Unmaking the Third World via the New Partnership for African Development (NEPAD): Experience and Future Action Areas

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Abstract
This paper examines the historical dynamics and the dialectical processes that culminated in the designation, characterization and the objective reality of some part of the “Planet Earth” as “Third World”. Specifically, we show, how the expanded reproduction of capital via merchant capitalism, colonialism, neo-colonialism and the current global economic system have partly or wholly generated and reinforced the indices of underdevelopment associated with “Third World” countries and the inertia of continental attempts at unmaking Third World underdevelopment challenges. In doing this we attempt an X-ray of the New partnership for African Development (NEPAD) showing lessons learnt and areas for further research and practical actions.

Introduction
A large literature of development research indicates that the most striking feature of Third World Countries (TWCs) is that, they are largely underdeveloped (Mohammed, Y. 1988). Indices of underdevelopment includes: short life expectancy, high birth rate, high unemployment rate, illiteracy, gender inequality, economic dominance of agrarian sector, weak comprador class and political authoritarianism. Even more encompassing are Leibenstein’s list which include the following: lack of entrepreneurship, technical knowledge, credit system, savings and employment opportunities, low volume of trade per capita, poor housing, major proportion of expenditure on food and basic necessities, malnutrition, high indebtedness relative to income, rudimentary hygiene and sanitation (Leibenstein, B.1957). At the superstructure Webster notes:

*The dominant group and the state in the third world are inherently weak with consequences for political instability and irregularities* (Webster, A. 1994). Furthermore, the non-autonomy of the state in the Third World by reason of its direct involvement in internal class struggle for accumulation renders politics “‘Hobessian’” and make access and or control of the state a do or die affair, as winners take all and the defeated loose out completely: reminiscence of Darwin’s survival of the fittest (Ekekwe, E. 1986). The situation is compounded as political gladiators, in a bid to retain power as a guarantee for the control of the state: being the primary basis of accumulation deploys the coercive arsenal of the state to unleash brutality upon the civil society and every flint of opposition. The case of 90% Nigerian governors seeking re-election in 2011 without any specific and objective evidence of performance in the previous tenure is a typical example. Situation of this nature is not unique to Nigeria but abound in other nations of the Third World. The nature of Third World leadership is summarized by Adio thus:

*Those that were not misguided and corrupt, were just plain inefficient, or mere replacements for the colonial masters: either in military or civilian garbs, they were of the same hues, more interested in power and wealth than in the emancipation of their people and sustained by neo-colonial and imperialist interest, they cultivated personality cults, repressed their people, pursued bogus policies and grandiose projects and turned the state into personal possession* (Adio, W. 2002). With leaders of this nature, it is not surprising why Third World Countries achieved neither democracy nor development.

Economically, the disarticulated, externally oriented and dependent nature of the Third World economies appears to be the foundation upon which other features are built. Fanon argues that, the period of merchant capitalism and colonialism forced a specialization of production on “Third World” countries that was primarily export oriented, of limited range and geared towards the material needs of the imperial powers (Frank, G. 1967). Idise observed that:

The Third World elite were incorporated into this system and could do little to establish a more diverse form of economic activities. For instance, Nigeria a typical TWC has been conditioned by imperialism into the production of export cash crops like Cocoa, Cotton, Timber and until recently crude oil in a global economic environment where industrialization and technology constitute the basis of growth and development. In any case even in the Oil and Gas sector that is technology oriented is largely dominated by multinational interest: with the oil reserve on Nigeria territory, while exploration, exploitation and control are in tight grip of multinational firms (Idise, G.1999). Thus, Nigeria imports virtually all its needs including consumables even the acclaimed made in Nigeria goods, it is doubtful if the local content of products such as matches and perhaps tooth pick exceed raw material and labor input. The overall implication is balance of trade and payment problems leading to debt crisis. At last check, 34 out of the 41 countries listed on the World Banks list of heavily indebted poor countries
However defined “Third World” as a concept is neither divine nor natural declared (Akuru, A. 1998). This position is clearly supported by Ake when he concludes:

The designation, characterization and reality of some parts of the globe as Third World should not be seen as natural, but a historically determined outcome of the European capitalist contact with the pre-capitalist territories dating the 16th century and has continued today in the form of foreign domination and exploitation of such parts of the globe so designated through neo-colonial agencies” (Ake, C. 1981, op.Cit).

