Rethinking Pan-Africanism and Nationalism in Africa: The Dilemma of Nation-Building in Nigeria

Fred Ekpe F. Ayokhai      Peter Wilfred Naankiel
Department of History, Federal University Lafia, Lafia, Nigeria

Abstract
After over fifty years of independence, many African states are steeped in the crisis of nation-building. Many have either witnessed sectarian violent conflict or are currently going through one. This has impacted negatively on socio-economic development across the continent. With many African states either failing or at the verge of failing, the future of nation-building in Africa appears not only bleak but also gravitating towards a justification of the thesis of colonisation that Africans are incapable of developing state systems without the intervention of the outsider – the West. Some scholars have blamed territorial nationalism for the nation-building deficit in Africa. Nigeria, the most populous nation of blacks in the world, is a typical illustration of a state currently steeped in the crisis of nation-building in Africa. This study interrogates her nation-building experience with a view to locating the roots of the problem and suggesting possible ways of fixing it. It finds that at the heart of the crisis of nation-building is the absence of an enabling political ideology. The study argues that the ideologies of nationalism and Pan-Africanism are not necessarily antithetical but mutually reinforcing. Consequently, the failure of nation-building in Africa as illustrated by the existential reality of Nigeria is the failure to realize the complementarities of nationalism and Pan-Africanism as ideologies of nation-building. It is recommended therefore that Nigeria and other African states should adopt Pan-Africanism as their political ideology as a way out of the crisis of nation-building in the twenty-first century.

Keywords: Pan-Africanism, nationalism, ideology, nation-building, Nigeria, Africa

1. Introduction
From the second half of the 1950s, African states and peoples began the transition to self-rule. Independence was the reward for the nationalist struggles that started on the continent in the post-World War II era. By the 1960s and 1970s, most African states had gained self-rule and independence from their erstwhile colonial overlords. The 1960s in particular was an era of great optimism and grandiose hope for the African continent. The virulent spirit of Pan-Africanism and nationalism had not only combined to enthrone successes for Africa and her peoples in the struggles against racist, apartheid and colonial regimes in the continent, but had also raised the hopes and aspirations of a better and more dignified life in an independent and free continent. It did not take long, however, for the bitter realities of a post-independence Africa to begin to dawn on her peoples and for despair and despondency to begin to replace the earlier grandiloquent dreams of life of freedom, abundance, peace and unity on the continent.

From the 1960s, life in most post-independence African societies had begun to manifest wide gaps between the quality of life of the rulers and the ruled. Wide gaps had also emerged between expectations of life and the realities of life in the post-colonial state. The allure of democratic governance had started to give way to the brutality of military dictatorship. The social cohesion that enabled and energised the anti-colonial struggles was being replaced by social discontent and upheavals. In the case of Nigeria, the Nande-nande and the Atetmyo in the first half of the 1960s among the Tiv, followed by the political crisis in Western Nigeria (operation wetie), the 15th January, 1966 military coup and the counter coup of July, 1966 and its attendant pogroms (the Araba riots) paved the way for the civil war that came to an end thirty months after in 1970. Within the first decade of political independence, therefore, Nigeria had witnessed a total conflagration in which ethnicity, religion and region determined what side of the divide Nigerians found themselves in the ensuing crisis and conflict that engulfed the nation-building process.

The existential realities and historical trajectories of Nigeria, through the 1970s to the second decade of the twenty-first century, have been one of predictable and escalating social degeneration, political misadventures, economic stagnation and individual trauma. The case of Nigeria is particularly pathetic, giving her enormous human and natural resource potentials, which did not only place her in the leadership saddle of Africa, but also among the emerging powers of the world, alongside the Asian Tigers in the 1960s. The failure of Nigeria to live up to the aspirations of the continent and the hopes of the world for her is one that has disappointed the expectations of not only Nigerians but the entire African peoples. Nigeria did not only fail to build a successful economy but also a sustainable nation-state in spite of her great opportunities. The Nigerian story is typical of most of the post-colonial African states. This study therefore attempts a diagnosis of the dilemma of nation-building in Nigeria by seeking to provide answers to the following questions: I. Why has Nigeria failed woefully at her nation-building efforts? II. Is Pan-Africanism antithetical to nationalism? III. What is the way out of the dilemma of nation-building in Nigeria? IV. Does the Nigerian experience provide useful lessons for the fixing of
the nation-building deficit of Africa in the twenty-first century? The remaining sections of this study are devoted
to answering these questions, but not without an attempt to locate the problem within an appropriate theoretical
framework.

