The Economics of US Policy of Regime Change in the Less Developed Countries: Saudi Arabia and Libya Compared

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Abstract
This paper studies US foreign policy of regime change in the Third World countries using Saudi Arabia and Libya as case illustration. The paper pursued an explanation for US dual mandate in the two countries that are fundamentally Islamic, undemocratic, terrorist sponsors, and autocratic. Guided by the structural theory enunciated by Seligson and Booth (1993) among others, secondary method of data collection and content analysis, the paper observed that US differential access to the two countries’ petro-dollar economies necessitated its dual policy of regime change. It observed also that the Saudi regime is a US surrogate that amenable to US interests while the Libyan regime is ideologically nationalistic and revolutionary. It is therefore recommended that belligerent use of force in the international economic system and competition should be avoided to deter the threat and possible actual use of Weapons of Mass Destruction (MAD) by emerging powers. Secondly, the constitutive acts of the UN and International Laws should form the basis of competition, agreement and relations between and among states in the international system. Finally, World Power must endeavour to abide by the contents of UN Resolutions during their implementation.

Keywords: policy, regime change, Weapons of Mass Destruction, UN

1. Introduction
Prior to World War 1, the United States of America [US] maintained an isolationist foreign policy. The synthesis of the war, which is US emergence as a world power and a global hegemon [Herring, 2008] led to a change in this policy to interventionist policy. Kennan [1976:524-525] argued that this transition was necessitated by economic factor in the following words; “We have about 50 per cent of the world’s wealth, ….We should cease to talk about vague, unreal objectives such as human rights, the raising of living standards, and democratization. The day is not far off when we will have to deal in straight power concepts”. Thus, the contemporary US pro-freedom, human rights and democratisation policies are only international propaganda structured to establish pro-US regimes across the world for her economic and security interests.

For instance, the underlying principle and framework for US policy of regime change in the Middle East was the Greater Middle East Initiative (GMEI) for "democratization", but democracy, autocracy or military regimes did not matter as long as US economic and security interests are guaranteed. Historically, the US has been involved in and/or assisted in the overthrow of regimes that were not authoritarian or military dictatorship, and has preserved autocratic or military regimes also. I argue therefore that US policy of regime change, in all its ramifications, is not pro-freedom, human rights and democratisation in the Third World particularly in the Arab World as it portends to.

US policy of democratisation and political reforms led to either destabilisation or change of regime in the Middle East are analysed and explained from this standpoint. Such upheavals include Tunisia’s crisis of 17 December 2010 that forced the president Ben Ali to flee to Saudi Arabia 14 January, 2011 [ICG, 2011]; Egyptian crisis of 25 January, 2011 that led to President Mubarak resignation on 11 February 2011; the Libyan crisis that led to the killing of President Muammar Qadhafi on 20 October, 2011 [ICG, 2011]; and the crisis in Bahrain on 14 February 2011 among others.

It is pertinent to observe that out of six cases i.e. Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Bahrain, Yemen and Syria, where popular uprisings and counter repression led either to the overthrow of dictators or to serious internal fracturing and contestation; and other suppressed uprisings in Morocco, Saudi Arabia and Jordan, etc, Libya was the only country that the UN Security Council approved NATO direct military intervention from March, 2011 [ICG, 2011:28]. Very pertinent to note also is the fact that most of the perceived dictators that fled their countries alive due to the crises such as Tunisia and Yemen presidents were harbouried by Saudi Arabia, whose president equally applied maximum repression against protesters in his own country [Amnesty International, 2011].