This in part explains Olukoshi’s declaration that, the making of the “Third World” is a direct historical consequence of the internationalization of capitalism (Olukoshi, A. 1991).

Pre-capitalist Third World Social Formation (Africa)

The entire span of pre-capitalist Africa is replete with variegated political systems ranging from the stateless Nuer, centralized kingdom of Benin, Mali, Oyo, Kanem-Bornu, Republican Ibo and Tiv societies and decentralized Tonga in Northern Zambia (Olatubosun, D. 1985). Despite these glaring differences certain similar forces characterized most African societies.

First, the pre-capitalist basis of surplus accumulation was inter and intra kingdom trade in agricultural produce ranging from Cattle, Slaves, Pepper, salt, Kola nut, Ivory, Horses and Gold, which were to service the direct need of the people. Trade was carried on along the Trans Sahara Trade route. Indigenous technology in iron smelting, craft and weaving constituted an integral part of the mode of production and conflict resolution institutions range from compensation, arbitration and religious beliefs among groups. In short social control was normative (Bates, R. 1987). Social relationship was on kinship and leadership either on gerontocratic, hereditary, charismatic or theocratic principles. The productive forces were at their rudimentary stage of development. This was the general direction of development in most African formation prior to the capitalist encounter. We return now to the capitalist incursion into African social formation.

Capitalist Expansion via Merchant Capitalism

Marx and Engels as early as 1846 had proclaimed in the “communist manifesto” that, the thrust of capitalism is the development of the productive forces. The urge to maximize profit, acquire cheap labor and market its goods competitively are the propelling forces behind capitalist expansion to other territories. Capitalism, Marx contends, “expands while assimilating other societies under its control”. The bourgeoisie “must nestle everywhere, settle everywhere and establish connections everywhere”. The bourgeoisie, by the rapid improvement of all instruments of production, by the immensely facilitated means of communication, draws all, even the most barbarian nations into civilization. The cheap prices of its commodity are the heavy artillery with
which it batters down all Chinese walls, with which it brings the barbarian intensely obstinate hatred of foreigners to capitulate (Marx, K. and Engels, F. 1980). Marx envisaged a two face mission for capitalism outside Europe: one destructive and the other regenerating and annihilating of the older order. Equally supportive of this position is Luxemburg, she notes:

**Capitalism must always and everywhere fight a battle of annihilation against every historical form of natural economy that it encounters, whether this is slave economy, feudalism, primitive communal or patriarchal peasant economy. The principal methods in this are political force, oppressive taxation by the state and cheap goods, they are partly simultaneously, and partly they succeed and compliment one another (Luxemburg, R.).**

Further refinement of this position by neo-Marxist scholars was to the effect that, with the incorporation of pre-capitalist formation, the pre-capitalist system was not totally destroyed. What obtained was the existence side by side of the pre-capitalist and capitalist mode with the gradual ascendancy of the capitalist mode. This situation they called articulation of the modes of production (Foster. 1979; Brad, P. 1975; Laclau, J. 1971; Brautra, S. 1975).

Merchant capitalism here is taken to mean the accumulation of capital through trade and plunder which ascended to the peak in the late 18th century (Webster, A. 1990). Merchant capitalism marked the first phase of capitalist expansion for which the commercial hunting of black skins (slave trade) appeared the most lucrative. The profitability of mercantilism was the salient issue raised in the works of Kay and Amin (Kay, G. 1975:59; Amin, S. 1976).

