

An Assessment of Relationship Between Permanent and Temporary Executives in Ethiopian Bureaucracy

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Abstract

Politics - administration interface is the relationship between politicians and public servants which lies in the heart of public administration. Ethiopia has officially been branding herself as developmental state since the early 2000s. In the context of developmental state, organic and symbolic relationship between the politics and Public service is vital in achieving developmental goals. The aim of this research is examining the nature of interface between leaders in political office and the bureaucracy in the Ethiopian civil service. To this end, the research question is: "What is the nature of interface between leaders in political office and the bureaucracy in the Ethiopian civil service?" The research approach is basically qualitative case study. The actual data collection has covered three ministries. The instruments that have been used for collecting data are in-depth interview with key informants; focus group discussions; and document analysis. Given the findings of this research, one of the key challenges that are hindering the Ethiopian federal civil service from being developmental is the lack of development of a professional and politically neutral civil service. Hence, the Ethiopian bureaucracy lacks some attributes of bureaucracies in developmental states.

Keywords: Ethiopian public service, politicization, bureaucracy

I. Background

The working of government rests on two pillars – political and permanent executive. A good relationship between politics and the administration is essential for successful government. Whereas political executive is temporary and usually representing the party in power, bureaucracy is permanent. 'Bureaucrat' in this paper refers to non - elective permanent government officials involved in government administration and is used interchangeably with 'administrator' and 'civil servant'.

Politics - administration interface is the relationship between politicians and public servants which lies in the heart of public administration. It can serve as guideline, value and norm in which roles and responsibilities of those in public offices have to employ and adhere to. The politics-bureaucracy interface is defined as "the particular forms in which politicians and bureaucrats engage with one another and the factors that shape this engagement" (Dasaandi 2014). Theoretically, they play different roles. For instance, politicians make policies and administrators aid and advise the government to make plans and implement them. But, in practice their roles often conflict and overlap because the line separating development of policy and its implementation is quite blurred.

A study on the relationship between politicians and civil servants is one of the core themes in public administration. The necessity to understand the relationship between politicians and bureaucrats in public administration derives from the fact that in many cases it is:

- (1) central to the success or failure to implement institutional (administrative) reforms;
- (2) fundamental for strengthening institutions and achieving successful development outcomes;
- (3) necessary for public sector efficiency and for improving the functioning of the modern democratic state;
- (4) the key feature of the successful developmental state, [which Ethiopia is claiming]; and
- (5) it builds citizens' trust in government (in both politicians and bureaucrats, with a clear distinction between them), and their perceptions about the performance of the entire governmental machinery (Vigoda-Gadot and Mizrah 2014: 66).

Organic and symbolic relationship between the politics and Public service is vital in achieving developmental goals. The Public Service must feel and champion society's aspirations, must serve people's interests, if not in the short term, in the long term. Hence, as a developmental state it is important to communicate the visions and missions of the state and the public service to the citizens. This helps to enhance genuine trust between leaders and citizens.

Thus, a successful politics - administrative interface within the public service is at the heart of good public-sector governance and effectiveness, which in turn, is critical for improved public service delivery and for the achievement of national development goals. For this reason, better understanding of how politicians and bureaucrats engage with one another and identification of the structural constraints and opportunities that affect this engagement is a vital task.

Separation between political and administrative positions is a generally recognized principle of the professional civil services, as well as a foundation for building viable administration system capable to function efficiently. However, countries can be placed into three broad categories, based on the type of relationships

between politicians and bureaucrats.

1. Developmental states- where there exists close relationship between political leaders and high-level bureaucrats, with the latter given a great deal of autonomy in designing policies.
2. Predatory states- which are again marked by a close working relationship between politicians and bureaucrats. However, in this context bureaucrats are largely controlled by political leaders, and therefore have little autonomy or influence.
3. States - where there is at least formally – a much greater degree of distance between politicians and bureaucrats. Though the level of bureaucratic autonomy varies from one state to another state, in general bureaucrats tend to be more autonomous than in predatory states, but far less so than in developmental states.

The relationship between politicians and bureaucrats receives significant attention in the literature on developmental states. Generally speaking, the literature identifies seven key characteristics of the politics-bureaucracy interface which leads to successful bureaucracy in developmental states:

- (1) A core group of ‘developmental’ senior politicians and bureaucrats who work closely together; 2) Shared developmental values and vision; 3) Shared social class or educational background; 4) Senior bureaucrats who were allowed to have significant influence in policy design; 5) Bureaucracies that were both meritocratic and ‘coherent’ – having corporate objectives, values and norms that are widely observed; 6) Significant movement between senior political and bureaucratic positions; and 7) Bureaucracies that were often subsumed within the dominant political party (Dasaandi 2014:4).

In developmental states, therefore, politicians and bureaucrats work closely together and there is little separation of roles between the two. However, politicians and civil servants have differing roles.

It is highlighted that "the work of the civil service requires a “fine balance” between being neutral and non-political and being politically sensitive and responsive" (speech of Prime Minister Lee on 26, 2016 April at the Administrative Service promotion ceremony).

In summary, it can be said that a strong and effective public service should have several key defining features. As already pointed out a public service belongs to and is a key component of the state apparatus. There must be a strong organic link between the Public service and the state. This entails a shared vision and total acceptance by the public service of the value ends of organizational action set by the state. Within the context of competitive multi-party politics, it entails neutrality from partisan politics while committing to and championing national interests.

This paper aims to scrutinize the politics - bureaucracy relations that occurred in Ethiopian civil service especially in the federal institutions. This is approached from the developmental states perspective. By doing so, the chapter discusses and answers the research question: How do politicians and bureaucrats interact with each other within the context in which they operate; and how the relationship influences the functions of public service? In search for answer/answers for this research question, variables which are vital for good relation between political executives and civil servants are discussed. Accordingly, Shared values and vision; and Influence of bureaucrats in policy design are the variables which are used to assess a relationship between political executives and civil servants.

2. Statement of the Problem

Public services belong to and are key components of the state apparatus. They depend on the concrete functioning of the state. Consequently, they derive their vision and mission from the vision and mission of a particular state at a particular point in time and contribute to the functioning, and effectiveness of the state. Hence, public services must have key features that reflect their organic relationship with the state.

Ethiopia has officially been branding herself as developmental state since the early 2000s. In the context of developmental state, a basic framework of a public administration might be seen as incorporating a highly competitive, extensive, relatively efficient and effective public bureaucracy. Thus, the creation of a meritocratic bureaucracy and extensive state capacity is also required; and it is a central task (Acemoglu et al. 2001:29).

Therefore, Public service, in a developmental state context means: “an efficient and effective state administration or apparatus; one that is committed to clearly outlined and systematically implemented development plans and programs that consciously seek to address poverty and underdevelopment” (Maphunye J. 2009:1).

Cognizant to this argument, therefore, as a developmental state, Ethiopia needs to have a public service which is competent, professional, autonomous, and strong among other qualities; if it desires to use the state as a very important vehicle to realize its developmental objectives.

However, many researches on Ethiopian developmental state (see for example, UNDP, 2012; Tesfaye 2011; Desta 2012; Fantini 2013) mention many virtues which the Ethiopian public bureaucracy lacks *Vis –a –Vis* developmental state qualities. *Inter alia*, lack of professionalism and commitment needed to mobilize the limited resources of the state for development (Desta Asayehgn 2012:7); lack of political neutrality of the bureaucracy

(Tesfaye n.d:1); lack of institutional autonomy (Desta 2012:5; Fantini 2013:4) are said to be the traps that impede the bureaucracy from accomplishing its *raison d'être*. In the same line of critics, Tesfaye (n.d:1) stated that “civil service structures and other benefits generated by state – led development were frequently manipulated by the government apparatus and ruling elites as a source of patronage”. What is more, bureaucratic elites who design and manage Ethiopia’s short and long-term plans are not politically neutral.

