The Fiscal Federalism Approach in the Eurozone Related to Structural Budgetary Development, and Its Contribution for the Last Period

In this study, we aim to bring up making meaningful the financial budgetary development which assert the financial alterations of budgets in EU express a powerful important to ensure the balance of countries that are in Euro Area. Therefore, as aimed at our research the general location of government budget positions related to the fiscal federalism that are formed via “interest expenditures”, “gross debt” and “deferred liabilities” from last year’s take important place to analyses and put forth budgetary developments in the scope of Euro Zone. In the other hand, how the budgets of EU member countries effect on the Eurozone is important matter due to the financial alterations related to these countries’ budget because this structural fact constitutes the affect levels that maniple on the Euro Area. Even more, the structural importance of the fiscal federalism is that come from the concept related to the effected general economic growth levels such as connected with each country government expenditures and revenues contributes in EU. Certainly, this concept determines its structural contribution levels to ensure and maintain Eurozone harmonization, and the assumption and no-assumption financial alterations or the concerned aims are shaped by these the denominators impact that reflect also computed in terms of potential GDP. Especially to the EU's future, it appears that the whole financial budgetary positive alteration access in the fiscal federalism process can set to important role to reduce the weight of financial total national tax burden.


Introduction
The concept of public budget related to fiscal federalism is a very important concept for ensuring the financial alignment of all the full member European Union countries and for a stable Euro application. The use of different currencies by the member countries and the different levels of development of each member state cause different budget deficits and have negative effects on common currency principles. The studies on this subject have been confirmed in the scope of concerned approaches as an important structural alteration scale concerning fiscal federalism. In addition to the work of the European Commission, other academic studies have shown very different and striking results. Nevertheless, the negative consequences of the separation from the common currency by the UK's Brexit application from the constituent countries have created important new dynamics open to discussion. One of the most important determinations of these studies is the study of the European Commission (2018-a). In this study, it is observed that the effects of future economic forecasts on the budget and the effects of possible change in Eurozone 2 are being analysed.
The effects of macro changes on EU countries and their position in shaping future EU policies constitute the main theme of this study. In addition, the European Commission, "European Business Cycle Indicators", which was conducted in 2017 as a technical study with a monetary work cycles, should also be touch upon. In this study, especially the structural relations between the financial change trends of the member countries and the federal fiscal developments' affect levels were emphasized. In this study, the correlation of member countries with public budgets was found to be quite significant. Among the studies on the subject, Rosiak's study (2015) has an important place in the study as the concerned matter. In this study, the question of whether a larger budget increase is needed in the Europa Area is questioned and the existence of a fiscal federalism in the Eurozone area is analysed. The question that the increasing budget limits of the member countries should be questioned with the economic growth limits constitutes the main theme of this study. Furthermore, Oreziak's (2018) study seems to have a meaningful place in the last period, especially on fiscal federalism and the studies on the autonomous budget preferences of the member countries.
In this study, it is observed that the adaptation dynamics of economic and political conditions are tried to be determined in order to create a more perfect European Union. It is seen to emphasize in particular that fiscal federalism is an inevitable cycle of the European Union integration process. We see that Mali federalism was first brought up by Musgrave in 1959 and later this concept was moved to a more systemic position especially for Wallace E. Oates (1972). James Buchanan (1995), an economist who defends a separate and autonomous budget for constitutional economics, pointed out the importance of financial federalism, especially in ensuring the desired integration of the European Union. Moreover, the fact is that Buchanan's approaches these member states' budget autonomy and then a financial federalism, as a structural insurance of the Union, would have a dynamic impact will confirm the Brexit Concept discussions in the recent European Union. At this stage, however, the necessity of handling the phenomenon of financial federalism in two different stages emerges. These two approaches in practice for the European Union are undoubtedly approaches that can also produce two different effects. For the purposes of fiscal federalism, the first of these approaches is to create a Supreme Dominant Union Budget that is binding on all member states and on all member states that can only be considered in the concept of European Union; the second is each different budgets of the Member States with their own autonomous budget, which present the financial alteration contribute to EU (Barbier-Gauchard et al, 2014: 33).