The slave trade was organized along a triple exchange pattern. European traders exchanged in most cases poor quality weapons and textiles at a profit for African slaves. Secondly, the slaves were traded as a profit in the sugar cane plantations of the Caribbean island and the American mainland and thirdly, the traders filled their ship with agricultural produce by the slave and marketed at a profit in Europe. In fact, it is estimated that about 9 million Africans aged between 15 and 35 were shipped across the Atlantic between 1650 and 1850. It must be noted that based on the logic of the “‘Dialectics’”, at some point the slave trade became economically unprofitable. With the advancement of the productive forces courtesy of improved science and technology coupled with huge losses incurred by traders and the voyage across the Atlantic arising from harsh weather conditions, the trade became non lucrative. This in part appears to be inevitable contradiction that precipitated the eventual abolishment of the trade (Olatubosun, 1985).

Rodney identified two major negative impact of this trade. He noted that the trade impacted badly on the growth of African population (Rodney, W. 1972). The importance of population as a crucial determinant of economic and social development is emphasized by Yesufu (Yesufu, T. 2001). Secondly, mercantilism had particularly destructive impact on the existing economic and political patterns of African societies. The most devastating was the out staging of Trans-Sahara trade between African kingdoms by the Trans-Atlantic trade, thereby breeding the germ of orientation towards the external: Africans looked in the direction of the sea expectantly either in fear or anticipation of gain.

On a sustained basis, merchant capitalism sowed the seed of economic weakness and dependency on European state in several ways. For instance, local money forms were relegated and subsequently, totally jettisoned during the colonial era with the introduction of western currency (Ake, C. 1981). Furthermore, it nurtured a small but wealthy elite class in societies that had close relations with European business magnates. Lastly, it ushered in a period of increasing interlocking of economies on a world scale dominated by the capitalist centre (Webster, A. 1990). The processes of making the Third World initiated by merchant capitalism were to be heightened during the later stages of colonialism and neo-colonialism.

**Capitalist Expansion via Colonialism**

The main period of capitalist expansion, with the scramble for and partition for Africa representing the peak was between 1850 and 1900. By 1900 all except perhaps Ethiopia and Liberia had come under one form of colonial administration or the other. Researcher’s interests in understanding the motives behind colonialism produced several theories. For instance, Toynbee has this to say;

“The great event of the seventeenth century was the impact of Western civilization upon all other living society of the world: the impact so powerful and pervasive that it out the lives of all victims all victims up side e down and inside out –affecting the behavior, outlook, feelings, and beliefs of individual men, women, and children in an intimate way, touching chords in human souls that are to touched by external material forces however ponderous and terrifying” (Toynbee, F. 1948). Toynbee’s claims about the civilizing agenda of colonialism were rejected by other scholars on the technical grounds of a historicity and empirically unverifiable assumptions. For instance, Offiong notes:

*Although formal colonies had been established in the 16th century by Spanish and Portuguese in Latin America, they were conceived as mere feudal estates that were granted independence in 1930. This conception changed in the 19th century, as colonialism was seen as a valuable political weapon for the control of foreign territories in furtherrance of industrial capitalist development.*

Despite variations in the colonial policies adopted by the imperial powers, some degree of unity can be
established in terms of the aim, general content, nature and consequences of colonial policies on African social formation. Firstly, even though pre-colonial African economies were surplus generating formations, they were largely agrarian subsistent economies. This pattern was overturned and colonies reduced to source of cheap raw materials as well as dumping markets for European manufactured goods. The hitherto existing African land tenure systems were replaced (Okodudu, S.1998). Moreover, monopolistic organizations like the Royal Niger Company in the West African sub-region encouraged only forms of agriculture and mineral extraction with productive use in the metropolis. Overtime, traditional crops which feed local population were abandoned as peasants were forced out of the land by the companies ostensibly to promote the production of coffee, cocoa, tea, palm oil. Rubber, groundnut and cotton, the so called cash crops (Bates, R. 1987). The above analysis partly explains the food dilemma in third world countries. Again, colonialism initiated the first real patterns of labor migration and displacement on a world scale. Wage labor became established in both rural and urban regions in the colonies productive and service sectors.

Lastly, colonialism introduced a system of law and order profitable to the imperial powers. The legal system became a mixture of European and customary laws. Geographically and politically the colony was the artificial phenomenon of globalization. The resiliency of capitalism makes for name and sometimes character reform but integration almost an impossibility. It also account for the series of boundary disputes among African countries. From the foregoing, it is evident that colonialism altered existing pre-capitalist mode of production, land ownership and labor patterns, and political structures with the unifying objective of creating a distorted and incoherent character for African social formation (Stave, H. 1973).