In this juncture, therefore, it is imperative to question why the Ethiopian civil service has failed to effectively realize its mission - effective implementation of developmental objectives. To this effect, looking at the Ethiopian civil service and searching for the developmental civil service attributes which Ethiopian civil service misses, in this regard, is a critical task.

This research, therefore, has made the attempt to scrutinize the Ethiopian public bureaucracy in terms of its relationship with politics.

3. Objective of the Study

The overall objective of this study is examining the nature of interface between leaders in political office and the bureaucracy in the Ethiopian civil service.

The specific objectives are:

1. To scrutinize whether the politicians and the civil servants do share common Values and Objectives in Ethiopian Civil Service;
2. To evaluate the level of understanding and commitment of the politicians and the civil servants towards the mission and policies of their respective ministries;
3. To evaluate and level the Position of Bureaucrats in Policy Making-Processes; and
4. To provide workable recommendations based on the findings and developmental state literature.

4. Research Questions

This research is guided by the main research question: What is the nature of interface between leaders in political office and the bureaucracy in the Ethiopian civil service? The research also sets the following pertinent specific research questions:

1. Do politicians and civil servants share common Values and Objectives in Ethiopian Civil Service?
2. To what extent the politicians and the civil servants do understand and are committed to Mission and Policies of their respective ministries?
3. What is the Position of Bureaucrats in Policy Making-Processes?
4. What appropriate measures shall be taken to build up developmental civil service?

II. Methodology

• Qualitative Case Study Approach

The research approach is basically qualitative in nature and mixed methods are used as data collection techniques so that supplementary quantitative data are used in simple descriptive statistics. Using qualitative research methods give the opportunity to dive deeper into the investigated phenomenon. Strategically, this qualitative research employed an exploratory and explanatory research with certain shared characteristics of descriptive research. It is a *holistic multi – case study research*, but the researcher is critical of whether the results can be applied in different contexts.

• Data Sources and Data Collection Instruments

The study has collected, collated and analyzed both primary and secondary data. The actual data collection has covered key offices within the public service which are selected purposely. To this effect, three ministries: Ministry of Public Service and Human Resource, Ministry of Finance and Economic Development, and Ministry of Industry which are purposely selected for their strong relevance vis-à-vis the issue under study.

As to secondary data, various materials including periodicals, books, and a range of relevant sources which are combined with data from previous official studies such as reports on progress, evaluation and seminars, and unpublished reports are searched.

The instruments that have been used for collecting data are in-depth interview with key informants; focus group discussions; and document analysis. The total of sixty-three personnel which include senior officers, senior experts, team leaders, and technical experts, from the three ministries have participated in interview, and focus group discussions. The same group and number of personnel also filled in the questioner. These peoples have been specifically selected for their specific knowledge of the information needed for the study. A review and analysis of documents also has enabled the research not only to look for facts, but also to read between the lines and pursue corroborative evidence elsewhere.

III. Data Presentation and Analysis

1. Assessment of Shared Values and Objectives in Ethiopian Civil Service

There are important factors that shape the politics-bureaucracy interface and its impact on policy; these factors are also the drivers of attitudes and behaviors. Shared values and objectives is the most important factor for smooth relationship between political executive and civil servants so as to effectively implement policies. Positive and close working relationship between political and bureaucratic leaders, in developmental states, was central to their transformation. In many of the developmental states, politicians and bureaucrats had common ends and visions. There, civil servants and politicians shared development-focused values and objectives – something that the political leaders actively fostered. This shared developmental vision was seen as key to the success of these countries.

The notion of an esprit de corps among politicians and bureaucrats is identified in virtually all accounts of developmental states. Some unwritten conventions between politicians and civil servants construct a shared understanding that impacts the functioning of their relation. A key argument in the literature on developmental states is that political leaders actively sought to promote values based on public service, nation building and development. As Saxena (2011: 38) describes, in the case of Singapore, for example, the People's Action Party (PAP) government 'did expect the civil service to be aligned to its vision.'

Yet, while it is not possible to replicate developmental states' model elsewhere in Ethiopia, lessons across different contexts suggest characteristics of the sort of political-administrative interaction that supports the development of developmental bureaucracy. The question here is, therefore, how these states managed building this shared value and objective. A number of factors are said to have contributed to the closeness of this relationship between political leaders and bureaucrats in developmental states.

- **Vision Guidance and Shared Vision**

As far as the relationship between bureaucracy and politics is concerned, the general expectation regarding politics bureaucracy relationship is that a shared vision and a total acceptance by the Public service of the value ends of organizational action set by the state.

After the completion of the five years development plan called the Plan for Accelerated and Sustained Development to End Poverty (PASDEP), in 2010, the grand developmental plan with clearly stated long term vision, the GTP, was launched. In what seems a differing attribute than its predecessors, the GTP stipulates Ethiopia's vision as: ". . . to become a country where democratic rule, good governance and social justice reign, upon the involvement and free will of its peoples, and once extricating itself from poverty to reach the level of middle-income economy as of 2020-2023" (MoFED 2010: 21).

Besides the democratic values embedded in the overall vision, the GTP further explicates the vision on poverty alleviation by giving specifics on the aspects of the economic vision. It says that Ethiopia's vision specifically on economic sector includes:

Building an economy which has a modern and productive agricultural sector with enhanced technology and an industrial sector that plays a leading role in the economy, sustaining economic development and securing social justice and increasing per capita income of the citizens so as to reach the level of those in middle-income countries (MoFED, 2010: 21)

The first phase of this overarching plan, extending for five years, 2010/11 to 2014/15 and covering a wide range of economic and infrastructural development has been completed and the second GTP is currently underway. The explicitly stated emphasis on economic development and the clarity of goals, such as eradication of poverty and elevating the country into a middle-income status by a definite date, indicate the developmentalist orientation of the contemporary Ethiopian state. Put differently, it can be argued that the Ethiopian state already has the requisite ideological orientation (Sisay and Regassa, cited in Ayenachew 2014).

However, many reports of ministry of Public Service and Human Resource (the then ministry of Civil service and Good Governance) (see for example, 2014/15 and 2015/16 annual reports) revealed that most of the higher leadership both at the federal and regional governments were unable to clearly define and set the missions and visions of their respective institutions based on context and respective environment. For this reason, they were also unable to lead, monitor and evaluate their respective institutions.

Thus, it is important to make sure that everyone has a clear understanding of his/her responsibilities. Officials must deliver a strong professional commitment to their respective institution's missions and objectives. Both must work together to deliver the best outcomes available in the political space and to help wider society trust that it is getting a good deal.

To improve internal and external engagement in the work of the Civil Service, to clearly communicate the role of the Civil Service and to ensure that accurate, relevant and timely information about the Civil Service is accessible and available to both staff and stakeholders. Close relationship between political leaders and bureaucrats is fostered by a set of shared values (Charlton, 1991; Leftwich, 1995). When political executives and civil servants have shared values, it is likely for them to pursue a specific common goal. In other words, they want to obtain certain policy outcome, indicating what they want to realize in the society at large. Thus, there has to be a sort of goal consensus. The point is that both parties, i.e., political executives and civil servants should agree that the goal of their cooperation is serving the public interest. To build and reach at some sort of common

understanding, "both parties need correct information, and this information should be as symmetric as possible divided between civil servants or political executives" (Schreurs et al. nd: 25). Thus, everything that happens in the public service should be accessible for all citizens. Accordingly, transparency and accessibility of information, not confidentiality, have primary importance.