The Location of the Fiscal Federalism in Eurozone and The Budget Balances in The Fiscal Structural Alteration
Fiscal federalism is usually defined as a system of financial relations between the central level and other levels of government in the public administration. This concept, if it is asked to consider especially to Eurozone, which means that the central Europa countries should have a sufficiently high budget to perform functions on the other member countries. The desired aim especially in this point that are meaningful for Europa Unity is the other regional European countries that should be controlled budgets perform functions in the whole financial regions (Barbier-Gauchard et al, 2014: 33). Financial federalism on the budgetary policies related to the European Union countries also means that the financial powers of the member states are combined under one roof, but also have different budgets authority. In this respect, the phenomenon of financial federalism within the European Union on the basis of public budgets is different from the classical federal structure including the absolute budget union.

Interregional Financial Federal Process as Related to Centralized Budget Transfers
Although the phenomenon of federalism expresses a political and economic difference as application in Eurozone but it is emphasized as an important sign of public financial autonomy as financial federalism. This approach is an important reason why a collective budget concept is subject to legal collective sanctions. For the European Union, a different level of fiscal continental autonomy at the financial level or a common European Union for different national budget understandings and its different levels of profit are understood. In this context, addressing the financial federalism on the basis of the European Union raises the fact that a common monetary union is inevitable in terms of budgetary policies. However, the nature of budgetary transfers in the process of fiscal federalism has a positive effect on the impact scale of social transfers, in addition to increasing the limits of public expenditures (European Parliament, 2010: 14-15). However, less developed countries, which share the same currency (Euro-) area, use their financial transfers that direct to investments more than some social transfers.
These preferences of countries with significant budget deficits in the Eurozone using financial transfers also bring up the necessity of a more flexible federal financial structure in the Eurozone. It is observed that the mutual financial transfers made to these countries' budgets from the central budgets of the member countries for a possible financial crisis are transformed into a selective structure with the change between the countries (or regions) or the preferences timed periodically. This structure of the selective financial transfers in the Eurozone region necessitated structural change, which should be more flexible in the implementation of fiscal federalism. This phenomenon is undoubtedly extending the practice of financial federalism far beyond the ongoing framework with federated rules and broadening the financial basis of regional cohesion directed to increase fiscal transfers (Veld, 2007: 1) This point is the main issue of the criticisms of the European Union members, especially for financial budget tariff applications. Because, this structural situation appears to occur in two different positions in practice: The first is the monetary value transfers of the member countries, which still do not use the euro -or want not to use as the common currency. Because the public budgets of these countries face a significant depreciation with national currencies. The second is the structural financial problems arising from the differences of the contribution levels of a common upper Union budget. At this point, the financial transfers of the central budget in a federal financial process show different sensitivities depending on the impact of the applied federal rules (Ershova, 2018: 412-413). In other words, the flexibility of the rules of fiscal federalism regarding the harmonization process of countries in the Eurozone region also determines the level of financial transfers from central national budgets. Therefore, the harmonization of regional budgets with the flexibility of the rules of financial federalism makes the financial limits related to between the federated regions meaningful via central budgets, which mean to form the core of fiscal federalism. It is possible to form and monitor this interregional financial federal process through centralized budget relations in figure 1