**Capitalist Expansion via Neo-colonialism**

Neo-colonialism is the worst form of imperialism: for those who practice it, it means power without responsibility and those who suffer from it; it means exploitation without redress...The essence of Neo-colonialism is that the state which is subject to it is, in theory, independent and has all the trappings of international sovereignty. In reality it’s economic and thus its internal policy is directed from the outside (Nkrumah, K. 1968). Thus, save for political independence of the erstwhile colonized territories the post colonial economic structures remains and share essentially the same feature with those of the colonial epoch. Consequent upon the end of world war 11, weakness of European powers and the upsurge of USA as an undisputed world power, most African countries gained independence by the mid 1970s. Veiled with the clothes of independence, newly independent nations occupied seats in the UN, ironically economic dominance was sustained. The principal mechanism for sustained economic and political domination of Africa is the growth of MNCs. MNCs uses their unlimited economic clout to control production from raw material, through the processing to the final retail stage. Describing the role and strength of MNCs in the Third World Garvin declares:  

A large growing share of production in the Third World is under the control of a few MNCs and by the end of the decade will own about 62% of the fixed assets of the entire globe (Garvin, N.1967). MNCs through their monopoly of global technology have continued to dominate and control Third World economies in vast areas of production, manufacturing, mining, distribution, advertising, insurance, banking, shipping, construction and development (Akpuru, A. 1998). In 2005, for example just ten companies control 86% of the $262 billion global communication business. In fact, the economic clout of these MNCs often exceed that of third World governments and, as amnesty international points out, human and labor rights are not priority in their agenda (Awake, 2003:7). The European Union (EU) helps to channel capital and sustain the health of European based MNCs as well as maintain trade, production and political links with ex colonies of Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific.

From the foregoing x-ray of the dynamics of the expanded reproduction of capital via mercantilism, Colonialism and Neo-colonialism, we are left without doubt that the making of the third world is the outcome of the internationalization of capitalism. Contemporary trend reveal that capitalism has assumed a world status courtesy of the end of the cold war and the phenomenon of globalization. The resiliency of capitalism makes for name and sometimes character reform but the supremacy of profit and exploitation remains immobilized. What then is the position of Third World nations within the present global order?

**The Global Order and the Position of the Third World**

Globalization is a complex process and phenomenon of antinomies and dialectics: integrating and fragmenting the world; uniformity and localization; increased material prosperity and deepening misery; homogenization and hegemonization. Globalization is nothing but a mixed grill. With reference to globalization Edward Shevardze, president of Georgia declared:

“We the people of the earth are one large family. The new epoch offers new challenges and new global problems, such as environmental catastrophes, exhaustion of resources, bloody conflicts and poverty” (Awake, 2002:4). It must be observed here that globalization is not an innovation, but a mere transformation in name, for long before now Wallenstein had described this historical process in the world system theory (Wallenstein,
The world economic community is one of sharp and widened inequality in the share of global wealth. The concern for this problem is reflected in United Nations Human Development report which declares: “The greatest concern about international economy is the widened gap between the have and the have not: while world resources and wealth is on the increase, it has become concentrated in few hands and few nations. The net worth of the 200 richest people on earth now exceeds the combine 40% of the people who live on the planet – some 2.4 billion people. And while wages continue to rise in advanced countries, 80 impoverished countries have actually seen a decline in average income over the past decade” With regards poverty in the Third World, former United Nations (UN) secretary general has this to say; “Sub-Saharan Africa has witnessed a continuous decline in income in the past 30 years. The international community allows 3 billion people almost half of humanity to subsist on $2 or less in a world of unprecedented wealth”. Third World poverty is accentuated by a global economic environment that favors the growth of transnational Corporation. The implication is that Nigeria for example, merely owns the oil reserve while transnational corporation owns more the actual business of exploitation and reward. Within the global economic framework, appropriation of surpluses from the Third World continues unabated (Sklair, A. 1991: 25). The global economy also allows for the pre dominance of transnational capitalist class. This class is not in the sense of Marx direct ownership of the means of production, but is defined thus; “A socially comprehensive category encompassing the entrepreneurial elite, managers of firms, senior state functionaries, leading politicians, members of the learned profession and persons of similar standing in all the sphere of society.” The practices of this class ranges from undue interference in the governments of third world nations (the US invasion of Iraq in April 2003 and invasion of Libya in 2011 in gross violation of international laws under the guise of restoring democracy), and the downgrading of certain Third World domestic practices by comparison with new and more glamorous transnational practices to create a comprador mentality. Finally with the end of the Cold War command economies were yielding to free enterprises and its political component liberal democracy (Adio, W. 2002:14). The adoption of the liberal democratic principles and ideals has become a major pre-condition for foreign assistance in the aids, loans and direct foreign investment by major international finance institutions (World Bank, IMF, IDB etc). TWCs are forced by the imperative laws of global capitalism to adopt reform programs e.g. Nigeria privatization, commercialization and all forms of structural adjustment programs. The relationship between the third world nations and the advanced capitalist countries within the global capitalist system is the asymmetrical. We now turn to development model adopted to undermine the third world prior to NEAPD.