The next issue is, therefore, exploring whether this vision is shared among the political leadership and between the political leadership and the civil service. Therefore, it is sound to look at whether Ethiopian public administration possesses factors that lead to the creation of shared values and visions. To this effect, it is important to address pertinent questions, like:

1. What fosters the creation of an esprit de corps among politicians and bureaucrats that focuses on promoting development within a country?
2. What prevents the creation of such a shared set of values and objectives?

A) Class and educational background

Common background of political leadership is said to have a positive impact on the leadership of developmental states in sharing common visions and values. Part of the explanation for the shared set of values and vision among politicians and bureaucrats in developmental states is that they often had similar class and/or higher education backgrounds. In the case of Japan, for example, Johnson (1982: 57-59) emphasizes the important role of the *gakubatsu*, the ties among classmates from elite university – particularly, the alumni of Tokyo University Law School (see also Evans 1989). This was also the case with South Korea, where the majority of those who passed the civil service entrance examination were from Seoul National University, and 40% had come from two prestigious secondary schools in Seoul (Kim 2007). Similarly, in the case of Botswana, significant attention has been given to senior politicians and bureaucrats coming from the same cattle-owning class (see Charlton 1991; Acemoglu et al. 2001). In Singapore, political leaders and senior bureaucrats had formed close ties at elite universities before entering public service. Politicians and bureaucrats tended to be 'English-educated middle-class men' (Saxena 2011: 40).

Currently, as far as the background is concerned, Ethiopian political leadership is diverse. At least three group of leadership can be identified. The first group consists of politicians and senior civil servants who were attending the same universities and schools. The group also emerged from student organizations and study groups at Addis Ababa University in the 1960s and the 1970s. Hence, the school link is a common ground for these prominent leaders. What is more, the current core political leadership, particularly those who come from ANDM and TPLF; and partly from OPDO and SEPDM have their background to the student movement and the subsequent political organizations that went to armed struggle. Attending the same schools and being members of political groups in the protracted armed struggle, this group is likely to share same values and vision. It is mainly this group that has adopted and moved forwards the ideals of developmentalism.

The second category of political leadership refers to those who were not in the armed struggle and joined the leadership in post 1991. This group had a very diverse background and different interests. The only common background this group may share with the first group, if mentioning worth, is that the majority of them were strong ethno - nationalists. Thus, almost all of the leaders came from political organizations that represent respective ethnic group's interest, not national interest. For this reason, there have been networks based on kin, ethnicity, or region, which tend to promote the use of public office for the advantage of group members, rather than for broader national development goals. Similar views, of course, have been consistently reflected by the incumbent. For example, *Addis Raey*¹ (2017) stated that narrow ethno - centrism and chauvinism are the main threats of the regime and also the country. According to this document, significant numbers of politicians and senior bureaucrats have been observed to give priority to the demands of those in their kin group.

The third collection is relatively junior and is mainly formed through informal networks based on friendship, business and patronage. This view argues that many of the top leadership has come together not on common backgrounds but based on common current interest – rent - seeking. Observers assert that such informal networks have prevented the formation of a shared development-oriented ethos among politicians and bureaucrats. Instead, wide rent- seeking networks have been established and have exacerbated the problems of good governance and corruption.

Here, what is also important to note is that the role of leadership is also central to the formation of a development-centered ethos among politicians and bureaucrats. This has been mentioned in studies that consider widespread bureaucratic corruption. Studies note that, for example, if corruption is prevalent among political leaders, it is almost inevitable that the bureaucracy will be afflicted by systematic corruption (Hyden et al. 2003; Evans 1989). This is to say that behavior in the civil service is very much dependent on how the political leadership behaves. If the elected politicians are not corrupt, they tend to set an example that is emulated in the bureaucracy. If, they are corrupt, this tends to spread to the civil service too. Thus, it is logical to conclude that it

¹ '*Addis Raey*' in Amharic, meaning 'new vision' is the bi - monthly ideological indoctrination magazine of the ruling party, EPRDF.

is, unlike many developmental states, the political leadership in Ethiopian public administration failed to make the bureaucracy developmental. This is because the leadership lacks solid unity around the values and vision of developmentalism.

Therefore, it can be said that, the current political leadership is the combination of three different groups. This diversity is in terms of both background and interest. This is to say that there is little in common among the political leadership to share with. It can be said that all groups come to leadership not because they share common causes but with the desire to maximize group and/or individual self-interests.

On this same issue, key informants, mainly veteran politicians and senior public service officials, demonstrate that the first-generation leaders were relatively homogenous in terms of, at least, ideological orientation. As a result, the leadership in this group shared common national values under similar vision guidance. In addition, the role of this group in inculcating the ideals of developmentalism and binding cohesiveness of the leadership was critical. However, through time, as the leadership circle increases in size, the heterogeneity of the leadership increased. At the same time the role of ideology, value and vision as connecting factor gradually eroded. Instead, ethnicity, and informal rent-seeking networks have become dominant factors of group cohesiveness. In the whole, the fact that particularly the political leadership is most often perceived as very homogeneous by the outside observers; however, the inner look does in fact show a slightly different picture. Therefore, divergent interests, values and visions are apparent among the leadership. As a result, the leadership lacks the very important quality of developmental leadership.

B) Political continuity and Development success

Political continuity is viewed as an important factor in promoting an esprit de corps among politicians and bureaucrats in developmental states (Leftwich 1995). In Singapore, for example, the continued rule of the People's Action Party helped promote the shared values and goals of politicians and bureaucrats (Saxena 2011). Likewise, in Botswana, as noted previously, the BDP party's long rule was important.

More frequent political change makes it much more difficult to create the shared values and objectives among politicians and bureaucrats that are a hallmark of political-administrative relations in developmental states - because different political leaders have different objectives. As different studies, for example, Smith (2009) point out, those bureaucrats may be more resistant to implementing changes promoted by politicians, on the basis that the same political leaders may not be in power after the next election. In Botswana, for example, the ruling BDP party has been in power since the country's independence. This political continuity has enabled a close relationship to develop shared values and objectives.

Despite the fact that political discontinuity is not a challenge so far and there is a visible progress in the country's economic growth, the Ethiopian developmental state is challenged in its move forward by both internal and external forces. One such pertinent challenge is the existence of chronic political difference impeding the possibility of consensus on major issues. Of course, one of the typical characteristics of the Ethiopian political landscape is the diametric differences on almost all important national issues that are so strong and emotionally charged that political dialogue among the elites is hardly possible. Many of the differences are fundamental to the views of different political groups on issues such as ethno - linguistic federalism as a political arrangement, the appropriateness of revolutionary democracy as an ideology, the development of democratic process in the country, conditions of human rights and political freedom, etc.

In the same token, the development success of a country has also been highlighted as a key factor in reinforcing the shared ethos between politicians and bureaucrats. In the case of Botswana, for example, rapid economic growth following independence was a key factor in reinforcing the 'ideology of developmentalism' that permeated the political leadership and bureaucracy (Charlton 1991).

In this regard, the government of Ethiopia claims that it is creating rich farmers in the rural areas and emerging private investors, through micro and small businesses, in the urban areas. However, this is highly contested by opposition and critics. For this group of people, macro-economic conditions such as the ever-increasing income gap, too much dependence on foreign aid than private investment, uncontrolled inflation, imbalanced development between the urban and rural areas and the small size but highly corrupt private sector are in the list of challenges to the Ethiopian developmental state.

