

Nigeria's Military Forces in Peace-Keeping Efforts in Africa and Beyond: An Impact Analysis

Ugwukah, C. Alexander, Ph.D Etete, M. Adam, Ph.D

Abstract

Nigeria's role in international peace-keeping missions predates its independence in 1960. This has continued unabated in varying dimensions in several African countries and beyond until 2013 when Nigeria officially withdrew its troops of up to two battalions from UNAMID. In Congo, Darfur, Sierra-Leone, Liberia, Gambia, Mali and Guinea Bissau among others, Nigerian soldiers' brilliant performances grew in significance in its participation and efforts to ensure that peace is restored in trouble spots in those countries. This paper attempts a critical historical analysis of Nigeria's commitment and role, through human capital, financial resources as well as technical weapon/armament support to resolve conflicts in Africa. From that basis, the work progresses to assess the positive and negative impacts of each of the missions on both the states involved in the conflicts and the sending party, Nigeria. The impact analysis takes a more critical approach through the utilization of various international relations theories and prisms applicable to peace-keeping efforts. Further, the work appraises the rising cases of insecurity across the country and its borders other West African which led to the withdrawal of its troops from United Nations Peacekeeping operations. Finally, the work concludes that despite the security threats at home, Nigeria's leadership role in Africa has led to its induction back to the UN Peacekeeping mission on March 15, 2023.

Keywords: Nigeria, Peace-keeping, Conflict resolution, Military Capability and Impact Analysis

DOI: 10.7176/IAGS/100-04

Publication date: July 31st 2023

1. Introduction

The Nigerian military may be defined as the composition of men and women of the armed forces who are trained in the art of warfare to defend the territorial integrity of their country and if need be advance the national interest of the country beyond its immediate borders (Waltz, 1997). The United Nations asserts that the military are also at times engaged in reserve missions for their nations to ensure safety of lives and property of citizens, adding that a good military organization are characterized by hierarchy, centralization of command, unquestioned discipline and authority as well as concentration of force (UN Official docs, 2013). The main divisions of the armed forces (military) are the army, the Navy and the Air Force. The Army is the arm that fights on land in Nigeria, and other developing nations of the world, and is the dominant unit of the Armed Forces. The Navy is the branch that is trained and equipped to fight on water (seas), while the Air Force is the composition of personnel's trained and equipped to fight in the air, using war planes and jet bombers to further defend their country's territorial integrity and other interests. The three arms are particularly expected to specialize in military strategy, the science and art of warfare as they may be called upon at any time to carry out such specific assignments. It is equally important to note that the Armed Forces of Nigeria as they exist today are regulated by the legal provisions in the instruments establishing each arm as the Army Act of 1960, the Royal Navy Act of 1960 and the Air Force Act of 1964 (Ojekwe, 2013). More importantly, there have been legal provisions in Nigeria's past and current constitutions. Section 217(1) of the Nigerian Constitution provided for the establishment of the Nigerian Armed Forces and also stipulated the legitimate duties of the force as follows:

1. There shall be Armed Forces for the federation which shall consist of an Army, a Navy, an Air Force and such other branches of the Armed Forces of the federation as may be established by an Act of the National Assembly.
2. The federation shall . . . establish, equip and maintain an Army, a Navy, and Air Force and such other branches of the Armed forces of the federation as may be considered adequate and effective for the purpose of:
 - a) Defending Nigeria from external aggression;
 - b) Maintaining its territorial integrity and securing its borders from violation on land, sea or air;
 - c) Suppressing insurrections and acting in aid of civil authorities to restore order when called upon to do so;
 - d) Performing such other functions as may be prescribed by an Act of the National Assembly.

It is therefore pertinent to note that although efforts were made by some persons during the formative stage of the 1979/1999 Constitutions to get Nigerian soldiers perform social and economic development functions. However, the constitutions did not enjoin soldiers to carry out such functions during peace-time. In fact, no Nigerian constitution has ever directed that our soldiers to be a working peace-time force. It is also clear that the Nigerian Constitution does not provide for the Nigerian military to intervene in the country's politics even

though they have overthrown the civilian government severally due to failures of the civilians to pursue the task of political administration, prudent management and nation-building.

In the context of United Nations application, peace-keeping has been defined by the International Peace Academy as:

The prevention, containment, moderation and termination of hostilities between or within states, through the medium of peaceful third-party intervention organized and directed internationally, using multi-national military, police and civilian personnel to restore and maintain peace (Watz, 1997).

Peace-keeping involves military or paramilitary operations that are undertaken with the consent of all major belligerent parties. These operations are designed to monitor and facilitate implementation of an existing truce agreement and support diplomatic efforts to reach a long-term political settlement. The objective of the operation is to fulfill a mandate, in many cases to reduce or eliminate violence, facilitate the implementation of an agreement, and support diplomatic efforts to achieve normalized peaceful relations (Francis, 2009).

Although peace-keeping was initially developed as a means of dealing with inter-state conflicts, its functions has been extended to intra-state conflicts and civil wars. Thus, it can be asserted that peace-keeping efforts trails back in time historically, as a mechanism to resolve conflicts between nations. Thus, although the term is not found categorically in the UN charter, Dag Hammarskjold referred to it as belonging to 'Chapter six and a Half' of the Charter, placing it between traditional methods of resolving disputes peacefully, such as mediation and fact-finding (Chapter VI) and more forceful actions such as embargos and military intervention (Chapter VII). With the evolution of the United Nations' concept of peace-keeping arose the need for UN peace-keepers in composition of soldiers and military officers, civilian police officers and civilian personnel from many countries including Nigeria to monitor and observe peace processes that emerge in post-conflict situations and assist ex-combatants in implementing the peace agreements they have signed (Akande, 2012).

Peace-keeping operations assume many forms such as confidence building measures, power-sharing arrangements, electoral support, strengthening the rule of law and economic and social development. All the operations must be approved under the charter of the United Nations. However, it must be pointed out that some conflicts have been resolved through the OAU – African Union and the ECOWAS direction given that it must derive its implementation through the United Nations who at-times wade into such conflict resolutions financially and otherwise. Such cases and their circumstances would be given attention as the work progresses. In order to properly understand the concept of peace-keeping as related to this work, it is pertinent to highlight the various typologies of peace-keeping. The types of peace-keeping efforts has been frequently described in terms of generations with each successive generation of operations growing in ambition and complexity, since the evolution of UN peace operations since 1948.

