The Economics and Dynamics of Internal Displacement in Nigeria

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Abstract
Internal displacement appears to have become a recurrent decimal in the socio-political narrative of Nigeria. While statistics reveal an increase in the number of both Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) and Returnees, especially in the Northeastern zone, the major thrust of this study is centered around the questions: what are the recent dynamics of internal displacement in Nigeria? What economic dimension(s) exist for internal displacement, especially in relation to the IDP camps? The study adopted a descriptive research method in investigating the phenomenon of internal displacement in Nigeria, drawing data primarily from secondary sources of data, and subjecting them to rigorous content analysis. The study found that IDPs continue to not only suffer exploitation and abuse from other male IDPs, camp officials and security officers, while services available in IDP camps can serve as push for internal displacement in Nigeria. It concluded that IDPs remain largely insecure and ‘displaced’ in the IDP camps which have also become a significant variable in the management of internal displacement. It was recommended that NGOs and other aid organizations should be allowed to get more involved in the IDP camps, particularly in the area of camp management and even security, as Nigerian government continues to recapture, rebuild and return IDPs to their communities.

Keywords: Displaced, Internal Displacement, Security, Camps, Internally Displaced Persons
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1. Introduction
The scourge of internal displacement, especially in the last decade, has not only tinted the image of the Nigerian state and further deepened ethnic and religious divides across the state, but has also resulted in very sharp decline in the socio-economic development of many communities within the state, particularly in the Northeastern zone, which has remained a hot-bed of various violent conflicts and terrorism. While the crisis of internal displacement is not a uniquely Nigerian phenomenon, the seeming unending nature of violent conflicts that result in displacement, as well as the arguably unique dynamics of Internally Displaced Persons (IDP) camps, make the Nigerian situation particularly significant. DeJesus (2018: 79) also observed other reasons for sustained research interests in displacement and forced migration as: “Africa’s diversity, dynamism, and changing political landscapes and spaces, policy formations and specificities of place”.

To provide some background, Betts (2009) reported that by the end of the Cold War, the number of IDPs around the world stood at 26 million, outnumbering refugees which stood at 14.9 million at the time. The United Nations High Commission on Refugees (UNHCR) global trends report revealed that of the 65.3 million people displaced globally at the end of 2015, 40.8 million were IDPs. Although the total number of people displaced globally by the end of 2017 rose to 68.5 million (an average of 44,400 people displaced everyday), the number of IDPs reduced by 800,000 to 40 million people, as 25.4 million became refugees outside their home countries and 3.1 million sort asylum to other countries; a rise from the 21.3 million refugees and 3.2 million asylum seekers in 2015. These figures reveal that rather than become IDPs or asylum seekers, more displaced persons became refugees within the period. According to UNHCR global trend report, Nigeria was the eleventh country with high number of IDPs by the end of 2017; with 1.7 million IDPs. Among the top ten states with the highest IDP population by the end of 2017 were (in reverse order): Afghanistan (1.8 million), Ukraine (1.8 million), South Sudan (1.9 million), Sudan (2.0 million), Yemen (2.0 million), Somalia (2.1 million), Iraq (2.6 million), DRC (4.4 million), Syria (6.2 million), and Colombia (7.7 million). The Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC) 2017 global report on internal displacement described the situation as a ‘consistent consequence’ of political violence, natural disasters such as flooding or drought, as well as intersecting factors, such as the growing famine and drought crisis in Somalia. It is also arguable that in Nigeria, such intersecting factors include ethnicity, religion, and conflicts resulting from competition for scarce land and water resources, among others.

These Internally displaced persons are described by the UNHCR as “people or groups of people who have been forced to leave their homes or places of habitual residence, in particular as a result of or in order to avoid the effects of armed conflict, situations of generalized violence, violations of human rights, or natural or man-made disasters, and who have not crossed an international border” (UNHCR 2018: 61). While it is unlike that a variety of factors are responsible for the dynamics in the number and type of displacement, it is evident that displacement remains a global security challenge with resultant human security dimensions, among others, and as such appears to extend the capacity of single states to handle on their own. Emphasizing this position, Filippo Grandi; United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees asserted that, “We are at a watershed, where success in
managing forced displacement globally requires a new and far more comprehensive approach so that countries and communities aren’t left dealing with this alone” (UNHCR 2018:4).