In East Asian developmental states, national consensus among the nations was a great contributing factor for their success in economic development. National consensus in countries like Ethiopia, where there are diverse ethnic groups and a country claiming developmental state is paramount. The developmental state in Ethiopia also has tried a lot to develop national consensus against poverty. However, there are still challenges to include all the nations as the situation needs. There are ideas that move against the direction of the developmental state in Ethiopia.

As a result, years after Ethiopia has officially claimed to have adopted the developmental state model, there is still fierce debate and disagreement continuing on such basic issues as: what is a developmental state? is developmental state relevant to Ethiopia? what type of developmental state should Ethiopia follow? which country should be a model for Ethiopia to learn from? and so on.

Besides, the lower level structure of the public administration is highly charged with the tension of the ethnic politics that is producing a “negative impact on the creation of civic country wide citizenship for successful developmental state” Bonda cited in (Ayenachew 2014:34). To lead the transformation with legitimacy and credibility, therefore, the state has to work on these issues of differences as much as it is working on economic growth.

2. Understanding of and Commitment to Mission and Policies

The agencies comprising the federal bureaucracy have specific duties, termed “missions” and hire individuals who are assigned specific tasks. Commitment to social objectives is one thing and dancing to the tune of a political party is another. In practice, however, commitment has assumed the perverted form of politicization and sycophancy.

In developmental states, regardless historical and cultural traditions in each country, the civil service has always had the same mission and the same tasks to carry out, i.e. to ensure professional, reliable, impartial and politically neutral execution of the tasks of the State. No matter which party is in government, public officials are supposed to pursue its policy with equal competence and dedication.

Very often, it is seen that the Ethiopian bureaucracy simply acts according to the dictates of the political executive without any independent examination of issues. This trend can be attributed to the ever-growing political interference in the affairs of administration. Political interference and impartial administration cannot co-exist. While the administrators do not perceive their role in policy making as subservient to the political leaders because of their knowledge and expertise, yet they have to conform to the prerequisites of representative politics. The political leaders claim to be the true representatives of the people and know what is good for them and because of their superior position succeed in dictating the terms to the bureaucrats. The bureaucrats who are not obliging enough soon find themselves in trouble. The political masters have many means of coercion – both overt and covert. Political interference in all matters including those where the statutory power is vested in the civil servants is a constant phenomenon.

At ministry level, both the top officials and experts need to understand the mission and policies attached to respective ministries. Without clear understanding of mission and policies, a given ministry cannot fulfil its role. As a result, it hinders the overall efforts of development by causing implementation trap. Hence, it leads to the proposition that political executives and civil servants must understand that they occupy strategic positions in Government.

In this regard, various government documents, interviews and discussions with politicians and civil servants reveal that lack of commitment and understanding of missions and policies of respective ministries are challenging implementation of government policies. For example, a state minister, who was a key informant in one of the ministries not only expressed his dissatisfaction with the performance of bureaucracy, he alleged that the bureaucrats lack commitment. He referred to the administrative machinery as ‘the stumbling block’ in the country’s progresses and stresses the necessity of creating an administrative cadre committed to national objectives and responsive to Ethiopia's developmental needs.

Similarly, the reports of ministry of Public Service and Human Resource (the then ministry of Civil service and Good Governance) (see for example, 2014/15 and 2015/16 annual reports) disclose that there is critical capacity gap and lack of commitment on the side of higher leadership. The top leadership of regional and city administration civil services, including both appointed politicians and senior bureaucrats, lack:

full understanding of government policies and directions, essence of renaissance, and development plans in their respective leadership; strong commitment in the struggle against rent - seeking attitudes and behaviors and actions as well as taking corrective measures to solve problems related to good governance; appropriate leadership in leading the development/change army by understanding their role from the national and developmental viewpoint. Because of this, the implementation of the set objective is between 75% and 50% (2014/15 annual evaluation report, MoCSGG).

Such problems are also, according to one of the interviewed state ministers, similar to middle level and lower level leaders. Most of the middle level leaders come to civil service from various political posts in *wereda* and city administrations. They are recruited basically not for their merit but for their political loyalty. So, they are not familiar with the missions and objectives of their respective ministries and departments for which they are responsible.

The problem in this regard is that, in such an environment same product, services are given in no uniform manner to its users. The members of an institution will not have equal knowledge of same issue, organizational culture, routine tasks, objective, vision and goal or the ethics needed by the establishment they are working for.

On this same issue, civil servants were interviewed in the case ministries. Interviewees were asked two questions to notice whether civil servants share sense of missions; and if they are committed to policies of their respective ministries. Their responses confirm the assertions of both the reports of the ministry of public service and human resource and that of the state minister.

As it reads from table 1, the significant majority (77.6%) of the respondents said they do not share sense of their respective ministries' mission. Similarly, 58.8% of the respondents replied that they do not strive towards the implementation of the policies. The messages are clear: the majority of the civil servants lack the minimum requirement – understanding and sharing the mission of their respective institutions which is *raison d'être* of any institution. In other words, they do not know their ministry's contribution to the public and to the whole national development. They also lack commitment to implement the policies of their ministries under their jurisdiction. If one fails to understand the mission of his/her institution, he/she cannot understand his/her importance and contribution in the institution.

As a result, such a civil servant does not know what to do and why to do. Thus, not only sharing visions and missions of the civil service, it is unlikely to understand the responsibilities as an individual civil servant. In such circumstances, it is not logical to expect vision sharing and commitment.

For a minister, it is common to staff his/her own choice. Specially, the posts of the advisor and the directorate directors are recognized as incontestably the minister's personal appointment. Not infrequently, the minister chooses such people either through recommendation or network. The problem, in this regard, is that the majority of the officials staffed by the minister's personal appointment are without the necessary qualifications. Their experience and knowledge regarding the posts they hold is lower than the experts under their office. Because there is difference between senior civil servants and middle and lower rank civil servants, it is highly unlikely that they will share the sense of mission. Senior Civil Service in politically dependent civil service system will stress the compliance in their day-to-day actions, as they can be replaced by the minister at any time.

The researcher's observation also complements the reports of ministry of Public service and Human resource. The researcher participated in many discussions where ministers, state ministers, and directorate directors of one of the case ministries vis. ministries of Industry. In such discussions, research findings related to issues which are under the jurisdiction of the ministry, were presented by some research institute and there were many points of disagreements among the top leaders of the ministry. Their points of departure were not limited to the findings of the researches but also to the very mandate and mission of the ministry. In this regard, it will be helpful to see two issues that created disagreement among the leadership. The first is related to the jurisdiction of the ministry. Here, the point up on which they failed to reach an agreement was that weather attracting to and managing investment in regional states is the jurisdiction of the ministry or not.

The second issue is related to the very pillar of the industry policy of the country. The research finding stressed that domestic investment is the engine of our industrialization per the policy, however, little attention is given to the domestic investment and consequently failed to play its crucial role in industrializing the country. Contrary to this argument, the leaders of the ministry said that it is not the domestic investment that plays crucial role in industrializing the country but the foreign one. On this very policy issue higher officials debated and failed to reach an agreement.

So, what is the implication of these facts? First, the top leaders do not have common understanding on the objectives and mandate of their respective ministries. Second, the leaders do not understand, even the pillars of main policies. As a result, they strive towards different ends. This, in turn, leads to in cohesive leadership with less esprit de corps. Consequently, it hinders the implementation of developmental state objectives in respective ministries.

