The post- independence conflicts in Uganda: A manifestation of the classical imperialistic divide and rule policy of the British colonial administration in Uganda

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Abstract

Uganda has now been independent since 1962 from the colonial British rule. The period immediately after independence saw the country ushered into civil conflicts and violent change of governments, and corruption among others.

Despite the fact that there has been relative peace in the second half of the 53 years of Uganda's independence in terms of violent change of governments, the recent happenings in this country like the blatant Human rights abuses, tribalism, sectarianism, corruption, state engineered killings, politically motivated imprisonments, over militarization of the country's daily affairs are reflecting similar traits that are believed to have characterized the country during the first half of independence and are raising questions as to whether the history of violence that immediately followed independence is about to repeat itself. A number of reasons have been advanced by various researchers and writers to explain the causes of these conflicts including Mr. Museveni, the current president of the country, who in his book "Sowing the mastered seed" pointed out the problem of leaders clinging on to power as the major cause of violent conflicts in post independent Uganda and Africa at large, yet he is in the list of Africa's longest serving presidents.

This paper therefore attempts to offer another narrative to Uganda's post-colonial conflicts by arguing that the root causes of Uganda's political unrest after independence are better explained by her colonial history in which the British sowed the seeds of the very conflicts through their "divide-and-Rule policy". That the leaders who took over from the colonialists simply inherited this corrupt system that has kept the country in conflict up now. In other words, Ugandans are still fighting the colonialists in black skin (rulers). In a nutshell, this paper reflects on the post-independence conflicts in Uganda (1966-2006), linking their origin to the divide and rule policy used by the British colonial Administrators from 1894 to 1962, as well as presents the current political, economic and social problems which are a manifestation of the divide and rule policy. It finally proposes Good governance and Democracy, Inclusive Political Settlement, Restoration of presidential term limits, and Reforms in electoral laws as some of the most optimal possibilities that may transform the country into a peaceful, patriotic and unified post-colonial entity. This study is so significant at this point in time because it analyzes issues that compound Uganda's rogue politics since colonial times till today, which have been deliberately misrepresented by the elite to their advantage, as the next presidential election nears. It further gives an understanding of the regional imbalances in the country; an understanding of why there has never been peaceful transfer of power in Uganda and an understanding of why Mr. Museveni has pursued to extend his candidature for February 2016 presidential elections that will extend his rule to 35 years, if he gets through.

It is however important to note that the study did not explicitly focus on all the causes of the post- colonial conflicts in Uganda. There are still a good number of issues, which need to be explored to have a holistic understanding of the post-colonial conflicts that besieged the Pearl of Africa. For example, there is need to still research on how climate change may have played roll in these conflicts. Secondly, there is also need to further explore how "Cold War" dynamics this period may have influenced the actors, which could have turned Uganda into an ideological battleground.

1.   Introduction

1.0   The divide and rule policy: A theoretical Overview

Divide and Rule (divide et impera in Latin) according to Lavie Shay is a very old political strategy. To him it basically means that you divide the population in to manageable agglomerations and that makes it impossible for them to come together and fight against the sovereign authority (Lavie, Shay. 2008). Elements of this technique involve: creating or encouraging divisions among the subjects in order to prevent alliances that could challenge

the sovereign; aiding and promoting those who are willing to cooperate with the sovereign; fostering distrust and enmity between local rulers; encouraging meaningless expenditures that reduce the capability for political and military spending (Grant, Thomas. 2002).

This strategy according to Acemoglu, Robinson and others is also used in economics and sociology. Economists according to them typically interpret divide and rule in terms of a specific class of theoretical models whose main feature, roughly speaking, is that a single actor exploits coordination problems among a group by making discriminatory offers or discriminatory threats. (Acemoglu, D., Robinson, J.A., & Verdier, T, 2004). Political scientists, historians and lawyers, however, sometimes use the term in the economists' sense, sometimes in other senses, augments the trio.

In order to assure the interconnectedness of the "divide and rule policy" to the theoretical database, hypothesis on this subject can be derived from the classical imperialism theory.

In the classical imperialistic sense, the desire for profit maximization causes production beyond the needs of the internal market and leads to the establishment of new markets in underdeveloped areas. Here, the automatic production and markets are being destroyed and, thus, unemployment is exported to underdeveloped areas (Luxemburg, R. 1913).

Lenin in addition assumed a decrease of investment possibilities and, therefore, of profit rate in industrialized countries. Thus, capital is being exported in order to maximize profits. In the underdeveloped areas, this capital is invested, not according to the needs of these countries, but according to the interests of industrial countries (Lenin, W.J. 1966). The profit is transferred to the industrial countries whose development is based on the exploitation of underdeveloped areas thus inaugurating the concept of colonialism. But such powers according to Acemoglu, Robinson and others are typically overstretched and understaffed; their problem is how to achieve maximum control with a minimum use of resources and force. Divide and rule is an attractive solution in such environments, because it is cheaper to set factions within the latent opposition to fighting among themselves, and if necessary to defeat them piecemeal, than it is to defeat them as a unified enemy (Acemoglu, D., Robinson, J.A., & Verdier, T, 2004). The British, faced with similar challenges of a growing industrialization that needed constant in flow of raw materials to feed these industries as well as market for their surplus products and an ever expanding colonial empire that was understaffed, needed nothing else but a cheaper way to solve this problem created by their ambitious economic instincts, thus making divide and rule policy a power instrument to achieve ambitious economic interests of the classical imperialists.

In some cases, the imperial divide and rule policy rested straightforwardly on discriminatory offers to split the opposition. British policy in India, for example was to create and exploit divisions among the indigenous monarchies by means of explicit or implicit subsidies to loyal allies, "who competed with each other for imperial favours" (Ashton 1982, 4). Although some of these subsidies were large, some merely involved honors and titles (Copland 1982, 94), and in any form they were certainly cheaper than all-out conflict against a unified opposition.

In other cases, imperialist divide and rule tactics involved fomenting divisions among subjugated groups by sowing mutual mistrust, rather than by selective bribery. For example, in the British colonies of the American southeast, in addition to keeping Indians and Negroes apart, Whites pitted the colored groups against each other. In 1725, Richard Ludlam a South Carolina minister, confessed that 'we make use of a Wile for our [present] Security to make Indians & Negro's a check upon each other by their Vastly Superior Numbers we should be crushed by one or the other.' . . . In 1758, James Glen, long governor of South Carolina, explained . . . that 'it has always been the policy of this government to create an aversion in them [Indians] to Negroes' (Willis 1963, 165).

However, during colonial Uganda, the British used a combination of similar tactics as in India and Southeast America through ethnic cleavages and ethnic division of labour.

In the case of post independent Uganda, various groups have used this policy by dividing the people on ethnic basis to obtain and use state power in order to gain access to scarce resources commanded by the state (Mamdani 1983). Such a situation then facilitates the economic and political insubordination of other groups and generates a discontent among the disadvantaged ethnic groups against the source of deprivation. Ethnic identities are therefore strengthened and may become the principle of organization and mobilization for rebellion, Mamdani notes.

Brass observes that "by monopolizing access to cabinet posts and top positions in the military and parastatal enterprises, dominant ethnic groups stir up hostilities thereby provoking coups and conflicts". The Ugandan case is illustrative of the entrenchment of ethnicity in politics and how ethnicity has led to political conflicts.

1.1   Ways in which the British exercised divide and rule policy in Uganda

After the partition of Africa in Berlin (1884-1885) like sharing a birthday cake, the colonial powers were faced with the challenge of administering their shares of the cake (colonies). They devised various strategies to achieve this end. France for example adopted the indirect rule through assimilation policy by which they taught their

subjects that, by adopting French language and culture, they could become French citizens; Germany, Belgium and Portugal among other colonial powers used the direct rule.

Britain on the other hand adopted indirect rule through divide and rule policy, which they applied in their various colonies including Nigeria, which accounts partly for the current scuffles between Nigerian Muslims predominantly in the north and Christians predominantly in the south as well as The Sudan, which also partly accounts for the birth of the world's newest nation, South Sudan (Chukwa, C, 2000). Not forgetting the troubles in Northern Ireland which also trace their origin from the British imperialistic presence in Northern Ireland from early antiquity (Hadden P, 1980). With the unfolding of such scenarios, Uganda wouldn't survive this policy as one of the British colonies.

In the first place, the entity called Uganda today is a British concoction from Buganda, a Kingdom that existed long before the coming of the colonialists. The present day Uganda was an area where several tribes lived and managed their own affairs differently either through kingdoms or chiefdom (Padmore G, 1969). Uganda became British protectorate in 1894 until 1962. Britain's declaration of protectorate status over Uganda was motivated by the geo-strategic importance of the upper Nile basin and the source of the River Nile to the achievement of British interests on the Indian subcontinent (Onek, C .A, 2009). At the time, India was regarded as the jewel in the British Imperial crown. The theory and believe among European powers was that the control of the source of the River Nile was necessary for the security of Egypt and the Suez Canal, a vital access route to India that had opened in 1869. The confirmation by John Hannington Speke and James A. Grant in 1862 that Uganda was the source of the River Nile reinforced the strategic importance of Uganda and the Upper Nile basin to Britain's strategy in Egypt and the Far East. From the early 19th century onwards, Britain secured the source of the River Nile and the entire Upper Nile basin through the informal control of the leaders in the north and East Africa (Onek, C .A, 2009).

