Remapping Secured Neighbourhoods in Conflict Prone Nigeria: The Jos Example

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Abstract
An emerging issue in Nigeria is the rising security consciousness of Nigerians. Military rule created a security tradition which excludes human being in favour of the state or regime survival. The coming of democracy raises people’s expectation that things would change. The lifting of restraints encouraged the outbreak of conflicts between groups. One consequence is the rising exclusion among hitherto friendly neighbours on the basis of religion and ethnicity. Thus in the emerging settlement readjustment and in the determination of places to reside, Nigerians are guided by this safety consideration as the government can no longer guarantee this. This paper examines neighbourhood readjustment in Jos, the capital of Plateau state in central Nigeria, and argues that elected government have not distance themselves from the security tradition they inherited and begin to cater for human being. It is this that creates the condition for disintegration which every violent outburst produces in the readjustment of residential areas among citizens.

Keywords: Economic Deprivation, Conflict, Segregation, Nigeria

Introduction
The world economic crisis that reached its peak in the 1980s uncovered the mismanagement that characterised Nigeria’s post colonial governments. The period was one of many crises for the Nigerian economy. Governance since independence did not address the short, medium and long term needs of the people. Governance was about the political class’s attempt to hold on to power in the face of daunting economic and social challenges. The tenuous coalition government could barely manage to hold its own while the opposition was considered as a threat to the government. Resources were therefore deployed into managing the perceived threats threatening the hold of the government. In accomplishing this onerous task, the promises of jobs, housing and development that preceded independence were sacrificed to maintain stability. Governance was no longer about the people but about those in government.

The growing disillusion in the polity translated into military interventions. Military regimes became entrenched and so was their narrow concern for maintaining security and stability. Their pursuit of security was typified by the violation and destruction of institutions. Security was defined in the maintenance of coercive structures and not in the provision of the needs of human being; it was defined in strengthening strong arm tactics rather than in creating jobs and access to health, schools and economic infrastructures; it was defined in the negation of civil institution such as the police, court and procedure in preference for the pre-eminence of the soldiers, tribunals and arbitrariness. Rather than salvaging the condition, the military reoriented the enabling environment that created suspicion among populace who had hitherto coexisted together.

The suspicion among the populace increased the need for soldiers and their ways. The suspicion was borne out of the growing disparity between government intervention in the pursuit of welfare needs of the people which created scarcity and thus the contest for the few available opportunities. To enhance access to these opportunities, there was the need for employment of strategies that seek to exclude. It is in the light of this that the crisis that reached their peak in the 1980s translated into violent conflicts all over the polity. Jos in Central Nigeria has featured prominently in this calculation especially because of the peculiar position it occupied in the country.

This paper examines how the growing economic crisis eroded peoples’ confidence in their plural coexistence resulting in the rearrangement of settlement along secured line. Security, defined here as physical safety, was from the military created enabling environment. This sense of security was the consequence of the absence of economic security defined primarily with human being as its focus--emphasising job, housing, health, schools, infrastructures--that promotes community inclusive environment. The absence of this type of security in governance created the ground where exclusion became the basis of survival as is the condition in Jos. Jos as used in this paper includes areas down to Naraguta on the Jos-Bauchi Road, NEPA on the Jos Zaria Road and the Building Material Market before Bukuru.

The Jos Magnet
Central Nigeria or Middle Belt area remained a magnet for people, culture and civilisation over the course of hundreds of years. It was the case in the pre colonial, colonial and post colonial periods. The middle belt is endowed with land resources, warm and hospitable people and a climate condition that combines the extremity
of both the far north and the far south. It is a condition that mirrors its political disposition since independence. Jos town is significant in the history of this region. The Jos magnet can be located in its hospitality, economic opportunities and temperate climate. As a town created by the colonial authority at the beginning of the last century, it served as the capital of the only large scale mining activities in the defunct northern region.

The temperate climate was attractive to European. It also facilitated the growth of vegetable and potatoes. At the height of its mining boom in the colonial period, it attracted people from all cultures—Nigerians, West Africans, Middle Eastern nationals and European. Most of these were employed directly or indirectly by the vast mining activities(Plotnicov: 1967,61) The peak of the immigration was in the Second World War when the British, the colonial power controlling Nigeria, suffered disastrous defeat in the hands of the Japanese in the Far East. The loss of Malaya cut off a major source of tin available for the war effort leaving the Jos fields as the other alternative(Olusanya: 1973,48-49). The British maximise their advantage by increasing the labour supply to the mines fields of Jos throughout the war period(Evans: 1944,153). It is the genesis of its diverse population.