. The Sensitivity of Centralized Budget Transfers within Fiscal Federalism Process
The level of financial transfers of central national budgets for sustaining fiscal federalism is increasing or decreasing with the flexibility of federated rules in terms of continuity. In the Eurozone region, between the member states (or regions), the rules and flexibility between the implementation weight of the fiscal rules and the central national budget have a special sanction for the budgets of the federal states. Countries such as Greece, Lithuania and Spain in the Eurozone region are among the countries that have most benefited from the advantages of financial flexibility in the framework of fiscal federalism (Feyrer and Sacerdote, 2013: 127). In other words, these countries have been the subject of significant financial advantages of flexible fiscal federated support, although they do not provide almost no tiers of national central government budgets in the Eurozone region.
To sum up, in the processes dominated considerably by the rules of fiscal federalism, the flexibility in the implementation of financial federalism have increased and it is seen that this increase positively affects the distribution scale of the countries or regions. This recently increasing impact scale has resulted in increased demand for federal applications with increased flexibility in the Eurozone region (Grauwe and Ji 2016: 5). For the countries in Eurozone, this situation appears to have caused two important structural problems on the basis of financial transfers. The first of these is related to financial transfers in which is a very flexible financial federalism process that creates (or will create) a significant financial burden on developed countries (European Commission, 2014: 6). Indeed, there is widespread opinion among the official financial practitioners like budget masters that this is the main reason for the Brexit practice in the UK.
In this context, because the central government budget lags behind a financial federated set of rules, it is seen as a loss of financial resources, as well as a significant loss of financial jurisdiction, as well as for the UK. The second is that the countries in the Eurozone region, which do not have a homogeneous income distribution, cannot present a sufficiently homogenous compatible infrastructure to create a federated financial structure at the desired level. This shortcoming would transform into more meaningful contradictions, especially in the base of underdeveloped and non-compliant countries including insufficient financial reform efforts like Turkey (European Commission, 2018-b: 113). This process, which the federated financial structure is adversely affected by the financial transfers aimed at the Eurozone region, has transformed into an unfair financial getting advantage process as an external process in which these countries with budget deficits have slowed down the process of being harmony.

The Compatibility Process of Fiscal Federalism in Eurozone and Its Alteration Dynamics
The concerned criticisms in interregional financial federal process with structural harmonization problems directed to the compatibility process of fiscal federalism are considered as a major financial federalism problem in the European Union. For the European Union, a budget for sanctions over national public budgets can be considered a common financial market discipline for Continental Europe (Bijlsma and Zwart, 2013: 3).
The most important financial element in ensuring the common fiscal discipline is undoubtedly the value that the common currency is performing for all member states. All fiscal policies of the member states, including public  Vol.10, No.4, 2019 debt management, can offer unfair financial benefits to the more advanced countries in the Euro Area region. The priority is to ensure a common fiscal federalism in a monetary triangle cycle in the euro area. These triple pillars of fiscal federalism can be expressed through prudential monetary policies and directed commercial markets in a clear financial management process. In the Eurozone region, the flow of capital to the desired level on the basis of the member states of the European Union, -as the result of the political and financial-effects has not reached the desired level (European Commission 2014: 3-4). One of the most important negative dynamics in the formation of a financial federalism in the Eurozone region appears to be this phenomenon. On the other hand, this phenomenon, in contrast to the financial federal structure, now displays a structure that supports economic nationalism. This also turns out to be captive trade limits protection where the adaptation process for financial federalism is also adversely affected. In the light of this approach, we can express the process of adaptation and interaction between financial federalism in the Eurozone region and the countries in