According to scholars, regimes in Saudi Arabia, Libya, Tunisia, Morocco, Yemen, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, and Syria are either radical single party regime or a conservative family rule (Jamal, 2007). Equally, the 2005 research report published by Freedom House as presented below, which assessed the level of freedom in 18 Arab states, reveals that both Libya and Saudi Arabia governments exhibit the same level of authoritarianism and repression against their citizens.
Nevertheless, a harmony of the above conceptualisations reveals that norms, forms, and principles of state
institutions that are legally originated to guide their relations and their relations with the society at large, are
components of a political regime. Thus, Pempel (1992:120) defined a political regime as; “... a particular social
order, a sustained fusion between the institutions of the state and particular segments of the socioeconomic
order... In short, a regime’s character will be determined by the societal coalition on which a state rests, the
formal powers of that state, and by the institutionalization and bias of the public policies that result”. Advancing
this, Booth (1998) defined regime change as changes in both the fundamental rules of politics and the makeup of coalitions associated with them. Other scholars like Bonfatti (2011); Padro-i-Miquel [2007]; Lizzieri and Persico [2004]; Acemoglu and Robinson [2006] perceive regime change as the synthesis of the strategic interaction of domestic political groups structured by the rules of the processes. These scholars were indifferent to the role or influence of foreign players in such interactions and their outcomes.

Regime change refers to the substitution of one type of political regime with another, or substitution of the members of the executive arm of government with another through elections, coup d’état, legal process, revolution, and or the death of the incumbent chief executive [Baird, 2001; Caldeira and Gibson, 1992]. Simply put, regime change refers to constitutional or unconstitutional replacement of the chief executive of a state with another person, and/or a change from one regime type to another, which in effect leads to the substitution of all political appointees with other set of people.

Changes in political regimes are classified into five different forms as follows: Change in the Structures of legitimacy and strategies of legitimization; Elite change; Change in institutional arrangement of power; Co-optation i.e. restricting populism and widening the regime’s power base; and External intervention in domestic processes and rules (Albrecht and Schlumberger, 2004). These changes are necessitated by many factors. Booth (1998) argued that the non-inclusion of new social and economic elites prompts processes that lead to regime change. Even when they are included as the South American political experiences suggest, they normally alter both the character and rules of the regime. The ruling group consider it crucial to share power with broader sets of citizens to avoid total regime change (Lizzieri and Persico, 2004). It is also historical to argue that class struggle due to social exclusion from the structure of distribution inevitably cause changes in regimes (Gurr, 1970; Walton, 1984; Skopol,1979; Olson, 1979; Wickham-Crowley, 1992; Booth, 1996; Gasiorowski, 1995). Thus, struggle for redistribution of resources leads to mobilization and regime change (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2006).

Tyler and Mitchell (1994); Easton (1965b) argue that the inability of regimes to proactively and effectively transform demand in-puts into expected policy outcomes based on socio-economic foundation of the society leads to pressures for and actual change of regimes. Such pressures lead to legitimacy crisis, civil rights movements and activism, demonstrations, coup d’état, assassination of the incumbent, demand for early elections, and revolutions.

The literature pervasively noted that a shifts in the distribution of critical material and organizational resources among political actors; distribution of political and economic resources and the mobilization of actors; the imposition of democracy by external actors are reasons for regime change (see Easterly et Al., 2008; Dube et Al., 2011; Seligson and Booth, 1993; Huntington, 1993; Whitehead, 1991; Carothers, 1991). However, research has shown that internationally propelled regime change is inconsistent with these reasons but was carried out in pursuit of the national economic and security interests of the Super Powers. Bonfatti [2011:10] elaborated this argument in the following words; “Although Western governments often claim that they only support democratically elected governments, their actions have often been motivated primarily by economic and geopolitical considerations. For example, recent empirical evidence suggests that covert CIA interventions were mostly detrimental to democracy during the Cold War”. History proves that superior powers in the international system adopt constructive engagement, détente, isolation, enticement, threats of the use of force, and the actual use of force to overthrow incumbent leaders of sovereign nations. Although ideology, despotism, ‘democracy’, security, and economic expansion are the major reasons for such internationally sponsored regime change (see Hroub, 2011), economic interest is a dominant factor (see Mikail, 2011).

