International Military Humanitarian Intervention as a Solution for International Conflict Management

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Abstract

Scholarly debates for and against military humanitarian intervention have raged on. For non-interventionists, nothing could justify unilateral or multilateral interventions against the territorial integrity and sovereignty of a state. For interventionists, states should not hold unto their sovereignty and grossly abuse the rights of their populations while the international community just watches. By looking at the arguments of both sides, this paper is a sweeping examination of the general concept of International Military Humanitarian Intervention as a last-resort solution for International Conflict Management. It starts with a historical overview of the humanitarian intervention concept, looking at the cause célèbre surrounding the legality of the Use of Force and other concerns surrounding humanitarian intervention. It further examines the concept of Responsibility to Protect, as a contemporary re-definition of humanitarian intervention and a gap bridger between sovereignty & military humanitarian intervention. While military intervention is the last-resort solution under the Responsibility to Protect, the latter provides an opportunity for the use of other diplomatic tools in conflict management. This paper also examines some successful and failed state case studies where military humanitarian intervention was deployed to resolve conflicts, ensure peace and alleviate mass sufferings. In addition, the paper analyses the challenges and criticisms of military humanitarian intervention. While military humanitarian intervention constitutes a last-resort solution for conflict management when it is done under the right authority of the UN Security Council, with the right intention, proportionality of force size and with reasonable prospects of success. This is to save human populations from gross mass atrocities when states have failed to do so. Discussions are also on other related issues that may support or challenge military humanitarian interventions such as: state sovereignty, the selectivity problem, political realism, and post-conflict peace building after interventions.

Keywords: Military Humanitarian Intervention, Conflict Management, Conflict, War, Responsibility to Protect, Sovereignty, Human Rights, Mass Atrocities

1. Background

International Military Humanitarian Intervention (IMHI) has been one of the most contested subjects in International Relations and Conflict Management. Scholarly debates for and against it have raged on. For non-interventionists, nothing could justify unilateral or multilateral interventions against the territorial integrity and sovereignty of a state. States should be allowed to deal with their domestic issues alone. A Belgrade Graffiti of 1999 which contemptuously and comically reads: Bombing for Peace is like Fucking for Virginity perfectly exemplifies their position. For interventionists, states should not hold unto their sovereignty and abuse the rights of its populations. It is a moral responsibility of the international community to make certain that states do not commit gross atrocities against its people in the name of state-sovereignty. In addition to interventionists’ argument, we live in an interconnected world, with shared and globalized values, principles and morals. They also justify interventions through spotlighting how non-interventions necessitate the issues of refugee crisis; shared bitter history of crimes against humanity, war crimes and genocide; and the commonality of conflict spills. Thus, they consider IMHI as one of the most efficacious tools in preventing gross atrocities in wars, and in managing conflicts, especially when the rights of a state’s citizens have been grossly violated.

International Humanitarian Intervention (IHI) is a state’s use of non-forcible and forcible methods against another state with the aim of ending gross human rights violations being perpetrated by the state against which it is directed (Marjanovic 2011). The forcible methods encircle military intervention, while the non-forcible methods encircle economic sanctions, humanitarian aid and peacekeeping (Scheffer 1992). It is an intervention in the sense that it often entails an intercession into the internal affairs of a state by sending military forces into the airspace or territory of a sovereign state that has not committed an act of aggression against another state. Often motivated by humanitarian objectives, IHI accentuates the perturbation between the principle of state sovereignty, a core of the United Nations (UN) system and international law, and transmogrifying international norms associated with human rights and the Use of Force (Tharoor & Daws 2001).
Besides, it has sparked empirical and normative debates over its legality, the moral principles of using military force to respond to mass sufferings, when it should be used, who has the legal authority to intervene (Pattison 2010), and whether it is efficacious (legality, when, who and whether).