Figure 2. The Structural Compatibility Dynamics of Fiscal Federalism and Its Alteration Process
The primary objective in providing a financial federalism in the Eurozone region, as it is observed in Figure  2, is that they have a common macro policy, which is equipped with the common financial building blocks of the respective Eurozone countries. A fiscal federal alignment between the countries in the Eurozone has made inevitable a process in which macroeconomic policies are supported by prudent macroeconomic policies. This process is a process for supporting the economic effect location of national financial budgets rather than a structural alteration process. A single market target in the Eurozone region has needed two important implementation dynamics at this stage in the recently years. Single monetary union including the whole macro monetary policy rules in Eurozone applications, or single currency. The structural difference between these two phenomena has occurred at the stage of implementation and distinguishes the single currency preference from the single monetary policy approach, but without included in the whole monetary policy rules. However, the formation of a common budget policy in the Eurozone region also complicates a balanced financial risk policy among countries.
The main reason for this situation is that the structural change policies of each country towards the common budget policies in the framework of financial federalism are different. As we mentioned, inter-country disparities, such as unemployment rates and economic growth, also affect the financial transfer policies among countries. At this stage, countries are reluctant to fulfil the high financial responsibilities required for the fulfilment of national public obligations. Indeed, the latest developments in the European Union confirm this situation. Unfortunately, the financial federalism has functioned on the countries with lower authority distribution in the provision of monetary union as a negative process from recently years. At this stage, as we have already mentioned, the scopedetail difference between a common currency and a common monetary policy for fiscal federalism is the biggest handicap to the adaptation process and differentiates the transnational advantages provided from financial federalism. Italy, for example, as a Eurozone region country, is not an equal responsibility as a net-direct beneficiary of European Union funds. In contrast, the recently seen situation in Ireland is on contrary to the Italy's present situation, because Ireland has fallen outside of the Eurozone as a country that is not net-direct beneficiary of financial funds (Dreyer and Schmid, 2015: 521). This position of these countries, which are subject to different financial burdens as net contributors to the Eurozone region, is not sufficient to explain the deviations due to a financial federalism, even if it is explained by the difference in development.
Furthermore, the search for different financial policies should also be considered in the search for an externally based justification on the basis of the European Union. However, overcoming problems related to common monetary union and ensuring a real compatibility is not a problematic issue that can be solved with monetary policies outside the Eurozone. The United States, which is a major reason for seeking a more stable common currency in the recent period, does not seem to be a justified approach as a matter of this situation. Even though the existence of a common European monetary policy from the beginning of the last century to the 1930s was interpreted in this position, the existence and up-to-date alignment of the financial federalism in Eurozone today depends more on the common monetary policy integrity than on a common currency. Prudent monetary policies and the mandatory structure of trade options have inevitably a role in the evident in this process of financial federalism. Addressing the adaptation process of fiscal federalism and the dynamics of change outside this structural triangle, which is the common cornerstones of which we are addressing, pushes the national budget activities of the countries in the Eurozone region out of the region. This phenomenon is also an important structural adjustment problem for a common Eurozone constitution that is intended to be established on the basis of fiscal federalism, and has manipulated inevitable the search for different sources of financial resources and debt from different regions, as a fiscal federalism matter. At this stage, the existence of a realistic financial federalism has made inevitable a reorganization of a functional common European Agreement in which the financial functions of the European Union are addressed more clearly and realistically towards to occur the single market via this concerned structural triangle. However, the functions of a federal superstructure that keeps fiscal federalism on the agenda face to be limited in an internal consistency with the country's tradition and common financial values.

Expectations directed to financial federalism in the Eurozone region and Probable Discusses on The National Budgets
This negative probability in the Eurozone region for financial federalism is that countries using the common currency (Euro) are subject to different impact scales against a possible regional devaluation. Partly, except for a common absolute monetary policy, the countries using the currency of the relevant currency have demonstrated meaningful arguments in terms of their national losses for years. This situation, which is a very important element in the failure report of a financial federalism aimed at securing a single market economy, has also disrupted regional commercial protectionism and has recently highlighted national subjective trade. Undoubtedly, this fact emphasizes the need for future fiscal federalism and the need to redesign national budgets in Eurozone.

Budgetary Development related to the Fiscal Federalism in Eurozone and Common Correlations
Structural factors such as the development difference in the Eurozone region have divided the budgets of the member countries into different equilibrium distributions as a common value. In the Eurozone's countries where all structural changes are different, net transaction values related to the budget are directly affected by this situation. For the Eurozone, this situation can be evaluated in two different cases related to the financial federalism. In the process of fiscal federalism, the decision-making countries, the public deficits are extremely low countries and the countries that directly benefit from the decisions on financial federalism especially in strategical financial decision process. This approach is also seen as the cause of deviations in the common correlation values and increases the negative burden of increasing Euro values on less developed countries (Checherita and Rother, 2010: 15). This significant financial fact has caused of budget deficits in countries, such as Lithuania, is an important cause, and this phenomenon has been a main matter of discussions in recently years especially directed to be perceived the fiscal federalism. The second approach is related to the problems in the financial alteration agenda due to the distribution of Euro-based capital flows between countries, which cause bigger development differences. In brief, the problem with him is a serious development difference and the negative aberrations that this situation poses on the common financial correlations (Cimadomo et al, 2018: 93). In these deviations, a financial federalism approach has been insufficient directed to ensuring a common fiscal federalism, and it is observed that the euro has a negative impact on real capital in these countries due to inflationary effects on countries such as Lithuania, Poland, Hungary and Croatia. National Income, as a dependent variable at this stage, is an important determinant of capital inflow and lower the correlation values between possible budget deficits and fiscal federalism and the structural correlation process (Lane, 2013: 12). In Figure 3, it is possible to see the relationship of Eurozone countries, and its distribution of net budget balances in the last decade based meaningful criteria.