2.2.2 US Foreign Policy of Regime Change: The US has supported and/or sponsored coups against socialist democracies or elections that would have produced socialist leaders in Africa, Asia, South America and Eastern Europe [Weart, 1998: 221–224, 314]. It has also supported and/or sponsored opposition liberal groups in Eastern Europe, Russian, Italy, Chile, and armed Kurdish rebels in Iraq among others. Directly, US marines attacked Columbia in 1903 to engineer a regime change and grant Panama independence from Colombia because Colombian leadership refused to allow US government to establish a military base in Panama - a northern province of Columbia. The US equally sponsored the removal of General Jose Zelaya of Nicaragua in 1909, the assassination of Nicaraguan presidents Sandino in 1934 and Anastasio Somoza in 1956; the overthrow of Daniel Ortega in the 1980s, Jacobo Arbenz of Guatemala in June 1954, Mossadegh of Iran in August 1953, the assassination of Karim Kassem of Iraq in 1959, Ngo Dinh Diem of South Vietnam in 1963, Patrice Lumumba of Congo in 1961, and made a failed attempt to overthrow President Fidel Castro of Cuba. The US forced President Jose Velasco of Ecuador to resign in 1961; invaded and installed Donald Reid Cabral of Dominican Republic in 1965. The United States also sponsored the assassination of General Rene Schneider -Chilean Army Chief - who refused to assassinate President Salvador Allende; and later sponsored the overthrow and assassination of Allende on September 11, 1973; and directly overthrow General Manuel Noriega of Panamanian on October 13, 1983; etc. The last of all, the US sponsored the overthrow and killing of President Sadam Hussien of Iraq and Muaman Gadafi of Libya among others. The Presidents of Syria and Iran are
currently next in the list afflicted with US international antiques of nuclear non-proliferation propaganda (see Bowen, 1983; Little, 1990; Cullather, 2006; Kinzer, 2006; Blum 2003).

2.2.3 Regime change in the Arab world: In the Middle East, the US has used the tools of civil society, Foreign Direct Investment [FDI], economic aid; intensified international pressures; and nuclear non-proliferation policy to pursue regime change (Yom, 2008; Ottaway, et al., 2002). These tools led to what has been popularly called “Arab Spring” that engulfed the nations since 2005. It led to the first nationwide municipal council elections that took place in Palestine in January 2005; elections in Saudi Arabia and Iraq; democratic reforms in Jordan and Kuwait among others, while demonstrations in search of democratic space trailed Lebanon, Egypt, Tunisia, Yemen, Algeria, etc. The various US strategies render the new regimes amenable to US national interests (Bacevich, 2005).

The democratic infidelity behind the US Middle East policy was exposed when some of these upheavals failed to install US puppet regimes in Lebanon, Egypt, Jordan, and Palestine. The Muslim Brotherhood captured majority seats in the Egypt; Hamas captured the Palestinian Legislative Council in January 2006; while the Muslim extremists took over Yemen etc [Yaghi, 2007]. Consequently, the US government and its allies scaled back aid and international pressures on Arab countries to liberalize and democratize because the process ushers in Islamic extremist regimes in the region (Rubin, 2007). Hamzawy and Brown [2007:40] therefore argued against US democratization project in the Arab world thus; “…there was no real policy—only a mentality and a rhetorical commitment that supported democracy and freedom in very general ways.” This paper therefore tries to explicate the major factor[s] that is responsible for US policy of regime change in the Arab world using Libya and Saudi Arabia as case illustrations.

2.3 Theoretical Nexus:

Structural theory as propagated by Seligson and Booth (1993); Huntington (1993); Easterly et al. (2008); and Dube et al. (2011) among others is the framework of analysis for this paper. The fundamental principle of this theory holds that an alteration in the distribution of political and economic resources among political actors lead to mobilization against subsisting regimes, and consequent imposition of democracy by external actors. During the imposition, the key elites expand the political space to include the new actors and thereby replaces authoritarian regime with a democracy.

The theory noted succinctly that the external imposition of democracy in the process of the change is to secure the economic and geopolitical interests of world powers (see Bonfatti, 2011). This suggests that the principles and practice of US imposed democracy are at variance with orthodox democratic principles and practices.