The lack of clarity and incompetence among the lower level hierarchy of government structure is another serious challenge. The implementation of developmental policies is being undertaken by people of least competence. There seems to be a paucity of solidified understanding about what developmental state is and how Ethiopia is embracing it. However, many of the middle level civil servants who were interviewed and those participated in focus group discussions identified themselves as having adequate information about missions, general strategies and principles of respective ministry.

Government makes particular decisions, identifies priorities and government structure is adapted to these priorities. For instance, nowadays the main priority is to attract foreign investment; accordingly, the ministry tries to attract investments and ensure that foreign money—as much as possible—enters Ethiopia and creates employment opportunities (one of the respondents in ministry of Industry).

As for the strategy, our particular ministry has an action plan as its strategy. The main priorities and activities are defined in this strategy; in particular, what is a priority this year, what should be implemented, how it should be implemented and what results should be achieved (one of the respondents).

I have an experience of working in different public service offices and it is different everywhere. In some cases, strategies are well defined, in others - not so well (one of the respondents).

Thus, the logical question that follows should be, if there is no gap in understanding the main strategies and objectives of their respective ministry, what is the problem to strive towards those goals?

Strategies and policies are well known among civil servants. Much training has been given on main policies and philosophy of developmentalism. The problem, I think, is lack of internalizing and

devoting towards the implementation of the policies and strategies. For me the relevant matter is that one should be sincere and genuine, taking work close to one's heart (one of the respondents).

Hence, it can be said that one of the pillars of the developmental bureaucracy - shared values, consensus on objectives and esprit de corps are missed. Regarding this, De Waal (2013) warns that in a country as wide and diverse as Ethiopia, implementing a policy without creating a common mind set first runs the risk of degenerating the principles, no matter how sophisticated the theoretical foundations are, in to a set of dogma parroted by party cadres, with hardly any understanding of the real meaning and implication of the policies and strategies. Confusion between political and developmental goals along with the incompetence of the bureaucracy and the growing of individual and group interests contest the effective implementation of the development policies at the grassroots level.

3 The Position of Bureaucrats in Policy Making-Processes

One of the basic characteristics of the Weberian ideal/legal rational bureaucracy is that bureaucrats should be politically neutral. That is, bureaucrats are not expected to be involved in the process of policy making, but rather they are only expected to implement policies made by the executive arm of government. What this suggests is that the elected political executives or appointed cabinet ministers are expected to make laws, while the bureaucrats take order from the executive for the implementation of the policies formulated. The top bureaucrats could at best play advisory roles to the politicians in the process of policy making. Going by this Weberian principle of political neutrality for bureaucrats, it is only technocrats who are appointed by the executive head of government as cabinet ministers play any major role in the process of policy formulation.

Politics has been identified as a key issue to understand policy management. Though not in Weberian sense, policy making in neo patrimonial regimes is totally dominated by political elite. It has been observed by Hyden (2006) that in neo-patrimonial systems the president and other politicians at the top play a significant role in policy implementation. He postulates that because African governments do not control power, politics emerges as supreme and undermines other rational bases for policy determination; subsequently, a policy deficit is caused. The transition from the movement type of politics to competitive politics has further compounded this problem because the ruling will ensure that there is total monopoly over state resources (Lindberg 2003:123). This, according to the author, leads those in power to become directly involved in policy management even where the work would have been delegated to street level bureaucrats.

Like many other developing countries, undue pervasive political influence on the public is one of the constraining factors to effective policy implementation in Ethiopian public administration. Usually, the political leaders formulate policies and as well control and direct the implementation activities of the policy. This situation is not proper as such controls and directives are mostly motivated by selfish personal or political interests. Indeed, the bureaucracy cannot effectively implement policies and meaningfully contribute to national development if it is fettered, controlled and directed by political authorities. This is more so, since in extreme cases, of such political control, the bureaucrats are not even allowed to take decisions or actions on basic routine administrative matters without consultation and the consent of relevant political authorities. In this process, much time and energy are wasted and prompt actions required for effective implementation of policies hampered.

The developmental state literature, however, negates this principle of political neutrality for bureaucrats in the process of developmental policy formulation and implementation. Instead of only focusing on the implementation of policy by the bureaucrats, the developmental state's orthodoxy holds strongly that bureaucrats remain necessary institutions for a state to achieve development. It is within this context that an attempt would be made under this section to examine the roles of the technocrats as well as the bureaucrats in the process of developmental policy making and implementation.

One of the major issues concerning the politics - bureaucracy relation is the power, or the role of political executive and bureaucracy in the policy-making processes. That process consists of several steps: agenda setting, policy formulation, policy decision-making, policy implementation, and policy evaluation. In search for clarity, in this study the policy cycle is divided into two parts: developing policy and implementing policy.

Roughly put, one could say that there exist three different types of tasks, that are dealt with by different types of civil servants (Smith, 1988), namely: direct servicing of wishes, requests and needs of people (this type is dealt with by administrative or lower civil servants); coordinating and organizing of the administration unit performance (type that is managed by managers or higher civil servants); and preparations, development and evaluation of public policies (that type is handled by public policy designers or high civil servants).

Given this, therefore, one can posit that the extent to which politics influence the bureaucratic activities will continue to determine and shape the extent to which policies can be properly and effectively implemented by the public bureaucracy in Ethiopian public service. The influence the bureaucrats can have on policy design and execution depends on the type of the relationship that exists between them. Literature on public administration continues to debate, sometimes contentiously, over the relationship between politicians and bureaucrats in the

policy making process. That debate has concentrated on the inability to draw a line, even a fine one, between the two roles and, conversely, to indicate where they converge in the policymaking and implementation processes.

The problem also has much to do with the liberal democratic ethos that entrusts elected officials with policy making, while the bureaucracy is seen as subservient to those officials, whose decisions they are expected to implement (Montjoy and Watson 1995). The reality in the ground of effective public administration, however, demonstrates that the role of politicians is to set priorities and policy directions, to make political decisions taking into consideration public needs and requirements. Administrators are involved in both the formulation and the implementation of public policy. Because policy decisions profoundly influence who gets what, this involvement in policy inevitably involves them in politics (Starling 1982). Starling further asserts that purely administrative matters can seldom be separated from politics and administrators also become involved in policy formulation when they recommend amendments to existing laws to the Legislature. Civil service organizations are closest to where the action is and therefore are more likely to see imperfections and incompleteness in the laws. Indeed, legislatures expect that those who deal continuously with problems will suggest improvements (starling 1982).

In the same line of argument, Dye (1995:312) confirms that “bureaucrats hire personnel, draw up contracts, spend money and perform tasks. All of these activities involve decisions by bureaucrats – decisions that determine policy. As society has grown in size and complexity, the bureaucracy has increased its role in the policy - process.” Dye (1995:313) further asserts that policy implementation often requires the development of formal rules and regulations by bureaucracies.

In carrying out its role, a bureaucracy does not only serve to implement policies made by the decision makers, but also runs policy mostly made its own, such as technical guidelines, circulars and others. The strong role of bureaucracy in policy process is also caused by several factors that are the source of power of bureaucracy, as suggested by Mas'oeed, cited in Azhari (2015), a) Its role as the personification of the state: A bureaucracy carries out all its duties, like tax collection, justice, and wide range of other bureaucratic role on behalf of the state. It is at the front side of the government where the government and the people interface. In personifying the state, a bureaucracy claims also obedience from citizens. b) Mastery of information: In carrying out its daily duties, a bureaucracy collects records that contain almost all areas of society and state activities. This role gives a bureaucracy a privilege, which politicians do not have, to identify areas that need a policy intervention. A bureaucracy can then influence politicians to adopt policies to their liking; and c) The ownership of technical expertise: provide that the bureaucracy is recruited in a meritocracy; one cannot deny that the bureaucracy has the technical expertise which is needed in decision-making. Mastery of information and technical ability is extraordinary source of strength for the bureaucracy.