2. Theoretical Framework
It is important to set out this discourse of Pan-Africanism and nationalism on an appropriate theoretical footing,
without which the historical analysis of the existential realities of the trajectories of nation-building in Nigeria
would end up another futile intellectual endeavour as many before it. It is on this premise that this study keys
into the theoretical current provided by Shivji (2011) that Africa’s tale of treasures at one end and tragedies at
the other cannot be understood without locating it in the trajectories of the development of global capitalist
accumulation. To facilitate his presentation, he resorts to some periodization of the process of accumulation, but
not without noting that ‘…all periodisation has its hazards – processes overlap and intermingle; the new is born
in the garbs of the old and takes time before it is recognized as such, while the old persists beyond its usefulness’.
Keeping that in mind, he categorizes the first four centuries (roughly from the last quarter of the 15th century to
the first quarter of the 19th century) of the African encounter with Europe as the period of primitive
accumulation, or accumulation by appropriation. He further observes that within this period, there are two sub-
periods – the period of looting of treasures, sometimes directly, sometimes indirectly, under the name of trade,
based on unequal, rather than mutual exchange. This is the period of European powers pursuing their singular
mission of destroying the pre-European long distance trade – the trans-Sahara trade on the West Coast and the
Indian Ocean trade on the East Coast of Africa – in order to establish their mercantile and maritime hegemony.

As the Portuguese privateers were devastating the African coast in the last quarter of the 15th century,
so were Spanish conquerors discovering the ‘New World’. Vasco da Gama laid the foundation of the European
invasion of Africa. Christopher Columbus inaugurated the extermination of the indigenous populations of the
Americas and the Caribbean–the first genocide and holocaust in the history of humankind. One led to White
hegemony, the other to white settlement. From then on, the fate of the three continents was inextricably linked
and found its immediate expression in the triangular slave trade. The second sub-period of some three centuries
(from 16th to 19th centuries) witnessed the gruesome Atlantic slave trade, the so-called triangular trade. Half of
the slaves were transported to the ‘New World’ in the 18th century. Millions – 50 million, one estimate says
(Zinn 2001:29) – of men, women and children torn from their continent worked the sugar plantations of the
Caribbean and cotton plantations of the southern states of America to provide the raw material for Lancashire
mills, the pioneer of the industrial revolution. The African continent was looted of its treasures in the first sub-
period, which also ruined its established mercantile routes; in the second sub-period, the continent was looted of
its people, devastating its social fabric and robbing it of its most important resource. This was accumulation by
appropriation par excellence – accumulating by appropriating wealth in the first instance and accumulating by
appropriating people in the second (Shivji, 2011).

Meanwhile, on the European stage, ‘capitalism is bursting its containers’ (Jha 2006:17) and re-
constructing them. Jha argues that in its 700 years of development, capitalism has gone through three cycles of
accumulation. At the beginning of each cycle, it has expanded the size of its container – from the maritime city-
states of Venice, Genoa, Florence, Milan, and Amsterdam, to nation states of England, Holland, and France. The
quintessential of the second cycle was from the nation state to the colonizing state (Jha, 2006:2), as European
powers colonized much of the rest of the world. The third was from the Island territory of the small nation state,
Britain, to the continental nation state of North America. Now, in the era of globalization, on the eve of the
fourth cycle, it is poised to burst the very system of hierarchically organized nation states. Shivji further argues
that whatever the merit of this thesis, two points can be made. One, that the capitalist container was never self-
contained. Arteries penetrating deep into the wealth and treasures of other continents fed the process of capital
accumulation in the heart of Europe and that Africa was the theatre of the most devastating kinds of
appropriation. Second, the ideologies, religions, cultures and customs constructed to rationalize, legitimize and
explain the processes of accumulation were centrally premised on the construction of race, in which ‘the Self’
was White and ‘the Other’ Black, the two also being the referents for the in-between. Geography was
constructed as such – Europe being the land of the White and Africa being the land of the Black. The racist
construct found its typical expression in the Other, Slave – a soulless, depersonalized and dehumanized object.
For planters and slavers, the Negroes are unjust, cruel, barbarous, half-human, treacherous, deceitful, thieves,
drunkards, proud, lazy, unclean, shameless, jealous to fury, and cowards (James 1938, 1989). The Supreme
Court of the civilized United States decided in 1857 that ‘Dred Scott could not sue for his freedom because he
was not a person, but property’ (Zinn op.cit. 187). Fathers, bishops, learned priests and men of conscience found
no fault in trading in and owning of slaves. ‘…we... buy these slaves for our service without a scruple...’
declared men of religion with conscience (ibid. 29-30). The bottom line was the enormous profits made from the
slave trade and colossal surplus extracted from slave labour. James Madison, one of the ’fathers' of the American
constitution, could boast to a British visitor that he could make 2,000 per cent profit from a single slave in a year
Towards the end of the 18th and the first half of the 19th centuries, capitalism entered the throes of the industrial revolution. With the Berlin conference of 1885, rapacious capitalist powers carved up the African continent and appropriated them as their exclusive possessions thus heralding another 75 or so years of colonialism (Shivji op. cit). The racist ideology of the White Self (master) and the Black Other (slave) came in handy in the creation of colonies. It was reinforced in religion, anthropology and literature as droves of missionaries preceded and anthropologists followed armed soldiers, to pacify the soulless, indolent ‘native’. The Self was now the White colonist and the Other was the ‘native’. The ‘colour line’ thus constructed had its own internal logic and drive – it determined the very life-conditions of the colonist/settler and the ‘native’. The settler’s town, as Fanon (1963, 1967) said, is a ‘strongly-built’, ‘brightly-lit’ ‘well-fed’ town. It is a town of ‘White people, the foreigners’. The native town is ‘a place of ill fame, peopled by men of evil repute’.