Although the term itself was not used, the principles that provide a solid foundation for IMHI have origins in the 15th century just war and religious theories. Vitoria (1492–1546) viewed it as the responsibility of ‘civilized’ states to interfere in ‘backward’ states to end inhuman practices such as human sacrifice and cannibalism, and to spread Christianity (Parekh 1997). Grotius (1583–1645) later added to these criteria - sexual immorality, atheism, and the suppression of idolatry. Customary international law has always acknowledged a principle of military intervention on humanitarian grounds. Feasibly, the first historical instance of a state expressly intervening in the domestic affairs of another, on humanitarian ground was during in the 19th century during the Greek War of Independence. This was when Britain, France and Russia adduced persecution of Christians in Muslim-governed territories of the Ottoman Empire and intervened. Since then, there have been assorted occurrences of interventions. After the end of the Cold War, several interventions have been used, such as the 1999 NATO bombing of Yugoslavia (Bonnén 2003); and the military intervention in Libya, in 2011 under R2P (United Nations 2011).

IMHI entails the Use of Force (UoF). There is still huge ambiguity over the legality of the latter in both Customary International Law and Treaty Law, despite the UoF provisions in the UN Charter. While the Charter in its Articles 2(4) and 2(7) refrains member states from using force against another state, the Charter makes provisions for the UoF, only under the authority of the UN Security Council in its Articles 24 and 25, and Chapter VII (UN Charter). According to the Charter, the Security Council may authorize UoF to maintain or enforce international peace and security. This justifies the Security Council’s right to use force in ensuring international peace, thus, the right authority for IMHI. In addition, though this is outside the context of this paper, Article 51 of the Charter also authorizes member states to use force in self-defense, in case a state expressly intervening in the domestic affairs of another, on humanitarian ground was during in the 19th century during the Greek War of Independence. This was when Britain, France and Russia adduced persecution of Christians in Muslim-governed territories of the Ottoman Empire and intervened. Since then, there have been assorted occurrences of interventions. After the end of the Cold War, several interventions have been used, such as the 1999 NATO bombing of Yugoslavia (Bonnén 2003); and the military intervention in Libya, in 2011 under R2P (United Nations 2011).

There is humongous ambiguity over this third condition for the UoF. For example, it was used by NATO in its 1999 intervention in Yugoslavia. This was clear through a statement of the then UK Foreign Secretary, who asserted that, *In international law, in exceptional circumstances and to avoid a humanitarian catastrophe, military action can be taken and it is on that legal basis that military action was taken*. However, it is very difficult to reconcile this statement with the UN Charter preamble. When NATO used military force against Yugoslavia, it did not have the authorization from the Security Council, but it was not condemned either. This is because of power politics in the Security Council. In the light of this, both proponents and opponents of IMHI have their legal grounds on the Charter of the UN. There is still a ceaseless cause célèbre as to whether sovereignty or humanitarian causes should prevail.

Many countries are against IMHI on the formal ground that they are simply illegal, or on the ground that such a right is only used against weaker states by stronger states. This was specifically exemplified in the 2000 Ministerial Declaration of G-77 countries, in Havana, in which 133 states condemned such interventions (G77 2000). However, interventionists have typically hold onto the claim that the right has developed as a new part of customary International Law. From historical examples, IMHI can be unilateral, or multilateral, under the authorities of International or Regional Organizations or Coalition of States. Although many scholars agree that humanitarian interventions should be undertaken multilaterally, there is still big ambiguity over which particular agents - the UN, regional organizations, or a coalition of states- should act in response to gross violations of human rights. The actor choice has implications for overcoming collective action challenges through the mobilization of political commitment and material resources (Dantiki 2005). Questions of motives and conduct of the intervener, extent of domestic and external support, and legal authorization have also been raised as possible criteria in the evaluation of the potential intervener’s legitimacy (Pattison, 2010).

The UN has continuously been involved in issues related to IMHI having intervened in an increased number of conflicts within states’ territorial borders (the Economist 2008). The interpretation of what constitutes threats to international peace and security has been stretched since the 1990s to encompass issues such as mass displacement, and the Security Council has authorized UoF in situations that many actors would have previously viewed as “internal” conflicts (Fisler 1993). In addition and in some instances, states or coalition of states have intervened with force, and without pre-authorization from the Security Council, as a response to alleged extreme violations of human rights. Examples include the 1965 US intervention in Dominican Republic, as well as the aforementioned 1999 NATO’s intervention.

