpose of motivating employee performance towards higher target. The use of performance incentives is provided on the belief that output can be measured and that increased pay can be tied to increased performance on the part of the employees, Banjoko (1996).

Work incentive is advantageous to both management and employees. The employee can increase his/her earning...
at the same time that management is increasing productivity. This advantage is successful to some extent but some incentives also encourage the employee to strive for cushions in the form of lenient or loose standards. They cause differences of opinions not only on appropriate standards but also on proper allowances for variations in job conditions, which according to Wolf (1987) in turn become translated into momentary income.

Heuristically, incentive plans are designed to promote greater achievement in terms of output, and also promote risk taking to stimulate contributions above and beyond the normal standard or expectation, and to assist in developing a productive work environment by rewarding those employees who contribute towards improving organizational output beyond certain predetermined standard (Banjoko, 1996).

Basic to any consideration of financial incentives is the motivation of employees. However, it has been observed by Viteles (1983) that a financial incentive may have no effect, which influence the individual to work. It is normally assumed that the prospect for additional earning will motivate employees to function effectively. This, according to Calhoon (1987) implies that the basic issue is the relation of such a plan to the needs and wants of employees. The incentive system forms a subset of, and total set of item in the exchange process between employees and employer. From the above, incentives are seen as those items given to individuals that are designed to influence future behaviour; incentives serve as an anticipated reward for behaviour to be accomplished.

Identifying items valued by employees is extremely important to establishing effective incentive systems. According to Massie and Douglas (1977), the administrator has much control and influence over the external forces, which comprise rewards, environment and equipment, in the person’s work world, some influence over the person’s internal forces, needs aspirations and perception; and none over the person’s genetic (socio-biological), genes and parental forces. Nealey (1964) found out that the application of one set of incentives and one incentive system to all employees in a given job class may not be best form of motivational standpoint. To influence behaviour, rewards must be associated with the behaviour of interest (Lawler, 1971). Social and behavioural scientists believe that performance is a function of three things; the motivational levels of people, their ability and traits, and their role perceptions (Vroom 1964, Porter and Lawler 1968).

STATEMENT OF PROBLEM

Over the years, most of the teachers’ grievances have always resulted from non-institution of functional and effective incentive schemes in the school system. More often than not, results in observed deviant attitude of teachers towards school work as shown in the high rate of absenteeism, non-commitment to effective teaching of students. It is very rare for teachers especially in the public schools to cover the schedule of work of their teaching subject. Slow learners no longer receive personalized teaching (extra attention) except payment is made privately, to teacher. The extra lesson syndrome for extra pay is a common feature in both public and private schools. All these problems gave rise to poor performance, low morale, restiveness and deviant behaviour by both the teacher and the students.

The poor performance of students in examinations like (SSCE, NECO and JAMB) and the decaying standard of education in our society is even becoming more problematic than ever, due to the inculcation of bribery and corruption and other malpractices in our school system. Based on the foregoing, this study is structured to determine the relationship between incentive scheme and job performance of secondary school teachers in Rivers State, Nigeria.

PURPOSE OF THE STUDY

This study sets out to find the impact of incentive scheme (packages) on job performance of secondary school teachers in Rivers State, Nigeria. Specifically, the study is meant to determine the relationship between incentives and teachers involvement in school discipline, assess the relationship between incentives and class attendance by teachers in secondary schools, examine the relationship between incentives and teachers’ participation in school decision-making, and also determine the relationship between incentives and teachers’ evaluation of students’ assignments.

RESEARCH QUESTIONS

The following research questions were posed to guide this study to a logical conclusion.

1). Is there any relationship between work incentive and teachers involvement in school discipline?

2). What are the relationships between work incentives and class attendance by teachers in secondary schools?

3) Are teachers’ participation in school decision making dependent on work incentives?

4) Is there any relationships between work incentives and teachers’ coverage of scheme of work?

5) What are the relationships between work incentives and teachers’ coverage of scheme of work?

NULL HYPOTHESES
H01: There is no measurable significant relationship between teachers work incentives and job performance.

