

The ‘Calculus’ of Integration or Differentiation in Africa: Post-neo-functionalism and the Future of African Regional Economic Communities (RECs)

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Abstract

The ghost of Berlin Conference (1884-1885) that partitioned Africa into specific spheres of influence has continued to haunt Africa many years after colonialism through neo-colonial ties thereby consolidating and reinforcing the balkanisation of African economies. The principal findings of this study, therefore, are that the regional economic integration in Africa has been largely undermined by one, overlapping memberships; two, numerous subgroupings; and three, proliferation of regional economic blocs. The resultant effect is differentiation, fragmentation, decimation or disintegration in Africa. The paper recommends that there is need to problematise neo-functionalism and elevate post-neo-functionalism as a viable option for African integration.

Keywords: Post-neo-functionalism, integration, functionalism, neo-functionalism, differentiation and Africa

1. Introduction

Regional economic integration is the intersection between neo-mercantilism and neo-functionalism representing a shift from economic nationalism to economic regionalism or from nation-state to region-state (Aniche, Okeke, and Ukaegbu 2009). Nweke (2000) further states that this pervasive trend of regional integration has led to the emergence of a multipolar global economy and formation of regional economic blocs. However, as Ake (1981) noted the idea of regional integration as a means or strategies of collective self-reliance for promoting economic integration and cooperation has been around in Africa for a long time like the pre-independence East African Community (EAC).

In fact, Igwe (2002) and Echezona (1998) note that Kwame Nkrumah was the first African leader to advocate for regional integration in Africa in the form of African Continental Government or United States of Africa, and as well laid the philosophical foundation to the current regional economic blocs in Africa. Africa regionalism, thus, flows from the pan-Africanist philosophical foundations of Kwame Nkrumah, Julius Nyerere, Nnamdi Azikiwe and others culminating to the establishment of Organisation of African Unity (OAU) in 1963 now African Union (AU) since 2001 and Abuja Treaty of 1991 that gave birth to African Economic Community (AEC). African regionalism is, thus, rooted in pan-Africanism.

However, despite decades of regional economic integration in Africa, scholars have noted that numerous obstacles remain, making it difficult for Africa to achieve successful economic integration. These obstacles and difficulties include neo-colonial ties, politico-ideological differences, export-oriented primary products of African states; disparity in size and development of African states; fear of domination or monopolization of benefits; adverse activities of multinational corporations (MNCs) operating in Africa; historical, political, economic and vertical linkages of African economies to Western economies; structural dependence of African economies to Western economies; intractable civil strife and the attendant refugee crises and internal displacements (Ake 1991, Echezona 1998, Kennes 1999, Ojo 1999, Nweke 2000, Page 2000, Okeke and Aniche 2012).

Ezeanyika (2006) points out that the proliferation of regional economic integration or cooperation in Africa that share similar or overlapping objectives and functions duplicate their activities leading to uneconomical use of available scarce financial and human capital (Kennes 1999). But few systematic inquiries had been undertaken or investigation made to ascertain the level of damage caused by incidence of proliferation, fractionalisation or decimation of regional economic integration in Africa into numerous strands of subgroups and the resulting overlapping or multiple memberships of African states in the regional economic communities (RECs) and other trans-regional organizations or cross-regional groups.

However, our focal point in this study will be on the role of African Economic Community (AEC) towards coordinating other regional economic communities (RECs) in Africa with the hope of achieving ultimately continent-wide single market and possibly a continent-wide economic and monetary union. These major regional economic blocs in Africa constituting RECs include ECOWAS, SADC, COMESA, EAC, ECCAS, CENSAD, IGAD and AMU. This paper therefore concludes one, that overlapping or multiple memberships of regional economic groups has weakened regional economic integration in Africa; and two, that proliferation of regional economic groups and subgroups has undermined or loosened regional economic ties in Africa.

2. Post-neo-functionalism and Crisis of African Integration

All the hitherto existing theories of integration or neo-liberal institutionalism such as functionalism, neo-functionalism, complex interdependence, intergovernmentalism, etc. are Euro-centric, western, parochial, or tailor-made for European integration, and therefore, not apt to explain the defects, failures and drawbacks of African integration. Thus, there is need to deconstruct them in the search for new theory of African integration or in the quest for paradigm shift for African integration.