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1 North Atlantic Treaty Organization
2. The Responsibility to Protect (R2P)

In contemporary international relations, IHI has been re-defined as the R2P. The latter is a norm that sovereignty is not an entire right, and that states forfeit elements of their sovereignty when they fail to protect their populations from mass atrocities and gross human rights violations ([such as crimes against humanity, ethnic cleansing, genocide and war crimes] (Iqbal 2010)]. R2P addresses some of the non-interventionists concerns about interventions, especially on the questions of legality, when, who and whether. The R2P, inspired by preventing mass atrocities, bridged the concept gap between sovereignty and military humanitarian intervention. It re-defines the right of humanitarian intervention. The R2P has three pillars: a state has a responsibility to protect its population from gross human rights abuses; the international community has a responsibility to assist the state to fulfill this; and if the state fails to protect its citizens from gross human rights abuses and peaceful measures have failed, the international community has the responsibility to intervene through forcible measures such as economic sanctions with military intervention being the last resort (Badescu 2010). The third pillar remains controversial.

R2P has grounds in the principles of International Law, especially the unexpressed principles of law relating to sovereignty, security, peace, human rights, and armed conflict (Hehir et al. 2011). R2P provides a system for using tools that already exist (i.e., mediation, early warning mechanisms, economic sanctions, and chapter VII powers) to prevent mass atrocities. While civil society organizations, states, regional and international organizations all have a role to play in the R2P process. The authority to employ the last resort and intervene militarily rests solely with the UN Security Council.

Following the failure of the International Community to timely respond to tragedies such as the 1994 Rwandan Genocide and the 1995 Srebrenica Massacre, Kofi Annan, in 2000, and in his capacity as UN Secretary-General, wrote the report "We the Peoples" on the UN 21st Century role. In this report, he raised the question: if humanitarian intervention is, indeed, an unacceptable assault on sovereignty, how should we respond to a Rwanda, to a Srebrenica — to gross and systematic violations of human rights that offend every precept of our common humanity (UN General Assembly 2000)? Responding to this question in 2001, while interventionists and non-interventionists were musing over the IHI debate, the Canadian International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) released a report titled The Responsibility to Protect. In a comprehensible reinterpretation of the meaning of state sovereignty, the report argued that sovereignty entailed not only rights but also responsibilities - particularly a state's responsibility to protect its people from grave violations of human rights (Cohen 2010).

The ICISS report further asserted that, where a state was unwilling or unable to protect its people, the responsibility should be transferred to the international community and the principle of non-intervention yields to the international responsibility to protect. The ICISS argued that military intervention on humanitarian grounds should be justified if it meets certain criteria, which include: Just cause, Last resort, Proportionality, Reasonable prospects, Right authority, and Right intention (Evans 2006).

R2P was later included in the Outcome Document agreeing to Paragraphs 138 and 139 at the 2005 World Summit by UN member states. These paragraphs gave final language to the jurisdiction of R2P. They identify to whom the R2P protocol applies; i.e., states first, and regional & international communities’ second. The Security Council has re-pledged its commitment to the R2P in several resolutions. On 12 January 2009, the UN Secretary-General, Ban Ki-moon issued a report entitled: Implementing the Responsibility to Protect. The report was the first comprehensible document from the UN Secretariat on the R2P, following Ban's stated commitment to turn the concept into policy. The report set the tone and the movement for discussions on the subject at the UN. In 2009, the Council recognized states’ primary responsibility to protect and re-averred paragraphs 138 and 139 in resolution 1894. In addition, the Security Council has mentioned the R2P in several country-specific resolutions or military humanitarian interventions: Darfur, Libya, Côte d'Ivoire, Yemen, Mali, and Sudan and South Sudan.