Institutions of indirect political rule and colonially constructed regimes of customary law were created. Colonial identities of race and tribe were formed, and to the extent that they were internalized, with self-identification and perception following suit. Colonial capital, by its very nature, introduced commodity relations thus planting the seeds of accumulation by capitalization. The post-independence development theorists of the West considered these pockets of capitalist relations the driver of modernization, but a few and minority scholars of the ‘Rest’ countered with the theory of underdevelopment, pointing out the relationship between two tendencies of capitalist accumulation and its contradictions. The modern was neither modern, they argued, nor the traditional backward. Rather, both were part of the capitalist whole in a symbiotic relation which ensured the drainage of wealth and surplus from the African continent to be capitalized in the West. In short then, accumulation by appropriation dominated colonial capitalism under the hegemony of imperialism. If it produced indigenous capitalists, they were compradorial or semi-feudal in alliance with, and under the shadow of, imperial bourgeoisie (Shivji op. cit). The historical processes of the development of capital in the West and underdevelopment in Africa did not exclude Nigeria; rather Nigeria was fully integrated into all its phases.

As Mao reasoned, we don’t have to be told that wherever there is oppression there is bound to be resistance. Similarly James (op. cit. 18) says, ‘one does not need education or encouragement to cherish a dream of freedom’. As happens so often in history, ideologies of resistance are constructed from the elements borrowed from the ideologies of domination (Shivji op. cit). Pan-Africanism and nationalism were the consequences of the ideologies of domination expressed in slavery and colonialism in Africa, including Nigeria. The next section of this paper discusses the manifestations of these ideologies as reactions to the ideologies of domination in Nigeria as part of the processes of capitalist accumulation.

3. Pan-Africanism and Nationalism in Africa

The basis of Pan-Africanism and nationalism lies in the existential historical realities of Africa, her societies and her peoples in the epochs of slavery, colonization and globalization. Pan-Africanism was the major concerted ideological and social movement by Africans and Africanists without and within Africa to resist the exploitation and underdevelopment of Africa and Africans in the historical processes of accumulation by appropriation and accumulation by capitalisation that characterized global social relations of production between the metropoles and the satellites discussed in the preceding section. To this end, Alli (2005:431) notes that:

Pan-Africanism is a movement initiated by people of African descent from the US and the Caribbean as a reaction to slavery, its aftermath and the condition of Africans in the world. In its most eloquent form, Pan-Africanism became an instrument of the African people to challenge colonial domination and oppression and to pave the way for the emancipation and development of the African people and countries.

In addition, Campbell (2000) observes that Pan-Africanism is the “solidarity between peoples who are oppressed developed over the last century in relation to the struggles for dignity in all parts of the African world…” Also, the conception of Pan-Africanism as liberation thought and action has gone through definite stages from the demand for self determination, the demand for economic freedom, political independence, regional economic integration to include the demand for democratization, the end to genocide, reparations, the emancipation of women, the humanization of the male, and the humanization of the planet (Campbell: 2000).

Similarly, Alli (2005) opines that Pan-Africanism was essentially socialist, anti-colonial, anti-neocolonial and therefore anti-imperialist in content. He stresses further that despite attempts to water down this aspect of the philosophy because of the ideological preferences of the leadership of independent African states, to be Pan-Africanist implies an acceptance of its egalitarian, socialist and anti-imperialist essence and orientation. This could not have been any less so since the experience of the Atlantic slave trade which has a profound effect on humanity, particularly Africans, took place in the same period as the scientific and technological revolution “that accelerated the transformation from feudalism to capitalism” and “Africans from the continent were dispersed as the global reach of capital opened new spaces for capital accumulation” (Campbell: 2000). This
position is reinforced by Asobie (2005: 445 & 450) when he asserts that Pan-Africanism which emerged as an ideological response to mercantilist slavery and capitalist colonialism is, according to the principles enunciated to guide the total emancipation of Africans by the Manchester Congress, anti-colonial, anti-imperialism, and provided for economic democracy as the true basis of democracy and non-violence.