H02: There is no significant relationship between work incentives and teachers’ involvement in school discipline.

H03: Class attendance by secondary school teachers does not depend on the provision of work incentives.

H04: There is no significant relationship between incentives and teachers’ participation in school decision-making.

H05: There is no significant relationship between incentives and teachers’ evaluation of students' assignment.

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

This research study is a descriptive research survey, framed up with one independent variable; incentive scheme, buttressed by a common dependent variable; job performance of secondary schools teachers.

The total population for this research study is made up of eighty-three (83) secondary school teachers from Degema Local Government Area (Delga), Rivers State, Nigeria. This very population was chosen as a matter of the investigator’s research interest.

The research sample size of this study is seventy-six (76) teachers from the selected population. The research sample size of this study was based on total number of questionnaires returned.

The research instrument used in this research study is a structured questionnaire designed and developed by the investigator of this research study. The instrument was given to experts in this field of study for proper screening and evaluation. The content and face validity were reaffirmed by this peer instrument review exercise. The instrument was piloted with 46 members of the research population and the data generated was treated with Pearson Product Moment Correlational Statistics. The calculated instrument reliability index anchored at 0.70 which was considered good enough for this research study.

The research instrument was finally administered to seventy-six (76) secondary school teachers. This exercise lasted for four weeks. The completed questionnaires were collected, collated, and decoded into numerical data. The subsequent data was treated with Pearson Product Moment Correlational Statistics (Pearson r). The SPSS statistical software was used to expedite the data analysis and computer simulations.

DATA PRESENTATION, ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS

Table 1: Correlation Coefficient of Work Incentives and Teachers Involvement in School Discipline

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>N</th>
<th>df</th>
<th>Alpha Level (a)</th>
<th>r–cal</th>
<th>r-crit</th>
<th>Decision</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>76</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>0.54</td>
<td>.2830</td>
<td>Significant</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**ρ < .01 Significant**

In responding to research question one, the calculated r value (.54) at .01 alpha level with df, 74, is greater than the critical r value (.54 > .2830) = significant at .01 alpha level. To answer the question posed in research question one, the calculated correlational value reaffirmed the fact that the extent of correlation between work incentive and teachers involvement in school discipline is high (.54). Therefore, the result confirmed that the work incentives has a measurable significant relationship with teachers involvement in school discipline.

Table 2: Correlation Coefficient of Work Incentives and Teachers Class Attendance

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>N</th>
<th>df</th>
<th>Alpha Level (a)</th>
<th>r–cal</th>
<th>r-crit</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>76</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>0.18</td>
<td>.2830</td>
<td>Nonsignificant</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**ρ > .01 Nonsignificant**

In responding to research question two, the calculated r value (.18) at .01 alpha level with df, 74, is less than the critical r value (.18 < .2830) = nonsignificant at .01 alpha level. To answer the question posed in research question two, the calculated correlational value reaffirmed that the extent of correlation between work incentives and teachers class attendance is low (.18). Therefore, the result confirmed that work incentives has no significant relationship with class attendance by secondary school teachers.

Table 3: Correlation Coefficient of Work Incentives and Teachers Participation in School Decision Making

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>N</th>
<th>df</th>
<th>Alpha Level (a)</th>
<th>r–cal</th>
<th>r-crit</th>
<th>Decision</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>76</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>0.23</td>
<td>.2830</td>
<td>Nonsignificant</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**ρ > .01 Nonsignificant**
In responding to research question three, the calculated $r$ value (.23) is less than the critical $r$ value at .01 alpha level and df 74, (.23 < .2830) = nonsignificant at .01 alpha level. To answer the question posed in research question three, the calculated correlational value reaffirmed that the extent of correlation between work incentives and teachers participation in decision making is low (.23). Therefore, the result confirmed that the teachers participation in school decision making is not dependent on work incentives.