Nevertheless, the R2P differs from IHI in two important ways. Firstly, IHI encircles mainly military intervention, whereas R2P is a preventative measure that stresses state responsibilities. Military intervention can only be carried out as a last resort, when all other, non-forcible measures have failed and it is authorized by

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1. There must be "serious and irreparable harm occurring to human beings, or imminently likely to occur".
2. Every other measure besides military invention has to have already been taken into account. (This does not mean that every measurement has to have been applied and been shown to fail, but that there are reasonable grounds to believe that only military action would work in that situation.)
3. The military means must not exceed what is necessary "to secure the defined human protection objective".
4. The chance of success must be reasonably high, and it must be unlikely that the consequences of the military intervention would be worse than the consequences without the intervention.
5. The military action has to have been authorized by the Security Council.
6. The main intention of the military action must be to prevent human suffering.
the Security Council (Adams 2012). Secondly, R2P extends the intervention beyond mainstream military means and has it encircles a whole continuum of obligations (GSDRC 2013): the responsibility to prevent: dealing with the root causes of internal conflict - the responsibility to react: reacting to situations of enthralling human need with appropriate measures that could include sanctions, or military intervention - and the responsibility to rebuild: providing full assistance with recovery, reconstruction, and reconciliation.

3. Case Studies

Examples of IMHIs include: British, French and Russian Intervention in the Greek War of Independence (1824), the Allies intervention in World War II, US intervention in Dominican Republic (1965), Uganda-Tanzania War (1979), Operation Provide Comfort (Iraq, 1991), Unified Task Force (Somalia, 1992), Operation Uphold Democracy (Haiti, 1994), UNAMIR (Rwanda, 1994), UNTAET (East Timor, 1999), NATO bombing of Yugoslavia (1999); British military intervention in the Sierra Leone Civil War (2000), [Coalition military intervention in Libya (2011), under R2P principle] and the ongoing 2014 military intervention against the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (2014). In examining whether IMHI constitute a solution for conflict management, some of these case studies are examined.

3.1 Successful Cases where IMHI was used to resolve conflicts, establish safe zones for humanitarian relief & peace, and prevent mass atrocities

3.1.1 British, French and Russian Intervention in the Greek War of Independence (1824)
The Greek War of Independence (1821 - 1832) was a successful war waged by the Greek revolutionaries against the Ottoman Empire (Faber 1968). Following years of negotiation and news that combined Ottoman–Egyptian fleets were going to attack the Greek Island of Hydra, three super powers – Britain, France and Russia intervened in the conflict by intercepting the Ottoman –Egyptian fleet at Navarino and ultimately destroyed the fleet (Ibid). With the assistance of a French expeditionary force, the Greeks drove the Turks out of the Peloponnesian and by 1828, proceeded to the captured part of Central Greece. This was instrumental in Greece being finally recognized as an independent state in May 1832 (Ibid).

3.1.2 World War II (WWII), 1945
The behavior of the Nazi regime constituted a great challenge to the principle of national sovereignty as the principle of non-interference provided a platform for actions that became genocidal. Following the invasion of other countries by the Third Reich and subsequent submission of the former’s populations to horrendous abuses, and the latter’s threat to dominate Europe, a coalition of states headed by Russia and the US confronted and defeated the Third Reich (Axelrod 2007). The Western Allies and Russia started by invading Germany and subsequently captured Berlin. This forced the Third Reich to surrender on 8 May 1945 (Ibid). Following the Potsdam Declaration by the Allies on 26 July 1945 and the turndown of Japan to surrender under its terms, the US dropped atomic bombs on 6 August and 9 August, on the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki (Ibid). With an invasion of the Japanese archipelago imminent, the possibility of subsequent atomic bombings, and the Soviet Union's declaration of war on Japan and invasion, Japan surrendered on 15 August 1945 (Ibid). This ended the war in Asia, and altogether with Third Reich’s defeat, ended the WWII.

The Operations were humanitarian and military operations initiated by the US, the UK, and some of the Gulf War allies, starting in April 1991, to shield Kurds who were fleeing their homes in Northern Iraq in the aftermath of the Persian Gulf War (Gordon 2004). This was through the UN Security Council Resolution 688, calling on Iraq to end repression of its population. A No-Fly Zone was established over Iraq by the US, UK, and France. The Operations were able to enter Northern Iraq, clear the area of the Iraqi threat and provide a safe environment for the Kurd refugees to return to their homes (Ibid). After security has been established, humanitarian supply and rebuilding of infrastructure were then initiated. The Operations took 58 days to complete.

3.1.4 Unified Task Force (Somalia, 1992)
This was a US-led and the UN-sanctioned multinational force which operated in Somalia between 5 December, 1992 and 4 May, 1993. The force charged with carrying out UN Security Council Resolution 794 to create a protected environment for conducting humanitarian operations in the southern part of Somalia (UN 1991). The operation was regarded as a success. An estimated 100,000 lives were saved as a result of outside assistance (Ibid).