The relevance of this theory to the paper lies in its highlight of the key democratic practices like the existence of multiple actors and multiple interests, prevalence of competition, political mobilization of people within and beyond the national boundaries, and resources. Secondly, the theory’s principle of external intervention to impose a group of conciliated actors as a new regime against the interest of any other groups makes the theory unique and most relevant for this study. It enables the paper to comprehend and explain US regime change policy and actions against constituted regimes of other sovereign nations.

Thirdly, the theory’s explicit declaration that the goal of the external intervention is the consolidation of economic and security interests of the Super Powers established the background that enabled me to explore US interests in Saudi Arabia and Libya. This interest necessitated US dual mandate in the two countries. Finally, the theory enables this paper to invalidate US justification of its operations in Libya and other Arab countries on the basis of human rights violation, autocracy and repression of citizens.

3. Data Collection and Analysis:

3.1 The character of Saudi Arabia and Libya Politics and Economy: The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is the second largest country in the Arab world after Algeria and practices absolute monarchy with Sharia as its legal code and the Quran its legal document. The country has no written modern constitution and has never conducted any national elections since its inception as a state. The King combines legislative, executive, and judicial functions with his decrees serving as the country’s legislation. The royal family controls most of the kingdom’s important and maintains dominant presence at all levels of government with key ministries being an exclusive reserve for the royal family. All Political appointments are not guided by tenure because the members of the royal family occupy them for life (Owen, 2000:56). Consequently, the Saudi royal regimes sternly corrupt (Reed and Brenda, 2006:14) as there is no dividing line between them and state assets. Corruption in the dynasty has been systemic, endemic, and acknowledged (Freedom House, 2005:63).

Democracy Index ranking of 2010 by The Economist reveals that Saudi government is the seventh most authoritarian regime out of 167 countries rated. Although the Saudi government established the National Consultative Council in 1990s, and an annual National Dialogue Forum in 2003, this and its strong tribal identity politics led opposition groups to increasingly mount pressures on the government to reform and modernize since 2005.

Consequently, the first municipal elections were conducted in 2005 and an Allegiance Council was created in
2007 to regulate succession among the royal family that was hitherto divided into factions based on clan loyalties, personal ambitions and ideological differences (Noreng, 2005:97). These reforms did not in any way consider and/or provide the space for non-members of the royal family to contest for any of the exalted political position in Saudi Arabia. They did not introduce national elections nor allowed for political parties formation. Authoritarianism continued to characterize Saudi politics.

The uncodified Islamic Sharia law that lacks the system of judicial precedence found in modern jurisprudence, remained the penal code of the Monarchy. Because the legal code never allowed for equity and fair-play, political verdict dominates the Saudi Arabia legal system [Otto, 2010: pp. 161–162], where the King serves as the Supreme Court. Consequently, high level of human rights violation with crude and severe punishments characterises Saudi criminal justice system. Suspects are arrested and detained without charges; arraigned without given access to a lawyer, and are subject to abusive treatment and torture if they do not confess, while trials are held in secret (Otto, 2010:175; HRW, 2008: 3, 4, 101, 102, 108–115). Western-based organisations like Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch have not only documented these atrocities but also condemned them.

On the contrary, the history and character of Libya’s political economy is more pro-western and modern. Though, one can argue that this is a consequence of the process of its emergence as an independent state. It emerged from the unification of three British, Italian and French held province through UN Resolution 289 of November 1949, administered by the UN until January 1, 1952 when it became a sovereign state. Prior to its independence, the UN established a National Constituent Assembly made up of the various tribal assemblies in October 1951 that produced a federal constitution with a federal system of government. However, unitary monarchy with centralized royal authority replaced the federal system of government in 1963.

RCC inherited the above political framework even after the 1969 revolution. That is, Col. Muammar al Qadhafi practiced unitary democracy wherein the political system is decentralized to allow for people’s participation at all levels of government. While Qadhafi and his closest supporters controlled the implementation structure and mechanisms of the national government, and exercised final authority over domestic and foreign policies issues. The principles of his socio-political philosophy include “the authority of the people” and the principle of transparent institutional processes. Blanchard [2009:65] captured Qadhafi’s unitary democracy thus: “At the local level, citizens meet in Basic People’s Congresses to appoint representatives to regional and ultimately the national General People’s Congress. Participation in the basic congresses is open to all Libyan citizens, although participation rates are notoriously low and Qadhafi regularly makes public statements expressing his disappointment with participation levels and urging broader popular involvement in public affairs”.