Post-neo-functionalism or post-neo-nationalism is not a theory of nihilism, that is, it does not advocate the total abolition or condemnation of regional integrationism or regionalism. It only says that Africa is not yet ready for integration particularly in the areas of economy and politics, or put in another way that African states are yet to mature for economic and political integration. Also, post-neo-functionalism does not align itself with Marxism or neo-Marxist dependency theories that advocates delinking. However, post-neo-functionalism may be nearer to protectionism, nationalism or mercantilism than Marxism and neo-Marxism, and still, distinct. Actually, post-neo-functionalism is a synthesis, a combination, a hybrid or a blend of neo-nationalism, post-nationalism and humanism. Therefore, post-neo-functionalism is a composite of neo-nationalism, post-nationalism and humanism. This requires further explanation (Aniche 2015).

For example, neo-nationalism is a new form of nationalism mixed with protectionism. Therefore, neo-nationalism is a composite of political nationalism and economic nationalism. In other words, neo-nationalism is a resurgence or a new wave or a revival of nationalism or nationalist movement that characterized the struggle against colonialism or the fight for decolonization in Africa. But now, neo-nationalism is geared towards the struggle against neo-colonialism, rentierism and dependency as well as to tackle the pervasive protracted, intractable and perennial conflicts in Africa that have rendered it a crisis region or troubled region.

Therefore, there are two main elements of neo-nationalism, namely; modern political nationalism and economic nationalism. Political nationalism is predominantly the political sphere of neo-nationalism, while protectionism or economic nationalism, on the other hand, is the economic aspect. Modern political nationalism is targeted at facilitating national integration or national unity through nation-building or state-building in order to eliminate or at least ameliorate internal conflicts or civil wars in Africa. This entails solving the problems of ethnic chauvinism and religious bigotry, or resolving national question of ethno-religious violence that pose serious or enormous security challenges in Africa.

The point being made is that a country that cannot achieve unity and integration at the national level cannot logically pursue, advocate or promote integration at the regional level because charity begins at home. But African leaders want their own charity to begin abroad. This is a clog in the wheel of African integration. Therefore, neo-nationalism aspect of post-neo-functionalism is advocating or proposing that integration should proceed from or start at the national level (national integration) then gradually and naturally proceed to regional level (regional integration), and probably ultimately moved to global level (global integration or globalisation).

Economic nationalism, on the other hand, advocates for not total closure of the economy but strategic closure of the economy before opening up in future when the African states must have been industrialised or attained the level of competitive advantage with other economies. Strategic closure here means imposing tariff barriers or total ban on certain commodities that will be instrumental for African states to attain industrialization and national development. This entails protecting home industries against adverse competition from abroad. Check the history of today's industrialised countries and you will notice that all of them including Britain, Germany, US, etc., and the newly industrialized countries (NICs) like China, Asian Tigers, etc., have all at one point in time practised protectionism before preaching free trade and liberalism. Therefore, protectionism or economic nationalism should be targeted more on regulating or restricting free trade, that is, importation of commodities, and movement of migrant or expatriate workers than on free movement of capital in terms of foreign direct investment. It is yet to be known a country or a continent which climbed the ladder of industrialization through regional integration.

The point being made is that African states are not yet ready for regional integration for the fact they are being confronted by rentierism, mono-cultural economy, primary producing economy coupled with consumeric appetite for imported or foreign goods, and as well as being decimated by internal armed conflicts like civil wars, ethno-religious violence, sectarian violence and terrorism. Most of European countries that adopted neo-functional approach to regional integration that resulted to European Union (EU) have transcended problems of national unity, de-industrialisation, national insecurity, etc. Almost all the African states are operating at the same level of economy or productive activities, and therefore have nothing to bring to the table. This is the reason why there has been minimal achievement or progress in regional economic integration in Africa. Put simply, African economies as presently constituted have nothing to protect because the present situation reinforces international division of labour or relationships of dependence, rather than relationships of interdependence. As such, those who do not produce have nothing to protect.

Post-nationalism, the next element of post-neo-functionalism, transcends nationalism. Therefore, post-neo-functionalism in this regard advocates regional cooperation in matters of security at the onset which is an

immediate or short-term strategy for tackling the enormous security challenges in various states in Africa at the continental or regional level. The successes of ECOWAS, AU and the recent combined efforts or forces by the four neighbouring countries of Nigeria, Niger, Chad and Cameroun to combat terrorism are all good examples. In other words, it advocates that regional security cooperation should precede regional economic integration, and even regional integration in political sphere. This complements neo-nationalism insistent that Africa is not yet ready or mature for regional economic and political integration and should proceed with national integration until such a time the continent is ready for regional integration or integration at the regional level in the areas of economy and politics.