The first generation of peace-operations also referred to as classic, involves the past-truce inter-position of a peace-keeping force with the consent of the parties. Such operations, which were characteristic of the cold war period, emphasized the importance of the three principles of traditional UN peace-keeping consent, impartiality, and use of force only in self-defense as was the need for tight command, control and coordination on the ground, force of micro-management from headquarters (Abdulwaheed, 2012). The second-generation operations entailed consent of the parties – of complex, Multi-dimensional Peace Agreements. Examples of this type of operations include the UN Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG) in Namibia, the UN Observe Mission in El Salvador (ONUSAL) and the UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC). These operations were deployed as part of negotiated political solutions and the responsibilities of peace-keepers which included non-military tasks such as disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of former combatants, resettlement of refugees, police training and supervision, election monitoring and other transitional administrative tasks (Firsing, 2013). This new generation of operations, engendered by the fading of bipolar antagonism, saw peace-keepers engaging in what came to be called 'peace-building'. A conceptual link was soon established by then Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali between peace-keeping and the range of other peace-making and peace-building activities prescribed by the UN Charter. This operational and conceptual activism represented a dramatic evolution of the UN peace-keeping operations in response to the growing number of intra state conflicts that erupted (or re-erupted) in the early 1990s (Al Jazeera, 2013).

The third typology of peace-keeping efforts represented the generation of operations that were taken under the UN Charter, chapter VII without the consent of the parties and usually in internal conflicts such as Somalia and Bosnia. In these cases, invoking chapter VII allowed the Security Council to bypass the specific injunctions in the charter not to intervene in internal affairs. The activism of the early 1990s clearly gave way to reform and regionalization. As Galadima has further noted "the United Nations does not have, at this point in its history, the institutional capacity to conduct military enforcement measures under chapter VII. Under present conditions, ad-hoc member states' conditions of the willing offer the most effective deterrent to aggression or to the escalation or spread of an on-going conflict (Francis, 2009). As in the past, a mandate from the Security Council

authorizing such a course of actions is essential, if the enforcement operation is to have broad international support and legitimacy. This typology was exemplified in the actions relegated to regional or sub-regional organizations such as the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Ceasefire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) to oust the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council/Revolutionary United Front (AFRC/RUF) junta in Sierra Leone.

It is important to observe that more contemporary conflicts often take place between multiple armed factions with different political objectives and fractured lines of command. Peace-keepers, consequently have sometimes found themselves in situations where ceasefire agreements are ignored, where consent to the UN presence have been called in to question, and where government and State institutions have ceased to function or have broken down entirely. Actions such as is witnessed in Nigeria and its neighbouring states by the Boko Haram are conducted through irregular forces and militias which ignore or willfully violate humanitarian norms and constantly shifting lines of confrontation, which have complicated the functions of peace-keeping the world over (Firsing, 2013). It is therefore in the understanding of the above typologies of peace-keeping efforts that the role of Nigeria's military in peace-keeping efforts in Africa would be properly assessed through the prisms of an impact analysis in this work. This is because Nigeria, the most populous African country have been involved in all the various forms of peace-keeping generations highlighted above.

Table 1: Top 10 Troop Contributing Countries to the UN (August 2013)

Country	Total
Pakistan	8,262
Bangladesh	7,931
India	7,858
Ethiopia	6,467
Nigeria	4,880
Rwanda	4,688
Nepal	4,606
Jordan	3,301
Ghana	2,979
Senegal	2,934

Source: Author's table based on information from United Nations peace-keeping statistics, 25 September 2013. <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/resources/statistics>.

Table 2: Nigeria's Peace-keeping Contributor Profile

Armed Forces	Helicopters	Defence Budge	Uniformed Peace-keepers
80,000 World Ranking (Size): 49 Army: 62,000 Navy: 8,000 Air: 10,000 Paramilitary: 82,000	26 Army: 21 9 Attack (6 multi-role, 3 transport), 5 training, Navy 5 (2 multi role, 3 light transport)	2014: US\$5,273 million = 1% of GDP 2013: US\$2,143 million, 0.76% of GDP 2012: US\$2,033 million, 0.75% of GDP. 2011: US\$2,249 million, 0.92% of GDP. World ranking 2016: 55	2,961 (233 women) 28 Feb. 2015 Rank 9th position 5th in-Africa and in African Union

Source: Adesoji Adeniyi, Peace and Security Research and Analyst, London, UK, 2016.

See also: *Nigerian Military Balance 2014*, http://www.premimumtimes.ng.com/business/161390-Jonathan_Signs_Nigeria,_2014_Budget_-_Defence-gets-209-percent.html.

Table 3: Comparative Analysis of UN Peace-keeping Involvement of Africa Top 3 – Ethiopia, Nigeria and Rwanda

Country	Top 3 Current UN Peace-keeping Operations Involvement (Number of Troops
Ethiopia	UNAMID (2591, Darfur), UNISFA (3851), Abeyi, Sudan, UNMIL (15, Liberia)
Nigeria	UNAMID (2946, Darfur), UNMIL (1611, Liberia), MINUSMA (261, Mali)
Rwanda	UNAMID (3464 Darfur), UNMISS (1034, South Sudan), MNUSTAH (1260, Haiti)

Source: United Nations, UNS Mission's Summary Details by Country;

Given that Nigeria's military is ranked 9th in the world and 5th in Africa for its troop contribution to peace-keeping operations, and then it can be asserted that Nigeria has an enviable profile in peace-keeping since 1960. With over 2,961 (233 women) and Defence Spending Troop of US\$ 26,788 compared to global average of approximately US\$ 70,000 and deployment to over 25 UN missions, Nigeria is currently one of the largest UN contributing countries with military and civilian personnel deployed in over ten UN missions. Nigeria has also

played pivotal roles in other non-UN missions in Africa. As the preponderant power in West Africa, Nigeria has been the main provider of military and other resources for ECOWAS peace operations to the tune of US\$ 8 billion in its various missions in Cote d'Ivoire, Guinea Bissau, Liberia, Mali and Sierra Leone. During the peak of the Liberian and Sierra Leonean civil wars in the 1990s, Nigeria provided over 70% of ECOMOG's military and civilian personnel as well as logistical support. In 2003, Nigeria deployed 1,500 troops to the ECOWAS mission in Liberia (ECOMIL) and a medical and signals team to the ECOWAS mission in Cote d'Ivoire in 2003 (ECONICI). In 2004, 1,500 Nigerian troops were deployed in Darfur as part of the AU mission in Sudan (AMIS). Nigeria also provided 1,200 troops to the African-led International Support Mission in Mali (AFISMA) (Nwolise, n.d).

Despite all the listed efforts, the tide of events of Nigeria's military in International peace-keeping started changing as the home front became more troubled than ever before. Nigeria domestic security challenges now demanded greater military attention with the expansion of the Boko Haram insurgency since the mid-2000s. The insecurity caused by the Boko Haram eventually led to the formation of the Multinational Joint Task (MNJTF) which in a way is also an international peace-keeping effort.