3.1.5 Operation Uphold Democracy (Haiti, 1994)
This was an intervention that removed the installed military regime of the 1991 Haitian coup d'état. The coup
overthrew the elected President Jean-Bertrand Aristide. The operation was authorized by the 31 July 1994 UN Security Council Resolution 940 (Hippel 2000).

3.1.6 The United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET), 1999
Established on 25 October 1999, it provided an interim civil administration and a peacekeeping mission in the territory of East Timor, until its independence on 20 May 2002, following the result of the East Timor Special Autonomy Referendum (UN Security Council 1999). The Security Council Resolution 1272 established the transitional administration in 1999. Its responsibilities included providing a peacekeeping force to maintain order and security; administering relief assistance to East Timorese; facilitating the rehabilitation of physical infrastructure; administering East Timor and creating structures for sustainable governance & the rule of law; and assisting in the drafting of a new constitution & conducting elections (Ian & Mayer-Rieckh 2005). A coalition of states led by Australia sent troops to support the peacekeeping mission. The mission was successful, got abolished on 20 May 2002, with most functions transferred to the new East Timor government (Ibid).

3.1.7 The United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL)
This was a UN Peacekeeping Operation in Sierra Leone from 1999 to 2006. It was created by the UN Security Council in October 1999 to assist in the implementation of the Lomé Peace Accord, an agreement that was intended to end the Sierra Leonean Civil War. UNAMSIL concluded its mandate at the end of 2005, (UN Security Council 2005) and Security Council declared that its mission was complete. The mission was popular for authorizing UNAMSIL to protect civilians under imminent threat of physical violence (albeit this was within its capabilities and areas of deployment) - a return to a more proactive style of UN peacekeeping.

3.2 Cases where IMHI failed to resolve conflicts, establish safe zones for humanitarian reliefs & peace, and prevent mass atrocities

3.2.1 United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR), 1994
The UNAMIR was established by the Security Council on 5 October 1993 (UN Security Council 1993). Its mandate was to assist in the implementation of the Arusha Accords, which was signed on August 4, 1993. The Accords was meant to end the Rwandan Civil War (DPI). The mission lasted from October 1993 to March 1996 (Ibid). Its activities were meant to springboard the peace process between the Hutu-dominated Rwandese government and the Tutsi-dominated rebel Rwandan Patriotic Front. The UNAMIR has received much attention for its brutal failure due to the limitations of its rules of engagement. Under its watch, the Rwandan Genocide happened and took more than 500,000 lives (Africa Focus Bulletin 2004).

3.2.2 Coalition military intervention in Libya (2011)
On 19 March 2011, a NATO military intervention started in Libya, with the intention of implementing the UN Security Council Resolution 1973 (BBC News 2011a). The UN’s intention were to have "an immediate ceasefire in Libya, including bringing to an end to the current attacks against civilians, which it said constituted crimes against humanity" ... "impose a ban on all flights in the Libya's airspace – a no-fly zone – and tighten sanctions on the Gaddafi regime and its supporters." The resolution was with respect to events during the Libyan Civil War (UN 2011). Military operations began, with the US and UK naval forces firing over 110 Tomahawk cruise missiles, the French, British, and Canadian Air Forces (BBC News 2011b) undertaking sorties across Libya and a naval blockade by Coalition forces. Fighting in Libya ended in late October following the demise of Muammar Gaddafi, and NATO stated it would end military operations over Libya on 31 October 2011 (BBC News 2011c). This intervention which subsequently plagued Libya into a deep crisis; led to humanitarian crisis within the region, the emergence of a terror group; was largely condemned by a lot of states especially China and Russia; and led to an end of further UN authorized military interventions under the R2P.

4. Criticisms of International Military Humanitarian Intervention
They have been many criticisms against IMHI. Firstly, some critics argue that powerful countries such as the US and its Western Allies are using humanitarian ruses to pursue other disagreeable geopolitical goals. Noam Chomsky and Tariq Ali are at the front line of this, viewing professions of humanitarian motivation with acute skepticism. They argue that the US has continued to act with its own interests in mind. And that the only development being that humanitarianism has become an ideology for the projection of US hegemony in a post Cold War world. Ali especially, argues that NATO intervention in Kosovo was conducted largely to springboard the organization’s credibility (Chomsky 2001).