Humanism is an aspect of post-neo-functionalism which advocates that once the continent is ready for integration in the matters of economy and politics, that such regional integration should not only be allowed to evolve naturally and gradually but should as well be humane, humanistic, man-centred, people-driven or private sector-led in order to facilitate people-to-people integration and bottom-up integration rather than the current state-driven, state-centric, top-bottom integration, public sector-led integration or inter-governmental integration of neo-functionalism. The role of the state or government should only be to regulate or facilitate. In other words, the role of the states in African integration at this level should be facilitative. One of the merits of post-neo-functionalism is that it does not support artificialisation of regional integration rather it suggests that regionalisation should be allowed to evolve naturally and gradually. Post-neo-functionalism does not advocate artificial and rapid creation or fast-tracking of regional integration. The argument is that once African integration evolve naturally and gradually at its own pace as driven by the African people and facilitated by the governments of African states, the incidence of multiple, duplicative and overlapping memberships, and subgroupings would not arise (Aniche 2014).

3. African Economic Community (AEC), Subgroupings and Regional Economic Communities (RECs) in Africa

There are multiple regional blocs in Africa known as Regional Economic Communities (RECs), many of which have overlapping memberships. The RECs consist primarily of trade blocs and, in some cases, political and military cooperation. Most of these RECs form the 'pillars' of AEC and several of these pillars also contain subgroups with tighter customs and/or monetary unions. It is often hoped that due to high proportion of overlap in memberships of these pillars of AEC that it is likely that some states with several memberships will eventually drop out of one or more of RECS. These pillars and their corresponding subgroups are as follows in Table 1.

Other regional blocs like Greater Arab Free Trade Area (GAFTA), Economic Community of the Great Lakes Countries (CEPGL), Indian Ocean Commission (COI), Liptako-Gourma Authority (LGA), Mano River Union (MRU), etc., are not included in the RECs or pillars of AEC, because (i) they do not participate in AEC and (ii) they are mainly trans-regional or cross-regional in that their memberships extend beyond Africa or include other non-African states. For example, GAFTA includes mostly Middle Eastern states (Okeke and Aniche 2012).

At this juncture, there is need to examine the origin and membership of each Regional Economic Communities (RECs). For example, Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CENSAD) was established in February 1998 by six countries, namely, Burkina Faso, Chad, Libya, Mali, Niger and Sudan, but its membership has grown to twenty eight, namely, Central African Republic (1999) Eritrea (1999) Djibouti (2000), Morocco (2001), Nigeria (2001), Somalia (2001), Tunisia (2001), Benin (2002), Togo (2002), Cote d'Ivoire (2004), Guinea-Bissau (2004), Liberia (2004), Ghana (2005), Sierra Leone (2005), Comoros (2007), Guinea (2007), Kenya (2008), Mauritania (2008), Sao Tome and principle (2008).

Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) was formed in December 1994 replacing a Preferential Trade Area, which had existed since 1981. Currently, COMESA has nineteen member states which include Burundi (December 21, 1981); Comoros (December 21, 1981); Democratic Republic of Congo (December 21, 1981); Djibouti (December 21, 1981); Egypt (January 6, 1999); Eritrea (1994); Ethiopia (December 21, 1981); Kenya (December 21, 1981); Libya (June 3, 2005); Madagascar (December 21, 1981); Malawi (December 21, 1981); Mauritius (December 21, 1981); Rwanda (December 21, 1981); Seychelles (2001); Sudan (December 21, 1981); Swaziland (December 21, 1981); Uganda (December 21, 1981); and Zimbabwe (December 21, 1981).

The Treaty establishing the East African Community (EAC) was signed on November 30, 1999 and entered into force on July 7, 2000 following its ratification by the three original partner states, which are Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania. Rwanda and Burundi acceded to the EAC Treaty on June 18, 2007 and became full members of the Community with effect from July 1, 2007. The EAC was originally set up in 1967, however; disagreements between the original-founding members, Uganda, Kenya and Tanzania led to its collapse in 1977 (Okeke and Aniche 2012).

Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) was established in 1985 by ten founding states, namely, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Republic of the Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Rwanda, Sao Tome and principle, while Angola joined in 1999.

Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) is a regional group of fifteen West African states founded on May 28, 1975 with the signing of the treaty of Lagos. In 1976, Cape Verde joined ECOWAS and in December 2000, Mauritania withdrew having announced its intention to do so in December 1999. Currently, the member states of ECOWAS are Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Cote d'Ivoire, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Togo, while Guinea was suspended after 2008 coup *d'etat* (Okeke and Aniche 2012).

The Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) was founded in 1986 by the following founding states; Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia Sudan and Uganda, while Eritrea joined in 1993. Southern African Development Community (SADC) was formed in Lusaka, Zambia on April 1, 1980 as Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) following the adoption of the Lusaka Declaration by the following founding states, Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe while Madagascar and Namibia joined (March 31, 1990). When SADCC was transformed into SADC on August 17, 1992 in Windhoek, Namibia four other states, namely, South Africa (August 30, 1994), Mauritius (August 28, 1995), Democratic Republic of Congo (September 8, 1997) and Seychelles (September 8, 1997) joined, however, Madagascar was suspended after the coup *d'etat*. The Arab Maghreb Union (AMU) was formed in 1989 by five founding states, namely, Algeria, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisia. For a comparison of these regional economic communities (RECs) in Africa see Table 2 below.

4. Subgroupings, Differentiation, Decimation and Fragmentation of Regional Economic Communities in Africa

There is, indeed, high incidence of proliferation of regional economic groups and subgroupings, or even trans-regional or cross-regional and sub-global groupings in Africa. As such some member states in these economic blocs are not geographically contiguous, coupled with absence of historical ties among the members of these economic groups. In order to move closer or sustain closer ties with historically linked countries member states resort to forming several subgroups among themselves which is evident in ECCAS, ECOWAS and SADC (see Table 1). A cursory look at the memberships of some of these subgroups shows that most of them share similar colonial experience in terms of past colonial rulers (as shown in Table 3 below).

The Table 3 shows that in the subgroups, most of the memberships are drawn from states that have the same past colonial ruler, and thus, the same linguistic appellation. For example, in the case of the Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa (CEMAC) a subgroup of ECCAS; it is only Equatorial Guinea that was colonized by Spain others were colonized by France and are Francophone countries. As regard to the memberships of West African Economic and Monetary Union (UEMOA) a subgroup of ECOWAS, with exception of Guinea-Bissau which was colonized by Portugal and a Lusophone country, the less were colonised by France and therefore are Francophone countries. For example, UEMOA's common currency, CFA Franc, is guaranteed by the French treasury (Okeke and Aniche 2012).

Whereas, West African Monetary Zone (WAMZ) another subgroup of ECOWAS draws its memberships from English speaking or Anglophone countries that were colonized by Britain except Guinea that is Francophone country as she was colonized by France. Guinea has historically been recalcitrant towards France. For instance, Ojo (1999) notes that Cote d'Ivoire along with UEMOA members has been resisting phasing the Francophone Community into the larger ECOWAS which has resulted to a deadlock. South African Customs Union (SACU), a subgroup of Southern African Development Community (SADC) draws all its memberships from Britain and South Africa.

In all of these subgroups discussed above colonial legacy engendered from many years of historical ties both in economic and political spheres is responsible for forming these subgroups. Even in the case of European Union (i.e. from ECSC and EEC) age long historical ties was responsible in bringing these continental European countries together before it spread to other parts of Europe. This is what Ejiofor (1981) meant when he points out that most of the regional organisations were sponsored, guided and promoted from outside Africa for purpose of perpetuating the presence of neo-colonialism in Africa, rather than serving as integrating factor in African politics. These regional groups constituted rival and divergent blocs which worked implicitly for destruction of African unity (Okeke and Aniche 2012).

However, one major problem of subgroupings in the African regional economic communities is that it undermines the commitment and allegiance of those African states towards the regional bodies. For example, in the case of ECCAS countries Tables 4 and 5 show that there are more economic ties between CEMAC countries in terms of trade relations than with non-CEMAC countries. For details see Tables 4 and 5 below. Table 4 shows that one CEMAC country Chad and one non-CEMAC country, Dem. Rep. of Congo is among the top five countries Cameroon a CEMAC country exports to; while Equatorial Guinea another CEMAC country is the only ECCAS Country in top five countries Cameroon imports from.