The MNJTF demanded troops from the members of the Lake Chad Basin Commission Countries (LCBC) – Nigeria, Chad and Cameroon as well as from Benin Republic. These countries were expected to jointly monitor their borders through which the Boko Haram insurgents infiltrated to the various concerned countries. On the long run, Nigeria contributed over 3,250 of the MNJTF's 8,700 troops when it became operational and much of the expenses of the groups security needs. Nigerian troops also continued to be deployed to the South-South geographical zone which continued to experience the threat of military and oil theft. All these local operations affected the country's ability to sustain its troops to peace operators in recent times. When all these internal and external operations are put together, one is left in no doubt that Nigeria's military continue to provide the most strategic role in peace-keeping in not just the West African sub-region but the whole of Africa as a whole. There is no doubt that these peace-keeping efforts have been fortified by training received by these troops before their deployment at peace-keeping wiring (PKW) of the Nigerian Army Infantry Corps Centre which was established in 2004. The center was upgraded and made an autonomous training institution in 2009 with a new name; The Nigerian Army Peace-keeping Centre (NAPKC). The center's other partners include the German Technical Assistance Team (GTAT), Peace Operation Training Institute (POTI) and the British Training and Monitoring Team (BTMAT).

2. Theoretical Framework of Analysis

This study has drawn its analytical explanations from the two major theoretical prisms of Realism and Idealism/Liberalism given the nature of the historical base of the work. Realism is the view that world politics is driven by competitive self-interest. Realists therefore believe that the decisive dynamic among countries is a struggle for power in an effort by each to preserve, or, preferably, improve its military security and economic welfare in competition with other countries (Aderiyé, n.d). According to Ejiga (1996), "The implication of this position for this work is that countries engage in international peace-keeping for the purpose of seeking more powers to their national interest and image. Furthermore, realists see this struggle for power as a zero sum game, one in which a gain for one is inevitably a loss for others. Classic realism is associated with Hans Morgenthau and other realists who are pessimistic about human nature. Advocates of this school trace their intellectual heritage to the English political philosopher, Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679) who argued in *Leviathan* (1651) that humans have an inherent life to dominate, which often causes them to be enemies and . . . to endeavor to destroy or subdue one another". Ogomudia (1997) posits that Neo-realists also portray politics as a struggle for power but believe that the cause of conflict in the international system is its anarchic (unregulated) structure. While Realist theory emerged partly as a reaction to the feature to preserve the peace after World War I (1914-1918), viz, the real politic pursued by the European powers at the time. The idealist theorists developed in response to the realist position by advocating, conducting global relations according to such lofty principles as cooperation, morality and democracy. President Woodrow Wilson was a leading idealist who argued that "peace could only be restored and kept by a partnership of democratic nations" (Olurin, 1993). The idealist vision also led to such initiatives as the Kellogg-Briand Pact (1929) whose signatories pledged to renounce war as an instrument of national policy.

3. General Survey of Nigeria's Participation in Military Peace-making Efforts in Africa

Nigeria's participation in peace-keeping operations is shaped by a number of considerations. Among the variables that help explain Nigeria's willingness to participate in multilateral interventions are geographic proximity, domestic political culture, national interests as well as economic reasons. Galadima asserts that in general, geographic proximity – a feature that may have security, economic, political and domestic dimensions – has played a crucial role. This is because what happens nearby is more likely to endanger nationals, raise significant security concerns and result in creation of refugees, economic disruptions and unwanted political

spill-overs cum attraction of comprehensive media coverage than events farther away. Also taking a proactive role in peace-keeping may be identified in the political orientation which is shaped by history as well as elite and public views which considers Nigeria's role as that of a 'big brother' to other nations of Africa, not just because of its population capability but its vast economic resources in petroleum. This was more characteristic of the period of Nigeria's military dictatorship under which several heads of states – Gowon, Muritala Mohammed, General Obasanjo, Buhari and Babangida were more easily able to support military interventions in Liberia, Sierra Leone, Chad and Niger. This is not exactly the case when Nigeria became more democratic, even though the trend has become marginal to a large extent since then. No doubt, Nigeria's military muscle, population and economic power have made it, not only a sub-regional leader but also an African leader (Nwolise, n.d).

It is only justifiable to trace the historical trend of Nigeria's peace-keeping role in Africa through the application of these background forces which have shaped the phenomenon. Thus, in the words of Nwolise, "the Nigerian military has promoted Nigeria's image in International Peace-keeping in several parts of Africa and beyond" (Galadima, 2001).

Nigeria's involvement in peace-keeping dates back to 1960 when Nigeria (a battalion) soldiers and about 400 police officers played a significant role in the United Nations contingent to the Congo between 1960 and 1964. These battalion of soldiers brought honor to Nigeria in their over three years stay in the Congo, especially when the then Major General Ironsi was made the Commander of the United Nations Peace-keeping Force in the Congo. Accordingly, almost simultaneously, Nigerian troops were on security assignments in Southern Cameroon and later performed frontier control operations along the Nigerian – Cameroon border from 1960 through to 1961. Again in 1964, as a result of an OAU resolution, a battalion of Nigerian troops was sent to Tanzania to replace the neo-colonial troops which were checkmating in the country. At this occasion, Nigerian soldiers were invited to replace the leaving British troops that initially quelled the rebellion and to train new soldiers for that country.

In 1965, a Nigerian observer team was deployed under the auspices of the United Nations in the Border Conflict between Pakistan and India. From May 1978 to January 1983, when Nigeria recalled her forces, 5,500 officers and the Nigerian Army (changed every six months) joined troops from ten other countries to keep the peace in Lebanon under the United Nations Interim Force (UNIFIL). In Lebanon, the excellent performance of the Nigeria soldiers drew high praises and attention as the UNIFIL Force Commander, Lt. Gen. William Callaghan observed:

Your application to your task is deserving of my highest praise... As a result of their performance, the Nigerian contingent Commander then, Brigadier N. S. Sanni was promoted to become UNIFIL chief staff status in recognition of the discipline and devotion of her troops and the troops' positive contribution to the search for peace in Lebanon (Galadima, 2001).

The involvement of Nigeria in the resolution of the Chadian conflict was a new and unique experience. Due to lack of necessary organizational infrastructure in place for peace keeping operations by the OAU, its initial attitude towards the conflict was marked by hesitancy. Nigeria struggled to wade through and the OAU merely supported the measures taken by Nigeria and other friendly neighbouring countries with whom Nigeria collaborated in managing the conflict. After a review of the whole operations, the "Lagos Accord" eventually provided the basis for the resolution through immediate ceasefire, the demilitarization of **NDjamena**, the restoration of law and order, release of political prisoners, withdrawal of French troops, and the granting of general amnesty for political exiles. It must be pointed out that Nigeria first deployed its troops in Chad in 1978 as a bilateral effort. However, given the complexity and escalation of the conflict, the Organization of African Unity Heads of States at its Summit in Nairobi in June, 1981 decided to adopt a collective security measure to resolve the crisis. Only three countries, Nigeria, Senegal and Zaire eventually contributed troops out of the entire African countries that promised. This particular contingent as earlier stated was commanded by General Geoffrey Ejiga, a Nigerian and thus was OAU's first peace-keeping operation. This operation could be classified as a second generation peace-keeping operation in compliance with our classification earlier in this work.