This mass oriented decentralization of powers, authority and functions was blended with an economic policy of pan-Arabism, Islamic, and socialist values. In summary, the redistribution of land and wealth, the allocation of fluctuating oil revenues, and a near total decentralization of political institutions were Libya’s structure of administration and socio-economic development. The regime had effective control and cooperation of Libyan citizens because of this political approach. However, repressive policies were pursued against opposition leaders and groups. They are tried in special “people’s courts” and “revolutionary committees”. This led to Libya’s poor human rights record that is characterised by; “...... disappearances; torture; arbitrary arrest; lengthy pre-trial and sometimes incommunicado detention; official impunity; and poor prison conditions. Denial of fair public trial by an independent judiciary, political prisoners and detainees, and the lack of judicial recourse for alleged human rights violations were also problems” [US State Department, 2010:4]. Nevertheless, Human Rights Watch report in December 2009 noted that Libya’s human rights record improved within the past five years preceding the report.

3.2 US Relations with Saudi Arabia and Libya: The fundamental factors that structure US relations with these two countries are oil and security interests. Saudi’s economy is monolithically petro-dollar with an oil reserve that is 2nd and natural gas reserves that is 6th to the largest in the world. Oil accounts for more than 95% of Saudi exports and 70% of government revenue [Wynbrandt, 2004:241-242]. The strength of this economy lays with US technical and financial aid. The Arabian American Oil Company – Aramco – a consortium of four US oil companies led by Standard Oil of California (SOCAL) was the first group to discover, drill, and market crude oil in Saudi Arabia in 1938. Resultantly, Saudi Arabia became US sphere of interest. Aramco possess an exclusive exploration and production concession leading to the subsidization of all production costs by the US Treasury (Prados, 2003:23-29). It equally led to full-scale development of Saudi oil fields and the integration of five other US oil companies i.e. Exxon Mobil Corporation, Conoco, Phillips Petroleum Company, Occidental Petroleum Corporation, and Marathon into the Saudi oil economy.

Ever since then, the relationship between Saudi Arabia and the US has been structured by oil and military/weapons (see Safran, 1985: 58-69). This relationship is faced with mutual threats. US control of Saudi Arabia is threatened by its democratic project as it tend to install radical Islamic extremists that are anti-US interest (Bush, 2003; Bronson, 2006:74), while the Saudi Monarch is afraid of loosing the security guarantees it enjoys from the US. This forms the basic ties that have kept US – Saudi relations in fact (Turki al-Faisal, 2003).
Any threat to this relationship encounters extreme force from the US. For instance, when the Aramco consortium was nationalised in 1975, King Faisal of Saudi Arabia was assassinated and a puppet king was installed. Ever since then, Saudi Arabia unflinchingly supports US wars, military and economic diplomacy in the Middle East. The Emirate supported Sadam Hussein with military technology during Iran-Iraq war, but joined the anti-Iraq Coalition in accomplishment of US interest during Allied war. Both the US and Saudi governments worked closely to perpetuate US interests internationally and in the Middle East.

Libya’s experience is different. The first factor that structured US-Libya relations was that the US used Libya’s air base as an important Strategic Air Command base and centre for military intelligence operations. The 1969 Libya revolution led by the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) abolished the monarchy – a regime that was aligned with the US interests, and secured full British and U.S. withdrawal from Libya’s military bases on March 28 and June 11, 1970, respectively. All Italian expatriates were expelled and their assets confiscated on October 7, 1970 (Blanchard and Zanotti, 2011:5-6). In addition, the US and other foreign oil companies were pressurised to renegotiate oil production contracts wherein a larger share of production revenues were ceded to the Libyan government. Consequently, most of the British and U.S. oil companies were nationalized (Blanchard and Zanotti, 2011:7).