Table 5 indicates that only one CEMAC country, Cameroon is in the top five countries, that Central African Republic (CAR), a CEMAC country exports to, while Cameroon and Republic of Congo are the two CEMAC

countries in top five countries, Central African Republic imports from. In the case of SADC countries, Table 6 shows that there is more economic ties between SACU countries in terms of trade relations than with non-SACU countries (Okeke and Aniche 2012).

Therefore, Table 6 shows that a SACU country occupies the second position with 10.2% out of the top five countries Botswana exports to and first position with 83.5% out of the top five countries, Botswana imports from. In the case of ECOWAS countries, common currency, that is, CFA Franc, which even transcends UEMOA, is a factor bringing them closer to themselves than WAMZ countries. The point being made is that subgroupings in African regional economic communities is undermining or loosening regional economic ties among member state by tightening the economic ties between members of subgroups. In others words, as subgroupings move member states of these subgroups into closer ties, or pull them together, the same subgroupings move their members further apart or away from other members of the same regional economic communities but different subgroups.

In search of stronger economic ties and avenues for market, many of them resort to forming or entering other regional economic groups. The result of this is the proliferation of regional economic blocs in Africa leading to unnecessary duplication, overlapping and multiple memberships. The basis for stronger and successful regional economic integration is weakened or loosened. The implication of the above is that AEC has failed to achieve or complete part of the second stage of strengthening the intra-REC integration or subgroups merging two years after the year (2007) it had proposed to do so (Okeke and Aniche 2012).

5. Proliferation, Overlapping Memberships and Regional Economic Integration or Disintegration in Africa

One major incidence of proliferation of regional groups and subgroupings or even trans-regional or cross-regional groups is overlapping or multiple memberships of African states in various economic groups. For details of this multiple memberships of African states in various regional economic communities in Africa see Table 7 below.

From the Table 7, Kenya is the only African state with membership in the four out of the eight regional economic communities (RECs) in Africa, namely COMESA, EAC, CEN-SAD and IGAD. While, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Eritrea, Djibouti Burundi, Rwanda and Uganda belong to three regional economic communities (RECs) in Africa. Thirty one other African states belong to two regional economic groups in Africa whereas fifteen other AEC countries belong to one regional economic blocs although some of them may still belong to other subgroups or trans-regional or cross-regional groups (Okeke and Aniche 2012).

The imports of the above are lack of commitment, conflicting obligations and allegiance coupled with problem of fulfilling financial and other obligations. For example, how can poor countries like Eritrea, Burundi, Rwanda and Djibouti be able to meet their obligations in these three regional economic communities (RECs), and at the same time been able to shoulder the financial burden resulting from financing their officials to attend and participate in the meetings. This is exactly what Ezeanyika (2006) is pointing at by insisting that proliferation of regional economic groupings in Africa leads to uneconomical use of available scarce financial and human resources.

In other words, there is likely to be poor commitment to some if not all of these regional economic communities (RECs) resulting from multiple memberships of African states in which functions are duplicated and resources wasted. For instance, what is rational behind memberships of many ECOWAS countries in the CEN-SAD when their common aspirations can be better carried out or derived from their membership of ECOWAS where they would rather concentrate their efforts instead of dissipating their collective efforts in the CEN-SAD. Ditto, with many members of COMESA or ECCAS who belong to the same CEN-SAD as well as the case with members of SADC that belong to COMESA (Okeke and Aniche 2012).

For example, despite her memberships of four regional economic groups in Africa, Kenya still maintain a much closer economic ties with members of East African Community (EAC) like Uganda and Tanzania to which she exports most of her products (see, Table 8 below). Ditto with Zimbabwe that belongs to SADC and COMESA, but maintain closer economic ties with SADC countries, mainly (see Table 9 below).

From the Table 9, three SADC countries, namely, South Africa, Mozambique and Botswana make the top five countries Zimbabwe exports to and imports from. While, no COMESA country featured in the top five countries either in the exports or imports of Zimbabwe. One could only imagine what would have been the case if Zimbabwe, Kenya and other African countries had concentrated their collective efforts in one regional economic blocs. Perhaps, in the case of Kenya and Zimbabwe more EAC countries and SADC countries would have featured in the top five countries. Single membership would therefore make the task of harmonising inter-RECs policies easier for African Economic Community (AEC).