The problem of this operation was that the OAU could not raise the necessary funds to maintain the troops, wherein contributing states had to take charge of their troops for over a month of its operations. In the end, "it was the assertive role that Nigeria played in defraying the cost of the peace-keeping operations that eventually saved the day" (Galadima, 2001).

Since this work is on the assessment of the Nigerian military, it is expedient to point out that the good behaviour of the Nigerian troops in Chad made a Chadian first class chief. Alifa Ali Zezerti (the Sultan of Mao in Kanem Province) commended the forces, throwing open his palace to them anytime they wished further comfort (Erskine et al as cited in Galadima, 2001). In the words of the then President Alhaji Shehu Shagari in 1982, "the exemplary comportment of the troops in Chad made a pride to Nigeria in particular and the African continent in general" (Doyle et al, 1997). These peace-keeping operations helped to project a positive image for Nigerians abroad, thereby paving way for the emerging nation to occupy a place of honor and respect in the

comity of nations. As rightly observed by the then Nigeria's Chief of Defence Staff, Lt. Gen. G. S. Jallo during the Army Day Celebration on July 6, 1983: "the high esteem in which the United Nations Organization holds Nigeria is due mainly to the good performance of our Armed Forces in Peace-keeping operations".(James, 1990). Also in that same year, there was a Nigerian contingent military observer mission in Iraq (UNIMOG) Brigade operations in Chad (Harmony II, OAU) 1982 – 1983 and the military observer's mission in Iraq – Iran (UNIIMOG) in 1988 – 1991. All these operations were embarked upon during the Cold War period.

In the post-cold war era, Nigerian military also participated in a number of peace-keeping missions. These include the Division Operations in Liberia (ECOMOG) 1990; Military Observers Mission in Iraq-Kuwait (UNIKOM) 1999; Military Observer Missions in Angola (UNAVEM II) 1991-1992; Sierra Leone (NATAG) 1991; Detachment Mission in Angola (UNAVEM III) 1992-1995; Military Observers Mission in Western Saharawi (MINURSO) 1991; Military Observers Mission in Cambodia (NNTAC) 1992-1993; Battalion Operations and Staff Officers in Yugoslavia (UNPROFOR) 1992; Military Observers Mission in Mozambique (ONUNOZ) 1992; Battalion Operations in Rwanda (UNAMIR) 1993; Gambia (NATAG) 1993; Military Observers Mission in Auzostrip (UNASOG) 1994; Military Observers Mission in Israel (UNTJO) 1995; Nigeria also sent its delegation to the United Nation's Mission in the Darfur region of Sudan (UNMIS) to support the implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement signed the government of Sudan and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army on January 9 2005 and to perform certain functions relating to humanitarian assistance and protection and promotion of human rights. (Galadima, 2001).

4. A Detailed Historical Analysis of Select Case Studies of Nigerian Military Peace-Keeping Efforts: The Congo, Israel/Lebanon Border, Chadian Crisis and the Liberian Missions

1st Case Study: The Congo Peace-Keeping Mission

The Nigerian military had its first shot at International peace-keeping in the Republic of Congo at the instance of the United Nations (operations des nations Unies on Congo (ONUC) from July 1960 until June 1964. The Republic of Congo, then a Belgian Colony had attained its independence on June 30, 1960 and in the days that followed its declaration; disorder broke out, while Belgium sent its troops to the Congo without the agreement of the Congolese government. The purpose for sending its troop was for restoring law and order and to protect Belgian nationals resident in the Congo.

However, this intervention did not convince the new Congolese government of their true intention after it had already secured its independence from Belgium. As a result, on July 12, 1960, the Congolese government demanded for a United Nations Military Assistance to protect its national territory against external aggression. In reaction to this request, the Security Council of the United Nations called upon Belgium to withdraw its troops from the Congo until further efforts are put in place to restore peace and order to the newly independent nation. In order to fulfill this demand, in less than forty-eight hours, contingents of a United Nations Force provided by a number of countries including Asian and African states began to arrive for peace-keeping assignment in the Congo. Nigeria was one of the major providers of the concerted United Nations Force at this instance.

Simultaneously, United Nations civilian experts were rushed to the Congo to help ensure the continued operations of essential public services. To tackle the complex challenge before the United Nations, a very large team was assembled which at its peak totaled nearly 20,000 officers and men. To emphasize the role played by Nigeria at this mission, it is noteworthy that 5,000 men of the Nigerian Army rotated over four years to ensure that there was peace in the Congo. In fact, to crown these efforts, Nigeria's Major General J.T.U Aguiyi Ironsi was the Force Commander as from January 1964 – June 1964, when the operation ended. In February 1963 other Katanga (the diamond province) had been reintegrated into the National territory of the Congo; a phasing out of the force was begun, aimed at its termination by the end of that year. At the request of the Congolese government, the General Assembly of the United Nations authorized that a reduced number of forces remain back for a further six months in order to stabilize whatever tension that was left in the country. The United Nations Contingency Force was completely withdrawn by June 30, 1964 ending a successful peace-keeping operation for the Nigerian military and others who had participated in the operations.

2nd Case Study: The Chad Peace-Keeping Operations

Another milestone in the history of the Nigerian military involvement in international peace-keeping was the Chad Republic operations, which unlike the former was carried out under the auspices of the Organization of African Unity (OAU). Nigeria was the first to deploy a peace-keeping force in Chad in 1979 and was later drawn into the operations under the auspices of the OAU at the July 1979 in Monrovia. The conflict in Chad had been raging since 1965 but was only ably addressed at the Libreville (Gabon) Summit. This particular operations followed charges brought by the Malloum regime of Chad against Libya over the latter's support of the FROLINAT. At the Libreville Summit also, an Ad-Hoc Committee was appointed comprising Gabon, Algeria, Mozambique, Nigeria, Senegal and Cameroon to mediate the conflict between Chad and Libya. Preceding these developments is the fact that there had been a civil war in Chad for twelve years. The Chadian government still

maintained the façade that its conflict was with Libya and that OAU's intervention was constitutionally permissible only in that situation of interstate conflict. The efforts of the Ad-Hoc Committee and the active involvement of Libya produced the first ceasefire agreement between the Chadian government and the FROLINAT which was signed on March 27, 1978 at a conference in Sebha and Benghazi in Libya. This ceasefire, like many to follow never took effect (Galadima, 2001).