Politically, the British being driven by their ambition to secure the source of the Nile and yet were faced with the challenge of inadequate personnel as well as limited resources resorted to using a cheap means to conquer Uganda, the "divide and rule policy". By this policy, the British made use of a well-established traditional state, Buganda on a relatively large scale; they over emphasized the differences and prejudices rather than the similarities between the people of Uganda (Kabwegyere, 1974).

In compliance with the divide and rule policy, the British protectorate government established different systems of administration over the entire protectorate. Their first alliance with Buganda was in a military expedition against Bunyoro under King Kabalega in 1899 followed by negotiations for a treaty with important Buganda chiefs which gave birth to the 1900 Buganda agreement (Padmore G, 1969). This agreement rewarded the chiefs with grants of freehold land (contrary to traditional custom) and rewarded Buganda generally by giving them administrative control over the part of Bunyoro annexed to Buganda as a result of their defeat. This agreement further guaranteed the position of the Kabaka (King) and introduced a modified version of a traditional Baganda hierarchy of chiefs, acting under the supervision of the British officers. It also entrenched religious divisions among them by favoring protestant over Catholic or Muslim chiefs. The resulting hierarchy of landlord-chiefs, from the parish up to the county level, all paying homage to, and taking orders from the colonial government, was basically protestant. Once established, this Buganda system of administration was extended to the rest of the country. The British then used the Baganda chiefs to conquer the rest of Uganda and to establish an effective colonial administration.

However, by treating Buganda as a state within a state, the British planted the seeds of ethnic tensions and conflicts in Uganda. The Baganda then developed a high sense of ethnic nationalism and this was reinforced by their economic and political centrality in Uganda. Other parts of Uganda were then considered by the British as satellites of Buganda. This has since then led to anti-Baganda sentiments in the rest of Uganda (Onek, C .A, 2009).

In fact, by declaring Uganda a protectorate, neither the interests nor the opinions of the indigenous people was taken into account. Likewise, in governing Uganda through informal control, that is, by collaborating with the

Baganda or indigenous elite, the interests of the communities over which these elite governed were not considered. As noted by Kasozi, in a number of instances, the communities showed their discontent at the new mode of informal control through riots directed at the newly-created corps of British imposed indigenous leaders (Kasozi.A.B, 1994). These indigenous chiefs were the necessary agents of direct colonial rule over subjugated areas for the principal purpose of advancing and protecting British interests.

Buganda type of agreements were there after signed with traditional rulers in other kingdoms like Bunyoro, Ankole and Toro, while local chiefs were set up in the remaining districts.

Consequently, the British expanded the Kingdom of Ankole to the west to include smaller kingdoms like Mpororo and Buhweju and also expanded Toro kingdom to include parts of Bunyoro, while reducing Bunyoro in size as a punishment for rebelling against British colonialism (Onek, C .A, 2009). This therefore means that none of these kingdoms corresponded exactly to the areas under their influence before British colonialism leading to ethnic tensions in Uganda given the fact that the new adjustments could not take care of the different ethnic interests of the new areas being expanded in to. Besides, the British sent Chief Semei Kakungulu, a Muganda collaborator to Busoga, Teso and Bukedi in Eastern Uganda to transform these scattered chiefdoms in to tribal organizations. Some of Buganda collaborators went as far as Lango and Acholi in northern Uganda and Kigezi in western Uganda. In these areas, the collaborators were used to rule people who had no history of hierarchical rule. They spread out as local tax collectors and labour organizers in these areas. This sub-imperialism and Ganda cultural chauvinism were resented by the people being administered. Wherever they went, the Baganda insisted on the exclusive use of their language, Luganda, and they planted bananas as the only proper food worth eating. They regarded their traditional dress, long cotton gowns called "kanzu" as civilized; all else was barbaric. They also encouraged and engaged in mission work, attempting to convert locals to their form of Christianity or Islam. In some areas, the resulting backlash aided the efforts of religious rivals. For example, Catholics won converts in areas where oppressive rule was identified with a Protestant Muganda chief.

Economically, the British created regional imbalances and ethnic specialization, an economic distortion which compounded the problem of ethnicity during this colonial era (Mamdani 1983). Building upon pre-colonial differences, the Britain turned the southern part (Buganda, Busoga and Ankole) in to cash crop growing areas. But cash crop production was officially discouraged in northern areas (West Nile, Acholi, and Lango), and in Kigezi in the west which were developed as labor reserves, from whence were recruited not only soldiers and policemen, but also workers in factories and plantations in the south. The result of this 'division of labour according to Mamdani was the building of ethnic cleavages that would entrench ethnic consciousness in the long run in the country. The Asians came from India (now also Pakistan and Bangladesh); some of them had been brought by the British to do clerical work, but most came in connection with the construction of the Uganda Railway, when over 31,000 labourers were imported for this six-year project. The British allowed the Asians to dominate the commercial sector because they were allegedly regarded as a non-national trading class isolated from the people of Uganda, and hence easy to neutralize politically in the pursuit of colonial interests (Mamdani 1983).Therefore, through divide and rule policy, the British managed to antagonize one region against another and one tribe against another.

As Mamdani summarized it up, "Every institution touched by the hand of the colonial state was given a pronounced regional or nationality character. It became a truism that a soldier must be a northerner, a civil servant a southerner, and a merchant an Asian" (Mamdani, 1983, p 10).

These economic distortions created by the British became troublesome for post independent Uganda. This institutional 'division of labour' was easily exploited by the ruling elites from these regions to acquire and retain power undemocratically during post-colonial period.

Socially, the Baganda were considered by the British superior to the rest of the tribes and it was in fact by extending the Buganda rule that the rest of Uganda was consolidated. This meant that Buganda's political institutions were exported to the rest of the protectorate, they were used as partners in the conquest of Uganda.

This kind of move developed a dislike for the Baganda and were regarded worse than the British by the rest of the ethnic groups.

In addition, the location of the colonial administrative centers in Kampala and Entebbe both in Buganda was not only a pivotal point from which colonial expansion to the rest of Uganda passed off, but it ushered them in to benefits in the fields of education, medical services, transport and telecommunication among others than the rest of the country. Meaning better social infrastructures like schools, hospitals, roads, etc were developed in Buganda than other parts of Uganda. For example, until independence in 1962, the Baganda filled a disproportionate number in secondary school places. In 1920, Buganda had 360 schools, western and eastern provinces had 42 each and there was none in northern Uganda (Kabwegyere, 1974).

Industrialization grew in Buganda at the expense of other regions. When the capital city Kampala, already offering central government jobs attracted industry, the Baganda were more available to take up wage employment from which they built up skills and became more stable employees, leaving unwaged work to migrants from other parts of Uganda thus dividing the country into the south rich and the rest poor. The British policy of divide and rule enhanced the spirit of ethnic consciousness and chauvinism which became a source of tension and conflict in post independent Uganda. Uganda's post independent leaders simply perpetuated the divide and rule policy through ethnic incompatibility as started by the British to obtain and use state power in order to gain access to scarce resources commanded by the state. This would therefore partly explain the reason and the nature of conflicts in post-independence Uganda.

1.1.1 How the conflicts in post-independence Uganda are a manifestation of the divide and rule policy of the British.

The post-independence Uganda in this paper refers to the early independent Uganda commonly referred to as Obote I (1962-71), Uganda under Idi Amini (1971-79), the Interim period (1979-1980), the return of Obote also commonly known as Obote II (1980-5) and Uganda under Museveni (1986-2015).

1.1.2 Uganda under Obote I (1962-71)

Politically, the early post-independence Uganda was a period characterized by leadership struggle (Mudoold.D, 1985).

The indirect rule approach the British employed in Uganda by the use of a stronger existing political structure(Buganda kingdom) to advance their imperialistic interests in the whole country through empowering them politically, economically and socially created a fragile ground on which Uganda got her independence, he continues. This divisive and fragmented political, Economic, social and religious foundation on which the British founded and build the multi-ethnic state of Uganda to their advantage kept Ugandans playing the British game of divide and rule even when their unity was sorted for during and after independence. This created a fluid situation which could only be filled by anyone who knew how to play the British game ('divide and rule') every well (Mamdani 1983). The first action of the players (local elites) in this game was to set the people of Uganda against each other and hide the actual enemy from them. That is, instead of pointing at the repressive colonial army, for example, they talked of northerners as the enemy; instead of indicating the colonial chiefs, they pointed at the Baganda as the enemy; and instead of singling out the comparators, they defined Asians as the enemy (Mamdani 1983). They divided the people and set them against each other, and the colonialists came in and played referee, again. Players like Milton Obote who even had no likelihood of leadership through democratic means that time because of his northern background saw political manipulation and maneuvering along the divided lines the British had created as the only way to take over from them, thus the beginning of the scuffles. Such post-colonial practices by the players, who inherited the nation state, saw reproduction rather than

deconstruction of political, social and economic distortions created by the British in Uganda (Kabwegyere, 1974).