Thus the attraction of the city was because of its ability to provide the economic wherewithal to support the teeming population. This created the condition for coexistence of people of diverse background in spite of colonial authority’s attempt to separate the population. This was especially located in their economic and social policies. For instance, the structure of the colonial economy created condition for separate development. The British were at the top of the economic ladder. They were followed by elements from the Middle East, Nigerians from the southern part and the far north. There were the indigenous elements who occupied the lower wrung of the available economic space. Socially, the colonial government encouraged different neighbourhoods for the population categorised on the basis of economic means, place of origins and religious affiliations. Thus there were the Government Reservation Areas, the Native Quarters and the Sabon Garis. While the economic and social conditions might not have been satisfactory for everyone, it was not as appallingly depriving as it is today. The economic opportunities were relative to the population of the time. There was conflict but it was not overwhelmingly driven by economic deprivation(NAK,1939-1946).

The post colonial crisis which engulfed governance in Nigeria culminated into the crisis that witnessed the frequencies of change of government especially among the military. The military’s foray into politics was ostensibly to ensure stability. Instead they turned out to be the most unstable and destabilising force in the march of Nigeria to nationhood. The 1980s was replete with this frequency. It was the decade that launched changes internationally that would affect the economic, social and political landscape locally. It was the period that one of Nigeria’s military regimes launched an ambitious transition programme partly in tandem with international reform agenda and with hindsight, partly to assuage the clamour for political participation locally. It was inconclusive and this further deepened the crisis in the country. The failed transition programme polarised the country. Economic failure had created condition that strained the social fabrics and increased the awareness of ethnicity and religious affiliation. The refusal to acknowledge the mandate given to the winner of the June 12, 1993 election and its subsequent annulment furthered the view, in the consciousness of the people, that the agenda was ethnic and religious. The polarisation took a north and south dimension and encouraged population movement into regions where their physical safety can be guaranteed.

The middle belt which had served as a crossroad for centuries was caught in this wave of movement and the Jos magnet took in people running away from the insecurity created by the political crisis. The choice of Jos was borne of the belief that in the contest between the north and south which the annulment now represented, the neutrality of the area as middle ground would provide shelter to the contending parties. Unfortunately the decay of governance did not reckon with the upsurge of population on such a scale with the dearth of infrastructures. Already reeling under the weight of the disproportionate imbalance between demand and supply, the influx became an additional burden. If Jos’s magnet in the colonial period was because it provided for the people, the failure of post colonial government to build on this meant the area’s hospitable character was tried and tested as it became the new space for contest. The result was the explosion of conflicts.

Today’s conflict has the hallmark of economic insecurity. It is the reflection of the inadequacies of governance since independence. The inability of governments to cater for the needs of people relative to the growth in population heightened contest over the few available opportunities. This resulted in the resort to exclusion. Economic deprivation triggered in people the awareness of religion, ethnicity and tribalism and to a lesser extent, political affiliation. These collectively became the basis for the struggle for economic space. In the Jos equation, religion became the driving force and basis of insecurity among hitherto plural neighbourhoods in the struggle for economic space. It is the quest for security that witnessed the resort to the rearrangement of neighbourhoods along religious line.

Developing a Life of its own: An Overview of the Jos Conflict
The outbreak of conflict has become a feature of living in Jos, the Plateau and Middle Belt area(Higazi: 2011). Jos is developing a character akin to Beirut in the 1980s and 1990s where factional fighting left a scar on its people, culture and structures. Most residents of Jos are conscious of the fact that the conflict can broke loose
any moment but it did not deter living which includes commercial and social exchanges among its divided people. Conflict is intrinsic to human existence. Endemic conflict smacks of crisis within society which needs to be addressed. In addressing the root of conflict, government should play a leading role while the people take their cue. However, the Nigerian governments have, over the years, demonstrated its lack of capacity or will to doing this. The persistence of conflict in Jos demonstrates this.