In addition, Libya changed its structure of foreign alliance and ideological leaning from pro-western capitalism to pro-Soviet socialism in the early part of 1970s. This led to the establishment of relations with the Soviet Union – a long and permanent US rivalry in the international system; and links and supports for revolutionary groups, anti-Western groups, and anti-Israeli movements across Africa, Europe, Asia, and the Middle East (Farah, 2004:23-25; Richards, 2005). Therefore, the US enlisted Libya as an axis of evil, sponsor of terrorism and subversive violence. Consequently, the US and its allies set up intelligence network around the activities of Libya. The US backed this up with sustained propaganda, training/ empowerment or support of dissident groups inside Libya, sponsoring of international resolutions, sanctions and military pressure against Libya.

These sanctions led to Libya’s loss of oil revenue, restrictions on the travel of senior Libyan officials, an international air travel ban, and arms embargo against Libya’s government. Consequently, Qadhafi agreed in 1999 to pay compensation for the victims of UTA Flight 772 bombing, and allowed two Libyan intelligence agents to stand trial for the bombing of Pan Am Flight 103. In addition, Libya offered counterterrorism and intelligence cooperation after September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks against US; agreed to dismantle Libya’s weapons of mass destruction and long range missile development programs in 2003; and withdraw government support for violent political movements around the world. The above Libya decisions generated a new regime of cordial network of relations between with the US, the international community and Libya. Equally, a new regime of business relations began as some US oil companies and other business firms re-entered Libya’s economy. Libya was elected as a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council in October 2007 and the President of the Council in January 2008. In February 2009, Qadhafi became the chairman of African Union (AU) while United States restored full diplomatic relations with Libya in 2006.

3.3 Analysis of US Regime Change Policy in Saudi Arabia and Libya: The US maintained a sustained policy of regime support for the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in spite of its autocratic/ undemocratic, and bad human rights records. Principally, this was to ensure security and stability in the production and supply of oil for US industrial and economic development. Equally, the stable oil supply neutralises the threat posed by the fact that other major international oil producers like Iran, Iraq, and Libya etc are either US arch-enemies or in serious conflict. The sustained policy of regime support was necessitated also by the fear of loosing the Emirate to Islamic radicals through democratisation - a trend that renders the region highly dangerous for US security and economic interests.

However, this hegemonic economic and security interests increasingly came into conflict with the US national security priorities, particularly after it was observed that fifteen out of the nineteen terrorists that perpetuated the September 11, 2001 attack against the US were Saudi citizens (Kitchen, n.d: 3). Thus, unlike many other Arab states like Afghanistan, Iraq, Iran, Libya, Syria, Lebanon etc whose citizens are willing and available instruments in the hands of the US to topple or destabilise their government, the Saudi citizens were perfectly mobilized against US interests, programmes and propaganda. Scholars attribute this to US long military and financial support for the autocratic and repressive Saudi regime. This may explain why virtually all suspected terrorists that were arrested or killed by the US are citizens of Saudi Arabia.

However, the Saudi government is amenable to US interests principally because its security lies in US partnership, and this led to US indifference in changing the Kingdom’s regime. Instead of forceful external imposition of a new leader or sponsorship of internal insurrection, the US adopted a subtle, pragmatic, and very slow institutional and procedural reforms approach.

On the contrary, US employed bilateral, multilateral, and internal sponsorship of dissident approach to effect regime change in Libya. From its inception through the September 1, 1969 revolution, the RCC regime reversed all standing agreements and contracts that existed between the US and Libya Monarchy, pledged support for the
Palestinians, and became sponsor of anti-colonial resistance across the world. Nevertheless, a reversal of these policies led to Libya’s new network of cordial relations with the US from the early 2000. However, Eljahmi (2006:12) noted that in spite of Mu'ammar al-Qadhafi’s change of policy, he remained resistant to structures and Western exploration and exploitation of Libya’s oil reserves or industry. Qadhafi refused to join any of the US/NATO imperial structures in the Mediterranean Sea Basin and the Middle East such as the NATO naval patrols and exercises in the Mediterranean Sea, membership of NATO’s Mediterranean Dialogue military partnership (Rozoff, 2011), the US - Africa Command (AFRICOM) that was designed to control valuable resources in Africa, safeguard trade and investment markets in the region, and contain or evict China from North Africa (Henningsten, 2011).