On the eve of independence religious and ethnic identities surfaced as the basis for party formation as the sidelined ethnic and religious groups struggled for the same political space which the Baganda and Protestants had enjoyed alongside the imperialists. For example, Democratic Party was formed by a coalition of Catholic landlords, the Catholic Church and the Catholic Action Movement on the basis of having been discriminated against since Protestantism was treated as a state religion by the British. There was also Uganda national congress, which later due to sectarianism got split in to two factions; its Buganda section was the Kabaka Yekka (KY) under the Buganda King, and its non-Buganda section was the Uganda People's Congress (UPC) under Milton Obote (Muzrui. A, 1977).

The people, especially from Northern Uganda who had for long been bitter of Buganda's prestige and privileges since colonial time, rallied behind Milton Obote's Uganda People's Congress (UPC), which was clearly non-Baganda but Protestant majority. Obote, upon discovering that he would not be able to govern Uganda without Baganda support, a precedence set by the British, formed an alliance with Buganda's Kabaka Yekka (King before All) party in exclusion of the Democratic Party, which was Catholic dominated (Muzrui. A, 1977).

At Independence in 1962, Obote became Prime Minister and Kabaka Mutesa II, President on agreement that Buganda would continue to exercise authority over the other kingdoms just like during the British administration, as well as being represented in the National Assembly (Mamdani.M, 1976). The alliance disintegrated shortly thereafter as it was just a manipulative move by Obote to gain support within Buganda to advance his political ambition.

As noted by Mamdani, the role that ethnic identity was to play over the coming decades was clear from the beginning.

Drawing from British tradition that a soldier must be a northerner, a civil servant a southerner and a merchant an Indian, Obote filled the army and civil service with members of his own and neighboring ethnic groups, predominantly Lango and Acholi from northern Uganda. With the aid of these northern troops and ministers, Prime Minister Obote suspended the constitution and assumed all government powers, removing the positions of president and vice president. In September 1967, Uganda was proclaimed a republic by a new constitution, which gave the president even greater powers, and abolished the traditional kingdoms, the Kabaka fled in exile (Mudoola, D 1985). This marked the beginning of pure Obote regime (Obote I) up to 1971 and it also marked the end of the development of systematic democratization process in post-colonial Uganda. In this period the Baganda became the enemy and objects of Obote's government, lost key government positions, many imprisoned, killed and exiled. While it is true that Obote was trying to break the heaviest concentration of power in Buganda in order to safeguard his position and perhaps concentrate on the nation-building objective, Kabwegyere holds that instead of using democratic means, he sort to use of undemocratic means (force and military as power base).

In a further effort to tighten its control over political life, Obote's government like the British colonialists discriminated in favour of Protestants, in favour of his fellow tribes men Longo and Acholi and in favour of his party UPC, for example in state schools, in top governmental positions, in the army and in the civil service. In other words, for Obote to consolidate his political leadership in Uganda, he had to keep high the divided lines and sectarianism the British had created to consolidate their colonial administration in the country; that is, manipulated the Baganda and used them to the maximum, northerners in the army and later in the civil service as well as key political positions, favored his supporters but persecuted anyone who dared to oppose him. Obote's regime terrorized, harassed and tortured people. His secret police, the general service unit led by his cousin caused a lot of atrocities.

In 1969, Obote released his famous 'common man's charter' in which he outlined his plans for Uganda and clearly stated a shift to socialism (moderate communism), which came to be known as 'the move to the left'. This did not go well with the British who felt that this move would diminish their influence over their former colony

and so fell out with Obote's government. This government could not last long from this point as Obote's attempt to assassinate commander in chief, Idi Amin Failed leading to his overthrow by Idi Amin in 1971 in a coup.

In conclusion, Obote did not make any difference from the colonialists. He consolidated his rule through manipulation and discrimination in favor of his party UPC, Langi and the neibouring tribe Acholi and in favuor of Protestants. He manipulated the Baganda like the British to assume power and ruled by exclusion instead of uniting all Ugandans. He demonstrably, utilized and kept live the political, economic and social fault lines created by the British to play his cards instead of deconstructing them. He as such set the basis for the politics of revenge in Uganda against which he suffered as Idi Amini bombed him out of office in a coup that saw Lango and Acholi officers being murdered brutally. This clearly shows how Obote prepared Uganda for war by heavily employing the British colonial policy of divide and rule.

1.1.3   Uganda under Idi Amin Dada (1971-79)

Idi Amin took over power in January 1971 in a coup that toppled president Milton Obote. He used the same tactics Obote had used against Kabaka to ascend to power. Like the British and Obote, Amin worked hard to legitimize his government and to gain support in Buganda. He promised security, rule of law, elections, economic progress, lower prices and taxes, arranged the return of the Kabaka's body from the UK (where he had died two years earlier) and allowed his son, the present Kabaka to pass through some of that office's rites, but he did not restore the kingdoms (Oloka-Onyango, 1997: 176). This was in a way to fulfill the precedence the British had set, which became a sort of truism that to rule Uganda, one must pass through Buganda and is the same precedence that came to be followed by the later rulers (Mamdani, 1983). Large sections of the people received the new regime favourably because they were disenchanted with the previous one, and expected a change for the better.

The chanting of the new regime could not go any further and people's expectations could not be met as Amin went back to the old cocoon of ethnic cleavage. He proclaimed himself president, abrogated the parliament, conferred more powers on himself through constitutional amendment and started ruling by decree. The coup had only narrowly outflanked Acholi and Langi officers on whom Obote had relied. They became objects of Amin's political persecution as many were massacred (International Crisis Group, 2012).

Amin depended on low ranking, little educated ethnic and religious kin he had personally recruited into the army. He secured his regime by murdering Langi and Acholi officers and soldiers who had not fled, suspending most of the constitution, giving himself absolute authority. Officers were given powers of arrest without authorization. Prominent civilians were murdered. His regime was probably responsible for well over 100,000 deaths by the time it was overthrown, and its unpredictable brutality accelerated the erosion of rule of law (Hansen H.B, 1977, Human Rights Watch, 1999).

Amin also expelled both citizen and Non-citizen Indians, who were identified by the players as enemies in 1972. He justified this act by considering the Indians as colonial perpetrators and thus parasites milking the economy of Uganda and that getting rid of them would give the Ugandans the chance to manage their own economy. This action wrecked the economy by removing some 90 per cent of the trading network but gave him unprecedented patronage resources and the opportunity to build support by giving Indian businesses to allies, which was not in a way different from what the British did by rewarding Buganda, their chief alley with a large chunk of land grabbed in a military expedition against Bunyoyo. State officials became far more significant to the economy, because they controlled most imported commodities and sold or bartered them privately. Patronage and corruption thus became firmly entrenched at all levels of public service. No government since has been able to eradicate either (International Crisis Group, 2012).

Amin tried to improve the status of Muslims in general and those from the North West in particular, who had been isolated during British colonialism and Obete's regime. He rapidly promoted Muslims despite their lack of academic qualifications. The resulting Catholic and Protestant resentment further politicized religious fault lines created by the British. As opposition widened, ethnic, regional and religious cleavages determined whom he trusted. The composition of the military leadership changed radically; by 1977 more than three quarters of those serving owed their appointments to Amin. The percentage of officers who spoke Sudanic languages – indicating they came from ethnic groups predominantly in West Nile, Amin's home area, rose from 37 per cent to 54 per cent. West Nile cabinet ministers increased from one sixth in 1971 to over half in 1978 (Hansen H.B, 1977).

This was the trend of political development in post-independence Uganda, so tribalistic, sectarian, egoistic, chauvinistic; all owing to political, economic, religious and social fault lines created by the British egoistic policy of 'divide et impera'. Amin's regime, which has been described by historians like Mamdani as "the reign of terror" was brought to an end in 1979 when he invaded Tanzania and was thereafter ousted in a joint expedition by the Tanzanian army and some Ugandan dissident forces called Uganda National Liberation Front (UNLF)

In conclusion, Idi Amin's regime to me was a replica of that of his predecessor Obote and at most as brutal as the colonial regime. He still depended on the colonial policy of divide-and-Rule as the masterpiece of his administration as elaborated above. He was not a kind of leader who would unite Ugandans. His dictatorial and authoritarian government was only a mechanism to amass wealth and to keep himself in power. Tribalism, sectarianism, manipulation, and corruption were some of the working tools he inherited from the colonialists just like his predecessor. This increased his unpopularity both within and without, thus giving the gun more chances to determine the future of Uganda. Sad to note that the rest of the rulers after Idi Amin followed the same trend, thus explaining the scuffles immediately after the fall of Amin as well as the later scuffles in Obote's second government and in the current regime of President Museveni.