Table 4: Correlation Coefficient of Work Incentives and Evaluation of Students Assignment by Teachers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>N</th>
<th>df</th>
<th>Alpha Level (α)</th>
<th>$r_{cal}$</th>
<th>$r_{crit}$</th>
<th>Decision</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>76</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>.14</td>
<td>.2830</td>
<td>Nonsignificant</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

** $\rho > .01$ Nonsignificant

In responding to research question four, the calculated $r$ value (.14) at .01 alpha level and df 74, is less than the critical $r$ value (.14 < .2830) = nonsignificant at .01 alpha level. To answer the question posed in research question four, the calculated correlational value reaffirmed that the extent of correlation between work incentives and evaluation of students assignment by teachers is low (.14). Therefore, the result confirmed the fact there is no significant relationship between work incentives and teachers evaluation of students assignment in secondary schools.

Table 5: Correlation Coefficient of Work Incentives and Teachers Coverage of Scheme of Work.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>N</th>
<th>df</th>
<th>Alpha Level (α)</th>
<th>$r_{cal}$</th>
<th>$r_{crit}$</th>
<th>Decision</th>
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<tr>
<td>76</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>.59</td>
<td>.2830</td>
<td>Significant</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

** $\rho < .01$ Significant

In responding to research question five, the calculated $r$ value (.59) is greater than the critical $r$ value (.59 > .2830) = significant at .01 alpha level. To answer the question posed in research question five, the calculated correlational value reaffirmed that the extent of correlation between work incentives and teachers coverage of scheme of work is high (.59). Therefore, the result confirmed the fact that work incentives have a measurable significant relationship with coverage of scheme of work by teachers.

NULL HYPOTHESES

H0: There is no measurable significant relationship between teachers work incentives and job performance.

Table 1: Correlation Coefficient (Pearson $r$) Results

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>N</th>
<th>df</th>
<th>Alpha Level (α)</th>
<th>$r_{cal}$</th>
<th>$r_{crit}$</th>
<th>Decision</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>76</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>.66</td>
<td>.2830</td>
<td>Sig. Rejects the null hypothesis.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

** $\rho < .01$ Significant

The result of the Pearson Moment Correlation Coefficient is significant at .01 level of significance ($p<.01$). The critical value of $r$ required for the rejection of the null hypothesis at $\alpha$, .01 and df 74 = .2830, but the calculated $r$-value = .66. The calculated $r$-value is greater than the critical $r$-value (.66 > .2830), therefore H01: is rejected at .01 alpha level ($\alpha$). Thus, there is a significant relationship between teachers work incentives and their job performances.

H0: There is no significant relationship between work incentives and teachers involvement in school discipline.

Table 2: Correlation Coefficient (Pearson $r$) Results.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>N</th>
<th>df</th>
<th>Alpha Level (α)</th>
<th>$r_{cal}$</th>
<th>$r_{crit}$</th>
<th>Decision</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>76</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>.46</td>
<td>.2830</td>
<td>Sig. Rejects the null hypothesis.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

** $\rho < .01$ Significant

The result of the Pearson Moment Correlation Coefficient is significant at .01 level of significance ($p<.05$). The critical value of $r$ required for the rejection of the null hypothesis at $\alpha$, .01 and df 74 = .2830, but the calculated $r$-value = .46. The calculated $r$-value is greater than the critical $r$-value (.46> .2830), therefore H02: is
rejected at .01 alpha level (α). Thus, there is a significant relationship between work incentives and teachers involvement in school discipline.

**H0:** Class attendance by secondary school teachers does not depend on the provision of work incentives.

### Table 3: Correlation Coefficient (Pearson $r$) Results

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>N</th>
<th>df</th>
<th>Alpha Level (α)</th>
<th>$r$-cal</th>
<th>$r$-crit</th>
<th>Decision</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>76</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>.22</td>
<td>.2830</td>
<td>Nonsig. Failed to reject the null hypothesis.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**ρ > .01** Nonsignificant

The result of the Pearson Moment Correlation Coefficient is nonsignificant at .01 level of significance (p>.05). The critical value of $r$ required for the rejection of the null hypothesis at α .01 and df 74 = .2830, but the calculated $r$-value = .22. The calculated $r$-value is less than the critical $r$-value (.22<.2830), therefore $H_0$: failed to reject at .01 alpha level (α). Thus, there is no significant relationship between work incentives and class attendance by secondary school teachers.