2. Theoretical Argument

The human security approach forms the theoretical arguments of this study. There has been a paradigm shift in the security discourse since the dawn of the 21st century from traditional (military) to human security. Owolabi (2018: 816) described it as a shift “from the traditional focus on heavy spending on a military budget at the expense of other sectors, such as healthcare, education, social amenities, and welfare”. Since the adoption of the United Nations Development Program’s (UNDP) Human Development Report in 1994, the concept of human security has continued to gain popularity in both discourse and implementation. More states, especially in the global south are increasingly committing, although insufficiently, to promoting the indicators of human security, namely; personal security, food security, political security, environmental security, community security, economic security and health security. Humanitarian intervention has heightened since the end of the Cold War and the rise of intrastate violent conflicts in many parts of the world, especially in the developing states of Africa, and the resulting loss of lives, ethnic cleansings, displacement and gross human rights abuses, as well as the spread of the democratization and increased emphasis on human rights protection in most regions of the world.

Some scholars have argued that human security and human rights are complementary subjects. Kaldor (2007) and Hampson (2012) observed that a strong relationship exists between human security and human rights because the latter consists of the right to life, the right to speech and other rights, also human rights contain the right of different sectors such as political, economic, and social ones, which have an effect on policy and development. Howard-Hassmann (2012) corroborated this view by observing that the major assumption of human security – “freedom from want” – focuses on protecting people from different threats, which is also a central part in terms of human rights. Amin (2016) argued that threats are important elements of human security, since the existence of human security is related to threats to individuals, and Hampson (2012) also corroborated that same view by suggesting that the language of threats is used to characterize the human security paradigm. Hence, just like Kim (2010) argued, emphasizing the universal concern and relevance of threat to everyone, human security requires interdependence regarding these security concerns because a threat to one citizen is a threat to other citizens.

Threat has arguably become equivalent with the perpetual condition of IDPs in Africa generally and Nigeria in particular. Threatened and displaced from their homes by rising tide of violent conflicts and other natural and environmental disasters, these IDPs are also threatened by the condition of the camps where they are accommodated as well as the actions and inactions of others, especially male IDPs, camp officials and military personnel. Hence, IDPs arguably remain perpetually “in want” as they continue to remain insecure outside and especially within the IDP camp premises provided to make them free from want and ensure their human security.

While critiques have argued that some obstacle to human security remains the difficulty in determining threats to individuals, and the broad vision of human security, which consists different sectors such as economic, environmental and political, being a threat to individual security, a composition which Newman (2010) reduced to a “Shopping list”, among others, non-state actors, including the United Nations, through its numerous agencies and programs, Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), and other humanitarian agencies must continue to canvas the tangible support and cooperation of the states in its responsibility to protect human security, regardless of the opposition they face from state sovereignty, national and vested interests.

3. Taking Stock of Internal Displacement in Nigeria

The Displacement Tracking Matrix (DTM) assessments are arguably one of the most rigorous efforts to document the nature; progress and otherwise, of displacement across the world. The 23rd round of assessment of displacement in Nigeria, for instance, covered 110 Local Government Areas (LGAs) or districts and 797 wards, in Adamawa, Bauchi, Borno, Gombe, Taraba and Yobe states (IOM, 2018: 2), which are some of the states most affected by the conflicts in Northern Nigerian and hold some the highest number of IDPs across the Nigeria.