Development Initiatives Prior to NEPAD: A review Development

When the African development problem mounted in the end of the 1970s and beginning of the 1980s, African governments elaborated Lagos Plan of Action (LPA). The LPA was a product of its historical moment that reflected the African development thought of that time premised on collective self-reliance and state-led development. According to LPA, the state being the leading economic actor should bear the burden of elaborating the social, economic and cultural policies that enable the mobilization of the resources and capabilities of the country. The plan also emphasized the role of the state in the distribution of both developmental burdens and benefits to ensure their fair distribution. Although it did not explicitly discuss the role of the state in development, the state was the main player in the LPA; it was part of the development crisis and the main agent for its resolution. The successive strategies adopted by African states were, according to the plan, responsible for the economic crisis. African states should, then, individually and collectively, bear the responsibility for that crisis (Lagos Plan of Action 1980).

Although the plan provided the bases for African integration, it did not adequately address the crucial elements for African development, namely: capacity, autonomy and partnership. While concentrating on sectoral Programmes, the plan did not adopt a detailed plan for building the capacity of domestic institutions in African countries. The plan also dealt with the African development challenge as purely an economic crisis. Corruption and clientelism were not, thus, a major concern for LPA. One can, then, argue that it was not only the lack of external support that led to the less successful implementation of the plan and affected its contribution in eroding African development crisis, but also the internal flaws in the orientation of the plan itself.

The United Nations Programme of Action for Africa Economic Recovery and Development (UNPAAERD), adopted by the twenty first Ordinary Summit of the OAU in July 1985, avoided some of LPA’s shortcomings. The Programme emphasized the central role of the state in the development process but added the need for building the capacity of state institutions to enable it to perform its role. According to the UNPAAERD, “African governments recognize that genuine efforts must be made to improve the management of the African economies and to rationalize public investment policies, particularly since the public sector will have to continue to play an important role in the development of the region. Such efforts would require, inter alia, improvement of public management systems, institutions and practices; improvement of the performance of public enterprises; reforming the public services to make them more development oriented services; greater mobilization of
domestic savings; improvement of financial management, including debt and development aid, fiscal administration and control of public expenditure with a view to promoting the efficient use of resources and cutting wastage and resource misallocation; reduction of foreign exchange leakages”. The Programme also asserted that admitting the central role of the state does not negate supporting the role of the private sector. However, the concern with the role of the private sector in the Programme was confined to stating that: “The positive role of the private sector is also to be encouraged through well-defined and consistent policies” (UNPAARED, 1986; article 11(ei)).