Also, as outlined by Ali (2005), Pan-Africanism has gone through the following phases:

- The colonial phase, from 1900 to 1957 when Ghana won her independence;
- The independence phase, from 1957 to 1963, when majority of African states won their independence up to the formation of the OAU;
- The national liberation phase, from 1963 up to the independence of Zimbabwe in 1980;
- The anti-Apartheid and Economic Development Phase, from 1980 when all focus of Pan-African national liberation struggles were directed at removing the apartheid regime and the election of Nelson Mandela as President of the Republic of South Africa in 1994. The period also covers the period of economic re-awakening and refocusing of attention on economic issues, the introduction of the Lagos Plan of Action (LPA) in 1980 and the African Economic Community (AEC) in 1991; and lastly
- The globalization phase, from 1994 to date, including the transformation of the OAU in 2000 to the African Union (AU), the introduction of the NEPAD initiative and other efforts to overcome economic decline and to achieve more rapid economic development in Africa, institutionalized more participatory and more democratic governance and resolve the remaining national questions.

The early leaders of the Pan-Africanist movements, among them Henry Sylvester Williams, George Padmore, William Du Bois, C.L.R James, started the campaign in Europe, the base of the colonial powers in Africa, where there was a concentration of African students. Thus the first Pan-African Conference was held in London in 1900. Subsequent Pan-African Congresses were held in Paris in 1919; in London in 1921 and 1923; in New York in 1927; and in Manchester in 1945 (Legum: 1962). The consolidation of Pan-African solidarity was evident from the period of the mass movement of Garvey down to the international campaign against apartheid. The underlying theme of the early movements was that “the people of one part of Africa were responsible for the freedom and liberation of their brothers and sisters in other parts of Africa and indeed the task of black people everywhere was to accept this responsibility,” (Qtd. in Campbell: 2000). If we limit the content of Pan-Africanism to anti-colonial, anti-neocolonial, anti-racist and anti-apartheid liberation struggles, the temptation is to conclude that these vestiges have been successfully combated in Africa. However, a more realistic appraisal of the history of the continent would reveal that this could only hold sway for some of the states, but not most of the peoples who inhabit them. The people still bear these yokes in the garb of globalization.

Nationalism was another political ideology and social action that marked Africans’ reactions and struggles against the processes of accumulation by appropriation and accumulation by capitalisation manifested under the Trans-Atlantic slavery, colonisation and globalisation. However, rather than mark a distinct ideology and social action, nationalism was a reductionist strand of Pan-Africanist thought and action which came to prominence, supplemented, and in most instances, substituted the former during the decolonization, anti-racist and anti-apartheid struggles in the different African states. Driving home this point, Egbomuche-Okeke (2006: 93) remarks that nationalism:

…embrace the multiplicity of national and continental struggles, by Africans for the total liberation or emancipation of Africans and African countries from the shackles of colonial or alien rule. It is a struggle against foreign domination internally, for national or domestic self-rule and self-determination.

In this sense, nationalism in Africa is a derivative of Pan-Africanism. Egbomuche-Okeke (2006: 93) further elucidates this point when he notes that nationalism is often “applied conterminously with the doctrines of Black Nationalism and Pan-Africanism…. these concepts exist in a continuum or inseparable matrix and extremely difficult to demarcate in practice.” The different succeeding strands of nationalism have been identified to include cultural nationalism, plaintive nationalism and radical nationalism (Mutiso & Rohio, 1975: xi – xii). Radical Nationalism began in the post-World War II era when African peoples in the European colonies in Africa demanded and struggled for independence from their colonizers, fought against racist and apartheid regimes and attempted to build nation-states out of the territorial heritages won from their erstwhile European colonizers.

The discourse on nationalism in Africa, more often than not, ignores the existential reality of its origin both as a thought and a social action. This is why the nature of the territorial nationalism that came to preponderate in the continent is scarcely given its pride of place in the nationalism discourse. This is also the reason its impact could not be felt beyond the “Africanization” of the states and the “indigenization” of the economies which characterized the post-independence African states. This accounts also for the divergent
perceptions of the process by the masses of the continent on the one hand and their leaders on the other. This divergence of perception is captured by Campbell (2000) as he observes that:

Independence and decolonization for the producers meant a transformation of the colonial state but for the assimilated and educated, it meant inheriting the mantle of coercion and administration. This in practice meant Africanization of the State and indigenization of the economy. There was no major effort to counteract the legacies of force, coercion and the devaluation of African labor power and African lives. Not only had the emergent political elite internalized the ideas of modernization but the ideas of ethnic legitimacy and tribal rivalry had become so pervasive that African leaders have developed a high tolerance for leaders who rule on the basis of fear and the promotion of genocidal violence.