The Displacement Tracking Matrix assessment, reported that an additional 37,310 people were displaced between April and June 2018, while identified returnees also increased by 8% to 108,531 within the same period. Although the number of displaced persons from the six states of Adamawa, Bauchi, Borno, Gombe, Taraba and Yobe, as at June 2018 stood at 1,918,508 individuals (364,323 households); a slight increase from the 1,899,830 individuals in January 2017, one can argue that displacement has continued in this region despite the record of individuals who are returned to their communities by the efforts of aid and relief organizations as well as the government. In fact, the figures of internally displaced persons in the six states between the April and June 2018 are better depicted in the table below;
places of origin, from the state capital in Maiduguri, Borno remains host to the highest number of IDPs in particular interest being the state with the highest statistic of newly displaced persons between April and June protecting and civilians and not refraining from attack on non-combatants, rather conflict parties are more likely generally, and Nigeria in particular, especially in the Northeastern zone. The International Committee of the Red continue to account for an increase in the number of internally displaced persons in many parts of the world displaced persons resulting from each of these factors would vary from one to the other, violent conflicts although the degree to which these factors propel displacement, as well as the volume of displaced persons resulting from each of these factors would vary from one to the other, violent conflicts continue to account for an increase in the number of internally displaced persons in many parts of the world generally, and Nigeria in particular, especially in the Northeastern zone. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) (2018) corroborated this view by asserting that armed conflict and other violence have forced more and more people to flee their homes and seek refuge elsewhere in their own countries in the ten years. The Committee argues further that the effects of conflict on the safety of citizens and resultant increased displacement is worsened in part because the parties to conflicts breach the rules of engagement which include protecting and civilians and not refraining from attack on non-combatants, rather conflict parties are more likely to cause harm or – in the worst cases – commit deliberate atrocities; including rape and other sexual and humanitarian crimes against the vulnerable population in the conflict zones.

Some of the earliest studies linking violence or conflict to displacement are those of Clark (1989); Gibney, Apodaca and McCann (1996); Schmeidl (1997); Cohen and Deng (1998); Weiner (1996); Apodaca (1998); and Moore and Shellman (2006, 2007), among others. While scholars seem to generally agree that violence or the threat of violent conflicts are a primary cause of displacement, some however, have argued that the scope and nature of these violent conflicts are also worthy interrogating in determining the extent to which violent conflicts link to displacement. Zolberg et al. (1989), for instance, observed that international war is a potential cause of refugee flows. Melander and Oberg (2006) and Melander, Oberg and Hall (2009) also argued that international territorial conflicts do not necessarily large number of produce migrants, unless in exceptional cases; for example, the period between 1990 and 1994 when post Cold War civil wars were at their peak. However, Melander and Oberg (2007) also argued that a more significant factor influencing displacement is the geographical spread of conflict, rather than the intensity of violence often measured by the number of deaths in the conflict. Furthermore, although some argue that the type of conflict may not be very significant in determining the nature of displacement; like Jonassohn (1993); Rummel (1994) and Davenport et al. (2003) who observed that government-induced violence are no different from those perpetrated by rebels, as both are significant predictors of displacement, Clay (1984) and Newland (1993), on the other hand, differentiate between ethnic and non-ethnic conflicts, insisting that ethnic conflicts are a more important determinant of displacement.

While Schmeidl (1997), argued that the violations of human rights and political freedoms had no significant effects on displacement, Moore and Shellman (2004), on the other hand found that the level of political terror was linked with the likelihood and magnitude of displacement, meaning that “lack of both political freedoms and rule of law cause forced migration, and states that do not respect human rights produce more forced migrants (and IDPs) than those that do” (Adhikari, 2011: 8). Aside the human right variable, Melander and Oberg (2006: 144) asserted that “regime transition reduces the number of forced migrants whereas regime collapse increases the number”, and Moore and Shellman (2004) corroborated this view in observing that a higher level of democracy will decrease in the likelihood of displacement. While it has been established that violent conflicts or threat to violence displace people from their home, the literature does not provide a measure of violent conflict

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From the above table, Gombe is the only state that experienced a decrease in the number of internally displaced persons within the state, although the security and reintegration of returnees in this state, as well as other returnees in the region, are also worthy of research and documentation, which unfortunately goes beyond the scope of this study. Aside Yobe state; which had the second highest displacement figure, Borno is of particular interest being the state with the highest statistic of newly displaced persons between April and June 2018; 18,353, although the presence of a Force Operation Base (FOB) and military screening activities, especially in Dikwa and Bama Local Government Areas. Also, despite the return of some 11,856 IDP to their places of origin, from the state capital in Maiduguri, Borno remains host to the highest number of IDPs in Nigeria (IOM, 2018: 5).