**H0:** There is no significant relationship between incentives and teachers participation in school decision making.

### Table 4: Correlation Coefficient (Pearson $r$) Results

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>N</th>
<th>df</th>
<th>Alpha Level (α)</th>
<th>$r$-cal</th>
<th>$r$-crit</th>
<th>Decision</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>76</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>.09</td>
<td>.2830</td>
<td>Nonsig. Failed to reject the null hypothesis.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**ρ > .01** Nonsignificant

The result of the Pearson Moment Correlation Coefficient is nonsignificant at .01 level of significance (p>.05). The critical value of $r$ required for the rejection of the null hypothesis at α .01 and df 74 = .2830, but the calculated $r$-value = .26. The calculated $r$-value is less than the critical $r$-value (.26<.2830), therefore $H_0$: failed to reject at .01 alpha level (α). Thus, there is no significant relationship between incentives and teachers evaluation of students assignment.

### DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS

The research study revealed that work incentive has a measurable significant relationship with teachers involvement in school discipline. The result also confirmed that teacher participation in school decision making is not dependent on work incentives. There was no relationship between work incentives and teachers evaluation of student assignment in secondary schools. In the course of work scheme by teachers did not correlate with work incentive. But teachers work incentive related significantly with teachers job performance. There was a significant relationship between work incentives and teachers involvement in school discipline. A midline questionable anomaly was observed between class attendance by secondary school teachers and the provision of work incentive. This particular result was not in harmony with the findings of Lawler, (1971).

### CONCLUSION

The result confirmed that the work incentive has a measurable significant relationship with teachers involvement in school discipline, also the result confirmed that work incentives has no significant relationship with class attendance of secondary school teachers, the result confirmed that teachers participation in school decision making is not dependent on work incentives, the result also confirmed no significant relationship between work incentives and teachers evaluation of students assignment in secondary schools, the result also confirmed that work incentives have a measurable significant relationship with coverage of scheme of work by teachers, there is a significant relationship between teachers work incentives and their job performance, there is a significant relationship between work incentives and teachers involvement in school discipline, there is no significant relationship between work incentives and class attendance by secondary school teachers, and there is no significant relationship between work incentives and teachers evaluation of students assignment.

### RECOMMENDATIONS
To recap this empirical research study the following recommendations were proffered.

The secondary school Authority within the hierarchy of ministry of education should plan and develop the teachers work incentive program in order to advance the development of teachers welfare program.

This research study should be replicated with an increased population to reaffirm the repetition of results and research findings.

Greater emphasis and program priority should be slotted into work incentives and teachers participation in school decision making.

REFERENCES


AUTHOR: DR. JOHN NYEM OKENDU (B.Sc. 1977, MA 1979, Ph.D 1984)

In 1974 the author of this research paper was admitted into Edinboro University of Pennsylvania, Edinboro where he studied Petroleum Geology and earned a B.Sc. degree in June 1977.

In July 1977 the author was admitted into the Teachers College of Oklahoma City University where he did a post-graduate study and specialized in teaching supervision, measurement and evaluation a program he completed with excellence in December 1979 and earned an M.A. Degree.

In January 1980 the author proceeded to the Texas Southern University (TSU), Houston, Texas and undertook a Doctoral Program in University Administration and Planning. This doctoral program was full-time and intensive. At the end of the first year he passed his qualifying examination. Almost at the end of the third academic year the author passed his Doctoral Comprehensive Examination and was offered his doctoral candidacy, an upper academic echelon of the graduate school for the TSU doctoral program.

On the 2nd of July 1984, the author defended his doctoral dissertations in University Planning, a moment in history that featured an audience of 2,500 persons in attendance. On the 18th of August 1984, Dr. John Nyemaichechi Okendu was born to the guilds of experts in University Administration/Planning. His doctoral dissertation in planning was displayed in the showcase of excellence, school of education, downstairs, for three years after his graduation.

Dr. Okendu has his professional membership with American Association of Higher Education since 1983.
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