Figure 3. Net Operating Budget Balances and Its Relations GNI per Capita in Eurozone
As seen on figure 3, deviations arising from the development difference of the member countries are seen as an important reason for the budget deficits, and as the growth rate decreases the increase in budget deficits is growing as a correlation related. This correlation balance due to National Income is high in countries such as France, Germany, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Italy, Denmark and the UK, which are considered as the main core countries of the European Union. However, in other countries that were joined in later where the Union has a low level of Euro effect, the net negative effect on net budget values is increasing. For the Eurozone region, the effects of fiscal federalism on the respective countries' budgets can be explained by an inverse relationship on a GNI per capita basis. In other words, the increase in the level of significance "R 2 " as the advanced level increases as an important variable has caused a non-homogenous Eurozone region.
It is possible to reveal this phenomenon with GNI per capita coefficient and the net budget balance is seen to grow GNI per capita income ratio decreases. Undoubtedly, the assessment of net budget balances based on the Euro currency (€) is also very important in the same process. In briefly, as a common correlation, fiscal federalism creates a more significant scale of impact in countries where it is more effective per capita and provides a fairer distribution of central budget burden. It is not a coincidence that net operational budget deficit is high in less developed countries compared to other countries. In these countries, the correlation values for budget burden are higher and more negative. The fiscal budget burden is effected by national income distribution, and this sharing of fiscal burden produce more negative effect on the poor citizen, which mean to reveal the fiscal uncongenial. At this stage, these less developed countries in Eurozone have entered into a different structural search for their central national budgets, which try to abandon the Euro currency or to move their national currencies to a more convertible position. It can be said that this phenomenon is an important cause of the possible deviation up to "0.59" in "R 2 ". It appears that in new member countries the time taken for being member in the Eurozone countries and also the subsequent time for the completion of the common monetary and financial institutionalization had a direct impact on the balance coefficient and the balance of net budget transactions. In this respect, the negative deviations in the increasing net budget values of the new member countries in the Eurozone region should be comment as prominent and meaningful deviations. These are countries with institutional shortcomings on the basis of institutional integration and development in terms of fiscal federalism, and these are also the cause of significant deviations in the institutional alignment of financial federal activities in Eurozone.