4. Conflict and Internal Displacement
Several factors are responsible for people fleeing their homes in search of refugee in displacement camps and other facilities across the world, among such factors are natural disasters, environmental changes, terrorism and violent conflicts. Although the degree to which these factors propel displacement, as well as the volume of displaced persons resulting from each of these factors would vary from one to the other, violent conflicts continue to account for an increase in the number of internally displaced persons in many parts of the world generally, and Nigeria in particular, especially in the Northeastern zone. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) (2018) corroborated this view by asserting that armed conflict and other violence have forced more and more people to flee their homes and seek refuge elsewhere in their own countries in the ten years. The Committee argues further that the effects of conflict on the safety of citizens and resultant increased displacement is worsened in part because the parties to conflicts breach the rules of engagement which include protecting and civilians and not refraining from attack on non-combatants, rather conflict parties are more likely to cause harm or – in the worst cases – commit deliberate atrocities; including rape and other sexual and humanitarian crimes against the vulnerable population in the conflict zones.

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Table 1: Change in IDP Figures by State

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Culled from: IOM (2018: 5)
or circumstance in which it is acceptable for individuals to flee. Hence, like Adhikari (2011) argues, individuals view conflicts and threat differently, and as such individuals are likely flee at different rates and at different times from various kinds and manifestations of conflict situations.

5. Internally Displaced Persons (IDP) Camp Dynamics
The IDP camps have become a very important aspect of studies and discourse on internal displacement across the world, and just like similar factors are responsible for internal displacement in several states in and out of Africa, it is arguable that the nature, dynamics and management of IDP camps would largely be the same, although there might be some differences arising from the peculiarity of each IDP situation and the society within which these camps are hosted. International laws stipulate that it is the primary responsibility of States to protect and assist people who are displaced within the state borders. Additionally, parties in armed conflicts (including non-State armed groups) also have a responsibility of assisting and protecting the people displaced within the territories under their control (ICRC, 2009). While it is arguable the to which these institutions are adhered to, internally displaced persons camps are one of the efforts made by governments to respond to the plight of persons displaced within their jurisdictions.

The ICRC (2009) posed some very sensitive questions in reference to the influence of camps on the IDP discourse, some of these questions include; Are IDP camps an answer to the challenge of internal displacement or have they become part of the problem? Do camps and the “pull” of their services in fact increase the displacement, prolong it, and undermine traditional methods of coping? These questions have become very important questions that beg for answers, especially as the International Committee of Red Cross argues, with the support of the UN and other organizations, that “Camps deflect the world’s attention from the harsh truth of internal displacement”. Highlighting the condition in the Gereida camp, in the Darfur region of south-western Sudan, the ICRC argued that the IDP camp in Gereida can now pass for booming town, with the shelters and compounds of the IDPs forming its newer districts. Following the efforts of the ICRC, the World Food Programme, one can observe some changes in the camp: food supply is no longer affected by droughts and crop infestations; every child can now go to school; shallow wells have given way to potable water, piped from boreholes to tanks and into neighborhood tapstands; there is access to three primary health-care centers offering free medical care to IDPs, one of these centers is run by the ICRC, and the standard of medical care surpasses that of the hospitals in the town and operate by the government, in fact, the primary health-care centers in the camp cater to non-IDPs as indigenes travel from in and out of Gereida to receive medical care in the camp. Essentially, the argument is that activities that begun as emergency response are now becoming regular services. While these services are not bad in themselves, the worry of the ICRC, which is a very genuine concern, is that “the ‘pull’ of camp services only adds to the ‘push’ of conflict” (ICRC, 2009: 12). Simply put, threats and fear of uncertainties force people to flee their homes, but the enticement of services beyond what they had ever experienced could encourage them to flee or further fuel displacement. Humanitarian agencies are thus thrown into a dilemma; how do you provide help enough without creating a camp environment that is a lot more conducive than the homes from which people are displaced that they just will not want to return? Although Jakob Kellenberger; former President of the International Committee of Red Cross, argues that “it may be much easier to provide services in camps, but in conflict areas the authorities and humanitarian organizations should do as much as they can to provide a decent level for everybody affected” (ICRC, 2009: 12), however, this perspective may further stretch the capacity of the humanitarian agencies, making them ineffective in meeting the needs of IDPs, as well as encourage the government to relax from its mandate of providing for the welfare of its citizens.