1.1.4   Uganda in the Interim Period (1979-1980)

Uganda after Amin commonly known as the interim period continued to be politically, economically, and socially unstable as the country got entangled in militarism, lawlessness, tribalism, frequent change of governments and gross human rights abuses. For exable, in less than a year after Idi Amin, three governments ruled Uganda in the persons of Yusuf Lule, who became very incompetent as a leader was then replaced by Godfrey Binaisa (International Crisis Group, 2012). However, Binaisa became very autocratic due to his unpopularity as such he sacked some of his army chiefs including Yoweri Museveni, who was by then the minister of defence, and the army chief of staff. This made the army officials to replace Binaisa with Paul Muanga who ruled Uganda till the time of general elections in 1980, which ushered Obote to power. The interim period clearly shows how fragmented Uganda continued to be after Idi Amin. With more players (tribes) in the field competing for the same political space, short time governments characterized this period. It was clear that the enmity the tribes developed against each other as a deliberate colonial construct, and as being perpetuated by the first two leaders would continue keeping the country in total turmoil. No wonder amidst this confusion, Obote found his way back with more deadly mechanisms that only extended the life of the gun in Uganda's politics. There is nothing else other than the divide-and-Rule policy at the foreplay of these conflicts.

1.1.5   Uganda under Obote's second term (Obote II 1980-85)

With the return of Obote through what was termed as fraudulent elections in 1980, Uganda once again show the history of tribal cleavage repeating itself (Kabwegyere, T.B, 1974). The Acholi and Lango on power made sure that they compensated for the lives lost during the previous regimes consequently the army made one of the worst Human rights Abuse records in the history of Uganda. Obote could not learn from his past mistakes, neither did he realize that he still remained a colonialist in black skin in the eyes of Ugandans than a change agent. At this point, Uganda needed a leader who would dismantle the colonial constructions that kept Uganda in conflict by emphasizing national unity, democracy, economic and social reforms but Obote who returned to power for the second time proved of no help. This led to widespread armed opposition against Obote's second government including People's Resistance Army led by Yoweri Museveni, which later came to be known as National Resistance Army after joining with Uganda Freedom Fighters under Yusuf Lule. Museveni's army gained trust and support even among the rural Baganda, Ankole and Toro in terms of food donation, enrollment in the army as well as offering intelligence services to the army. In an effort to crush Museveni's opposition, Obote launched "Operation Bonanza" which led to the death of an estimated number of 10,000 Ugandans in Luwero triangle according to Human Rights Watch, 1999. This increased Obote's unpopularity even in his own government leading to his deposition by Bazilio Okello, his own army genral from his tribe in 1985 (Mamdani.M, 1976). Meanwhile, Museveni intensified his fight against military regime, which to him was the cause of Uganda's unrest until he toppled Okollo after taking over Kampala on 26th of January, 1986. This marked the beginning of Museveni's regime till today.

1.1.6   Uganda under Yoweri Museveni Kaguta

Once on power through a coup in 1986, Museveni through the National Resistance Movement (NRM) government embarked on political, social and economic recovery of the country. He declared a "fundamental change" and the end of tribal, ethnic and regional sectarianism in Uganda (Kjær, 1999). In order to further legitimize his government, Museveni sort to establish a broad-based government which was more open to include even the former enemies. In other words Museveni appeared at first to follow a more inclusive democratic path by supporting a new political recipe to restore civilian control, rule of law and economic growth (International Crisis Group, 2012). His government worked out to create a non-partisan "democratic" system that was widely embraced. His army proved more disciplined and sensitive to civilian control than its predecessors. He recognized the kingdoms abolished by the first president, Obote, in 1967 as cultural, but not political entities. Museveni also recalled the Indians who had been expelled by Idi Amin .An elaborate consultative process led to a 1995 constitution with checks and balances intended to prevent inordinate centralization. The Constitution also guaranteed a variety of basic human rights, including the expression of individual freedom, the right of assembly,etc (Barkan D. Joel, 2005).

All in all, Museveni and his NRM government may be said to have been more successful than his predecessors in that first, the NRM government restored peace and security in Uganda by reestablishing an effective government through constitutional development and rule of law as well as professionalizing the army, which brought to an end violent change of governments. Second, it regenerated the economy from a state of economic suffocation to real economic development. Thirdly, it started but remains unaccomplished the democratization process, that is to say, the establishment of democratic institutions through which Ugandans of all regions, ethnic backgrounds, and political orientations have a meaningful stake in the political system and resolve their differences under democratic rules (Barkan D. Joel, 2005). The failure of the NRM government to accomplish the democratization process according to Barkan D, Joel has thrown the country back to the undemocratic practices like during the colonial regime and the regimes that immediately followed independence.

On realizing that he was becoming unpopular in the country, Museveni like his predecessors resorted to undemocratic means to keep himself on power. For example, he filled the army (UPDF) and civil service with members of his own and neighbouring ethnic groups, predominantly Banyankole, Bakiga, and Batoro from western Uganda. This has been evidenced in a report by Advocates Coalition on Development and Environment (ACODE), 2009 that by 2008, the command structure of the Uganda Peoples Defense Forces (UPDF) substantially changed that is to say, 74 per cent of the officers in top positions come from western Uganda distinguishable from 17 per cent from the central region, 9 per cent from the north and zero from the east. Therefore, based on this kind of report, it is reasonable to argue that there seems to be no major differences in the regional and tribal compositions of the command structures of the army in comparison with his predecessors and that President Museveni's continued defamation of the previous leaders only helps keep the tribalism issue at the center of public policy discourse in the country (Advocates Coalition on Development and Environment (ACODE), 2009). Not only that but he further removed presidential term limits through manipulative constitutional amendment to give him unlimited time to remain in power; corruption is at the helm. The intricacies of what Museveni has turned out to be after promising a lot to Ugandans constitute the basis of the current political, economic and social problems in Uganda.

2.0   The current political, economic and social problems in Uganda which are a manifestation of the divide and rule policy

The honey moon years of NRM government on power under Museveni were indeed years of political, social and economic recovery, and thus of nation building after decades of total turmoil in Uganda. As Barkan and Carson noted, there has been a significant measure of political liberalization in the country especially from early 90s till today. This according to them has been evidenced by emergency of "a free media and civil society", though mostly operational in urban areas like the capital city, Kampala. The constitution of the republic of Uganda, promulgated in 1995 was also a step forward towards constitutionalism and the rule of law among other notable achievements. However, the current political, social and economic situation in Uganda are becoming so pathetic and deplorable that many Ugandans believe the current regime is falling back in to the mistakes of the past rulers.

Politically, Uganda's systematic journey towards a fledged democracy is systematically being abrogated by Museveni's NRM government and the country is slowly going back to "one man role" like during the previous

regimes. This has however been pointed out by Barkan and Carson that "after an extended period of political liberalization which resulted in the strengthening of parliament, the judiciary, watchdog agencies such as the Inspector General of Government (IGG) and a free media, Uganda has slipped back into a period of neo-patrimonial, or "big man" rule". Museveni's NRM government continues to keep herself in power through a bunch of corruption, use of force, patronage, as well as political manipulation through transition from one-party to multi-party rule (Barkan D. Joel & Carson, 2005).

It is therefore not surprising that the IMF, in its most recent country report on Uganda, stated that the country is "at a crossroad" and must "launch a second wave of reforms and consolidate peace throughout its territory." It went on to note that in respect to four of the six indicators of "good governance," Uganda's rating now falls below the average for sub-Saharan Africa (Muzrui. A, 1977). This downward trend is also reflected by the ratings of other organizations.

Freedom House, for example in its annual report of political rights and civil liberties indicates that Uganda has fallen in respect to both. On a pair of scales ranging from "7" at the lowest to "1" for the highest, Uganda received a "5" for political rights in 1994 and 1995. Its rating rose to "4" from 1996 through 1999 but dropped back to "5" in 2000,and then to "6" in 2003.Though Uganda's political rights score rose slightly to "5" in 2003 it remains below those for both Kenya ("3") and Tanzania ("4") (International Crisis Group, 2012).

A similar picture as presented in the same report by International Crisis Group, 2012 emerges with respect to civil liberties. Uganda received a "5" from 1994 through 1996. Its score rose to "4" from 1997 through 1999, but dropped back to "5" in 2000, and "6" in 2001. It rose again to "4" from 1997 through 1999, but dropped back to "5" in 2000, and "6" in 2001. It rose again to "4" in 2003, but also remains below the civil liberties scores for Kenya and Tanzania both of which are now rated"3".