The nature of the Chad conflict changed into another stage in February 1979 when the Malloum regime was defeated by the FROLINAT faction led by Hissene Habre. The defeat of Malloum meant an end to the Southern domination over the Muslim North, but also transformed the conflict into a struggle for power among the Muslim leaders as Hissene Habre was challenged by his long-standing Northern rural, Goukounni Weddeye. This second development in the conflict resulted in Nigeria's assumption of a leadership role in the regional mediation efforts which were legitimized because they were pursued in the framework of the OAU mediation. After the resolutions, Nigeria convened a conference on National Reconciliation in Kano, attended by representatives of the four Chadian factions. President Malloum, Hissene Habre, leader of the Forces Armees du Nord (FAN); Goukounni Weddeye representing the FROLINAT and Aboubakar Mahamat Abderaman, leader of the Movement Populaire Pour la Liberation de Tchad (MPLT). This conference was the first genuine attempt at bringing together all the important factions and interested parties within and without Chad, for the purpose of seeking a negotiated settlement of the conflict (Nwolise, n.d).

After five days of intensive negotiations, the participating parties on March 16, 1979 signed a Peace Accord to take effect on March 23, 1979. An aspect of the agreement was a general ceasefire in Chad and the establishment of a neutral peace-keeping force to be provided by Nigeria. Nigeria eventually hosted a second Kano Conference on April 3, 1979 and later a third National Conference in Lagos from May 26 – 27, 1979 after the collapse of the first agreement. It must be pointed out that both the Kano II and Lagos Conference III ended inconclusively (Warusi, n.d).

3rd Case Study: The Nigerian Military Peace-Keeping at the Lebanon – Israeli Border

This third case study is that of Nigeria's military peace-keeping at international level too, and outside Africa. It is noteworthy because the two former cases, Congo and Chad were although international but was still within the African continent. It is also important to note that whenever the peace-keeping operations was within the ambit of the United Nations, it was better managed than the former operations in Chad which ended inconclusively.

The Lebanon – Israeli border peace-keeping operations in which the Nigerian military participated was actually one of the oldest peace-keeping operations given the nature of the conflicts. Since the creation of the state of Israel in 1948, it had found itself in the midst of conflicts on all fronts from the neighbouring Arab countries. The operations was established 1978 by the United Nations Security Council Resolution and was given the name of United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) (Nwolise, n.d). The major purpose for constituting this interim force by the United Nations was to ensure that the Israeli forces withdrew from their Strongholds in Southern Lebanon, restoring international peace and security and assisting the government of Lebanon to restore its authority to the entire region which had earlier been usurped by the Israelis. The council's action followed years of tension along the Israeli – Lebanon border, a March 1978 attack in Israel by Palestinian Liberation Organization fighters coming from Lebanon and a subsequent Israeli invasion of South Lebanon, while cross-border fighting continued between the two, Israeli did not completely withdraw and the authority of the government of Lebanon was not restored in the South. Under these circumstances, UNIFIL could not fulfill its responsibilities under Resolution 425(Nwolise, n.d).

In June 1982, Israel invaded Lebanon and subsequently established its own security zone inside the country, which remained until they withdrew in June 2000. Nonetheless, the government of Lebanon which could not extend its authority to the South requested that UNIFIL remain in order to pursue the implementation of earlier stated Resolution 425. Throughout these years, the Security Council regularly renewed UNIFIL's mandate.

At this international peace-keeping exercise, Nigeria contributed 643 officers and men. Nine Nigerian battalions totaling 7,000 men were rotated through UNIFIL from 1978 – 1982. Nigeria withdrew from UNIFIL in 1983. Galadima further noted that the activities of the Nigerian forces at UNIFIL included maintaining the ceasefire through patrols, observations from fixed positions and close contact with the parties. Within its limited means and thanks to contributions of Troops Contributing Countries (TCC), assisting the civilian population with medical care, water projects, equipment or services for schools or orphanages and supplies of social services to the needy; clearance of mines and unexploded ordinance (Ogomudia, 1971). In addition, despite restrictions to its freedom of movement and at great risk to its personnel, UNIFIL continued to carry out other humanitarian services such as, the evacuation of civilians away from the areas of greatest conflict; escort of humanitarian convoys, distribution of food and water to vulnerable populations, evacuation of wounded civilians, treatment of civilians at United Nations medical facilities, provision of water to local hospitals and evacuation of foreign nationals (Ogomudia, 1971).

4th Case Study: The Nigerian Military Peace-Keeping at the Sub-Regional Level – ECOMOG in Liberia/Sierra Leone

Nigeria's military peace-keeping at the sub-regional level had a different methodology and added another phase of experience to the Nigerian soldiers and contingents. It must be clearly noted that Nigeria spearheaded the formation of the ECOWAS Ceasefire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) and participated actively in its peace operations in Liberia and Sierra Leone. In the Liberian conflict, West African states embarked on the peace-keeping intervention after more than 150,000 people had either been killed or displaced in the civil war which started in Liberia in 1989. In the Sierra Leone case, the mandate was to reverse the military coup restores the legitimate government of President Ahmed Tejan Kabbah to power after a coup d'état led by Major Johnny Paul Koromah of the Sierra Leone Army on May 25, 1997. In the Liberian peace-keeping effort, about 3,500 troops with their basic equipment were lifted in the first phase of the operation on August 23, 1990 which consisted of two battalions each from Ghana and Nigeria, while Guinea and Sierra Leone provided a battalion each. Gambia came up with a rifle company.

Nigeria supported the mission with Nigeria's Naval Ships, NNS AMBE – a Landing Ship Tank – LST. There were also fast attack crafts: NNS SIRI – a fast attack craft (Missile) and NNS AGU. There were other support gun boats namely GNS Yogaga and GNS Achimota and two fast attack aircrafts, NNS Ekpe and NNS Damisa which was contributed by Nigeria. Nigeria also provided an ocean-going Tug-Dolphin Rima and the MT Northern Navigator oil tanker. From the Nigerian Airforce came Six Alpha Jets, two Super Puma helicopters and Nine Hercules C-130 combat transport planes, Dornier 122 A/C, Dornier – 228 A/C to the Air force wing of ECOMOG (Ogomudia, 1971). The Nigerian Navy on its part provided almost all the ships that were put in the Operation Liberty. The fleet of NNS Ambe, NNS Enyimiri NNS Erinnomi, NNS Dawusa, NNS Ekpe, NNS Agu, NNS Ayam, NNS Ekun and NN Tug Dolphin Mira Ring and NNS Tug Rudolph kept the Liberian water under attack. In the process, NNS Damisa and NNS Ekun arrested 2 on-shore patrol crafts and vessel sea Ree respectively in 1990, carrying arms and ammunition to supply the warring factions. They were escorted to the free port and the arms confiscated (NIGCON Headquarters Monrovia, 1998).

In seven months of intensive air operations, several of NPFL tanks, Armored Personnel Carriers (APC), artillery pieces and trucks were either destroyed or damaged. According to General Olurin, attacks on their transportation assets were so successful that the NPFL was unable to provide any substantial reinforcement and re-supply transportation to her over 30,000 man rebel army. The disruption of the transportation, he noted, was the decisive blow that eventually forced the NPFL into a ceasefire agreement with the ECOMOG forces (Nwolise, n.d). Although, the peace operations proved to be a difficult experience for ECOMOG, yet it was able to stabilize Liberia to a reasonable extent and more importantly, halted the carnage in Liberia.