Other complications in the IDP camps arise from the way the IDPs are grouped, or the grouping IDPs make for themselves in camps where they are not officially grouped, which is arguably the case in many of the camps in Nigeria. Ethnicity, religion and political affiliation are some of the factors that influence the grouping of IDPs in the camps which can lead to identity tensions and violence within the camps, also some groups are not allowed into the territory of other groups, and these seclusions can become safe haven for IDPs who go on raids across the camps. These groupings and seclusions can also aid operations of armed groups and arms trafficking, as well as the extortion and harassment (in all forms) of vulnerable IDPs within the camps.

The National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA) is the government agency charged with the management and care of IDPs and camps across the country, and they carry out this task with the support of other international organizations like the United Nations High Commission on Refugees (UNHCR), International Organization on Migration (IOM), the Red Cross, United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), Médecins sans frontiers (Doctors with Borders), the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), and the State Emergency Management Agencies (SEMA) in those states were these are available. While it is difficult to ascertain the total number of IDP camps across the Nigerian state; owing to inadequate documentation and data management culture, the IOM (2018) identified 282 camps and camp-like settings and 2,106 locations where IDPs were residing with host communities in Adamawa, Bauchi, Borno, Gombe, Taraba and Yobe states alone.
Hence, it is safe to conclude that while considerable efforts continue to be made in returning displaced persons to their homes, IDP camps still remain a very significant part of the internal displacement challenge in Nigeria.

Internally displaced persons camps in Nigeria are mostly under surveillance by the military and law enforcement agencies, and some of the camps are almost completely inaccessible to civilians and researchers, and as such it is difficult to gain access to some of the very important information about the humanitarian condition in the camp as well as the welfare of the IDPs generally. While not undermining the security of the IDPs and the need to ensure their safety with military and police presence, this security architecture has arguably provided protection for some security operative and camp officials, as well as IDPs themselves to take advantage of other vulnerable individuals within the camps, as well as divert relief materials intended for the IDPs without being caught or exposed.

Among the 282 camps and camp-like settings in Nigeria surveyed by the IOM between April and June 2018, it was reported that emergency (41%) and self-made (36%) shelters were the most common types of identified shelters in camps and camp-like settings, others were schools (8%), government buildings (8%), individual houses (8%), community shelters (2%) and health facilities (1%). Hence, it is safe to say that many of the IDPs were exposed to harsh weather and climate conditions, as shelters may not provide the necessary humidity to cope with environmental temperature. Also, 71% of 28,738 IDPs surveyed in June 2018 reported that food was the major need they had that wasn’t met; this is a slight reduction from 73% who reported food as their main unmet need in April 2018. Considering the volume of food supplies that are continuously released to the IDP camps by relief organizations, private donors and the government, one would expect that the statistics of those in need of food would much lesser than it is. Some other statistics from the Round 23 survey of the IOM Displacement Tracking Matrix are listed below:

1. Toilets were described as ‘not hygienic’ in 91% of the displacement camp sites (up from 89% in April 2018), while toilets were reported to be in good condition in only 9% of the sites. In Yobe state, all toilets were termed as not good/hygienic.

2. While 89% of the camp sites had access to food on-site, 6% had no access to food and 5% solely had access to food off-site.