Corporate Common Fiscal Goals and The Deviations in The Process of Fiscal Federalism
It is understood that the deviations in the Eurozone region for the common financial objectives have emerged in institutional positions where a heterogeneous macro infrastructure is generally present. At this stage, it is important to say that the deviations of macro-common values between countries (unemployment rate, inflation, etc.) are a result of higher costs incurred by countries with lower chance of competition. In the other word, a heterogeneous federal infrastructure has transformed the process-related changes such as unemployment insurance and regional labour market regulations into an even more unified structure for years, but this phenomenon will be able to further enhance structural contradictions due to differences. Obviously, a more feasible federal infrastructure for the Eurozone emerges as a result of fewer national sanctions in which there is a lower market competition (Hayek, 1948: 266). This phenomenon of financial change increases the costs of adaptation to the federal structure of the least developed countries in the Eurozone region by turning a financial region change with high financial costs. Even more, the national decisions taken by the member states for the provision of a financial federalism has remained insufficient and the effectiveness of the precautionary policies they have taken against the common monetary union becomes meaningless. This is because there is no common agreement between the dynamics in the provision of financial federalism, and this also destroys the Euro's monetary value balance for the countries. It is possible to emphasize and explain the deviations related to the financial federalism process in the scope of applications in the Eurozone region as follows: Deviations related to Tax Bases and Exclusive Tax Bases with Shared Tax Bases: It can be said that the most important financial mismatch phenomenon in the process of financial federalism within the scope of common objectives is to provide a common tax base for the regionally-targeted taxes. These concerned to matter as fiscal deviations cause some different tax applications like different tax rates, which mean to be busy with not action the national tax with national budgets as to fiscal federalism. It is imperative that countries with a common currency should have, as a financial necessity, common financial applications integrity as well as social impact levels of taxes require to have equivalent criteria. However, the aimed tax revenues targets based on national budgets are far from practices in the common tax base in the Eurozone. This financial phenomenon has deviated significantly the impact of a federal financial structure on the Eurozone (Franks et al, 2018: 21). To future of Eurozone the undesired fiscal applications have been keeping increase for recent years to bring up the common fiscal practices forming effects on especially less developed countries as negative effects. As these formed results, the less developed countries have to take on more financial burdens than others, which means to more negative effects via common currency -as Euro-as directed to the fiscal federalism. From this angle, this discussed financial phenomenon has supplied the harmonization problems directed to the future of fiscal federalism in Eurozone.

Deviations Related to Revenue Sharing Arrangements in The Tax Revenue Resources:
Although the countries' tax resources are generally the same, these countries that are in Eurozone appear to have different levels of impact in the Eurozone with different forms of implementation. The fact that tax resources are subject to changes is the result of differences and practices in the proportionate value of tax revenues within the national income of the country concerned in the Eurozone. In other words, the weighted proportional differences of the sectoral structures of countries are interpreted as differences of tax resources. These concerned Federal deviations from the harmonization process for a federal financial structure in the implementation of common financial objectives emerge from direct tax-related values, such as employment and price policies, and unfortunately the countries in the Eurozone are increasingly differentiating tax practices. This process, in which the autonomous structure of national budgetary practices is prominent, is a process in which the intended federal financial structure in the Eurozone returns to a vicious circle as related to financial applications. At this stage, it is a matter of important debate and federal financial deviations in which the financial resources are or will be the priority for the primary fiscal common objectives in the Eurozone. In addition, the importance considerably of the practice is seen in the indirect taxes, and this phenomenon differentiates the commodity-capital markets in the Eurozone (European Central Bank, 2016: 57-58). The fact that the common tax resources and revenues in the Eurozone are subject to different budgets in the goods and wraps market are the areas where financial federalism is most deviated. This structure, which adversely affects the joint sharing of regional tax resources, also leads to significant financial loss in terms of federated financial practices as related to incompatible tax adjustments. Deviations Related to Tax Expenditures as an Add Fiscal Burden Harmonization: Deviations directed to federal financial purposes in the Eurozone also reveal significant from the costs of differences that can come on the scene from the tax exceptions and tax exemptions. As the tax expenditure phenomenon means to give up some of the taxes to be taken, it can say that the tax exemption and tax exemption differences arising from tax practices in the Eurozone also cause significant deviations. This financial phenomenon is an important additional financial burden in the Eurozone, particularly for the less developed countries, and is also the basis for these countries' significant compliance issue objections to a federal financial structure (European Commission, 2015: 17). This process, in which different income expectations for national budgets have come to the forefront, also direct the financial transfers expected from a co-federated budget with the different position of the possible open positions of each country's budget. As a clearer approach the limits of the financial expectations of less developed countries from a common fiscal federated budget have been shaped according to these fiscal expectations of these countries for a long time. The financial burden for the Eurozone to the provision of financial federalism is a bilateral financial burden and imposes ground for practices outside of the common financial structure related to the fiscal deviated alterations as in Spain (Haug and Nesse, 2016: 57). This phenomenon, which creates an additional financial burden, disrupts the adaptation process, while increasing the scale of the commodity-capital market with the countries outside of the Eurozone, and this fact has raised the search for different areas where the tax expenditures will have positive impacts (Barriors et al, 2016: 11). Therefore, the fiscal federalism has been main subject to of the federal financial structure alterations as some significant reason deviations in the Eurozone in the recent years. Deviations Related to use of federal spending power on the basis of Financial Transfers: Despite the common currency values in the Eurozone, financial transfers to less developed countries have been to subject to different political practices. This phenomenon has two meanings in practice. The first problem is what countries and how the distribution of financial transfers in the region is directed. Is it possible to put forth the criteria for the loss of financial in condition to be clearly in Eurozone? Or is this structural formation shaped by political regional expectations? It is not possible to find the answer to these questions in a federal financial structure in the Eurozone for recently years. Because the regional distribution criteria of financial transfers of the current federal financial structure are not clear (Devesa, 2016: 13). On the other hand, it should be questioned whether the regional federated financial power distribution is also equal in the expenditure and use of financial transfers under a common federal budget. Because, as related to the federal financial structure in the Eurozone is a reality in the implementation processes in which the country where the budgetary responsibility is shared and the countries where spending authorities are shared are different. The differences in budgetary responsibilities and spending powers in the Eurozone region of Greece in the past years is a good example of questioning the federal financial structure (Hawkesworth et al, 2008: 43). In this context, it is observed that the spending power in practice is based and formed on structurally constituent countries for the Eurozone region. This concept currently leads to significant deviations from the use of financial authority directed to fiscal federalism applications, which means also to break into the fiscal distribution, as negative process, in Eurozone.