On Christmas Eve 2010, Jos, the capital of Plateau State in central Nigeria witnessed a bomb blast as a novel phase in the conflict that has come to define existence in the area. In whatever guise it manifested--the main explanation was political--it burrows deep into the unsettled climate of previous inconclusive conflicts. Of the conflict typologies identified by the Plateau Peace Conference, thirteen causes provided explanation for the state of insecurity in the area. They include land use/ownership, indigene-ship, citizenship, settler-ship syndrome, traditional matters, social factors, religious factors, political factors, security matters, economic factors, farmer/grazer conflict, the role of the media, youth issues, women issues and non release of previous reports of commission of inquiries, panels and government white papers(PLSN, 2005:12-13). What can be deduced from these thirteen conflict inducing factors is its economic underpinning(Ross,1993). There is a widening gap between population growth and expanding economic opportunities. The Nigerian economy has been dominated by heavy reliance on oil. Following the oil boom of the 1970s, Nigeria neglected its strong agricultural and light manufacturing bases in favour of an unhealthy dependence on crude oil(CBN,2005). New oil wealth, the concurrent decline of other economic sectors (including mining for Jos), and the adoption of an economic model fuelled massive migration to the cities and led to increasingly widespread poverty especially in rural areas. Agriculture which accounts for 30 percent of GDP suffered from years of mismanagement(Umaru,2009:12).

In the face of declining oil revenue, it was asserted that “with the exception of Lagos and a few, if states were to be judged based on performance in terms of internally generated revenue, a large number of them would be declared technically bankrupt”(Umaru,2009). The persistence of the conflict from the late 1980s can be situated in the declining fortune of Plateau State in particular and Nigeria in general. The adoption of structural adjustment program regarded as notorious and the bitter herbs of poverty it produced fed into the discontent within(Gumedze, 2007:6). It is the inability of the state to cater for the population that resulted in the insecurity spawning consciousness which translated into indigene-ship, citizenship, settler-ship, youth and women issues and the sensitivity of the media in implementing its mantra of “if it bleeds it leads”, in reporting issues related to the conflict.

The genesis of insecurity in Jos is its resource endowment and as crossroad between the north and the south. It was home to minerals such as tin and columbite which not only attracted prospectors from within but also formed the basis of the colonization of the area by the British at the beginning of the last century. As the city grew, incidences of conflict manifested in the hierarchies of power within the emerging cosmopolitan town(Plotnicov, 1967). The hierarchy had European, Asians, the tripod (Igbo-Yoruba-Hausa), West African and finally the autochthonous group at the bottom of the economic relations. Secondly, the arbitrary inclusion of Jos and indeed the central Nigerian area into the northern region by the colonial authority was itself a conflict inducing factor as it entrenched the insecurity that characterized their pre colonial relation in the colonial epoch. The persistence of the attempt by the north to undermine their unique cultural heritage was elevated in the colonial period through a quasi confirmation of their position as internal colonialist.

With colonialism emerged the character of the place as a Christian and traditional worshippers zone and politically inclined towards the maintenance of its independence from northern control as was the case before colonial intervention. The essentially Muslim north was determined to change this orientation while the people were equally resolved to protect it(Kukah,1993). This more than any other factor became the source of confrontation in the relation between the groups. Thirdly, the birth of party politics and the identification of the area within the context of the middle belt aspiration further estrange relation with the north(Udo, 1970;Tyoden,1993;Okpeh et al,2007;Mvendaga,2003; Onoja,2003:26-39). The concept of one united north(Onoja,1999;Kukah,1993:19) was more of a rhetoric than reality as all attempts to penetrate the area was resisted.

The fourth factor was the aftermath of the first coup leading to the emergence of General Gowon as the leader. The development changed the power equation in favour of the largely Christian element within the north(Kukah,1993). On the one hand, it ushered in the realization of the middle belt aspiration through the creation of Benue-Plateau state. On the other hand, the perpetuation of military rule in the 1990s and their representation furthered the liberation paradigm of the middle belt. It was the attempt to resist this change in the face of the international environment enabling that compounded insecurity and conflict in the area. Fifthly, the present political order which began in 1999 further exposed the inadequacies of the one north philosophy(Onoja,2003:26-39).

Finally, the processes following the end of the cold war sensitized the local environment and heightened peoples’ perception of the insecurity within thus aiding the transformation of conflict in Jos. It fed into an expanding population lacking economic space resulting in a growing awareness in the application of concepts of
citizenship and indigene-ship unique to Jos in the context of indigene-settler phenomenon in Nigeria (PLSN, 2005:12-13; Danfulani et al., 2007:354-359). There was the inability of the failing state to tap into the potential which the expanding population presents cumulatively escalating insecurity.