However, Uganda's current political life fabric is being dominated by a number of issues, but notable among them include the following; 1. The transition to multi-partism and the removal of presidential term limits. 2. Museveni's succession scuffle: The Muhoozi project. 3. The widespread corruption in the country. 4. The human rights issues. 5. The homosexuality bill

2.1   The Transition to Multiparty Politics and the Repeal of Presidential Term Limits ("Project Kisanja")

President Museveni resisted for many years the transition to multiparty politics on the grounds that multiparty politics were the root cause of Uganda's instability in the 1960s, and during subsequent attempts at civilian rule (Mudoola. D, 1985). Indeed, the Movement system as noted by Mudoola was viewed by Museveni and his colleagues in the NRM as an alternative to multiparty politics that was ideally suited to Uganda's history and needs. The Movement system was originally conceived as a competitive political system within a "no-party" or "non-partisan framework—i.e. the NRM was not a party in the conventional sense, but rather a "big tent" to which all Ugandans belonged and within which all could compete on the basis of their own "individual merit" rather than on the basis of their party affiliations. Of course, one may view this as a brilliant move by Museveni to unite Ugandans after being divided by the sectarian and tribalistic multi party political system at independence and the periods that followed.

However, since the late 1990s, and especially after the elections of 2001, the Movement has morphed into an old-style one-party state reminiscent of Africa during the 1980s (International Crisis Group, 2012). Some members of the Movement—those loyal and closest to Museveni—were increasingly regarded as "more Movement" than others. The "big tent" to the Crisis group became a fusion of party and government dominated by the President seeking to centralize power. The result is that the Movement today [now renamed the National Resistance Movement Organization (NRMO) and registered as a party under the Political Parties and Organization Act] is an organization that revolves around one man and his followers.

The combination of the switch to multiparty politics and the repeal of term limits has split the Movement. Several of Museveni's oldest and closest colleagues dating back to 1986 and earlier have left government or been forced out, because of their stated unhappiness with the President's intention to continue in office after two decades in power. Among this group are Bidandi Ssali, the former Minister of Local Government and the architect of Uganda's famed system of decentralized government; Eryia Kategaya, a former vice-president once touted as Museveni's likely successor; Augustine Ruzindana, the former head of the Public Accounts Committee in the National Assembly; and Mugisha Muntu, a former commander of the Army. The former and late National Political Commissar of the NRM, James Wapakhabulo, is also reported to have opposed the repeal of term limits. And of course there is Besigye (Mamdani, 1983).It is important to note that all of these Movement heavyweights, with the exception of Ssali and Wapakhabulo, come from Museveni's home area of Mbarara and are ethnic Banyankole.The President has been deserted by his own men. This group of former "Movementists" strongly believes that Uganda's future stability and prosperity is contingent on an orderly and democratic transfer of power to a new generation of leaders. Notwithstanding this opposition, President Museveni become so brutal in dealing with his opponents. For example, strong armed tactics have already been used to deny permits, breakup meetings, and otherwise cow MPs who have joined together to create the Forum for Democratic Change (FDC).The FDC, led by former Movement stalwarts, is regarded as the most potent threat to Museveni and the NRMO—far more potent than the Democratic Party (DP) or Uganda People's Congress (UPC), two old holdovers from the 1960s.

In fact, there has not been any meaningful election in Uganda ever since the inception of multi-party political dispensation. Most elections have been marred by mismanagement of tax payer's money for vote bribing, stealing of votes, controlling the electoral body for favors, use of the military to intimidate voters as well as opposition politicians. This is what gave birth to the famours "walk to work protest" in April 2011 in which peaceful protestors were brutalized by government forces in a bid to crack down the protests.

Given these realities, all signs point towards a Moi/Mugabe-type election—i.e. an uneven playing field for those who oppose the Movement and the third term or even the fourth term as it stands now, intimidation of the opposition, rising violence, etc. What then, given Uganda's past? In this regard, it is important to remember that in its 53 years of existence as an independent state, Uganda has never had a constitutional and peaceful transfer of power from one elected government to another. Should the President prevail by force or intimidation, it is possible that some elements of the opposition will go underground and pursue the very option that Museveni himself pursued successfully two and a half decades ago—a guerilla insurgency. The regime already accuses its opponents, and the FDC in particular, of planning this option. It is a recipe for trouble and is likely to be either highly destabilizing or to lead to widespread repression. Should events spin out of control, Uganda's success will indeed be a record of the past.

2.1.1   Museveni's succession scuffle: "Project Muhoozi".

The Muhoozi project is a succession plan to install Museveni's son, Brig. Muhoozi Kainerugaba as a replacement for president Museveni. The fire was stoked by coordinator of Intelligence Agencies, Gen. David Sejusa formerly Tinyefuza after he wrote a letter to the Director General of Internal Security Organisation (ISO) calling for an investigation into allegations that certain individuals opposed to an alleged "Project Muhoozi" had been targeted for assassination (The Daily Monitor, 7th, May, 2013).

In this letter, Gen. Sejusa further talked of a plan by President Museveni and a small circle of close family to install Brig. Muhoozi kainerugaba, currently head of the Special Forces Command, to succeed him as President.

This led to the closer of Daily Monitor, a private print media that first published the letter followed by the Red pepper tabloid in a raid to search for the letter.

The government responded by claiming that this was diversionary and baseless to incite Ugandans. Museven on a private TV personally denied the claims by saying that he does not have the power to choose a leader for

Uganda but his party, NRM has and that another person can only come in place when he chooses not to stand again for presidency or when his party chooses another person. He vowed to prosecute those propagating such deceitful and contagious lies.

Critical looking, I personally believe that there is some truth as presented in the letter by Gen. David Sejusa. Basing on the saying that "there is smoke without fire", there are a number of events I can recall in Uganda under Museveni that could explain the existence of such a project.

Firstly, the rapid rise of his son, Muhoozi to a Brigadier now in charge of Special Forces Command at the expense of NRM historicals who fought with Museveni to take over power points to that fact. Secondly, the underpinning reasons for the desire to choose Brigadier Muhoozi Kainerugaba as a successor to his father to me is the First Family's survival strategy in a post-Museveni era in Uganda. To achieve that objective, Gen. Yoweri Museveni needs a poodle. A servile or obsequious person, a person trusted to a fault to guarantee Museveni's future and protect his loot as well as prevent independent investigations into the Luwero, Teso and Northern Uganda mass murders by the regime. A servile successor will ensure that Museveni and his cohorts will never be prosecuted for the serious crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes including crimes of massive corruption and abuse of office. The choice of his son, Baby Museveni, otherwise known as Muhoozi, is a logical one, particularly for a desperate Commander-in-Chief of the army, NRA/UPDF, who does not want to end up like Ben Ali of Tunisia, Muammar Gadhafi of Libya or Hosni Mubarak of Egypt. The crimes Gen. Museveni has committed against the Ugandan civilian population since 1981 weighs, or should weigh, heavily on him. Similarly, the alleged crimes he committed in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) --the massacres of Congolese civilians and plundering of Congo's resources-- will not go away; for such crimes have no statute of limitation. Gen. Museveni needs protection particularly when he is no longer president and exercises no executive and military power. He will be extremely vulnerable to national and international criminal prosecutions. However, the choice of Muhoozi to succeed his father, while appealing to Museveni, may not fully protect him. Papa Doc tried and imposed his son on Haitian people. After his death, such succession did not protect Baby Doc and family.

Now a Ugandan general who still reported to Museveni, Gen. David Sejusa Tinyefuza's disclosure that there is a "Muhoozi Project" for succession, is therefore not a surprise. It is also not a surprise that persons opposed to the idea of Muhoozi replacing his father as president of Uganda may be targeted for assassination. Gen. Tinyefuza wrote a letter published in Uganda's The Daily Monitor, asking that the rumors be investigated. He said he and former Prime Minister Amama Mbabazi were included as some of the alleged targets. The track record of the National Resistance Army/National Resistance Army (NRA/NRM) suggests that since its formation and throughout its existence, for a variety of reasons, the NRA/NRM has eliminated, and continues to eliminate, those it considers undesirables from within and without its rank. Those undesirables are generally known as "biological substance". The undesirable description has since been expanded to include "cockroaches" and that is one of the reasons Gen. Tinyefuza was afraid, that on arrival at Entebbe in Uganda from London, he may have been arrested like a "cockroach". Gen Tinyefuza is best placed to know how the NRA/NRM treats cockroaches as the presidential advisor on security matters. If in doubt, ask Daniel Omara Atubo, a former minister of State for Defense, one of Tinyefuza's victims who were treated as a cockroach, by being publicly flogged, humiliated and thrown in detention for one year before being released. The derogatory term "cockroach" is used by the NRA/NRM to dehumanize its "enemies" in a similar manner used against victims during the Rwanda genocide. The NRA/NRM historical record demonstrates that it has always been careful to leave a window of opportunity for a "plausible deniability" explanation of many political killings by creating alternative versions of causes of death of persons suspected to have been murdered by the agents of the regime. The untimely death of the young Brig. Noble Mayombo is one such recent examples. Similarly, unexplained deaths of Dr. Andrew Kayira, a former minister in the NRM government, the former Vice- President Gilbert Bukenya's son, former Speaker of Parliament Francis Ayume and former Member of Parliament Ms. Cerinah Nebanda are examples of alleged political murders with 'plausible deniability'. Gen. Tinyefuza's concerns on being a target for possible assassination alongside others, coming from one who knows how the system works and is also a suspect in some of the criminals acts committed against the 'enemies' of the NRA/NRM, must be taken seriously. Only the willfully blind can ignore such warnings. This is clearly a politics of manipulation, exploitation, a politics that thrives on the blood of those who would like to hold fast to the values of objective truth that would benefit all Ugandans. It is a politics that has its roots in the divide-and-Rule police as introduced by the British that thrived

through setting Ugandans against each other, killing prominent anti-colonialists, etc. This is what Museveni has learned to practice on his own people to keep himself in power.