ECOMOG peace-keeping effort in Sierra Leone deployed its forces in the midnight of May 26, 1997 at Hastings and Lungi Airports which were secured by the Nigerian and Guinean forces respectively. Nigeria had always maintained 7,000 troops in the country under the status of Forces and Security Agreement. However, with the coup and the potential threat posed, especially by the RUF, the troop strength of the Nigerian military increased to 12,000. The Nigerian led ECOMOG force began a swift and decisive operation against the AFRC/RUF. ECOMOG advanced towards Freetown and the State House with a combination of ground and air assaults. The battle for Freetown took only seven (7) days. The Nigerian Battalion fought their way, marched into the capital and the State House and sacked the AFRC rebels. This paved the way for the eventual return of President Ahmed Tejan Kabbah. The first ECOMOG mandate was thus accomplished.

Instability and various skirmishes continued in various regions throughout the country in spite of the home agreement. It was at this at this point that Nigeria decided to withdraw its troops from ECOMOG due to the financial involvement which was high and critical. Nigeria was widely criticized under Generals Babangida and Abacha for every spirited effort to establish democracy in Liberia and Sierra Leone which Nigeria never had at the time.

As a result, the UN Security Council authorized the creation of UNAMSIL in October 1999 to assist with the implementation of the Lome Agreement. In November 1999, the first UN Peace-keepers of the UN Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) arrived to replace ECOMOG. The UN Force was tasked with the enforcement of the Peace Agreement, the Lome Accord, signed between the Sierra Leone government and the RUF on July 7, 1999. The Nigerian military was also involved in the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL). As at June 2004, no less than 40 nations were contributing 9,925 military police and civilian police to UNAMSIL (Galadima, 2001).

5. Impact Analysis of the Four Case Studies

It is very clear that the four major peace-keeping missions highlighted by this work were influenced by different circumstances and had varied technicalities in the deployment of the Nigerian forces to the scenes of conflicts and even more importantly differed in the management of the forces on each occasion. Evidently, at the first peace-keeping effort of the Nigerian military which was to Congo, it can be clearly discerned that the whole

exercise was thoroughly guided by the United Nations. There were no shortcomings in the contribution of troops which came from various African states, while adequate funds were made available to the military formations and contingents in the peace-keeping exercise. That is the more reason; accolades and brilliant performances were recorded by the troops contributed to the Congo. More so, in 1960, most African states were zealous and fought desperately to keep their newly won independence from their former foreign overlords. Thus, the intervention of Belgium in the affairs of Congo after its exit was seen as a new dimension or neo-colonialism which Nigeria particularly fought desperately to halt the foreign intervention with the backing of the United Nation (ONUC). On the long run, the Nigerian military and others, and operations checkmated the action of Belgium and the impact was that Belgium was washed away from African soil.

The Chad Republic operation was under the auspices of the Organization of African Unity (OAU). The conflict in Chad had been raging since 1965 but was only addressed at the 1977 Libreville, Gabon Summit of the OAU. Although, OAU appointed an Ad-hoc Committee of Nigeria, Senegal, Cameroon, Gabon, Algeria and Mozambique, most of these nations could not support their troops effectively financially. While OAU had not established a strong financial base then, it behooved on the various countries to maintain their troops abroad with limited resources at their disposal. Another complexity of the Chad operations was that apart from the civil war in Chad, Libya also gave the country a run of its security at the borders of the two countries which made the exercise not only complex but a twin exercise of peace-keeping. The Chad peace-keeping efforts helped to project a positive image for Nigerians abroad, thereby paving way for the emerging nation to occupy a place of respect and honor in the comity of nations.

On the negative impact, it must be clearly pointed out that the frustration encountered in Chad was a fore taste of what was in store for the OAU's subsequent efforts at peace-keeping. Launched by a broad and overly ambitious mandate, neither the Nigerian peace-keeping troops nor the Chadian factions appeared adequately briefed on what was required of them; their mentality was not understood or appreciated and consent was lacking, misunderstood or withdrawn (Galadima, 2001). As relations between Nigeria and the major Chadian factions soured, the peace-keeping force was perceived as part of the conflict and not an instrument for its solution, the neutral force was subjected to harassment and attack. In 1980, the Chadian conflict changed dramatically following the large scale intervention of the Libyan troops in support of President Weddeye in a concerted anti-Habre Campaign. Libya and its clients put Hissene Habre's troops to rout from N'Djamena by the end of December 1980.

Thus as Ogwu noted; this first OAU Peace-keeping force was plagued from the beginning by organizational, logistical and financial problems? By the time it became operational, the ceasefire had broken down and there was no peace to keep. She argued further that the first OAU peace-keeping operation had to withdraw from Chad by the end of 1982 (Galadima, 2001). He identified the following reasons as responsible for the failure of the operations; the unrealistic expectations of the factious and the absence of adequate OAU infrastructure to deal with them; inadequate funds to finance the operation. The OAU had to withdraw its forces in 1982 barely a year after deploying as a result of the financial difficulties; and inability of the OAU to establish a firm neutral political arrangement to which all matters relating to their country would be referred. Such a political unit would have been able to deal with the OAU and the rest of the world and not the kind of compromise which visibly divided GNUT that was on ground (Galadima, 2001).

General Ejiga (1996) who was a Commander of the OAU Peace-keeping Force in Chad later pointed out that throughout the seven months of the OAU force in Chad; it did not receive support from the OAU. More so, that the day-to-day operations of the forces were directed from Forces Headquarters through the National Contingent Commanders as the forces did not receive any direct support from other African countries. The excellent performance of the Nigerian soldiers at this operation drew praises from the UNIFIL Force Commander, Lt. Gen. William Callaghan who during the NIBATT IX Mental Parade in 1982 told the Nigerian contingent.

"Your application to your task is deserving of my highest praise . . . while the Nigerian Contingent Commander then, Brigadier N. S. Sami was made UNIFIL Chief of Staff in recognition of Nigerian status, the discipline and devotion of her troops and the troops positive contribution to the search for peace in Lebanon" (Ogomudia, 1997). This experience in Lebanon – Israeli border crisis was also rewarding in several ways to the Nigerian contingent in terms of exposure and financial rewards for the Nigerian government and the soldiers.

Then, the fourth acid test for the viability of the role of the Nigerian military is in the integrated radio communications linking Forces Headquarters to the troops deployed in the operational zones. Compared to the next case study which was Nigeria's participation in the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon, one is left in no doubt, that the Chad operations was not properly funded and managed.