On Security and the Nigerian Notion

Security is a buzzword everywhere in the world today. This is not unrelated to first the lifting of the restraint that the end of the cold war represented and second, the events of 9/11 and its repercussions. Security discourse and practice heightened as a result of the politics that governed its management among governments everywhere further revealing the disagreement embedded in it.

Security terrain is a contested one among academics, practitioners and policymakers (Buzan, 1991; Booth, 2007; Booth, 2005; Williams, 2008; Collins, 2010). The contest provides lee way for especially policymakers (Weaver, 1991:17) to apply their vision of security. The governments in Nigeria are not an exception. Over the years, they have operated within this premise and have chosen the notion of security that most satisfied their quest to remain in power regardless of legitimacy. The question of legitimacy burrowed into the regime type that dominated governance. Of the two--civil and military--the latter had ruled most of the time and had with its decision to return to its constitutional responsibility guided the transition that benefited retired military personnel and the new breed of political class that horned its skill under military rule. By the virtue of the military’s long hold on power, it created the environment in which most people understood security.

Security was defined in the context of the military’s role in physically protecting the country against internal and external threats. Both civilian and military administrations and by far most institutions operated within this socialisation milieu. However, the definition and application of security should be culture-specific, value laden and in particular development conscious.

We can discern two broad understanding of security. The one focused on the people and their welfare (Booth, 2007:1-8). The other focused on safety or physical preservation (Buzan, 1991:17). The former is all encompassing and its application guarantee the latter—the safety of most people and those in position of power. The governments failure to provide security of the kind that give material comforts and opportunities for its people created the condition where it spent its time ensuring and maintaining its physical security (Robin, 2004).

Thus the latter form of security—borne out of fear—became the de facto security it understood. Both version of security would have enhanced complete security of people and institutions. Nigerian governments have failed over the years to provide both. How did the government get the security equation wrong and landed the country in this mess where people have to run away from each other in the name of security?

We can situate the pull of insecurity in the country and thus the discourse on security in the country. From the 1960s to 1970s, we had relative security largely because there were fewer persons, commensurate infrastructure, opportunities and a thriving agriculture base reliant on healthy regional competition which prevented rural-urban migration. This structure was interrupted by the entry of the military following the coup of 1966. With the entry of the oil economy, the pervasion of military rule especially their obsession with centralization and their poor governance culture, the trend of relative security change to rising insecurity which upped with every bout of military rule.

The population began to increase as the work place culture engendered mass migration and movement from the rural economy into the insufficient urban economy. The crisis that reached its zenith with the profligacy of the civilian regime was compounded by the oil price collapse of the 1980s on the one hand and governance crisis on the other. Insecurity moved from relative to absolute term in human and infrastructural terms. The entry of the Breton Wood into economic management and their implementation regime established insecurity as a perpetual development issue spawning chicanery and charlatans of all type including the emergence of what BBC described as “useful idiots”—intellectuals who upturned reality in their attempt to burnish the different dictatorships. It is within this condition that the conceptual confusion about security and what constitute national security emerged.

Every decade in Nigeria from the 1980s onward represented decay in the living conditions of Nigerians. The early 1980s witnessed the commencement of the austerity measure with the enactment of the National Economic Stabilization Act (Olukoshi, 1991). The essence of the Act was to reduce government expenditure and capital imports using import restrictions, monetary controls, and financial policies. It was an acknowledgement of crisis in the economy. In spite of these measures, party apparatchik went on to politicising access to essential commodities while the non payment of salaries of workers especially teachers became a common feature of existence just as the conspicuous consumption of the elite. This manifest dual standard was a reflection of the crisis of governance compounded by the inordinate ambition of members of the ruling party to return to power.

The height of this was the landslide election victory of the 1983. It was this as in 1964-65 that return the soldiers to governance. For the ruling elite, security or national security was the interest of the party. In this it was in competition with soldiers whom it regarded as the only threat to its hold on power. The welfare and safety of Nigerians was secondary in its definition of security. Indeed hued as it were in the cold war politics of the period,
security could not be anything else than the survival of the regime. It was more interested in power security than human security.