1 Department of Public Information of UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations
Secondly, some critics criticize the inconsistent nature of most policies on IMHI. These critics argue that there is a tendency of the concept being invoked in the heat of action, giving the appearance of rectitude for Western television viewers, while it neglects the conflicts that are not aired by the media or occur as a result of chronic distresses rather than precipitous crises. For an example, Henry Kissinger finds that Bill Clinton's practice of IMHI was wildly inconsistent - the US started two military campaigns against Serbia while ignoring more extensive slaughter in Rwanda, welcoming to the US the second-ranking military official of a globally recognized severe human rights violator - the communist government of North Korea, and justifying the Russian assault on Chechnya (Kissinger 2001).

Thirdly, another main concern against IMHI is that it infringes upon national sovereignty. And again, that in most cases, the intervention is being carried out when non-forcible methods have not been fully exploited. IMHI has also historically consisted of actions directed by powerful Northern states against the internal affairs of weaker Southern states. The norm of non-intervention and the preeminence of sovereign equality are still enamored by a preponderance of states, which see in the new Western regime not a growing awareness of human rights, but a regression to the selective adherence to sovereignty of the pre UN Charter world (Hehir 2005).

Fourthly, On Libya, some critics suggested that resources and regime change, not democratic or humanitarian concerns, were the real catalyst for the intervention. There are further accusations of imperialism on the part of NATO and the West which were voiced by many world leaders and governments including: Ayatollah Khamenei, Iran's Supreme Leader; Hugo Chávez, former Venezuelan President; and President of Zimbabwe Robert Mugabe; as well as the governments of Raúl Castro in Cuba, Daniel Ortega in Nicaragua and others. Moreover, criticisms have been made on the actuality that negotiations or mediations were not carried off before the military intervention. The only leader who tried to negotiate with Gaddafi was Hugo Chavez, and he was mocked in the international diplomatic circles and media. Every suggestion for the negotiations was rejected (Maksimović et al. 2011).

Finally, some other critics have argued that bombing is bombing whether for humanitarian purposes or for traditional warfare; and that nothing that is achieved by bombing can be righteous. They view humanitarian military intervention as war (Ibid). As expert in International Law, Peter Vedel Kessing stated, humanitarian intervention is an international war and an international armed conflict. From a legal point of view it is a war (Ibid). In addition, and to them, what Western states often do not see, or do not want to see, is that post-intervention society is extremely divided, economically ruined and arrested by war traumas that need a lot of time to evanesc e even if the intervention is rated as successful, like for instance in Somalia. They argue that bombing of people can never help to protect civil and human rights as bombs don’t choose who to kill.

5. Challenges
Challenges facing IHI or R2P are: firstly - the case of ulterior motives and advancement of strategic national interests of states that intervene especially when the intervention was unilateral or through a coalition of the willing. When nations send their military forces into other nations' territory, unilaterally, it is argued that it is rarely "humanitarian" purposes. Non-interventionists, argue that they are typically pursuing their narrow national interests - grabbing territory, gaining geo-strategic advantage, or seizing control of precious natural resources.

Secondly, the intervention in Libya and crisis it created has overshadowed further IMHI or occasions where the Security Council invokes R2P to use force. Experts say that the sentiments and criticisms it drew have given pause to humanitarian interventions backed by regional or global bodies. Russian officials have vowed to block further essays at Security Council-endorsed interventions even amid humanitarian suffering. Unfortunately, the international community took sides in Libya and we would never allow the Security Council to authorize anything similar to what happened there, Russian foreign minister Sergei Lavrov told Australian TV in January 2012 (Heath 2012). Increasingly, the intervention in Libya has contracted the appetite for IHI or R2P. Thirdly, is the challenge of post-conflict peace-building after interventions. The U.S. nation-building experiences in Afghanistan and Iraq have demonstrated the on-the-ground challenges faced after US-led interventions. Ultimately, is the challenge of sovereignty.