The implication from the arguments above is that there is a wide range of expectations of an effective civil service. These include the ability to deliver government policy; help formulate that policy; and challenge policy to ensure that it is workable. In policy- making processes, therefore, the role of the civil servants slowly shifted through time from servant of politics to relatively equivalent to one of the politics.

Civil servants in developmental states play critical roles in policy designing and implementation. In view of that, a defining characteristic of policy-making in developmental states is that the significant influence that senior bureaucrats – part of the developmental elite – have on policy design, particularly in comparison to western democracies (Johnson, 1982; Charlton, 1991; Leftwich 1995). This is to say that one of the common features of developmental public administration is that bureaucrats have more influence in designing policy than is usually the case. This influence is particularly important and prominent for key economic ministries and agencies, such as the Ministry of Trade and Industry (MITI) in Japan (Johnson 1982). Similarly, in Botswana, bureaucrats have a huge amount of influence in the policy-making process, in terms of the initiation, design and implementation of policies (Charlton, 1991). Likewise, a key factor in Singapore's development success was that the bureaucracy was given the autonomy to design, implement, and adapt economic policies. This was, in part, possible because of a largely meritocratic bureaucracy that recruited the country's best graduates.

Thus, among other factors, the extent to which recruitment and promotion in the civil service is based on merit is one of many contextual factors that shape the interaction between political and administrative leaders. This section explores whether civil servants have significant leverage on policy processes specially in developing policy. Usually, in the tradition of Ethiopian public administration, the state bureaucracy was seen as a mere implementation apparatus, with no role in policy development. There is no explicit legal statement as to the role of the bureaucracy in policy related issues. For example, the FDRE constitution is silent about the role of civil service in relation to policy process. Instead, it stipulates that the council of ministers “shall formulate and implement economic, social and development policies and strategies” Art 7(6). By implication, the political executive both formulates and implements policies. As a result, the politico-executive function is seen as issuing policies, decrees and other by-laws in order to facilitate enforcement of laws and issuing directives on how certain legal acts should be implemented. In contrast, the administrative-executive function has been seen as mere law enforcement.

Likewise, as to the relationship between political leadership and permanent executive, the current constitution does not regulate in an explicit manner. Other legal acts, though implicit, stipulate that the civil service should be non-partisan and professional in fulfilling its duties.

The Federal Civil Service Proclamation (2007) reads: "Any civil servant shall:

[1] be loyal to the public and the Constitution (61:1; [2] devote his whole energy and ability to the service of the public (61:2)". By implication, therefore, the law forbids the civil servants from partiality when fulfilling their office duties. They must not be guided by their political beliefs and other perceptions. However, they are not prohibited from being members and party supporters.

The discussions and analysis of the empirical data in this chapter also provide evidence which indicate that, unlike many developmental states, politicians believe that they have fiduciary powers and, therefore, the prerogative to set policies, and that the administrators should obediently implement them. Such a view implicates, in case of policy formulation, that the Ethiopian public administration developed as almost a classical Weberian administration, where the civil service is only concerned with policy implementation, according to the law. This is contrary to the situation in many developmental states, where civil service has gained a virtual monopoly on policy development. This demonstrates a clear dichotomy between policy making and policy implementation. Therefore, it is possible to assert that the exclusion of the civil servants from policy formulation process continues and is a feature of the present civil service too.

The data obtained from the interviews with key informants and focus group discussions confirm the above conclusions. Respondents were asked two questions in order to examine their view and engagement on a policy making process. First, they were asked if they consider policy making as one of their responsibilities. The second question was asked to know whether they engage in the policy making process or not.

The result, as illustrated in table 2 above, shows that the majority of the respondents (61.9%) believe that policy making is under their jurisdiction. However, only 23.8% of the respondents said that civil servants engage in a policy formulation process. The figures in the table mean that though most civil servants perceive that civil servants' participation in creating policy initiatives as appropriate, they do not engage in the process of policy making. Of course, the number of respondents who do not agree with civil servants' participation in policy making is also considerable, which is about 40%. What is more, there were few key informants who assert that policy making is not under their sphere of responsibilities.

For example, a senior expert in ministry of civil service argued that: "Thinking about policies and later on identification of their strategies is not my direct responsibility. I am just an expert/a specialist. Accordingly, I am responsible for implementation of the strategies set by higher bodies".

A related question that needs to be answered in this regard is 'why do civil servants participate less in policy making process while the majority of them believe policy making is part of their duties?' Interviews were conducted in order for answering this pertinent question and found some explanations. For example, one of the key informants said that "there are no institutionalized practices that allow the civil servants to formally engage in policy making processes. Instead, politicians have a monopoly on policymaking."

Another senior civil servant stressed government's unwillingness to encourage civil servant's participation in policy design and stated that:

The government is not keen to entrust additional responsibility to the civil service. It regarded the civil service as routine-minded, conservatives and lacking in the necessary commitment. Hence, it sought to restrict the civil service role to its traditional pursuits. Instead, the incumbent resorts to high level party officials constituted outside the official channels of the bureaucracy to initiate policy deliberations prior to legislative debates and executive assent and implementation.

This shows that in addition to the absence of practical engagement in policy design, there is also unconscious acceptance of the dichotomy between policy making and policy implementation on the side of the civil servants; and this is not a healthy situation in the civil service under developmental state ideals. As a result, bureaucrats continue to be shut out of the policy making process.

Challenges for absence of engagement of civil servants in policy making are, however, not limited to the beliefs of the civil servants and lack of institutionalized practices. There are also some other challenges that hinder the civil servants from meaningful participation in policy making process.

4 Availability of Expertise and Informational Resources

Expert knowledge is necessary in policy-making processes, since in these processes the problems of public policies are solved. Therefore, it is of high importance for people involved in policy-making processes to own such knowledge. It is believed that a policy-making process is owned primarily, if not exclusively, by administration. The possession of expert knowledge itself enables the bureaucrats to gain power in policy-making processes.

The key resource that bureaucrats can draw on is technical or informational resource, these being knowledge and expertise about different aspects of the political and policy process. Core competencies in policy

analysis and generalist skills that can be applied to different areas of policy and operations are essential and will always play an important role in the work of the civil service. However, this needs to be complemented by professional expertise in key functions. This is to say that for civil servants in general and senior civil servants in particular, to be able to effectively engage in policy making processes, relevant expertise and information are prerequisites, among other things.

Weber noted that expertise represents the principal source of political power for bureaucracies; this is particularly so in countries where they are 'often said to monopolize the knowledge and expertise relevant to government' (Smith, 2009). Bureaucrats typically are assumed to possess greater substantive expertise on a specific policy issue and/or knowledge about government procedures than do politicians. It is also said that a principal reason for the influence of bureaucrats in the policymaking process in developmental states was their technical expertise.

However, in Ethiopian context, unlike other developmental states' bureaucracies, the lack of development of policy capacities by the bureaucracy is main factor in explaining absence of participation, let alone, influence on policy making from the side of the bureaucracy. Developing policy capacities in the administration is, therefore, an important issue.