Its worst fear was confirmed when soldiers ceased power in December of 1983. For the next twenty months, security would be defined in line with the aspiration of the soldiers. It was evident that their mission was the clean the mess as their singular policy platform was the war against indiscipline. Soldiers were role out into the street to enforce the regime’s regulation against the discredited politicians and what they considered the moral lapse of the citizen. The clamp down on the press, labour and professional unions and adopted hard line position against the international communities. The economic crisis bedevilling Nigerians was not tackled as more time was wasted on the campaign to root out corruption. Increasingly the regime became alienated from Nigerians and from section of the armed forces. It was removed from power in a house coup on 27th August 1985.

In terms of programme, the new regime knew its mission as it unveiled economic and political programme of action with a populist bend. The period coincided with the changes that would significantly alter the theory and practice of governance worldwide. The coming to power of Mikhail Gorbachev and his institution of perestroika and glasnost would affect not only the defunct Soviet Union but most countries of the world. In Nigeria, the country committed itself to adopting home grown measure of economic reform even as the government proceeded through the backdoor to inviting the Breton Wood Group against the wishes of Nigerians. The introduction of structural adjustment programme affected Nigerians in ways that all previous economic reform did not(Mkandawire et al,1995). The immediate impact of the SAP was as unsettling for the state as for the various social forces in society and whose ultimate aim was to fundamentally alter the structural basis of Nigerian economy.

The argument has been made on the need to pursue simultaneously economic and political reforms as the two go hand in hand. Thus Diamond was of the view that in so far as the market reform programmes of the IMF and WB help to streamline the over-extended post-colonial African state and encourage the emergence of a genuinely productive domestic bourgeoisie able to cope with the discipline of the market, they are bound to be beneficial to Africa’s democratic prospects(Diamond et al, 2006). In so far as Nigeria was concerned, it was a disastrous application as the economic reorientation not only destroyed the ground for the emergence of political activities, its poor and Machiavellian implementation unleashed social forces of the dimension never experienced before. Indeed as it became evident everywhere in Africa, the initial success of the implementation of the SAP could only have occurred in an authoritarian political space. The state in Nigeria became increasingly authoritarian as the implementation of the programme unfolded. According to Olukoshi, the formal adoption of adjustment witnessed the most widespread and passionate contestation of the adjustment programme by various social groups adversely affected(Mkandawire et al,1995:180). Protests manifested across university campuses, in the workplace, on the streets, and at May Day rallies in 1987 and 1988 as students, workers, market women, the unemployed and the urban poor protested vigorously against the adjustment programme and demanded nothing less than its total abrogation. It was a period of unprecedented hardship for many Nigerians at a time when most had not been able to devise mechanisms for coping with the adverse effects of the market reforms which the government was attempting to push through. The main immediate avenue available to most groups to defend their interests was by exerting pressure on the state, often in the form of spontaneous and violent protests(Mkandawire,1995).

It is this pressure on the state that has been interpreted as constituting security or national security threat. It was treated in relation to the survival of the regime and the expertise of the military as the specialist on security came to play. The regime was not only confronted with power security threat but also defense security threat. It therefore invoked the speech act view of security in designating every act of protest against the biting effect of the SAP as threat to national security and often used it to silence its critics. Indeed it was on record that the head of the regime described the 1989 SAP riots and demonstration as the civilian equivalent of a military coup d’état. The regime treated the symptom rather than the disease that bred insecurity. It was at war with itself and with Nigerians and thus upped its perception of insecurity. The contradiction of its programme forced it to resign in 1993. It was succeeded by another military regime that was more obsessed with security than its predecessor. This, it justified, on the division created by the annulment that permeated all facets of society including the armed forces. Indeed as it became clear subsequently, the regime orchestrated most of the insecurity scare with which it descended on its enemies whether real or imagine. It was a state sponsored programme aimed at emasculating Nigerians.