Conclusion
The relationship of a financial federal structure with national budgets in the Eurozone region varies according to the process in which the federal structure is implemented and the countries governing this process. Efforts to create a common federal district budget for further consolidation of a common currency use ground are affected to a different extent from the different dynamics of the Eurozone region and cause different deviations. In this process, the position and financial position of national budgets constitute an impact that cannot be ignored and a federal financial structure in the Eurozone region sometimes causes some hurled financial applications. On the other hand, the development gap (or differences) between countries also differentiates the financial impact levels of the budgets of countries in the Eurozone region, and these less developed countries have been exposed to higher financial burdens on their national budgets. This financial phenomenon has occurred two important consequences for the federal financial structure in the Eurozone region.
The first of these developments is that due to the possible budget deficits of the less developed countries desire that their national currencies should also be a priority in commercial-financial affairs and take own measures for possible financial burdens in the contrary to the Eurozone federal dynamics. The effect of the use of Euro require, as a common currency on these countries with budget deficits, to require taking measures to counteract the financial burdens arising from the common federal financial structure rather than the structural change in these countries. These structural deviations have been seen to be an important cause of financial contradiction, and it is observed that this fact cause the financial transfers in the Eurozone region have caused deviations from the real practicing fields with objectives of fiscal federalism applications in especially recent years.
Secondly, the contribution of Eurozone practices to the formation of a federal budget has increased the negative consequences of tax mismatches recently. In fact, the regional impact level of Euro use, and the fact that Euro preferences may cause more significant financial deficits among countries is an issue that has been frequently discussed in recent years because of this specific of action contradictions. In addition, undoubtedly the differences in the tax base of the countries in the Eurozone region are also directly related to the national income as related to the financial burdens between these countries. In this context, the regional existence of financial federalism causes deviations in the financial power of the countries due to the differences in monetary policies. In this respect, the flexibility of national budgets associated with national income in the face of financial federalism has also directly has been affecting the levels of national contribution in the provision of a common federated budget in the Eurozone region for a long time. Targeting common target financial correlations on the countries of the region adversely affects the regional conservationist structure. The lack of an absolute monetary union and the deviations in the distribution of fiscal authority can be said to be one of the possible reasons for these national concerns. Regional negative correlations of economic and financial transactions and the distant forms of structural adjustment policies have undermined the structural change policies in the Eurozone region. At this point, it is seen that the less developed countries aim to bring their fiscal reforms to the forefront in order to increase their monetary conversions by moving their national budgets to a stable position rather than providing the common dynamics of a federal financial structure.