Peace-keeping at the sub-regional level which involved the entire West African region and the ECOMOG forces was another important effort of the Nigerian Army. At this instance, Nigeria led the coalition within the Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in both the Liberian and Sierra Leone crisis. Although, ECOWAS authorized the intervention in July 1990 but at the onset, only five of the sixteen member countries,

the Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Nigeria and Sierra Leone committed their troops. Nigeria supported the mission with Nigeria's naval ship NNS AMBE – a landing ship Tank LST, fast Attack Crafts: NNS SIRI, gun boats, an ocean going tug, six Nigerian air Force jets, two Super Puma helicopters and 9 Super Hercules C-130 combat transport planes amongst others. With these fortifications by December 24, 1990, the NIBATTS had cleared the rebels from the Free Port and the Executive Mansion was secured. With these developments, the task of making Monrovia a safe haven was achieved.

This enabled relief organisations to set up camps for displaced persons and to administer them. Unlike in Liberia, ECOMOG's mandate in Sierra Leone was to reverse the military coup and restore the legitimate government to power. The ECOWAS Foreign Ministers were the first to consider the crisis in Conakry on June 26, 1997. ECOMOG task was clear – to restore the government of President Ahmed Tejan Kabbah which was overthrown by a military coup d'état led by Major Johnny Paul Koromah of the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC).

The ECOMOG forces advanced towards Freetown and the State House with a combination of ground and Air assaults. The battle for Freetown, Sierra Leone took seven days. The Nigerian battalion fought their way, marched into the capital and the State House and sacked the AFRC rebels. President Tejan Kabbah was subsequently restored back to his Presidency of the country. In November 1999, the first UN Peace-keepers of the UN Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) arrived to replace the ECOMOG. The UN Force was tasked with enforcing the Peace Agreement, the Lome Accord signed between the Sierra Leone government and the RUF on July. Subsequently, on October 22, 1999, the Security Council authorized the establishment of UNAMISIL, which had a mandate under chapter VII of the UN charter to provide security in key areas of the country. According to the resolution 1270 (1999) of 22 October, 1999, UNAMSIL had the authorized maximum strength of 17,500 military personnel including 260 military observers (S/RFS/134) and up to 1,270 civilian police personnel (S/RES/1436). Thus, it can be clearly asserted that Nigeria's participation at the ECOMOG operations in Liberia and Sierra Leone were result-oriented and brought peace to the conflict zones and governments of the two war-torn countries in the 1990s. To prove this, Liberia had its democratic elections which brought in Ellen Sirleaf while Liberia too restored its peace through subsequent elections.

Nigeria's participation in these operations (Liberia and Sierra Leone) were initially begun by the singular effort of Nigeria's military heads of states particularly, President Ibrahim Badamosi Babangida but later the ECOMOG troops transformed to United Nations Peace-keeping force. It must be asserted that Nigeria's role at the ECOMOG brought relative peace to the West African sub-region. The role played by the Nigerian government had to be reconciled with its foreign policy objectives which made Africa its centerpiece. It is significant to note also that Nigeria dominated the operation contributing the bulk of the troops' overtime as much as 90 percent at some period. Nigeria also shouldered the heavy cost of its participation in Liberian and Sierra Leone, an amount estimated at \$12 billion (Ogomudia, 1997).

President Obasanjo noted during his address to the United Nations General Assembly in September 1999; for too long, the burden of preserving international peace and security in West Africa has been left almost entirely to a few states in our sub-region – Nigeria's continual burden in Sierra Leone is unacceptably draining Nigerian financially. For our economy to take off, this bleeding has to stop (Ogomudia, 1997; Galadima, 2001). Nigeria's decision not to contribute troops to the ECOMOG Mission in Guinea-Bissau in 1998 and to reduce significantly Nigerian troops in Sierra Leone in 1999 were clear signs that the country could not continue to sustain such expenditure especially as the country transited in its democratic dispensation and governance.

This was quite clearly reflected in Nigeria's delegation to Darfur which posed serious problems. The Nigerian Battalion in Darfur was reportedly sent home a month later owing to below-par performance. The head of the UNAMID at this operation, Prof. Ibrahim Gambari observed that the deficiency revolved on quality of the troops they send to the UN, that the pre-deployment training they give to them is adequate, thorough and rigorous, thirdly, that the selection of the people whom they actually send is also of the topmost quality and that they operate much more cohesively. Nigerian forces had little option in the Mali troops deployment in 2012 when the domestic imperatives in Nigeria demanded that they come back to get involved in the insurgency case of the Boko Haram. It was argued that without much political and strategic security at home, it was not advisable to get Nigerians involved in peace-keeping.

6. Summary and Conclusion

This paper has attempted to show the involvement of Nigerian military in peace-keeping efforts and operations in Africa and elsewhere. The work also attempted to situate the theoretical explanations for the involvement of Nigerian troops and its impact. They were able to impact in each of the situations they found themselves. The work also revealed that even though, Nigeria has attained the position of military capability to provide African solutions for African problems, especially in the Liberia – Sierra Leone peace-keeping efforts, yet there were some other peculiarities of under-development which impeded these efforts. These can be highlighted as their lack of economic capabilities in buying more sophisticated armory for peace-keeping and particularly, the lack

of acquisition of technological know-how and liaising with foreign technical partners to support them in the equipment for curbing conflicts in their peace-keeping efforts. This work no doubt, has clearly shown that various International Relations theories and respective explanations can help explain why Nigeria and other African countries participate in peace-keeping operations despite the risks, finances and other peculiar issues involved.

However, it would seem that Nigeria for the foreseeable future would be better-off continuing to allow the bigger powers to be involved in these conflict resolutions first, and make efforts to stabilize the current problems of insecurity, insurgency, displacements generated by forces like Boko Haram, Islamic State West Africa (ISWA) and other separatists group like The Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB) whose activities can deter the essence of the military in external Peacekeeping effort. It is only when the home front of Peacekeeping in the country is stabilized could the Nigerian military engage in International Peacekeeping missions and peace-building activities.

Thus, while worth pursuing in the long run, Nigerian solutions to African peace-keeping problems is not a realistic proposition for peace-keeping and peace-building efforts on the continent in the short term, mainly because of the funding and equipment restraints. In any case, peace-keeping missions will not end soon. So long as conflicts continue to arise and nations call upon the international community for help in restoring peace, the need for the intervention of countries like Nigeria will always be a necessity. Indeed, this is the more reason that the government of President Major General Muhammadu Buhari (retd.), between July 2021 and May 2022 deployed no fewer than 640 soldiers to Guinea Bissau and Gambia, among others, despite the rising cases of insecurity across the country. (S. Odeniyi 2023). It must be stated that the deployment has been condemned by security experts.

7. Recommendations

The work therefore recommends that Nigeria must review its activities in international peace-keeping after each exercise which of course is a military prerogative. Also, efforts should be made to ensure that conflicting parties duly accept the intervention of peace-keepers before they are sent out to the regions. Each operation must be duly understudied before the deployment of Nigerian troops to such designations. Their equipment should also be ascertained to ensure that they are not deployed to dangerous assignments which they may not be able to checkmate or stabilize the required peace. Budget for peace-keeping should be aligned to that of other contributing countries to ensure that every plan works in harmony and unity or achieve success on the long run. With Nigeria's experience and position, not just at the sub-region level but in Africa as a whole, it is doubtful that peace-keeping missions can be stopped abruptly as part of its foreign policy stance in the foreseeable future.