At the end of the 1980s, the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA) mobilized its intellectual resources to design “The African Alternative Framework to Structural Adjustment Programme (AAF-SAP). One of the main arguments of the Alternative Framework was to debunk the ingredients of SAPs especially those that defend the minimal role of the state. For the Alternative Framework, the role of the private capital is highly skeptical. Privatization has failed as a reason of the lack of an efficient, robust private sector in most of the African countries and the danger of the domination of foreign capital over African economies (AAF-SAP 1989, chapter 3). Four imperative categories or blocs should be applied, the framework stated, in order to pursue the path of adjustment with transformation, these are: strengthening and diversifying Africa's production capacity, improving the level of people's incomes and the pattern of its distribution, adjusting the pattern of public expenditure to satisfy people's essential needs and providing institutional support for adjustment with transformation (AAF-SAP 1989, chapter 5).

While many African scholars celebrated the AFF-SAP for its severe critics for SAPs and its trial to elaborate an alternative plan based on mobilizing national resources and supporting regional integration, others does not regard it as a real alternative framework and criticize it for being state-centered plan that calls for the domination of the state. This argument was denied by Adebayo Adedeji, the architect of the AAF-SAP and the General Secretary of the UNECA at that time, who stressed that the framework is drawing a balanced non-ideological vision which neither calls for a strict intervention of the state nor promotes a total reliance on markets (Onimode 1995:138-140).

The effort of elaborating an alternative framework to SAPs was complemented by the Arusha Conference on popular participation in Development in 1990 which adopted the African charter for popular participation in Development and Transformation. The charter introduced a mode of partnership between state and civil society for promoting development based on popular participation in the continent. Civil society organizations can, according to the charter, mobilize African masses to effectively participate in negotiating and debating development policies. These organizations can also serve as an oversight tool that reviews the extent to which the state is committed to implementing its development policies (African charter for popular participation in Development and Transformation 1990: articles 9-13). Organizationally, the charter proposed establishing a dialogue forum between state and civil society organization in every African country to institutionalize this partnership (African charter … 1990: article 23).

Given the ambitious, popular–oriented strategy of the African charter, there was little to wonder that it was enthusiastically welcomed by African civil society organizations. However, the charter lacks an implementation mechanism, something that led to the African idealist plan going no where.

To sum up, the African development plans of the eighties and nineties concentrated on establishing an alternative development strategy to SAPs, a strategy in which the state play a central role leading the process of development. Some of them realized that for that to happen, there should be an adequate reform for public management systems and a capacity building for state institutions, others drew a partnership project between state and civil society to achieve a people-centered mode of development. However, these plans were skeptical about the role of private sector. While admitting its role theoretically and claiming the bid to encourage this role, no action plans were adopted to achieve this aim. It is against this backdrop that NEPAD emerged as a development initiative for Africa.

**NEPAD and African Development**

The opening paragraph of the NEPAD foundational document (October 2001) declares:

“This New Partnership for Africa’s Development is a pledge by African leaders, based on a common vision and a firm and shared conviction, that they have a pressing duty to eradicate poverty and to place their countries, both individually and collectively, on a path of sustainable growth and development, and at the same time to participate actively in the world economy and body politic. The Programme is anchored on the determination of Africans to extricate themselves and the continent from the malaise of underdevelopment and exclusion in a globalising world.” More succinctly, paragraph 60 of the foundational document declares that NEPAD is “envisaged as a long-term vision of an African-owned and African-led development programme.”

The lofty goals they aim to achieve by means of democratization and promotion of fundamental rights, liberalization of African economies, promotion of export in the area agricultural and mineral resources, greater integration of Africa into the global economy, promotion of foreign trade and investment, and development using foreign aid and loans where necessary.
A review of the vision, objectives and strategies of NEPAD reveal as follows:

**Ownership and Control** – The development model did not emerge from any participatory process and therefore Top-button in origin and approach with the attendant consequence of loss of control over the productive process, as the intended beneficiaries (poor majority) have no decision making power over its conception and even implementation (Anikpo, M. 1984:34). Gaining consensus, domestic ownership and commitment on the part of majority of stakeholders is a quintessential condition for the successful implementation of reform and development. Alapiki notes:

“Development is an organic process that is man centered which can not be “delivered” from above. It is an endogenous process and there are no “front runners””. Thus, the appropriateness of the initiative to meet the particular needs of the poor who constitute the greater majority of the African population is doubtful. Furthermore, only recently has the program been publicized. This is why fears and skepticism is expressed in several quarters that the absence of prior debate with African citizens may skew the priority of the program against the native interest of the masses. It may probably account for the failure of previous continental attempt at achieving genuine development.