6. Recommendations
The Use of Force in violation of sovereignty and in pursuit of humanitarian goals is fraught with problems. It has never “clean” or quick. For these reasons, consideration of military humanitarian intervention should be subject to rigorous preconditions which have unaccustomed if ever been met in practice (Waal & Omaar). The recommendations: Firstly – and in line with R2P criteria, IMHI should be a last resort and under the right authority (UN Security Council). Where IMHI intervention is thought of or implemented, there has always been a history of damaging diplomacy. Pre-alternatives, if tried, occasionally have been tried properly. In every case in which IMHI has been implemented or contemplated, observers with extensive knowledge of the situation can point to missed diplomatic opportunities and serious blunders. In addition, from the examined cases, intervention
cases under the UN mandate has achieved better results and reduces the occasion of the interveners having ulterior motives.

Secondly, the most important question concerning IMHI is: “Can military forces do the job?” This encompasses several distinct questions such as whether the forces can remain militarily unscathed, sustaining a minimum, politically admissible level of casualties. Most modern military forces are furnished for and trained to fight high-technology wars with the aim of securing a speedy victory. Events in Somalia have demonstrated the inappropriateness of such training and equipment for humanitarian missions. Humanitarian Intervention demands a different set of military skills. It is related to counterinsurgency. A separate question is whether the military can accomplish the tasks at hand. Military assistance can assist with relief logistics. There is a tendency to assume that escorting relief convoys is an end in itself. But food assistance is always a relatively small factor in alleviating the hardship and death caused by famine (Ibid).

Thirdly, intervening military forces should prioritize neutrality, and must be accountable under all circumstances. An independent body, incorporating representatives of the international and local community, should oversee the neutrality of and respect for human rights by the intervention forces. Fourthly, there must be an accurate evaluation of the scale and nature of humanitarian needs. This will help to evaluate the assistance needed and predict successful outcomes. And ultimately, in line with R2P criteria, IMHIs must be for a just cause; with the right intention; and have proportionality & reasonable prospects.

7. Conclusion

Despite the criticisms and challenges of IMHI, this paper concludes that it constitutes the most favorable recipe for International Conflict Management when implemented under the right authority, with foreseeable reasonable prospects, with the right intention, and ultimately as the last resort - when other means of conflict resolution have failed. From the case studies above, it is always with fewer errors and better results when done under the UN authority. This is to save human populations from mass atrocities and crimes, and to prevent another holocaust - Rwanda and Srebrenica. States should not be allowed to commit mass atrocities under the shadow of sovereignty while the international community just watches. For non-interventionists, the consequences of non-intervention are grave. At the same time, states should not be allowed to use the pretext of IMHI like we have seen in Libya to devastate regions, cause conflict spills, and advance national interests.

IMHI has raised many complex inter-related concerns in International Law, International Relations, political philosophy, and ethics. IMHI has always failed and resulted in bigger disasters especially when pursued unilaterally or with ill-intentions (nations’ strategic interests), with the tendency of fuelling conflicts, causing more deaths and making reconciliation and post conflict stability a lot harder. Intervention is solidarity to our general cause as one humanity. The responsibility of well-functioning states to help individuals whose human rights are contravened in broken states or as a result of repressive regimes is needful. The answer to non-interventionists questions on the legitimacy of using military means to protect people’s human rights and should we even get involved in the domestic affairs of another state all-together?, is YES. This is because there are certain problems which simply cannot be solved by negotiations, mediations, or sanctions. And when the international community, as a last resort, is left with the choice of indifference or military action, that choice is clear.

For non-interventionists also, there is a weighty difference between traditional warfare and humanitarian intervention. Claiming that there is no difference simply shows a lack of understanding of the strategic element of warfare. Traditional warfare is an armed conflict between two states, usually with the purpose of enlarging state territory or over the control of resources. A humanitarian intervention, using military means, is carried out with guns and bombs, but with the purpose of protecting the civilian population, which leads to employment of different military techniques. Freedom fighters should not die in vain – Survivors should not be abandoned and left to perish in lawless and increasingly violent circumstances. Ultimately, the UN Security Council should be reformed and democratized to represent a changed world since it’s the right authority for humanitarian interventions.

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