2.1.2   High level of corruption for the purpose of regime maintenance

Corruption is the third major issue facing Uganda. Though it is very hard to make a quantitative estimate of the extent to which corruption reduces economic growth, especially in the near term, there is no doubt that it eventually takes its toll—on both the rate of growth, and the level and quality of domestic and foreign direct investment (FDI) that impact on growth. Moreover, given Uganda's high dependency on aid for budget support, the donor community directly and indirectly (but unintentionally) finances corrupt practice (Anti-Corruption Coalition Uganda, 2011).The downside impact of corruption according Anti-Corruption Coalition Uganda 2011 report can be seen by the spread of "crony capitalism" among members of the political elite, including various "sweetheart" deals of dubious value that have been granted to attract foreign investors of questionable integrity (e.g. the recent leasing of the state-owned Dairy Corporation to a Thai investor for $1 and other deals approved outside official procedures). Corruption in Uganda is pervasive, and appears to involve prominent members of the first family, including President Museveni himself. Moreover, while some alleged acts of corruption have not resulted in prosecutions or convictions by the courts, these acts would be regarded as clear conflicts of interest in most countries. For example, the fact that a leading public official or his spouse participates in a business that has a contractual relationship with the Government of Uganda is not officially regarded as a corrupt practice so long as neither the official nor the business has violated the law. Such practice, however, even if "lawful," meets the standard internationally accepted definition of corruption, i.e. the use of public office for private gain. Examples of corruption allegations surrounding the first family as per the 2011 Anti-corruption Coalition Uganda report are as follows:

❖   Lt. General (retired) Salim Saleh (a.k.a. Caleb Akandwanaho)—President Museveni's younger brother and the former head of the UPDF, who retains considerable influence over the army reserve. He owns Caleb International, now inactive, which used to procure equipment for the military, Saracen Ltd., which provides security services in and around Kampala, and several other companies including Efforte which in turn owned a 40 percent stake in Entebbe Handling Services or ENHAS,a major contractor for ground services (passenger check-in, baggage and freight handling) at Entebbe International Airport. Saleh is alleged to have engaged in a number of scams involving the UPDF including the sale of "junk helicopters" to the army and the illegal export of gold, coltan and other minerals from the Congo during UPDF operations there in the late 1990s. His wife, Jovia Akandwanaho is also alleged to have been involved via several front companies that they both own or control.A commission of inquiry into the Congo matter implicated both, but concluded that it did not have supportable evidence to bring formal charges. However, in June 2005, the United States denied Jovia Akandwanaho a visa to visit the US on the grounds that she had engaged in corrupt acts.

❖   Muhoozi Kainerugaba—President Museveni's son, commander of the armored unit of the Presidential Guard Brigade and de facto head of the force. Kainerugaba was the former managing director of Caleb International.

❖   Samuel Kutesa—currently the Minister of Foreign Affairs, and a close advisor of the President. Kutesa was censured by the 6th Parliament for alleged conflicts of interest, but was retained in the Cabinet (indeed promoted to his current position) by the President. Kutesa was the co-owner (with Saleh) of the controlling interest of ENHAS and now owns 80 percent of the enterprise after buying Saleh's share. His late wife was a cousin of Janet Museveni. His close friend, Hope Mwesigye is the Minister for Parliamentary affairs responsible for insuring that MPs supported the repeal of Article 105(2). His daughter is married to Muhoozi Kainerugaba. Another daughter was employed by Hunton and Williams, the London-based law and public relations firm retained by the Government of Uganda, and with an office in Washington.

❖   James Muhwezi—the Minister of Health. Muhwezi was also censured by the 6th parliament, but has continued in the Cabinet.The decision by the Global Fund to Fight AIDS,Tuburculosis and Malaria on August 25th to suspend further disbursements to Uganda as a result of a "serious mismanagement" of its funds has also happened on his watch. His wife Susan is the special advisor to President Museveni on AGOA and a confidant of Janet Museveni. Her brother, Richard Kabonero, is a long-time diplomat at the Uganda Embassy in Washington. Another brother, Robert Kabonero, owns the distributorship that sells mobile phone airtime for Uganda Telecommunications Ltd., a semi-privatized firm in which the government retains a 49 percent share.

❖   Jackie Mbabazi is the Managing Director of Luwero Industries, a government—owned firm that produces ammunition for the UPDF. Her husband, Amana Mbabazi, is the Minister of Defense. She is also the sister of Hope Mwesigye, close friend of Samuel Kutesa. Mrs. Mbabazi was previously a commissioner at the Uganda Revenue Authority where she was responsible for the collection of customs duties. She was transferred from her post following an investigation of corruption in that body regarding the failure of Danze, a defunct trading company owned by the NRM, that failed to pay duties due.

The list goes on and on. It consists of a group of individuals around the President who have constructed a web of businesses, government contracts, and other schemes. Not surprisingly, they are among the most vocal supporters of the President's running for another term. Their schemes not only enrich, but also provide a flow of income and patronage that sustain the regime. It now takes approximately $50,000 or more to run a credible campaign for the National Assembly. With the 2016 elections approaching many backbenchers are beginning to scramble for cash. It is the perfect time to assist compliant MPs who voted for the repeal of term limits while denying those who did not. As previously noted, the macroeconomic implications of corruption are unclear. The Government of Uganda, especially the Ministry of Finance and the Bank of Uganda, try very hard to keep Uganda's macro-economic house in order. They should be commended for their efforts. They know that this program has been the key to the large aid flows, particularly through budget support. But so do those engaged in deals of questionable propriety. Given the magnitude of aid that now approaches three-quarters of a billion dollars a year, combined with the opportunities for skimming by Museveni's cronies, the President does not need to order the Bank of Uganda to print money as former president Daniel arap Moi ordered the Bank of Kenya to do in 1992 when that country faced its own transition to multiparty politics. Indeed, there is plenty of money and the official budgets for the Office of the President, the NRM secretariat, and the UPDF, that are not subject to the normal audit practices, or whose audits are not made public.

The IMF has begun to question the sustainability of the current situation. The Uganda Revenue Authority currently collects only 12 percent of GDP, far less than the 24 percent collected by its counterpart in Kenya where aid flows cover only 11 to 12 percent of the country's budget (Anti-Corruption Coalition Uganda, 2011). Put differently, excessively high aid flows, especially when provided as budget support, hold out few incentives for a country like Uganda to balance its budget on its own. This in turn according to Anti-Corruption Coalition Uganda nurtures corrupt practice by allowing tax cheats to continue avoiding their obligations. Low revenue generation combined with high levels of budget support also lay the foundation for a second debt crisis somewhere in the future. But, the bottom line is that this high volume of aid, particularly budget support, is a major financer of a neo-patrimonial regime (Kabwegyere, T.B, 1974).

Furthermore, another illustration of how people close to the president are getting away with corruption and misuse of public funds involves the former Army Chief of staff of the Uganda armed forces, Mr Kazini, who is a relative of the first lady. While he was the commander of the 4th Division of the UPDF based in Gulu, it was reported in the Monitor Newspaper of 22 July 1997 that while the army account at the local Uganda Commercial Bank branch was almost always empty, the commander's personal account which was in the same bank was running a turnover of over Ushs 800 million (equivalent to US$ 750,000) per month as a result of division funds being paid into it to conduct his personal business. No action was taken to investigate this mater and no action was taken against Kazini. Instead, he was later promoted from Commander of the 4 the Division to Army Chief

of Staff. He was later found to be involved in another scandal that involved the disappearance of $1 million dollars that was meant to pay Uganda soldiers in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). Nothing was done until he was implicated in the case involving the so called ghost soldiers. Though he is dead under unclear circumstances, he went unprosecuted (Anti-Corruption Coalition Uganda, 2011).