3. Virtually all sites (99%) had access to health facilities; 68% of the camp sites had health facilities on-site and within three kilometers, while 28% had access to health facilities off-site but within three kilometers, although most of United Nations agencies and international NGOs were main health providers in the facilities, with some help from the government.

4. 99% of the camp sites reported access to (formal or informal) education services; however, high cost associated with school as well as absence of teachers deprived many from accessing educational services.

5. Petty trading (29%), daily labor (28%), farming (23%) and firewood collection (15%) were the main forms of livelihood in the camp sites.

6. While security was provided by the military, police and local authorities in 95% of evaluated camp sites, almost 4% of the sites reported or cited friction among residents of the camps.

While these figures represent a fair and arguable improvement of the camp sites in the six states hosting the most displaced persons in Nigeria, the research did not so much evaluate the actual access and benefits of IDPs from these services available in the camps, neither did it evaluate the conduct of the care-givers (local and international) health workers, and security personnel in the camps. In other words, the mere existence of these services and facilities do not translate to their effective and efficient deployment to meet the needs of displaced persons. Decrying the character of officials and IDP camp personnel in Nigeria, Abdulazeed (2016) asserted that problems exist with the management of displacement in Nigeria, as camp officials embezzle funds meant for the IDPs and other authorities in Nigeria have raped and sexually exploited women and girls displaced by the conflict with Boko Haram. The government is not doing enough to protect displaced women and girls and ensure that they have access to basic rights and services or to sanction the abusers, who include camp leaders, vigilante groups, policemen, and soldiers”. Although these allegations have been denied by the government along the military and other security organizations, the reality still remains that displaced women and girls continue to suffer sexual harassment, and the male IDPs themselves cannot be completely exonerated from this unfortunate trend.

A new dimension to the phenomenon of displacement in Nigeria may be the ‘commercialization of IDP camps’. Pulse (2018) reported the complaint of Malam Jiddah Ambari, the alleged leader of the Fariya camp in
Maiduguri, Borno state, who said that the 5,000 IDPs in the Fariya camp observed the Eid-el-Fitr Muslim holiday with little joy, a complaint which the IDPs had made in a separate interview to the News Agency of Nigeria (NAN). However, the Spokesperson of the NEMA, responding to this allegation asserted that “the camp would never attract government attention as it is illegal” (Pulse, 2018: 1). While the status of the Fariya camp may be a controversial one, it raises the concern of the possibility of private organization of IDP camps for commercial purposes, which would create an entirely new twist to the subject.

6. Drivers of Internal Displacement in Nigeria

Despite the evident, but arguable slow progress made with the management of IDPs in Nigeria, internal displacement remains a major puzzle that continues to confront the Nigeria, and many other state across the world, particularly those experiencing incidences of violent crimes and other humanitarian challenges. Jakob Kellenberger asserted that; “internal displacement poses one of the most daunting humanitarian challenges of today. The impact not only on many millions of IDPs but also on countless host families and resident communities is hard if not impossible to measure.” (ICRC, 2009: 6). While, as argued earlier, the challenge is internal displacement may be unique, in terms of complexities and dynamics and causes across states, some of the factors that continue to fuel and sustain internal displacement in Nigeria, aside the continued violent attacks and conflicts in many of the communities in the Northeastern zone, include the corruption, lingering socio-economic inequalities, and arguable lack of sufficient political will to see an end to this humanitarian challenge.

The many efforts made by international organizations, non-governmental organizations and other donor agencies, as well as the Nigerian government and agencies, are largely undermined by the seeming inability of the government to sufficiently contain the activities of the Boko Haram terrorist organization as well as those of the alleged killer-Fulani Cattle herders, which are the major causes of armed violence in Nigeria’s Northeast. The continued incessant sudden attacks of these groups on innocent civilians and communities do not only pose a threat to returnees and make them uncertain about their life and safety in their places of origin, but also forces more people to flee their homes and communities in search of safety in the displacement camp and other settlements and shelters, all of which ‘spoils’ the gains of internal displacement management in Nigeria. Also, as earlier stated, the arguable lack of sufficient political, corruption, and lingering socio-economic inequalities; all of which seem to have a link one to another, also do not allow for effective resolution and management of the foreseeable conflict in the state, hence there doesn’t appear an apparent end to the spite of displacement in the foreseeable future.