In 2006, Qadhafi re-nationalized the Libyan oil industry (Faucon, 2012). He contended that “Oil companies are controlled by foreigners who have made millions from them. Now, Libyans must take their place to profit from this money” (Qadhafi, 2006). Prior to 2006, foreign oil companies appropriate 50% of the high-quality oil produced in Libyan fields but after Qadhafi’s 2006 declaration, it was reduced to as low as 12%. Consequently, an Italian energy giant Eni SpA had to pay a $1 billion signing bonus in 2007 to be able to extend the life of its Libyan interests until 2042. The re-nationalization exercise made it compulsory for foreign Oil companies to hire Libyans for top jobs (Muñson, 2011; Chazan, 2011) while the oil companies were forced to give their local subsidiaries Libyan names.

These policies were criticized by US in November 2007. The US State Department cable noted; “Colonel Gaddafi, proved to be a problematic partner for international oil companies, frequently raising fees and taxes and making other demands” [Muñson, 2011:4]. Equally, Gaddafi was seen as an obstacle to the Western economic strategies of unhindered trade and development projects on a global level through his promotion of trade, development and industrialization projects on a local, national, regional or African level as AU chairman. He spearheaded the idea of launching a pan-African system of technologically advanced network of telecommunication which began in the early 1990s and led to the establishment of Regional African Satellite Communication Organization (RASCOM) – Africa’s first satellite in the continent. This eliminated a $500 million annual lease being paid to Europe for its satellite services by Africa [Pougal, 2011]. Consequently, the US stepped up sponsorship of insurgency and espionage activities across the Libya boarders thereby causing internal catastrophe/conflict. Complementing this and guided by humanitarian, democracy and human rights propaganda, the US secured UN mandate to enforce a no fly zone against Libya regime, and lead member states of NATO to invade, and subsequently killed Mu'ammar al-Qadhafi.

4. Conclusion

In international politics, world powers have spear headed changes in the regime configuration and administration of sovereign states through such alternatives like foreign aid or assistance, ‘democratization’, and military invasion. Of all, the US has regime change as a major foreign policy. Through this policy any government or regime - whether dictatorial and democratic - that threatens its hard earned global hegemony and national interest is removed or replaced.

In the Middle East/Arab world, the US sponsored the Greater Middle East and Arab Spring projects after September 11 terrorist attacks against the US that resulted in mass uprising that led to change of regimes, modernization and/or reforms. The US sponsored multilateral military invasion against Libyan regime while it adopted reforms as a response to Saudi uprising. This dual mandate raises the question of why Libya that is more democratic was invaded and Saudi Arabia was supported. Two fundamental reasons account for this. US relations with Saudi Arabia have been peaceful and subordinate with Saudi’s economy under the control of the US, while relations with Libya has suffered graduated conflicts due to Libya’s persistence on the sovereign management of its oil economy since the 1969 revolution. Secondly, the Saudi regime is a surrogate that amenable to US interests while the Libyan regime has been ideologically nationalistic and revolutionary thereby posing serious threat to US interests in the region as a whole. Therefore, this paper innocuously concludes that US access to the countries petro-dollar economies necessitated its dual policy of regime change in Libya and Saudi Arabia.

Regime change should be a function of systemic needs, people’s aspiration and movement and not that of imposed foreign interests. Secondly, belligerent use of force in the international economic system and competition is inconsistent with the neo-liberal order established by capitalism. Its absence will deter the threat and possible actual use of Weapons of Mass Destruction (MAD) by emerging powers. Thirdly, the constitutive acts of the UN and International Law should form the basis of competition, agreement and relations between and among states in the international system. Finally, World Power must endeavour to abide by the contents of UN Resolutions during implementation. This will avert international anarchy and a possible Third World War.

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