The leaders’ perceptions of the process also accounts for the divergent strategies they employed. It was not also difficult for Pan-Africanists to transform into nationalists. The explanation is that though the entire African continent suffered colonization (excluding Ethiopia and Liberia) and therefore defines the territoriality of Pan-Africanism, Africa was nonetheless carved into different colonial territories by the different colonial masters. These colonial territories in turn provided the spatial platforms for the different nationalist leaders to articulate their thoughts, negotiate and struggle for independence. Though Pan-Africanism provided the ideological basis, it was the colonial experiences and territorialities of the different African societies that provided the frameworks for the leaderships of the decolonization struggles. Therefore, while Pan-Africanism is a ‘transfusionist’ ideology, nationalism is a ‘transfissionist’ ideology. That is to say, while Pan-Africanism sought to construct one mega federal state over the colonial territories in the African spatial world, nationalism sought to deconstruct the African peoples in one territory into several post-colonial territories along the colonially constructed borders. Nationalism thus became the dominant strand of Pan-Africanist thought and the mantra became “Seek Ye the Political Kingdom and all will be added to thee” (Nkrumah quoted in Campbell: 2000). At this point, just like its underlying philosophy of Pan-Africanism, nationalism became preoccupied with decolonization, anti-racist, anti-neocolonial and anti-apartheid struggles. In other words, just like Pan-Africanism, nationalism failed to conceptualize liberation and independence within the framework of the existential realities of nation-building in post-colonial African nation-states. Noting this trend, Asobie (2005: 443) remarks that:

From the Pan-Africanist perspective, the fundamental challenge confronting contemporary Africa, is not the ethnic question, or the conflict between ethnic nationalities, nor is it the tension between democracy and development. The challenge is how to confront Africa’s second colonialism, it is the question of the most efficacious strategy for the liberation of Africa from neo-colonial domination and exploitation…. The response to it is not globalisation. It is rather the construction of a mega federal state, and the inauguration of an era of “economic democracy”.

Rather, from the point of the independence of African states which began with Ghana in 1957 through the establishment of the OAU to its transformation into the AU and the establishment of NEPAD, the strategy of implementing nationalist objectives shifted focus to functional cooperation among African nation-states under the auspices of regional organizations and bilateral engagements with the world. Inter-African relations were nevertheless subservient to the preferences of the priorities of erstwhile colonial masters and international organizations.

Consequently, nation-building in Africa was neglected in the priorities of African statecraft and the outcome is the narration of gloom and doom emanating from, and on, the continent. The experiences of war and violence in such states as Angola, Burundi, Chad, The Congo Republic, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Liberia, Libya, Mali, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Tunisia, Uganda, are eloquent but sad testimonies of the outcome of the misreading and neglect of the nation-building requirements and needs of the continent. The preponderant role of ethnicity, religious intolerance, fetishism, and male chauvinism in the emergence and aggravation of war and violence on the continent exposes the deficit of the Pan-Africanists and the nationalists’ articulations and actions of nation-building in Africa. Worse still is the fact that they neglected the roots of these contradictions in the historical processes of the development of capitalism and the emergence and development of the African elite class (the comprador) who articulated the ideologies and provided leadership for the movements they inspired. Is there something inherently deficient in the ideologies of Pan-Africanism and nationalism that make them seemingly incongruent with the aspirations and existential realities of nation-building among African peoples, societies and states? The attempt at answering this question dominates the next section of this discourse.