**Democracy, Rights and Citizenship**
The hallmark of democracy is the extent to which fundamental human right and freedom are protected, in that human rights emphasizes equality, due process, participation and democratic governance (Alapiki, H. 1999:153). However, a close look at NEPAD document reveals that its primary focus is the political and administrative framework of participating countries and although, the various documents and reports of the initiative emphasize the role of civil society organization, much emphasis is put on its integration in the NEPAD process as a channel for popular participation in the initiative rather than on drawing a partnership in development projects. How possible then is it to actualize the vision of eradicating poverty, promotion of human rights among others via technical and administrative measure? What is more, the role of periodic monitoring and assessment of progress in meeting the goals of good governance and social reform is assigned to the leaders only. Democracy can not be guaranteed through horizontal accountability, particularly in Third World countries were leadership lack commitment and are comprador in nature (Anikpo, M.1984:02). In fact, the issue of development as pointed out by the Canadian commission for international corporation (CCIC) is not limited to managing resources but the productive use of resources and in whose interest. If is a matter of conscious decision making in which the power to decide is a contestable terrain. What Africa needs is dedicated, patriotic, accountable and self less leadership.

**Trade and Investment**
According to the Declaration on Africa’s Development Challenges, [adopted at the end of a conference jointly hosted in Accra, Ghana in April 2002 by the Council for Development and Social Research in Africa (CODESRIA) and the Third World Network (TWN)-Africa on “Africa’s Development Challenges in the Millenium”] the development vision and economic measures proposed by NEPAD are unrealistic and flawed because they do not challenge the status quo (Kofi, T. 2002). More specifically, the Declaration argues that the vision will do little more than “reinforce the hostile external environment and the internal weaknesses that constitute the major obstacles to Africa’s development. The premature opening of the economies of the African continent to the international market, and its integration has been remarked as contributory factors to African under development (Okodudu 1998:120). Yet the New Partnership for African Development (NEPAD) aims to achieve internally agreed integration of Africa in the current model of economic globalization. The goals of poverty alleviation can not be achieved without significant reform in international trade, investment and political regimes. Furthermore, the initiative is not perturbed with capital flight through repatriation and money laundering by the de-nationalized local capitalist aristocracy. Rather than seek an alternative paradigm of development that would anchor the foundations of its actions on its own history and culture, NEPAD authors simply bought into the ‘final triumph of bourgeois rationality’ and the end of history  Yet these are paradigms of development that have zero tolerance for “alternative pathways to social development.
On the question of huge African debt profile, NEPAD does not call for outright cancellation of debt even when debt poses serious challenges to African countries. Its continuous reliance on foreign loan and aid from international finance institutions is counter productive since Third World debt is a major obstacle to development.

**Conclusion, Recommendations and focus for future research**
Conclusively, the launching of NEPAD and its presentation at the G8 has merely put the future of the African content on the international public agenda. The whole idea simply constitutes an opportunity to expose the liberal development paradigm and policies which have been promoted for decades by the international finance institutions, the World Trade Organization (WTG) and the G8 countries. NEPAD does not offer a comprehensive detailed paradigm that benefits from the role of the private sector, takes the social aspects of development into consideration and gains the international support (Dakar
Declaration of Africa Trade Union Conference 2002). However, it can be safely argued that NEPAD offers the general framework of such a paradigm. African scholars, researchers and policy makers should, then, move to the next step by reflecting on the following:

- The convocation of a conference to determine priority programs in conformity with the needs of the majority;
- Monitoring and evaluation of programs by the expected beneficiaries (masses) of programs;
- Economic development re-directed at rural industrialization based on particular culture and history;
- Social re-orientation aimed at imbibing new ethos and values of accountability, dedication and reputation on the part of African leadership;
- Discontinuation of debt payment or outright repudiation of such debts damning all consequences; and diversification of African economy.

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