All the above cases are just examples of how lack of political will to fight corruption manifest itself in Uganda and how corruption is used by Museveni's NRM government to keep in power. They represent clear and indisputable circumstances when the due process of the law should have taken its full effect through the prosecution of corrupt high profile figures but who precisely because of their profile and closeness to the president were never prosecuted. It is also clear that the various institutions within the government responsible for combating and prosecuting corruption in the country have not been able to address corruption at the highest level. Corruption itself has been the life fabric of colonialism. All the forms of colonialism and its policies including divide-and-Rule were the highest expression of corruption. The fact that the NRM government uses corruption to hold onto power manifests how this evil colonial legacy will continue to keep Uganda more fragmented and in conflict.

2.1.3   Human Rights Conditions

Like the time of colonialism and the regimes of Museveni's predecessors, Uganda under Museveni today has registered serious human rights violations. According to the State Department's *Country Reports on Human Rights Practices in 2010*, Serious human rights problems in the country included arbitrary killings; vigilante killings; mob and ethnic violence; torture and abuse of suspects and detainees; harsh prison conditions; official impunity; arbitrary and politically motivated arrest and detention; incommunicado and lengthy pretrial detention; restrictions on the right to a fair trial and on freedoms of speech, press, assembly, and association; restrictions on opposition parties; electoral irregularities; official corruption; violence and discrimination against women and children, including female genital mutilation (FGM), sexual abuse of children, and the ritual killing of children; trafficking in persons; violence and discrimination against persons with disabilities and; restrictions on labor rights; and forced labor, including child labor.

When a regime survives on systematic violation of the fundamental rights of the people it is supposed to protect, know that such a regime is degenerating in conflict. This explains why one can easily be arrested in Uganda for choosing to walk to work in protest to the government. Some of the first "walking to work" protests organized by Activists for Change in April, 2011 were directed particularly at rising transport prices. The government broke them up, arresting and charging Besigye and more than ten other politicians with inciting violence. Three days later it broke up "walks to work" in seven towns. In Gulu, a riot developed when Mao was arrested, resulting in soldiers shooting three persons dead. The army, led by Museve-ni's son, took over the next protest from police, in which at least 47 were injured (Besigye was shot in the hand) and 220 arrested (International Crisis Group, 2012). Internal Affairs Minister Kivejinja told parliament demonstrations were not price-related but "part of a hate government campaign. It was for this reason therefore that police were instructed to disallow these activities". The next week soldiers, deployed in ten dis-tricts, including Kampala, responded to new protests with bullets and teargas, killing one person. If a regime brutally cracks down a peaceful demonstration aimed ensuring that the people's demand are heard by the government, what comes next given the Uganda's past history?

Crackdown on Homosexuals in Uganda under NRM government is yet another highest point of violation the fundamental human rights. In 2009, a Member of Parliament from the ruling National Resistance Movement, David Bahati, introduced a bill that will make it a crime to engage in, promote, or fail to report homosexuality. President Museveni reportedly has expressed his opposition to the bill. Members of Congress, the Obama Administration, and others in the international community have condemned the bill.

The draft bill states:

➢   Any person who engages in homosexuality is liable to a fine not exceeding 500 currency points or imprisonment not exceeding 10 years or both.

➢   Any person who engages in a homosexual act with someone who is under 18 years old could face the death penalty, if the offender is infected with HIV, the offender is a parent or guardian, the victim is disabled, and the accused is a serial offender.

➢   Any individual who promotes homosexuality will face five years of imprisonment and fines.

➢   Any person who fails to report commission of any offense in this act could face six months imprisonment.

According to the author of the bill, David Bahati, "the pro-gays have made the world believe that whoever will be found guilty of getting involved in homosexuality will be sentenced to death. No. Only when an adult forces a child or someone under the age of 18 into homosexuality, that is, where the death penalty should apply." In May 2010, a committee setup by the Ugandan government reportedly recommended the withdrawal of the bill from parliament. The Ugandan Parliament adjourned in May 2011 without voting on the bill. In late January 2011, David Kato, a Ugandan gay rights activist, was beaten to death. Ugandan authorities have arrested one suspect. President Obama said he was "deeply saddened" about the death of Mr. Kato.

Economically, Uganda under the current NRM government has no doubt moved from a state of economic suffocation during Obote and Amin's refimes to economic recovery with some donor support. This has been evidenced by increased level of micro-economic development in the country. But this "economic 'miracle' according to Barkan .Joel D , Professor of Political Science, University of Iowa has benefited some ethnic groups far more than others, a fact that sows the seeds of potential conflict along ethno-regional lines." By this, the NRM government continued to keep high the economic fault lines between north and south created by the British. The North continues to trail down under the weight of poverty while the south moves out of poverty. The proportion of the population living in poverty across the South and in the West for example is now roughly 27 percent, while the one in the North remains high at 63 percent followed by the East at 46 (international Crisis Group, 2012).

Furthermore, Uganda is blessed with fertile soils, regular rainfall, and sizable deposits of copper and cobalt. Its largest sector is agriculture, which employs 78% of the workforce and accounted for about 90% of export earnings and 23.4% of Uganda's Gross Domestic Product (GDP). Coffee exports make up half of its export earnings, and Uganda is Africa's largest coffee producer. Other major exports include cotton, tea, and to a lesser extent, maize. Crop production has been hampered by security concerns in the northern and western regions of Uganda. The 20 years of LRA war forced many northern Ugandans into IDPs as such it has seriously disrupted agricultural productivity in the region. According to USAID officials in Uganda, the restoration of normal farming practices is essential to the recovery process. However, the NRM government has been so reluctant in establishing programmes to facilitate the recovery process. The only government programme, Northern Uganda Social Action Fund is heavily embedded with corruption with no tangible results. Most farmers in the North are still locked in the use of traditional, less efficient farming tools while the farmers in other regions, south and west have moved ahead to using modern farming tools such as tractors distributed by the government. This is how selective NRM government is in proving the lives of Ugandans, still along the colonial south and north fault lines. The industrial sector has also expanded, with real output growth approaching 10% a year. Industry constituted 20.4% of GDP in 2004/2005. The main industries include the processing of coffee, cotton, tea, sugar, tobacco, edible oils, dairy products, and grain milling as well as brewing. Other ventures include vehicle assembly and the manufacture of textiles and metal products. According to the Economic Intelligence Unit (May 2011), real GDP growth is estimated at 6.3% in 2011, and 7% in 2012. However, the dividends of this growth are shared by few who keep Museveni in power. Above all the location of these industries in the south points to

how colonial the NRM government has remained. Worst still, Most of the companies are either owned by foreign investors or prominent Ugandan business people who get licenses corruptly in turn for financing Museveni's political ambitions.

Privatization initiatives pose a problem, as they are seen by many to be a scramble for previously state-owned property, which in most cases are purpotively purchased by the first family in the name of prominent business men and women in the country. President Museveni has heavily made use the Indians he return after being chased away by former President Idi Amin to buy off government parastatal. Examples of such deals include the sale of former Uganda Hotel property to Maldivani Group companies of Indian origin, Entebbe Airport, and many other government businesses. These matters are not only known to the highly educated but every averagely educated Ugandan.

The late June 2009 discovery of an oil reserve in the fields of western Uganda much larger than initially estimated has many speculating about the potential implications for Uganda's economy. The oil was discovered in an exploratory mission by oil and gas groups Heritage and Tullow. The oil reserve is located in the Albertine Basin, close to Uganda's border with the Democratic Republic of Congo. These are already cases of corruption in the oil deals. Some NRM members of parliament have been branded by Museveni as 'rebel Mps' for opposing him and his cohorts on the proposed oil bill which gives the minister responsible absolute powers to award contracts and revoke them at will. The NRM Mps who saw this as a channel for corruption stood up to oppose it. This has led to the expulsion of the Mps namely Theodore Ssekikubo, Wilfred Nuwagaba, Barnabas Tinkasimire, and Mohammed Nsereko from the party on on unfounded claims that they were being found guilty by the party's Central Executive Committee for malicious propaganda, decampaigning official party candidates in recently held by-elections, and working for foreign interests in oil and gas affairs (The Daily Monitor, 2013). This is how the divide-and-Rule works for Museveni and his NRM government even after 50 years of independence; work with those who are ready to cooperate even in dubious deals and throughout or at most eliminate any one who dares to oppose him.

In conclusion, Museveni's governance trajectory resembles those of Obote and Amin – without the blatant brutality – beginning with policies of tolerance and inclusion that gradually change to exclusion and repression. All three have relied on personal rule, rather than constitutional and institutional restraints, and turned increasingly to patronage and coercion to govern. Museveni is more skillful than his predecessors and had greater political opportunity to overcome the cleavage between tribes as well as between Buganda and the central government, but he has not found a workable solution. Nor has he been willing to tolerate any opposition that might threaten his rule. To work with either Buganda kingdom officials or political parties, he needs to accept restraints, but the prospect of large oil revenues makes this less likely, since they offer potential to sustain, even extend, his patronage system. Furthermore, Museveni has adroitly deflected Western criticism of his growing authoritarianism and of government corruption, while preserving substantial development aid and security assistance. However, tensions are building, and patronage and repression may be insufficient to keep Uganda stable much longer. There is likelihood of Uganda falling back into chaos if a remedy is not sorted for.