4. Pan-Africanism, Nationalism and Nation-Building: The Nigerian Experience

Pan-Africanist and nationalist thoughts and social movements were the direct outcomes of the historical processes that led to the creation of a colonial state in Nigeria. Apart from the establishment of the Colony of Lagos in 1861, the establishment of the Protectorate of the Oil Rivers in 1885 marked the transition from
consular rule to formal British colonial rule in the coastal city-states in the Southern Nigeria area. This was followed by systematic conquest and establishment of protectorates over the polities and societies in the hinterlands of Southern Nigeria up to the second decade of the twentieth century. This process was further extended into the Northern Nigeria area. The conquest and establishment of colonial rule in the Northern Nigeria area came to a climax in 1903 with the defeat of the Sokoto Caliphate. Like in the Southern Nigeria area, the final “pacification” of the polities and societies in the Northern Nigeria area was not completed until the second decade of the twentieth century. Nigeria, which is today one the largest of the emergent African states, achieved its present territorial framework partly as a result of the two amalgamations in 1906 and 1914 (See Anene, 1966: 318). The amalgamation of the latter period finalized the unitarization of the hitherto independent social formations which were at varying levels of development before colonial contact, the different ethnic nationalities and the complexes of African cultures in what became the Colony and Protectorate of Nigeria in 1914. At independence in 1960, Nigeria was a pseudo Pan-African state, comprising over two hundred and fifty ethnic nationalities that spoke over four hundred languages and worshipped a handful of various gods. Nigeria thus became a quintessential example of an African state in critical need of a nation-building experience. This is against the backdrop of a history complicated by the processes of accumulation by appropriation and accumulation by capitalization during the era of slavery and colonization respectively in a world that was undergoing rapid globalization.

The historical realities of Nigeria’s nation-building experience reveal a huge gap between the aspirations and the practices of Pan-Africanism and nationalism. The political thoughts on which the social movements that liberated the country from the shackles of colonization were founded were not only fundamentally flawed in the necessary nationalist ideology of statecraft but also strongly skewed in favor of ethno-regionalism and religious sectarianism on which the Nigerian post-colonial nationhood project was founded. An examination of “The Official Programme of the Nigerian Youth Movement 1938”, Azikiwe’s “Political Blueprint of Nigeria”, and Awolowo’s “Towards Local Self Government”, and “Argument for Empire” reveals this inherent lacuna.

One area that this lacuna was common to the thoughts expressed by these leading Nigerian nationalists was that their perspectives fell essentially within the domain of plaintive nationalism. They all pleaded for the accommodation of Africans in the governmental and administrative process of Nigeria’s colonial state. For instance, the political charter of the Nigerian Youth Movement (NYM) pledged itself to the goal of “a complete autonomy within the British Empire” for Nigeria and pressed “for more use to be made of Nigerian barristers for judicial and legal appointments....” While in its economic charter, it pledged itself to “demand for our people economic opportunities equal to those enjoyed by foreigners”, “protect all Africans in industry and to resist every attempt by foreigners to oust them....” and “to champion the good cause of the labourers employed under the railways, at the docks and workshops of the Government, at the colliery at Enugu, at the tin mines of the Bauchi plateau and on the gold fields”, its cultural and social charter committed it to “urge on the Government to make elementary education progressively free and compulsory....”.

Similarly, Azikiwe (1975: 100) advocated that there should be two stages (the Preliminary and the Intermediate) in the evolution of the Nigerian state. The Preliminary Stage of ten years should be marked by:

...a conscious process of Nigerianization in all aspects of our political and administrative life. The economy of the country should be planned in order to adjust and adapt it to the conscious process. At this stage, 200 scholarships should be awarded to the sons and daughters of Nigeria annually, for five years, to enable them proceed abroad for specialized training in all branches of human endeavour.... If Britain means to reduce the period of tutelage during which period this country must suffer political servitude, then it should realize that only by this country producing trained men and women in all aspects of human endeavour can political progress be accelerated.... He further elucidated this position when he stated that:

...during the First Stage, Nigeria should be ruled by non-Nigerians, and Nigerians should undergo a period of tutelage which should prepare them for self-government. The key positions in the Nigerian State should be shared between Nigerians and non-Nigerians, and the former would act in an administrative capacity in concert with the latter (Azikiwe, 1975: 100).

At the Intermediate Stage, he opined that Nigerianization “makes it necessary for non-Nigerian appointees in the Civil Service to act in an advisory and not in administrative capacity, in all aspects of Nigerian political life.” This stage should last for five years, after which “non-Nigerian political experts should ‘hands off’ our affairs administratively”.

In the same vein, Awolowo (1975: 103 – 6) proffered answer to how local self-government was to be attained by recommending the elimination of “all Administrative Officers from the Native Administrations”. Though he did not recommend their replacement with African Administrative Officers, he nonetheless argued that the trusteeship role of the British colonial government in the political development of Nigeria would be...
better served by training and appointing educated Nigerians into substantive positions in the clerical, technical and administrative cadres of the Native Administrations.

In his essay, “Argument for Empire”, Awolowo (1975: 295 – 7) made a plea for Nigeria to remain within the British Empire, but however pleaded that all acts of unfairness and injustice to Nigerians within it should be addressed. While criticizing the average Briton’s total ignorance of the colonies or some of the grotesque ideas held about its inhabitants, he pleaded that there was:

…a growing body of people among the white groups in the Empire, who are strongly opposed to all acts of unfairness and injustice towards the coloured groups, and are working strenuously for the wider and equal distribution of the good things of the Empire. The best interest of the coloured peoples, therefore, lie in co-operating whole-heartedly with this body of people, confident in the hope that in due course the beneficial influences of men of goodwill will prevail over the discordant and disrupting forces of snobbery, prejudice, and racial superiority.