Take for example, Rwanda that belongs to three regional economic communities (RECs), namely, COMESA, EAC and ECCAS. Rwanda maintains strong economic ties with Kenya which belongs to COMESA, EAC, ECCAS and IGAD; Democratic Republic of Congo that belongs to SADC, COMESA and ECCAS; Uganda

which belongs to COMESA, EAC and IGAD; and finally, Tanzania that belongs to SADC and EAC. Kenya, Democratic Republic of Congo, Uganda and Tanzania feature in the top five countries, Rwanda either imports from or exports to (see Table 10 for details).

The implication of the above study is that overlapping or multiple memberships of regional economic communities (RECs) in Africa has weakened regional economic integration in Africa. But with announcement of the African Free Trade Area (AFTA) of the tripartite summit of the heads of EAC-SADC-COMESA on October 22, 2008, there is hope that African Economic Community (AEC) will be able to use the opportunity to galvanize other RECs towards achieving the second stage goal of strengthening of intra-REC integration and inter-REC harmonisation. However, it still remains a hope that is yet to materialize and given the fact that this second stage is two years behind the set out target, one would not, but agree with us that it is an indicator that the less of the set out targets may not be achieved by AEC come 2017, 2019, 2023, 2028 and finally 2034 (Okeke and Aniche 2012).

6. Conclusion

We have been able, in the course of this study, to conclude that, one, proliferation of regional economic groups and subgroups has loosened regional economic ties in Africa; and two, that overlapping or multiple memberships of regional economic communities (RECs) has weakened regional economic integration in Africa. The ultimate resultant effect of the above findings is that AEC is confronted with fragmentation, decimation, fractionalisation, differentiation and disintegration rather than regionalisation, cooperation and integration in Africa (Okeke and Aniche 2012).

The point being made is that the ghost of Berlin Conference (1884-1885) that partitioned Africa into specific spheres of influence has continued to haunt Africa many years after colonialism through neo-colonial ties consolidating and reinforcing the fragmentation of African economies into several regional blocs, subgroupings trans-regional or cross-regional groups and sub-global groups. France, particularly, has used various strategies to frustrate any meaningful regional economic integration in West Africa and other sub-regions. This is because the erstwhile colonial masters stand to benefit from this balkanisation in the form of proliferation of regional groups and subgroups (Ake 1981).

We, therefore, insist as we argue elsewhere that so long as African states are producing similar primary products which none of them needs from the other, multiple memberships and proliferation of regional economic organisations rather than tightening economic ties among African states will undermine regional economic integration in Africa (Aniche 2009, Okeke and Aniche 2012).

Even when the subgroupings move or pull their member states into closer economic ties and further away from other non-subgroup members of the same regional economic communities, it is only channelling or linking their collective economies towards vertical economic integration with the industrialised developed countries of the West their erstwhile colonial masters. In the light of this, we presume that base on the facts on the ground, it is very unlikely that AEC would be able to realise its set out targets even with the prospect of Tripartite Free Trade Area (T-AFTA).

7. Recommendations

In seeking for solution to the predicament of African integration, we insist that the solution should not be sought in the existing Euro-centric strategies or theories, but in a new theory propounded by Aniche (2014) - a post-neo-functionalism or a hybrid of neo-nationalism, post-nationalism and humanism - and apt or suitable for African situation and capable of solving its problems. We, also, noted that while classical functionalism and neo-functionalism reify global supra-nationalism and regional supra-nationalism, respectively, as a starting point of integration, post-neo-functionalism or post-neo-nationalism problematises it and rather advocates that regional and global integration should proceed from national integration, thus, reifying nationalism as a step towards achieving regionalism and ultimately global integration or globalism.

For Aniche (2014), post-neo-functionalism follows more or less the following stages: national integration, sub-regional integration, regional integration, trans-regional integration and finally global integration. Post-neo-functionalism is as well humanistic or humane because it advocates people-centred or human-centric or bottom-up integration rather than top-down approach to integration, or state-centric or inter-governmental integration of classical functionalism and neo-functionalism. Therefore, integration should be people-driven or private-sector-led rather than state-driven or public-sector-led. The role of the state should be regulatory or facilitative.