Perhaps it was the climax of the SAP induced debasement of human being in the developing world and above all the enabling environment that came in the wake of the recession of power politics following the end of the cold war with the fall of the Wall and Soviet Union in the late 1980s and early 1990s that necessitated the re-evaluation of past focus on security. The emerging security paradigm is focused on human being(UNDP,1994) rather than the state. Human security means, ‘first, safety from such chronic threats such as hunger, disease and repression. And second, it means protection from sudden and hurtful disruptions in the patterns of daily life—whether in homes, in jobs or in communities. Ensuring human security requires seven-pronged approach to
address economic, food, health, environment, personal, community and political security (Kerr, 2010: 122). Thus the periods of military rule witnessed the increasing expenditure in offensive and defensive capabilities while correspondingly allocation to health, sanitation, infrastructure, school and job creation decline (Ake, 2000: 145). Military spending means loss of opportunity to rescue disappearing social services and disintegrating infrastructures. The human cost of military expenditure is not only high but it also produces the insecurity with which the regime is forced to justify its measure (Oluwasegun et al., 2008: 2). Military expenditure in Nigeria cannot be justified on the need for security against external threats. Instead the lack of attention to the welfare of the people created condition for internal conflict. The level of poverty in Nigeria is such that the struggle for social existence is waged on a level of physical immediacy so absorbing and debilitating that it is hostile to the condition of security.

**Neighbourhoods Rearrangement in Jos: Mapping Secured Neighbourhoods**

As the ability of the state to guarantee security in its entire ramification decreases every year, people sort to live outside the reach of the state. Of immediate priority to people in Jos is their physical safety. One of the outstanding consequences of the persistent conflict (Onoja, 2010: 1-15) in Jos is the marked rearrangement of places of residence and business among inhabitants. The notion of defined residential area is not new to Nigerians. Indeed it not only predated colonialism, it is part of the criteria of settlement even in the pre colonial period. The advent of British colonialism gazetted the idea of exclusive residential and business areas into the culture of Nigerians. The colonial idea not only reflects the concern for the maintenance of law and order (Scott, 1998: 53-83), it incorporated the class character based on income levels, their racial prejudices and the need to maintain internal segregation of not only the autochthonous inhabitants but also between Nigerians from other parts of the country.

Jos town embraced this line of colonial thinking. Indeed it should be noted that each town in Nigeria was peculiarly arranged in the distribution of residential areas. While it is common to find Sabon garis (Olaniyi, 2006) in the northern Islamic parts, the idea of Sabon gari did not feature in the southern parts and in central Nigeria. However, neighbourhoods were people from the north settled did emerge. These settlements had their origin in the first non-indigenous person to reside in the neighbourhood. Those who settled in these areas did so because of the security provided by the presence of their kith and kin. The areas that were overwhelmingly settled by people from a particular part of the country became identified as such. But there were also neighbourhoods that did not emerge distinctive in such characterisation. They were mixed either as residential areas or especially as business areas. The latter was most common because of the different specialisation of people in particular crafts but also because as business areas, contact were restricted to particular hours of the day. This is unlike the residential areas.

Jos area has all of these. As a town that grew at the height of mining boom and attracted people with different skills from all over Nigeria and the sub region, the area’s population was mixed whether in residential or business sense. The mining camps scattered all over the city and other adjoining mining towns were not noted for segregation in their occupants. They were owned by mining companies who employed labourers from all parts of the country. The very nature of the mining activities allowed for considerable interaction among persons of different background setting the stage for the emergence of multicultural existence.

A sample of neighbourhoods in Jos before the conflict-induced rearrangement along defined religious and economic neighbourhoods would suffice. Before the crisis, residential areas were mixed and not exclusive to one particular group. However, particular group dominate settlements whether as religious or ethnic group. This did not amount to insecurity in the sense that came to be the vogue following the crisis. Thus neighbourhoods such as Tina Junction, Abbator, Dilmis Village, Angwan Rogo, Sabon Pegi Area, Central Area (Massalaci Juma’a to Terminus), Nasarawa, Rikkos, Angwan Rukuba, Tudun Wada, Jenta Area, Alheri, Utan Area, Fera Gada, Gada Biu etc were all mixed neighbourhoods with particular group dominant.