Another lacuna common to the political thoughts of these early Nigerian political thinkers was their unanimity on the role of Western education and the educated elite in the evolution of self-government in Nigeria. This can be gleaned from the role they prescribed for the educated elite in the process of political development outlined above. They believed that the destiny of Nigeria was in the hands of the educated elite whom they claimed were better equipped by virtue of the Western education they acquired than the traditional elite to drive the process of self-governance.

In addition, they also believed that liberal democracy characterized by universal adult suffrage was the only viable strategy for attaining self-government. In fact, for Azikiwe, democracy as a political philosophy was not only “the goal of progressive humanity but also the “indigenous political philosophy of Nigeria, in the main, is essentially democratic...” (1975: 100).

Finally, Arowolo (1975: 295) appeared to approximate the thoughts current in Nigeria’s nationalist circles when he concluded that:

It is indisputable that if Britain had not subjugated the country then, some other so-called civilized nation would have done so; or the Fulanis would have overrun the greater part of it. There is no attempt here, therefore, to paint Britain blacker than the rest of the world. Every nation or tribe, at one time or the other, has been guilty of wanton aggression.

The inevitability of the conquest and colonization of Nigeria expressed in the above statement largely informed the plaintive character of the decolonization thoughts and movements which in turn manifested in the constitutional reforms that eventually led to the political independence of Nigeria. Although Nigeria gained independence from Britain on 1st October, 1960, it was not unlikely that this was more the outcome of a combination of the demand by “an influential body of people in the United States of America” that “Britain should set her colonies free and let them go their own way” (Arowolo, 1975: 295), British fear of the contagious effect of the outbreak of radical nationalism that was already festering in some other African colonies, and the possibility of mass revolt among the subject peoples of Nigeria, rather than the constitutional negotiations between the educated elite and the colonial administration.

The violent conflicts that predominated in the political experience of Nigeria in the first decade of independence which culminated in the Nigerian Civil War (1967 – 1970), the failure of the attempt at the experimentation of democratic governance, the predominance of the military in Nigerian politics, and the economic crisis that typified the country since the 1980s were some of the symptoms of a nation devoid of a clear nation-building goal. Others include the ethno-religious and regional dichotomies that characterized intergroup relations, the citizenship question, the militancy and insurgency that dogged the country and the high rate of poverty and youth unemployment in spite of her enormous economic potentials. While these were the outcomes of the process of accumulation by capitalization, the deficit of a clear vision of nation-building by the emergent class of Western educated political elite that drove the process of the Nigerian statecraft from decolonization through independence to the post-independence era were not any less than the products of the capitalist political culture that gave birth to the sectarian political parties that instituted the ideologies of ethnicity, regionalism, religious bigotry and nepotism that came to replace Pan-Africanism and nationalism in the nation-building process of post-independence Nigeria.

This explanation for the deficit in Nigeria’s vision of nation-building is, therefore, not difficult to substantiate since it is squarely domiciled in the variants of Pan-Africanist and nationalist thoughts that powered the process of statecraft since independence. It is obvious that the political thoughts of Nigeria’s leaders discussed above were clearly bereft of a sound prognosis of the historical processes of the development of capitalism during the colonization of Africa and, therefore, lacked the radical ferment of nationalist thoughts and social actions that could not only holistically liberate Nigeria as a part of the liberation process of the entire Africa but also generate a realistic vision and a workable strategy of nation-building founded on sound radical Pan-African nationalist thoughts.

It is needless to reiterate here that the succeeding generations of post-independence Nigerian leaders...
made an even poorer showing of the understanding of the process and the demands of nation-building. The primordial basis of the struggle for political power among the class of the Nigerian political elite in the First Republic and the resultant crisis which began in the Western Region, the military coup of 15th January, 1966, the counter-coup of July, 1966, the genocidal pogroms against the Igbo of the Eastern Region and the Mid-Western Region, the struggle for power among the intransigent elite in the Nigerian Army and the avoidable thirty months civil war that started in 1967 were clear testimonies to the fact of the predominance of a corps of clueless leadership class that was saddled with the responsibilities of nation-building. For instance, it is on record that to the principal actors in the leadership class of the First Republic, Nigeria was either not more than a “mere geographical expression” or it was “the mistake of 1914”. With this perception of the nation by its leadership class, it was by share divine intervention through the agency of the outsider that the pogroms in support of the Araba (let’s separate) movement and the secessionist move of the exponents of Biafra did not have their way.