As a result, because the administration does not have monopoly on expert knowledge, politics can, therefore, (more or less) gain it from elsewhere and is not necessarily dependent on administration. This means, in addition to inner ways of providing expert knowledge and information, politics can use outer ways also. Best-known outer ways of gaining expert knowledge and information are as follows:

First, politicians have the opportunity to include in policy-making processes outer experts from different areas as their counselors. The experts offer the politicians expertise and information. They work as individuals or as a group of experts. If they work as a group of experts, they usually have a special name. In many cases, the names that are used are something like: office or council of counselors (for a specific area: e.g. Council of economic advisors to the prime minister). These counselors can offer expert support regularly or periodically.

Second, specialized analytical organizations have been formed recently and they work on one or many policy areas. They possess knowledge and since they are established for policy research and advice. Politicians (ministers) can work with them for advising. In this regard, it is worth mentioning the federal policy study and research center (PSRC). The Centre was established by the Council of Ministers in March 2014 with the primary mission of conducting policy study and research. The center is a major policy research institute with the principal mission to study local and international issues and to formulate and propose policy and strategic ideas essential for the development of the country. The government uses this center whenever policy revision and formulation of new policies are planned.

However, since both arrangements are external to the bureaucracy, it can be said that the policy making is mainly the task of political leadership and experts outside of the civil service. Thus, no or little role is left for civil servants in policy making process.

What is more, key informants as well as focus group discussion participants were asked whether experts and senior bureaucrats have the capability to influence the policies of their respective ministries. Generally speaking, their view is that the existing middle and senior level managers are not in a position, let alone influencing policies, majority of them are not familiar with their posts. For instance, a senior trainer and consultant in the area of civil service capacity building explains the case as:

The majority of the middle and senior level civil servants come in from outside the ministry have come from local government services for either their political affiliation or being in the network of the minister or state minister in a given ministry. Indeed, when top managers are appointed through political considerations rather than by merit and competence, the likely result is that such officers are incapable of meeting the expectations of this high office and advising impartially without fear or favour. It becomes even more unthinkable and miserable for the system if the incompetence is led at the top by the political executive.

She continued explaining: "There is also a situation where the ministry gets a dynamic minister who wants the job done with high quality and innovatively and top bureaucrats are incapable of providing quality advice to achieve the goals of the ministry".

Hence, policy capacities remain a highly underdeveloped quality in Ethiopian public administration and it would be important to prioritize their development. The politicization of top level appointments was also seen as one of the factors in the weakening of policy related engagements, as professional capacity at senior level declined.

5 The Practical Exclusion of Civil Servants from the Policy Development Process

Policy development is still predominantly carried out outside the administration in many ministries. The role of civil servants as professional advisors on the substance of policy has hardly been developed. Politicians generally rely heavily on political advisors, from outside the administration, when it comes to the development

of policy and strategy.

In this regard, the observation of the researcher and discussions held with senior civil servants give an idea that even the appointed policy advisors in the ministries do not engage themselves in policy related activities, instead they act as if they were personal aid for their respective ministers. This non-engagement of the advisors in policy related activities partially related to their noticeable incompetence while lack of due attention from the political executives also undermines their role. In most of the cases, policy advisors are outsiders to the ministry; not to mention their being political appointees like ministers. They also lack the expected required expertise in policy advising in what they are supposed to have mastery of the issue.

Thus, it is not appropriate to consider policy advisors as real advisors but political aides and party comrades to their affiliated ministers. On top of this, in most of the cases, the frequent shifting of ministers also is accompanied with shifting of the advisors. This is to say that the advisors come and go together with a minister and they would not have adequate time to understand the works of a new ministry let alone identifying issues that need intervention and designing better way of executing the existing policies.

The responses from interviews held with key informants and discussions in focus groups back up the argument that civil servants are not in a position to influence policy making processes. In this regard, among the key informants who were asked if there is the will from government to engage the bureaucrats in policy formulation in their respective institutions, a senior civil servant in Ministry of Industry replied:

What is important to note is that the policy role of civil servants has never been well developed in most ministries. At the same time, practically, no attention was devoted to this matter. Professional policy advice is delivered by special structures, placed outside the ministerial hierarchy. The government uses political cabinets placed outside the ministerial hierarchy for the delivery of policy advice.

Similar argument that strengthens the view that civil servants are excluded from policy development process comes from a senior expert in ministry of public service and human resource. He explained:

To start with, there is no a position classified as policy expert. Hence, civil servants do not take policy - related issues, in terms of evaluation and recommendation, are under their jurisdiction. What is more, the top leadership gives no attention to matters of policy evaluation and recommendation. The leadership always does indoctrination of existing policies and try to preach that the existing policies are best with no limitation. In fact, civil servants are most often criticized for less performance and lack of commitment to implement the policies. There is no need to criticize and recommend on policies but improved implementation performance and commitment on the side of the civil servants. Thus, there is no room to criticize policies and civil servants prefer to keep silent, though they observe many limitations on the policies they are implementing.

The implication is that politicians are unwilling to empower civil servants in matters related to policy making. This is mainly because the political executives feel that policy development should be carried out only by political trustees. This is a generalist approach which implicitly assumes no need for specialization on policy matters. It is argued that the resulting generalist approach has led to amateurism. Civil servants have often voiced a concern about their strong dependence on politicians and reported that they feel that politicians are insufficiently responsive. Conversely, the top leadership notes that an unresponsive civil service as an obstacle to implementing their policy changes.

What is more, policy analysis and advice had increasingly been contracted out. At the same time, advisory ministers from outside the government oversee and provide policy advice. Policy units were introduced in Prime Minister Office, with all of their staff recruited from among senior politicians.

Of course, there is no obvious reason to criticize the involvement of external advisers in policy developments, in principle. However, though the use of political advisers and think tanks is common practice in most modern states, the development of policy exclusively or even predominantly by such entities is a danger that limits too greatly the role of the civil service in the process of policy making. This, in its part, may prevent the making of high quality policies in the long term.

For the time being, the Ethiopian civil service systems appear to have become extreme version of the classical Wilsonian paradigm: politicians make policy and civil servants implement policy. This strict separation of policy development and implementation leads to the lack of civil service involvement in policy development. In view of the complexity of the problems in contemporary society, however, this is hardly a feasible or desirable model for a developmental state. Ethiopian public administration, therefore, should where possible avoid the permanent exclusion of the civil service from policy development.

However, in considering the close relationship between politicians and senior bureaucrats in developmental states and, in particular, the influence of bureaucrats, it is important to note that the power of bureaucrats did not go unchallenged and nor was the nature of this relationship wholly fixed over time. For example, in the case of Botswana, Charlton (1991) cites a number of high level BDP party officials who saw the influence of bureaucrats as a big problem in the country. Furthermore, he noted that bureaucrats were often overruled when it came to policies that touched politically sensitive issues which could impact the BDP's electoral success, such as providing universal access to education. This highlights another important point about bureaucratic influence in

developmental states: it is a result of political leaders willingly conceding power to bureaucrats on the basis of their knowledge about policy issues.

Thus, one can conclude that politicians have become the sole policy developers (makers). What is obvious is that the policy making process has remained the bona fide arena for politicians. As a result, the policy making in Ethiopian public administration is characterized by top-down; monopolized; a unidirectional flow of power and influence that discourages bottom-up policymaking approach. Therefore, while there is a greater distinction between the roles of bureaucrats and politicians in the civil service, bureaucrats are, in general, not granted the autonomy or the influence in the policy-making process that has been highlighted in the case of developmental states.