A number of recommendations flows from this as embedded and embodied in post-neo-functionalism: (i) that African leaders should seriously commence with the task of national integration, nation-building and national development beyond rhetoric, and as such, as a strategy of eventually achieving regional integration in Africa (ii) as a corollary to the above, African leaders should desist from divisive politics of divide and rule or balkanisation and disintegrative nationalism; and work towards unleashing and synergising the collective energies of their people towards transforming the abundant and strategic mineral resources in their territories into

manufactured goods necessary for diversifying their economies from the present rentierism needed for transforming their current dependency on the industrialised countries of the West and their neo-colonial influences into relations of interdependency, and (iii) if they must relate with themselves since they enjoy all the fanfare, pomp and pageantries that are associated with it, it will be better to float a regional security organisation that will assist in the addressing the national questions that result to civil wars or strife and resolving wars in Africa (Aniche 2014).

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List of Tables

Table 1: Regional Economic Groups and Subgroups in Africa

S/N	Groups		Subgroups
1.	Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CEN-SAD)		
2.	Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA)		
3.	East African Community (EAC)		
4.	Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS/CEEAC)	a.	Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa (CEMAC)
5.	Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)	a. b.	West African Economic and Monetary Union (UEMOA) West African Monetary Zone (WAMZ)
6.	Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD)		
7.	Southern African Development Community (SADC)	a.	Southern African Custom Union (SACU)
8.	Arab Maghreb Union (AMU/UMA)		

Source: Okeke and Aniche (2012).

Table 2: Comparison of AEC with other Regional Blocs

Pillars regional blocs (REC)	Area (Km ²)	Population	GDP (PPP) In million	(\$US) per capita	Member states
AEC	29,910,442	853,520,010	2,053,706	2,406	53
ECOWAS	5,112,903	251,646,263	342,519	1,361	15
ECCAS	6,667,421	121,245,958	175,928	1,451	11
SADC	9,882,959	233,944,179	737,335	3,152	15
EAC	1,817,945	124,858,568	104,239	1,065	5
COMESA	12,873,957	406,102,471	735,599	1,811	20
IGAD	5,233,604	187,969,775	225,049	1,197	7
Western Sahara ¹	266,000	273,008	?	?	N/A ²
Other African blocs	Area (km ²)	Population	GDP (PPP) In million	(\$ US) per capita	Member states
CEMAC ³	3,020,142	34,970,529	85,136	2,435	6
SACU ³	2,693,418	51,055,878	541,433	10,605	5
UEMOA ³	3,505,375	80,865,222	101,640	1,257	8
UMA ⁴	5,782,140	84,185,073	491,276	5,836	5
GAFTA ⁵	5,876,960	166,259,603	635,450	3,822	5

¹The Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR) is a signatory to the AEC, but not participating in any bloc yet.

²Majority under military occupation by Morocco; some territory administered by the SADR.

³Economic bloc inside a pillar REC.

⁴Proposed for pillar REC, but objecting participation.

⁵Non-African members of GAFTA are excluded from figures.
 Source: Culled from Aniche and Ukaegbu (2014).

Table 3: Member States and Past Colonial Rulers of Regional Economic Communities in Africa

ECCAS Subgroup	Member States	Past Colonial Rulers
CEMAC	Cameroon Central African Republic Chad Republic of the Congo Equatorial Guinea Gabon	France France France France Spain France
ECOWAS Subgroups	Member States	Past Colonial Rulers
UEMOA	Benin Burkina Faso Cote d'Ivoire Guinea-Bissau Mali Niger Senegal Togo	France France France Portugal France France France France
WAMZ	Gambia Ghana Guinea Nigeria Sierra Leone	Britain Britain France Britain Britain
SADC Subgroup	Member States	Past Colonial Rulers
SACU	South Africa ¹ Botswana Lesotho Namibia Swaziland ²	Britain Britain Britain South Africa Britain and South Africa

¹Initially colonized by Netherlands and later by Britain.

²Jointly colonized by Britain and South Africa.

Source: Okeke and Aniche (2012).

Table 4: The Trade Profile of Cameroon

S/N	Exports Main Destination	%	Imports Main Origin	%
1.	European Union (27)	74.3	1. European Union (27)	35.0
2.	United States	6.4	2. Nigeria	23.3
3.	China	3.4	3. China	6.3
4.	Congo, Dem. Rep. Of	2.8	4. Equatorial Guinea	3.5
5.	Chad	0.8	5. United States	2.9
	Unspecified Destinations	2.8	Unspecified Origins	29

Source: Culled from Aniche and Ukaegbu (2014).