Also, the failure of the reconciliation, reconstruction and rehabilitation programme of the post-war military governments, its divide and rule strategy that continuously led to the balkanization of the Nigerian state structure, the increasing unitary character of the Nigerian federation, the predatory nature of the state, the bourgeois orientation of its democratic culture, the hegemony of military dictatorship, the militarization of public psyche, the failure of the Second and Third Republics, the faltering steps of the Fourth Republic, the slide into militancy and insurgency, among others, are further evidences of a leadership class wanting in nation-building ideas and strategies.

Nigeria has, over time, evolved into an albatross. An examination of the cardinal principles of the policies of the Nigerian state since independence can only further illustrate the point made above. Apart from the so-called federal character and the quota systems decreed into the Nigerian constitution by the military regimes to regulate intergroup relations, there is nothing else to suggest that the Nigerian elite class has devoted itself to useful thoughts in nation-building. Even the federal character and the quota system, apart from serving the personal interest of the members of the elite class, have proved rather counter-productive and injurious to the nation-building aspirations of the masses of Nigerians who perceive them as sources rather than solutions to social instability and discontent. Rather than facilitate national integration they aggravate ethno-regional suspicion, rivalry and hatred. Hence, there have been calls for them to be expunged from the Nigerian constitution.

Some Pan-Africanist and nationalist ideals only found expression in the 1979 Nigerian constitution as directive principles and fundamental objectives of Nigeria’s foreign policy. Under section 19, Nigeria’s foreign policy objectives were defined in the following terms:

The state shall promote African unity as well as total political, economic, social and cultural liberation of Africa and all other forms of international cooperation conducive to the consolidation of universal peace and mutual respect and friendship among all peoples and states, and shall combat racial discrimination in all its ramifications.

By the 1999 constitution, the Pan-Africanist ideals encapsulated above had been watered down. For instance, the objective of “total political, economic, social and cultural liberation of Africa” was replaced by the objective of the “promotion of a just economic world order”, and the pledge that the state “shall combat racial discrimination in all its ramifications” was replaced with a weak commitment to “elimination of discrimination in all its ramifications”. In addition, the objective, “promotion of African integration and support for African unity”, was diluted to read the “promotion and protection of the national interest” (Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999). The foreign policy objectives of the 1999 constitution reveal the weakening Pan-Africanist ideological basis of the post-independence Nigerian political elite. From the above, it is evident that the Nigerian state has been more ideological in her foreign policy towards other African states than she has been in her domestic policies.

5. Conclusion

Pan-Africanism and nationalism emerged as ideological responses to capitalist mercantilist slavery and capitalist colonialism in Africa. It is therefore antithetical to the historical logic of nation-building in Africa to assume that globalization as illustrated by Nigeria’s foreign policy objectives enunciated in the 1999 constitution is the right response. While it is possible to glean some weak degree of Afrocentricism in her African policy, the same ideal of African solidarity is not visible in her nation-building policy objectives. Rather, the politics of ethno-regionalism, religion and nepotism which predominates the process of the evolution of the Nigerian state has come to replace the ideologies of Pan-Africanism and nationalism envisioned by the classical political thinkers of Africa.

The Nigerian experience of nation-building makes it appear as though Pan-Africanism and nationalism are incompatible with the nation-building aspirations of African nation-states. The classical Pan-Africanist view is that the answer to the nation-building debacle in Africa lies in the construction of mega federal African state, while those opposed to this view advocate functional cooperation among independent African states. Nigerian
leaders belong to the latter school of thought. Both schools seem to agree that territorial nationalism is antithetical to nation-building in Africa and therefore concede that Pan-African nationalism that integrates the African states at the sub-regional levels is a viable alternative. The dismal performance of the sub-regional organizations at integrating independent African nation-states proves the fallacy of this assumption. The conclusion, therefore, is that Pan-Africanism and nationalism are not incongruent with the nation-building aspirations of African nation-states. Rather, the failure of the nation-building process in Africa lies in the inability to fully grasp the process of accumulation by capitalization, which in turn is due to imperialist domination in alliance with local comprador classes and the failure of the leaders to recognize the viability of the alternative ideologies of Pan-Africanism and nationalism in the process of nation-building. The leaders have failed to realize that unless the different ethno-regional and religious groups in the independent African nation-states are integrated at the national levels, no amount of integration at the international level will succeed. The only ideology that is available to the nation-building process is Pan-African nationalism that not only emphasizes the oneness of Africans but also the commonality of their shared historical experience within the independent nation-states and at the supra-African state.

References