After the crisis began and persisted, people consciously began to rearrange neighbourhoods with their physical safety as the primary criteria. The method of doing this includes buy out and exchange. Often buy out occur with property fetching half or less than half of its value in price term. Incidence of exchange was few. This took the form of dominant groups in the pre crisis areas cleansing the less dominant groups and maintaining their holds of these areas. Today the demarcation is decidedly religious. Although the crisis was driven by economic realities and government inability to find solution to it, religion took over as the vehicle for mobilization.
In Jos post crisis, the following areas can be described as exclusively Muslim settlements. They are Angwan Rogo, Sabon Pegi Area, Central Area, Nasarawa, Rikkos, Gangare Area, Dogon Karfe Area, Dilimi Spare parts Area. The Christian areas include Angwan Rukuba, Tudun Wada, Jenta Area, Gada Biu, Utan Area, Ferin Gada, Abattoir, Dilimi Village and Tina Junction (Wakawa, 2011). According to Lagi, Nasarawa is mixed with Christians and Muslims areas. For instance, Doula Junction, Dogon Dutse, Kongo Russia etc are areas populated by Christians (Lagi, 2011). Stretching from Zaria road right through Saint Murumba, Algadama, Alheri, Utan, Gada Biu to Maternity area are populated by Christians. The entire stretch used to be mixed. Accordingly, Muslim is not restricted to Hausa only. It includes autochthonous Muslim, Edo and Yoruba. Table 1: Safe Neighbourhoods in Jos Post Crisis
The neighbourhood rearrangement affects mostly working and middle class areas. The Government Reservation Areas and other high brow neighbourhoods such as Liberty Boulevard, Ray field remained mixed as contact among residents is limited. Neighbourhoods such as Zarmaganda, Anglo Jos, Dadin Kowa, Dogon Karfe has few Muslims on the outer layers while the Christian reside inside (Dalat, 2011; Danjuma, 2011; Azgaku, 2011; Kudu, 2011). However, Christians are in the majority here. Business or commercial areas also remained mixed and mostly non residential as contact is limited to certain hours of the day. Thus Murtala Mohammed way, Ahmadu Bello way, Terminus area, Zaria road and Bauchi road are mixed. However, because of skill and trade specialization, there is a movement towards separation. Indeed one of the recent crises had the hallmark of an attack on the Igbo commercial interest in Dilimi which is a cluster of streets with shops for spare parts and fabrication. The attack emptied the place of Igbo. The attack was considered a breach of understanding between the Hausa and the Igbo. The post attack situation is in the emergence of neighbourhoods with exclusive business niches. Areas such as Ferin Gada mechanic village, Building Material/Produce Market areas continued to remain mixed with the dominant trade/skill specialized groups in the majority.

There are markets and places of business mushrooming all over the city and in clustered neighbourhoods. For instance, there is fruit market in Mararaban Jamaa, spare parts shop in Dadin Kowa and in the stretch of road from Gada Biu to the Zaria road cemetery. The persistence of the crisis resulted in the decline of the era of trade specialisation. In the past, butchers are almost always Muslims and northerners. Today butchers encompasses both Muslims and Christians and butchers’ shops or stands can be found in most neighbourhoods. This scenario applies to fruits sellers, water vendors and mobile shoe shine and repair boys. The shoe shine and repair boys are mostly Christians from Adamawa State.

Much as neighbourhoods are taking this character, use of utilities such as taxis and acha or motorcycle prior to its ban and replacement with the tricycle or Keke NAPEP continue to remain mixed. However, operators are mindful of areas they ply and this consideration is part of the post crisis stocktaking. Thus most Muslim operators of tricycle would not ply Christian neighbourhoods especially areas considered high risk ones. The same condition affects Christian operators as well. Taxi cab operators also function this way. Taxis only ply major routes with road infrastructure and so their service unlike the Kekeor tricycle is limited. Most of the taxis plying the Muslim neighbourhoods are mostly owned by Muslim cab drivers whether Hausa,

### Table: Neighbourhoods and Business Niches

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<th>Muslim</th>
<th>Mixed</th>
<th>Mixed Commercial</th>
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<td>Angwan Rukuba, Eto Baba</td>
<td>Angwan Rogo</td>
<td>Nasarawa Area</td>
<td>Ahmadu Bello Way</td>
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<td>Tudun Wada Area</td>
<td>Sabon Pegi Area</td>
<td>Ferin Gada</td>
<td>Murtala Mohammed Way</td>
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<td>Tafawa Balewa Area, West of Mines</td>
<td>Central Area</td>
<td>Government Reservation Areas</td>
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<td>Jenta Area*</td>
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<td>Dadin Kowa Area</td>
<td>Bauchi Road</td>
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<td>Gada Biu</td>
<td>Rikkos, Kongo Russia</td>
<td>Ray Field State/Federal Low Cost</td>
<td>Terminus Area</td>
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<td>Utan Area</td>
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<td>Naraguta</td>
<td>Kwararafa</td>
<td>Police, Prison and Military Barracks</td>
<td>Yakubu Gowon Way</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tina Junction</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Mararaba Jamaa Fruit Market</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zaria Road to Maternity Junction</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Building Material Market, J.D.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hwolshe Area</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Gomwalk Road</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anglo Jos</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zarmaganda</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source**: Field work/Interviews 2011