7. Responding to Internal Displacement in Nigeria

International assistance from humanitarian and donor agencies, especially within the United Nations, as well as efforts from relief organization and religious groups within the country, have been one major way of responding to the needs within the northeastern zone, including internal displacement. In addition to providing donations and other relief materials and services, the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) reported that the humanitarian aid workers and the Nigerian military officers have received training on humanitarian principles and civil-military coordination in a complex emergency environment, and at the time of the report, were undergoing a civil-military coordination trainings in the conflict area, which will help introduce the military and aid workers to the North-East Nigeria-Specific Guidance and provide a agenda for addressing humanitarian concerns. Other programs and plans resulting from international assistance include; the Nigerian Humanitarian Fund – Private Sector Initiative, the election contingency plan, 16 Days of Activism Against Gender - Based Violence Campaign, the Joint Approach in Nutrition and Food Security Assessment (JANFSA) and the Cadre Harmonisé (CH) analysis, which help to generate information that enhances nutrition and food security needs of in the conflict region, among others. Also, the implementation of the 2019-2021 Humanitarian Response Plan; hatched by a collection of Nigerian government representatives, civil society and donors, began in January 2019.

Support from international organizations in the conflicts and humanitarian crisis in Nigeria doesn’t come without its challenges as well. Lamenting the financial constraints of humanitarian efforts in Nigeria, OCHA (2019) also reported that as at October 31st, only 58 percent (607 million dollars) had been raised of the 1.05 billion dollars needed by 60 humanitarian agencies to undertake 176 humanitarian projects and meet the needs of 6.1 million people in Borno, Adamawa and Yobe states alone. Aside financial constraints, humanitarian aid workers continue to be victims of attacks, kidnapings and killings in the area. Between January and November 2018 alone, three aid workers had been killed in attacks by armed groups, Saifura Hussaini Ahmed Khorsa and Hauwa Mohammed Liman; midwives with the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), were executed in September and October 2018 respectively, and a UNICEF nurse who was abducted in March 2018, remains a hostage of the armed group. These incidents have posed a threat to humanitarianism in Nigeria, as aid workers are frightened and organizations are withdrawing from the conflict zones, leaving the people without help.
8. Closing Arguments

Humanitarianism, including management of internal displaced persons especially in camps and camp-like settings, remain a concern for not only the north-eastern zone, but for Nigeria generally, as the prolonged conflicts in the northeast have continued to strain the economic and social security across the country, and in some cases have also triggered violence in Southwest and southeastern zones. Hence, the Nigerian state as a whole is in need of help.

If humanitarian aid is to survive and continue on an upward trajectory in Nigeria, the conflict parties must respect international humanitarian laws and allow aid workers and organizations access to civilian and other vulnerable individuals who need help within the conflict areas. Also, government must show more commitment in the mobilization, training and arming of troops in managing the conflicts in the northeast, the collaborations of aid workers and military officers in civil-military trainings in the conflict areas should also be sustained, and if possible extended to all the battalions and divisions of the military organization. Furthermore, international and non-governmental organizations should be further incorporated into the management of Internally displaced persons camps in Nigeria; aid workers should be allowed to participate in the daily activities in the camps and in provide counseling and more psychological help to the IDPs, especially the children, women and girls.

Establishment of public complaint mechanisms within the IDP camps that allows for anonymous complaints by IDPs would help promote freedom of expression and reduce the frequency, if not eliminate any acts of sexual and other forms of abuse by officials and other IDPs. Again, while the security of the camps should remain a priority, government should encourage displacement research and investigation by private researchers and research organization, as this would provide the needed information of key areas of concern and trends that would guide government decisions, lighten the task of humanitarian agencies, as well as adequately meet the humanitarian needs of affected individuals.

References