Although, Nigerian soldiers participated in the Darfur peace-keeping, the effort was extraordinarily frustrating despite continued attacks on civilians. Part of the problem was that of the resistance of Russia and China on the Security Council to strong measures as interventions indicate the element of interference in the sovereignty of such countries. But much more than that, is that their defense of sanctions and interventions stems from their self-interests as China buys about two-thirds of Sudan's petroleum exports. Russia also has commercial interests in Sudan and among other things, has sold the Sudanese government over \$500 million in weapons since 2000. Sudanese government to this effect at some point during the crisis declared that it would consider any attempt to send in peace-keepers without the permission of the government as a hostile act and an invasion. This work strongly recommends that Nigerian soldiers should not be sent to such missions where the interests of the 'big powers' especially of the UN Security Council is at variance and clashing.

Even after the UN finally authorized a UN force to go and supplement the African Union force, the Sudanese government refused to let it enter, and the politics of the UN prevented a forced entry or even sanctions on Sudan. All these reactions came through the influence of China and Russia. Sudan currently is at war again and persistent Peacekeeping efforts are required from major powers such as: United States and Saudi Arabia taking the lead while other African countries and the African Union (AU) may watch the interest of the parties at loggerhead before their intervention.

Finally, as Rourke (2009) has noted:

In sum the exact configuration of international security forces in the future is not clear as they face many problems and there is no consensus on how to regulate them properly. The UN process especially the veto in the Security Council makes it difficult to take action or institute change. Additionally, countries are not willing to pay enough money, send enough troops, or give the UN enough authority to not just keep peace but to enforce it if necessary.

It is however obvious that despite the above enumerated problems by Rourke, the advantages desired from peace-keeping far outweighs its deficiency as world politics would have become more deadlier and uncontrollable with the lack of a total enforcer of peace from any singular country but the United Nations (Galadima, 2001).

Reference List

- Abdulwaheed, L. (2012). Nigeria and peace-keeping process in Africa: The Darfur peace process in Sudan. *International Journal of politics and good governance*
<http://www.onlineresearchjournals.com/ijopagg/previousissues.php?n//25>
- Aderiye S. "ECONOMIG LANDING" M. A. Vogt (ed.). *The Liberian Crises and ECONOMOG: A Bold Attempt at Regional Peace-keeping*. Gabumo Press.
- Akande, L. (2012). *UN Reflects Nigeria as head of peace-keeping panel: The Guardian Nigeria*, 23. February 2012 @ [http://odili.net.news/source/2012 Feb. 23/5html](http://odili.net.news/source/2012%20Feb.%2023/5html).
- Al Jazeera (18 January, 2013). *Mali army retakes key towns from Rebels*.
<http://www.aljazeera.com/news/Africa2013D18/22039129487.html>.
- Alli, O. W. (n.d). *Nigerian and the African Union (AU) in Nigeria, in the Global Arena: Past, Present and Future*, FOG Ventures, Lagos.
- David Francis (2009). Peace-keeping in a bad neighbourhood: The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in Peace and Security in West Africa. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*.
- Doyle, M. W. Johnstone, I., Orr, R.C. (ed.) (1997). *Keeping the peace: Multidimensional UN operations in Cambodia and El Salvador*. Great Britain: Cambridge University Press.
- James, A. (1990). *Peace keeping in international politics*. New York: St. Martins Press.
- Ejiga, G.O. (1996). *Analysis of Operational Aspects of the OAU Peace-keeping*.
- Ejiga, GO. (1996). *Analysis of Operational Aspects of the OAU Peace-keeping*.
- Ekoko, E (eds.). *Nigeria in International Peace-keeping 1960-1992*. Lagos & Oxford, Malthouse.
- Firsing, S. (2013). Thinking through the Role of African militaries in peace-keeping: The cases of Nigeria. *Elliyana and Rwanda in Southern African Journal of International Affairs*. Routledge.
- Firsing, S. (2013). Thinking through the Role of African militaries in peace-keeping: The cases of Nigeria. *Elliyana and Rwanda in Southern African Journal of International Affairs*. Routledge. 46.
- Galadima, H.S. (2001) *Nigeria in International peace-keeping in Nigeria in the global arena: Past, present and future*. Osita Agbu and Ogaba Oche (eds.). Lagos: FOG Ventures.
- Galadima. S.H. (2001). *Nigeria in International Peace-keeping in Nigeria in the Global Arena: Past, Present and Future*. Osita Agbu & Ogaba Oche, FOG, Lagos.
- Interview with UN Official. 6 July, 2013.
- Odeniyi S. (2023). "Nigeria rejoins UN Peacekeeping mission 10 years after exit". <https://punchng.com/nigeria-rejoins-un-peacekeeping-mission-10-years-after-exit/>
- Ogomudia, A (1997). "International Peace-keeping: The Nigerian Experience". M.A. Vogt and A. Ogomudia, A (1997). "International peacekeeping: The Nigerian experience". M. A. Vogt and A. E. Ekoko (eds.). *Nigeria in International Peace-keepign (1960-1992)*. Lagos & Oxford Malthouse.
- Ogomudia, A. (1971). "Nigeria in the management of subregional conflict", Saliu Hassan (ed.). *Selected Themes in Nigerian Foreign Policy and International Relations*. Ilorin: Sally & Associates.
- Ojekwe, A. (2010). *Peace-keeping in West Africa: An Analysis of Nigeria's Roles, 1990-2005*. EFD Collection for Robert Woodruff Library, Atlanta University Centre, Paper 118, <http://digitalcommons.auctre.edu..dissertations/188>.
- Olonisakin, F. (2008). *Lessons Learned from an Assessment of Peace-keeping and Peace Support Operations in West Africa*. Kofi Annan, International Peace-keeping Training Centre.
- Oluri, A.T (1993). "Nigerian Battalion (NIBATT) in United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFL) in Nigeria, in International Peace-keeping, 1960-1992. Lagos & Oxford, Malthouse.
- Olurin, A.T. (n.d) "Nigerian Battalion (NIBATT) in United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL). *Nigeria International Peacekeeping (1960-1992)*. Lagos and Oxford Malthouse
- Rourke, J.T. (2009). *International Politics on the World Stage*. New York: McGraww Hill.
- UN Peace-keeping (2012). *Financing Peace-keeping*. 10 Dec., 2012 @ <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/operations/financing.shtml>
- Victor J. (2010) "African Peace-keeping in Africa: Warlord, Politics, Defense, Economics and State Legitimacy. *Journal of Peace Research*, 47, 2.
- Waltz, K. (1997). "Evaluating Theories" *American Political Science Review*, 91, 4.