**Key**: * Area is used to denote streets in close proximity. Sabon Pegi Area includes streets such as Haruna Hadeijia, Kasuwan Kaji, Masallaci Idi, Idi Maiborkono, Kasuwan Nama, Sarkin Arab, Abba na Shehu etc. Jenta Area includes Jenta Adamu, Jenta Apata, Jenta Makeri, Jenta Mangoro. Jenta Mangoro before the crisis was essentially a Muslim settlement while the others had Muslim inhabitants. After the crisis Muslims moved out in all the streets.
Indigenous or autochthonous, Yoruba and other groups. Cab drivers plying the Christian areas are mostly Christian owned as well. There are areas where the two converge in their quest for passengers. Indeed the sheer need to survive and the force of habit often compel people to disregard the safety measure in place. Characteristically, after a long lull in the crisis, life returns to near normal especially in commercial interaction. The precaution assume after a round of another crisis. This is reminiscence of life in Beirut at the height of the sectarian conflict. Commercial avenues in whether Christian or Muslim areas enjoyed patronage. Because of the density of population in certain areas, operators often risk going into them.

As we observed somewhere in the preceding, Jos has served as a melting pot in different context. The need for physical safety of individuals and groups did not only result in movement into secured area within the city, it has resulted in relocation outside the State. The June 12th 1993 crisis and the consequent influx of population into the city already strained by the dearth of infrastructure. The situation further poison the already tensed atmosphere and coincided with the intensification of the suspicion among residents especially the Hausa and autochthonous groups which had commenced the spate of conflict that would marred the city. For States such as Plateau, Benue, Kogi and Nasarawa especially and for others within the Middle Belt area, Jos is significant and symbolic in all sense--political, social, economic, spiritual and educational. Although there are no estimate of those who have moved families and businesses out of Jos, there have been substantial asset disposal and relocation to the relative safety of life outside Jos.

Conclusion
Getting the definition of security right and especially contextualising it by the government is one step to finding solution to all insecurity in particular physical safety in Nigeria. We argued that security in the Nigerian context deferred from those pursued in the West first and foremost and secondly those in operation under military rule created enabling environment. This is because the former is specific, value laden and development bound. It takes a lot of things for granted such as the availability of basic economic and social infrastructure and the attainment of a level of material comfort. The latter suffered from conflict of interest in that as the institution saddled with the defence of Nigeria from external aggression, maintaining territorial integrity, securing its borders from violation on land, sea or air, suppressing insurrection and acting in aid of civil authorities to restore order when called upon to do so by the president(Constitution, 1999), it assumed this constitutional role to be akin to what security mean. Because of the stranglehold it had over governance, the military succeeded in inculcating its view of security on institutions and the political class.

We defined security from two perspectives. The first is the creation of the enabling environment that put human welfare as the centrepiece of governance. This can be accomplished through the provision of economic and social infrastructure that will encourage individual and group initiative towards economic empowerment especially in the absence of job creation by the government. We argued that the lack of this amidst grinding poverty is responsible for the absence of physical safety. The threat to physical safety is what is responsible for rearrangement of places of residence in hitherto mixed neighbourhood on the line of ethnicity but particularly religion in Jos. The phenomenon is not peculiar to Jos. In the middle belt and far northern towns, this trend is well underway as people begin to prepare for what they think would be a domino effect of the Jos conflict(2011). Unless the government disrupt, defeat and dismantle poverty, the trend in Jos would continue and spread to other parts of the country. Poverty has developed complex recipe in Nigeria since independence. The last twenty years has been instrumental as combinations of interests coalesce to deepen the recipe’s ingredients. Among the implications of this is to thwart any attempt to building a united and strong nation strengthened rather than weakened by their diversity. The military regime type failed to deliver this to Nigerians. This is the task before the much hyped much clamoured representative governance in Nigeria.

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