Table 5: The Trade Profile of Central African Republic

S/N	Exports Main Destination	%	Imports Main Origin	%
1.	European Union (27)	55.9	1. European Union (27)	20.8
2.	Switzerland	13.7	2. Cameroon	15.7
3.	Cameroon	11.9	3. Congo Dem. Rep. Of	6.1
4.	Israel	5.0	4. Japan	3.9
5.	Hong Kong, China	2.6	5. Congo Rep. Of	3.6
	Unspecified Destinations	5.9	Unspecified Origins	41.0

Source: Culled from Aniche and Ukaegbu (2014).

Table 6: The Trade Profile of Botswana

S/N	Exports Main Destination	%	Imports Main Origin	%
1.	European Union (27)	67.7	1. South Africa	83.5
2.	South Africa	10.2	2. European Union (27)	6.0
3.	Norway	8.1	3. China	1.8
4.	Zimbabwe	7.3	4. Zimbabwe	1.3
5.	China	1.9	5. United States	1.2

Source: Culled from Aniche and Ukaegbu (2014).

Table 7: Overlapping Memberships of African States in Regional Economic Communities (RECs)

SADC	COMESA	EAC	ECCAS	CENSAD	ECOWAS	AMU	IGAD
Zimbabwe	Zimbabwe						
Zambia	Zambia						
Malawi	Malawi						
Angola			Angola				
Swaziland	Swaziland						
Tanzania		Tanzania					
Madagascar	Madagascar						
Mauritius	Mauritius						
Demo. Rep. of Congo	Demo. Rep. of Congo		Demo. Rep. of Congo				
Seychelles	Seychelles						
			Central African Rep.	Central African Rep.			
	Eritrea			Eritrea			Eritrea
	Djibouti			Djibouti			Djibouti
	Burundi	Burundi	Burundi				
	Comoros			Comoros			
	Egypt			Egypt			
	Kenya	Kenya		Kenya			Kenya
	Libya					Libya	
	Rwanda	Rwanda	Rwanda				
	Uganda	Uganda					Uganda
				Gambia	Gambia		
				Senegal	Senegal		
				Morocco		Morocco	
				Nigeria	Nigeria		
				Tunisia		Tunisia	
				Benin Rep.	Benin Rep.		
				Togo	Togo		
				Cote d'Ivoire	Cote d'Ivoire		
				Guinea-Bissau	Guinea-Bissau		
				Liberia	Liberia		
				Ghana	Ghana		
				Sierra Leone	Sierra Leone		
				Guinea	Guinea		
				Mauritania		Mauritania	
			Sao Tome and Principe	Sao Tome and Principe			
	Ethiopia						Ethiopia
Sudan							Sudan
				Somalia			Somalia

Source: Okeke and Aniche (2012).

Table 8: The Trade Profile of Kenya

S/N	Exports Main Destination	%	Imports Main Origin	%
1.	European Union (27)	26.6	1. European Union (27)	20.2
2.	Uganda	12.2	2. United Arab Emirates	14.8
3.	Tanzania	8.1	3. India	9.4
4.	United States	7.0	4. China	7.6
5.	Pakistan	4.9	5. United States	7.4

Source: Culled from Aniche and Ukaegbu (2014).

Table 9: The Trade Profile of Zimbabwe

S/N	Exports Main Destination	%	Imports Main Origin	%
1.	South Africa	37.4	1. South Africa	42.8
2.	European Union (27)	16.5	2. Botswana	11.4
3.	Mozambique	13.0	3. European Union (27)	8.3
4.	Botswana	6.1	4. China	5.7
5.	Switzerland	4.0	5. Mozambique	4.8

Source: Culled from Aniche and Ukaegbu (2014).

Table 10: The Trade Profile of Rwanda

S/N	Exports Main Destination	%	Imports Main Origin	%
1.	European Union (27)	35.6	1 European Union (27)	21.9
2.	Kenya	18.7	2. Kenya	17.8
3.	Hong Kong, China	12.5	3. Uganda	14.0
4.	Switzerland	7.3	4. United Arab Emirates	7.8
5.	Congo, Dem. Rep. of	5.7	5. Tanzania	6.8

Source: Culled from Aniche and Ukaegbu (2014).

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