The main conclusion is that the civil service is not able to perform decisive and prominent role in policy design. Within ministries, the managerial arrangements are relatively constrained by other veto players; not to mention ministers' intervention in routine implementation activities through ad hoc committees or task forces on a day-to-day basis when they felt it necessary. Generally speaking, politico-administrative relations are still in flux and despite the formal separation of the political and administrative spheres, this division does not protect against political intervention and patronage.

The question is, therefore, in what way and under what conditions the civil service can obtain a greater role in policy development processes. In this regard, the need to harness the intellectual capacities and professional depth of highly qualified policy professionals and ministerial advisors in the delivery of government's policies and programs is imperative. Thus, it is important to identify possible ways in which the involvement of civil servants in policy making and providing professional advice on the substance of policy can be increased thereof create civil servants better prepared to play such a role.

IV. Findings and Conclusions

A. Vision Guidance and Vision Sharing

As far as creating shared vision on the ideals of developmental state, its policies, and strategies is concerned, the Ethiopian civil service is found to be far from the expected level. Regarding this issue, the main finding is that not only the politicians and the civil servants but also the top leadership have not always worked together to pursue a common vision and objectives. Divergent interests, values and visions are apparent not only between political leadership and the civil servants but also among the core leadership itself. The leadership lacks solid unity around the values and vision of developmentalism. Therefore, the leadership lacks the very important quality of developmental leadership, in this aspect.

B. Understanding of and Commitment to Mission and Policies

Officials, at least those in the higher or closer to the higher rank, could be on same page in their understanding and perception of what they are dealing with. However, this is not the case; they have been seen using different and inconsistent approaches to development policies and strategies. There seems to be a paucity of solidified understanding about what developmental state is, how Ethiopia is embracing it, and how the policies be implemented.

- There exist different outlooks and interpretations concerning the relationship between the political executives and the civil servants. This shows that there is a breakdown in trust and cooperation between the civil servants and political executives.

C. The Role of Bureaucrats in Policy Making-Processes

The issue of professional influence in public policy-making is another indicator of politics - bureaucracy interface. In East Asian developmental states, the depth of political appointments was low which has been cited as one important reason for that regions economic success. The finding that the existence of deep layers of political appointments in the Ethiopian bureaucracy would indicate a lesser role of bureaucrats in policy making.

- Undue pervasive political influence on the public is one of the constraining factors to effective policy implementation in Ethiopian public administration. The process of policy formulation and decision making has been highly centralized and relatively opaque to the public servants at large. Usually, the political leaders formulate policies and as well control and direct the implementation activities of the policy.
- Unlike many developmental states, politicians believe that they have fiduciary powers and, therefore, the prerogative to set policies, and that the administrators should obediently implement them. Such a view implicates, in case of policy formulation, that the Ethiopian public administration developed as almost a classical Weberian administration, where the civil service is only concerned with policy implementation, according to the law.
- This is contrary to the situation in many developmental states where civil service has gained a virtual monopoly on policy development. This demonstrates a clear dichotomy between policy making and policy implementation. Therefore, it is found that the exclusion of the civil servants from policy formulation process continues and is a feature of the present civil service too.

D. Lack of Available Expertise

- Policy capacities remain a highly underdeveloped quality in Ethiopian public administration. The politicization of top level appointments is seen as one of the factors in the weakening of policy related engagements, as professional capacity at senior level declined. As a result, policy making remains mainly the task of political leadership and affiliate experts outside of the civil service. Thus, no or little role is left for civil servants in policy making process.

E. The Practical Exclusion of Civil Servants from the Policy Development Process

- The Ethiopian civil service systems appear to have become extreme version of the classical Wilsonian paradigm: politicians make policy and civil servants implement policy. This strict separation of policy development and implementation leads to the lack of civil service involvement in policy development.

F. Frequent Reshuffling of Top Leadership

- In the Ethiopian public administration, ministers and state ministers rarely stay in one ministry for more than one election term. Though not to the extent of the ministers and state ministers, directorate directors also come and go frequently. Clearly, frequent turnovers damage the overall performance of the civil service, just as frequent turnovers of ministers (often termed reshuffles) impair the performance of the civil service. It results also in loose institutional memory and continuity. Thus, unless the reasons for such frequent changes are gross indiscretion and/or corruption on the part of the heads, it should be carefully managed.

Therefore, the implementation of developmental policies is undertaken by people of least competence in professional terms who work in a tense political environment. To sum up, the civil service is not able to perform decisive and prominent role in policy design. Within ministries, the managerial arrangements are relatively constrained by other veto players; not to mention ministers' intervention in routine implementation activities through ad hoc committees or task forces on a day-to-day basis when they felt it necessary. Generally speaking, politico-administrative relations are still in flux and despite the formal separation of the political and administrative spheres, this division does not protect against political intervention and patronage.

Recommendations

- Managing the political - administrative interface is a key aspect of the tradeoffs that must be made. The objectives of political involvement in senior appointment should be to enhance politically responsive policy and implementation, rather than patronage in the form of jobs to party faithful or family members.
- It should be noted that any short-cut to de-politicization can hardly be successful. Civil-service professionalization will be promoted, in the longer term, by the development of the pool of human resources and of labor markets.

So, what are the reform options for the shorter term? It is recommended with the following possibilities:

a) Hybrid Senior Appointments: Many countries have a significant number of hybrid appointments in which merit, defined by meeting explicit and contestable criteria, is accompanied by subjective political judgments. By contrast with "pure" political appointments, in hybrid appointments merit is a necessary but insufficient condition for appointment.

However, hybrid appointments require careful management. There are two problems to be solved in hybrid appointments: first, attracting the best, given that merit is not a sufficient criterion for appointment and so the best might be deterred by the threat of apparently arbitrary political dismissal. The second is balancing two conflicting sets of recruitment criteria.

The most common solution is a "pool system" which places the candidate in a pool upon satisfying the merit criteria. Those in the pool are then available for subsequent political selection. Here, the advantage is, therefore, with the acceptance of some level of politicization, it helps us to introduce meritocracy.

a) Select among the appointees based on competence: Merit - based selection can be through a system of university - style competitive examination (as in South Korea), or by scrutinizing educational qualifications (as in Singapore). Such methods are fair and command public confidence, but they define the best person for any given job as the one that does well in examinations.

b) Start Pure merit system in Economic Ministries: There are some ministries which are less political. Such ministries mainly need high level experts with less political missions. Thus, it is advisable to implement meritocracy by selecting ministries with less political more economic missions.

However, it should be clear that none of these is as important, as the clearly demonstrated political will to pursue the development of a merit-based and professional civil service.

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Tables

Table 1: Civil servants view on mission understanding ad level of commitment

		Yes	No	Do Not Know	Total
Individual employees have a sense of the ministry's mission	Frequency	12	49	2	63
	Percent	19.4	77.6	3	100
Employees strive to the policies decided upon by top political leadership	Frequency	22	37	4	63
	Percent	34.9	58.8	6.3	100

Table 2: Civil servants believes regarding their role in a policy making process and their engagement

		A	SA	NC	D	SD	Total
Responsibilities of civil servants include policy making	Frequency	29	10	1	18	5	63
	Percent (%)	46	15.9	1.6	28.5	7.9	100
The ministry or its officials and experts engage in policy making processes (like policy drafting, reviewing, and commentary) in areas under the ministry's jurisdiction.	Frequency	11	4	4	33	11	63
	Percent (%)	17.5	6.3	6.3	52.4	17.5	100

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