3.0   Proposals to avert these problems

As earlier on alluded to, the 53 years existence of Uganda as an independent political entity has been a continuum of political, social and economic upheaval. The problems that were set during colonialism continue to ravage this country. None of Uganda's leader has offered a tangible and lasting solutions that would keep the country in peace and prosperity. This paper articulates that the solutions to Uganda's continues unrest lye in her dubious politics in dire need of reforms and this would consequently improve people's social and economic spheres as presented below.

3.1   Good governance and Democracy

Good governance as Patrick Chabal (1992: 169) rightly notes, is a rare commodity in the history of the world especially in countries of the Third World. The process of its evolution within the context of plural politics, is often fraught with serious tensions, conflicts and contradictions. However, as Patrick Chabal further augmented,

the capacity of the political rulers to manage the process effectively, the resilience of the civil society and the nature of the international political economy are some of the important factors which will ultimately determine the extent to which democracy could cohabitate with good governance and whether both will survive in countries like Uganda. All the bad practice in Uganda from colonialism to post-colonial era were as a result of lack of good governance and democracy. Colonialism itself is undemocratic and a perfect epitome of bad governance and its bad policies that continue to persist in the governance of post-colonial Uganda can only be reduced or at most eliminated by employing good governance and democracy. Uganda needs to embrace good governance and democracy that will bring about proper accountability, transparency in her political, economic and social spheres. Good governance will further bring about prevalence of rule of law and respect for institution established for proper functioning of the state. Its good governance that will pave way for real democracy, which all the leaders of Uganda have failed to realize, including president Museveni who claims to be the only visionary Ugandan.

3.1.1 Inclusive Political Settlement

Secondly, it is imperative to mold an all-inclusive political settlement that is pegged largely on the interest and support of the peoples and communities in the country many of which hitherto have been excluded from full participation in the exercise of their country's political power.

I feel that this approach could borrow a leaf from the 1961/62 Lancaster Conference through which the country worked out its transition to political independence. This process is imperative to the resolution of political problems of Uganda and would help usher in a new beginning for Uganda. The contemporary times and its dynamics call for a new political settlement and a national democratic transition (like that which happened in South Africa- i.e. from Apartheid to the new democratic South Africa) for Uganda. I believe this is the only credible way the gun can be taken out of Uganda's politics and through which a new political consensus can be evolved that can return Uganda to the condition of an asset country which is at peace within itself and all its neighbours. It's also the only credible way we believe Uganda can be saved from degenerating into another cycle of bloodletting and possibly to a much larger scale than ever witnessed before. This approach (a national and democratic political resolution to Uganda's recurrent problems) calls, among other things, the resolution of key and accumulated outstanding issues including:

➢ The Power relations question. Establishment of Democracy and Rule of Law so absent in Uganda from colonial time till today.

➢ Viable programs to foster and institute sustainable peace.

➢ The question on the Army and Security systems.

➢ The National Resources, Land and Environmental questions especially regarding the equitable sharing of these resources irrespective of which region or tribe leadership originates from.

➢ Questions of partnerships with Foreign and International capital in National Development.

➢ Questions on wealth creation, distribution and sharing.

➢ The Humanitarian and Welfare Questions.

➢ The foreign relations question.

➢ The Question of Reparations and Compensation to the victims and Reconstruction of war destroyed areas such as Northern Uganda.

➢ The Justice and National Reconciliation questions.

➢ Corruption and its ills

Finding viable answers to these issues will be an example that will find significant positive echo throughout the length and breathe of the riparian lands of the Nile River, the Great Lakes Region and the Horn of Africa.

In making this path possible, World Powers that hold leverage over the political power circles in Uganda and its President should work in tandem with the hitherto politically marginalized and excluded forces that are representatives of the peoples and communities in the country and all other interested groups that have hitherto been excluded from real political participation in the politics of the country. It is only through this that a way can be paved out of the current threateningly explosive crisis in Uganda.

I strongly believe that to avert a deeper and bloody conflict and war, it will be imperative to make Yoweri Museveni into a Frederick de Klerk of Uganda; to mold him into a personage and political element with whom to generate the necessary democratic Uganda. All who support the rise of a replicable example of peaceful and transformative change and the overall dynamic development in the Nile River valley lands, the Great Lakes Region and the Horn of Africa countries need in this regard to lend necessary support to the people of Uganda in the long odyssey for democratic renewal of the country and entire region.

This support is not only requisite, but critical in the realization of the common democratic and developmental objectives in Uganda and the pivotal region of Africa. A new appreciation, creative and imaginative adaption of the viable examples and subsequent democratic experiences of Northern Ireland and South Africa may help to pave the way out of and forward from the political imbroglio of Uganda and to a certain extent the larger Nile River valley countries, the Great Lakes Region countries, the Horn of Africa and indeed Africa itself.

3.1.2   Restoration of presidential term limits.

Restoration of presidential term limits is one of the key recommendations to avoid the recurrence of violent change of governments in Uganda. The presidential term limit as encrypted in Article 105(2) of the Constitution that limits individual incumbents for the presidency to two elected terms was repealed in 2005 to allow President Museveni more time in office. This came to be known as project kisanja. Museveni, in essence said, "You can have multiparty politics at the price of my continuation as president." Museveni himself has constantly justified the move on various grounds—that he is still young and vigorous, that there is unfinished work to be done, and that any likely successor will likely "mess up" Uganda and "not listen to me" were he to retire and follow the model for African elder statesmen set by Julius Nyerere and Nelson Mandela. Stated simply, President Museveni now regards himself and his presidency as indispensable for Uganda's future well-being, which to me is far from the reality. The critical question is what is it that Museveni will do for Uganda again when he has failed to do it in the 29 years as president? Presidential terms limit should be restored as a sign of respect for the constitution to set a better precedence for the leaders to come. It is to me the highest expression of democracy and good governance so that other Ugandans are given chance to lead the country and avoid the bad precedence being set by the previous leaders that Uganda's leader must always be bombed out of office for change.

3.1.3   Reforms in electoral laws

Uganda's electoral laws should be reformed particularly the law that makes the chairperson of the electoral commission a political appointee by the president. This has been the source of dubious electoral practices. It should instead be replace by an electoral board representative of all the political parties. This will bring about transparency and accountability in this institution.

4.0   Conclusion

In conclusion, one may say one of the British colonial legacies in Uganda is that they brought together people who lived in their different tribal cocoons with different political, social, religious and economic settings under one demarcated territorial entity called Uganda. But the question whether this legacy sort to unify the multi-ethnic state of Uganda due to the conflicts that characterized the post-colonial Uganda keeps Ugandans pondering. The British with the divide-and-Rule produced through decentralized despotism a state that got entangle in racism, and widespread tribalism with Buganda chiefs very instrumental in consolidating British rule in the rest of Uganda, which intensified ethnic cleavages and conflicts. The British economic policies led to the underdevelopment of the local industries and stifling of the private sector and thus bringing about the racial tensions between the Indians and Africans. The colonial policies further exacerbated regional inequalities where production and wealth were effectively concentrated in the south while the north was used as labour reservoir and later soldiers, thus the famous "south and north fault line". At independence, Uganda needed a leader(s) who would work to dismantle these colonial constructions in order to set the basis for proper democratization and peaceful coexistence among the tribes. As Mamdani noted, to achieve a meaningful level of democratization,

colonial constructions that are divisive in nature had to be transcended through a process of deconstruction of its bases. The major objective of any serious nation-state project should have been to dismantle and concurrently to rebuild institutions for deconstruction of such colonial distortions in the development process of the country (Mamdani 1996:288-290)

Unfortunately, the post-colonial leaders did not work out to correct these political, social and economic distortions the colonialists created but instead inherited and nurtured this weed of division (ethnic incompatibility). Although President Museveni in his honey moon years in power tried to offer solution to these distortions but as time went on, he is seen to have fallen back in to the mistakes of his predecessors with some political analysts saying his regime is increasingly becoming worse than that of his predecessors, Obote and Amin. The reforms by the political leadership that inherited these distortions were limited as concerns the deconstruction of the political bases of ethnic consciousness, restructuring the economy to defuse the ethnic and regional material expression and the liberation of the civil society. That means no post-colonial government seems to have provided a sustainable solution to the confusions created by the British thus explaining why we see recurrence of violent conflicts in this country.

However, Uganda may have a grip of peace, unity and development if the above mentioned recommendations are taken into consideration.

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