

Class Theory of Terrorism: A Study of Boko Haram Insurgency In Nigeria

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Abstract

This paper uses an interesting and but rather neglected theoretical discussion of Karl Marx's Historical Materialism in order to shed light on the discourse of terrorism that pervades the contemporary global society, and present a class theory of terrorism based on the study of Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria. This theory states that terrorism is an expression of an unending class struggle implicit in the hidden structures of oppression and structured contradictions of global capitalist system. The antagonistic class relations between the ruling class and the lumpen class translate into state and individual terrorism that has featured prominently in the recent times. Through this perspective, it is argued that: the discursive frame of terrorism cannot be analysed in isolation of its class nature and the socio-economic conditions that gave rise to it; and that investigating terrorism must be limited to specific context and society that is crucial to the explication of the action that will be required to transform that context. Boko Haram insurgency is a potentially useful model for the case discussed, thereby making it possible to develop an analytical construct and explanation for terrorism across societies. The paper concludes that as long as the endemic socio-economic problems caused by global capitalism remains, the use of individual terrorism will inevitably become a recurrent event or normal social response to the state of affairs.

Keywords: Terrorism, Class, Boko Haram, Capitalism, Individual terrorism, State terrorism, Nigeria.

1. Introduction

The concept of terrorism became a major concern in philosophy and social sciences following the early writings of Auguste Comte, Emile Durkheim, Karl Marx and other philosophers who critically delved into the discursive frame of Enlightenment epoch, and the qualitative effects of French revolution (of 1789) on the European society. Though, none of them single out terrorism as a study but each commented on it in course of explaining other pertinent social problems at the time. However, terrorism regained renewed academic vigour following the Bolshevik revolution of 1917 in Soviet Russia, counter-revolutionary violence in Hungary, Germany and Spain in 1919, 1925 and 1937 respectively, couple along with the attendant crises, violence and social dislocations that heralded the cold-war period. Consequently, the post-cold war era did not ushered a new lease of peace and end of terroristic history as suggested by Francis Fukuyama (1992), rather, it was characterized by brutal killings and campaign of terror and violence especially in Somalia, Afghanistan, Rwanda, Democratic Republic of Congo and the defunct Yugoslavia, given the changed nature of conflicts from international to local with different actors—state and non-state actors engaged in terrorism to balance out each other and defend respective interests.

The balance of terror and the wave of global insecurity that shaped the beginning of the 21st century was the product of unsettled issues that cold-war had brushed raw. The deepening contradictions and the fallout of these unresolved issues came to fore following the bombing of New York and Washington in 2001, Madrid in 2004, London in 2005, and Oslo in 2011 on one hand, and the orgies of bombing of non-western countries such as Somalia, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Iraq, Yemen and Nigeria on the other hand. In Nigeria, the savage killings and wanton destruction of property that characterized the recent terror attacks in Niger-Delta and Northern part of the country were carried out by sectarian groups and militants as a protest against the Nigerian state. Nigeria's internal security remains extremely volatile following a spate of recent shootings, kidnappings, bombings and suicide assaults. Almost every week, there are reports of attacks or threats putting the security agencies on high alert. The carnage of serial bombing of most towns and cities left over a hundreds of dead bodies in its wake, while charred remains of vehicles dotted the affected places, and many public buildings went up in smoke. Interestingly, terrorism permeates every facet of international society prior to the September 11th attacks and the subsequent "war on terrorism", with few places were unaffected by the hysteria caused by 'terrorism'. Since then, the study of terrorism has preoccupied the attention of scholars in an attempt to laying viable foundation for peaceful resolution of conflicts in the contemporary epoch.

However, three major schools of thought have dominated theoretical debate on terrorism: Psychology (approach that focuses on personality, psycho-pathology and psycho-social traits of a 'terrorist'), Orthodox—Realism and Liberalism (approach that focus on non-state actor terrorism) and Critical terrorism studies (approach that focuses on state terrorism)¹. These theoretical studies adopt a general point of view on terrorism, despite being strongly marked by socio-cultural,

¹ Due to its voluminous nature, this paper will not be able to highlight detailed review on earlier approaches to the study of terrorism. For comprehensive review on theoretical approaches to Terrorism, see Ogunrotifa (2012) papers titled: Research on terrorism: Overview of Theoretical perspectives and Putting Historical Materialism on terrorism studies.

economic and institutional context that gave rise to terrorist acts. Because of their general approach, none of these works have delved into class analysis of terrorism. This study seeks to fill this knowledge gap by using an interesting but rather neglected theoretical discussion of Karl Marx's Historical Materialism in order to shed light on the class dimension of terrorism: what gave rise to the use of terror, and what are the roles of social classes in the use of terror in the society or state, using Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria as a potential case. This is a potentially useful model for the case discussed, and it also makes eminent sense to locate the root of present day terrorism at the behest of the class antagonism inherent in contemporary global capitalist society, and how the existing capitalist social relations requires the use of terrorist tactics by all the classes in the society or state rather than that of the lumpen (suppressed) class. With this perspective, a thorough scientific investigation of terrorism must be laid at the discourse of existing social relations and prevailing mode of production through rigorous and critical scrutiny of historical evidence. It should be stressed that the aim of this study is not to provide an exhaustive explanation on what is terrorism, a discourse which has been the subject of substantial monographs in its own right.

This article is organized into eight main sections. In the section two and three respectively, I seek to outline how Karl Marx's Historical Materialist foundation make eminent case for class perspective. On this theoretical basis, the fourth section extends the theory to uncover the history and nature of terrorism in Nigeria. Section five delves into application of class theory to the understanding of Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria. Section six theoretically discusses the findings of the study. Section seven and eight are devoted to conclusion and policy recommendation respectively.

2. How Karl Marx's Historical Materialism make case for Class perspective

Historical Materialism is a philosophical perspective that was developed by Karl Marx (1818-1883) to explain the successive evolution of society and the conditions of its material life. Marx's historical materialism came into being as a critique of Friedrich Hegel's dialectics. Hegel in his *Philosophy of Right* (1821) developed dialectics as the logic of evolution, movement, and change and argued that material world was a reflection of a 'universal idea' or God (Hegel, 1821). Hegel further asserts that the universe is becoming a combination of being and non-being such that the inner movement of reality is the process of God thinking, as manifested in the evolution of universe and thought (ibid). The fundamental weakness of Hegelian dialectics, according to Marx, was that Hegel combined them with a mystical idealist view of life. Marx however posits that the only *spirit* was human culture, the human spirit, and human life. Marx further argued that human culture is the humanized and civilized world that comprises human life and human spirit; it is the world that has been created by human beings, and it is the world that is always being re-created by human beings².

Therefore, the social world is the objective reality of human society which is the reality of a past human life, which can only, comes into being on the basis of the creation of man through human labour, and through the supersession of an earlier form already in existence (Copleston 2003). Karl Marx therefore rejected Hegel's mysticism and thus developed Historical Materialism as the dialectics of historical development that encompasses the locomotive of class struggle between classes in all societies. In other words, Historical Materialism is the scientific law governing human development and historical succession of society. The fundamental idea behind HM is that 'in the social production of life, men enter into definite relations that are indispensable and independent of their will, relations of production which correspond to a definite stage of development of their material productive forces. The sum total of these relations of production constitutes the economic structure of society, the real foundation, on which raises a legal and political superstructure and to which correspond definite forms of social consciousness. The mode of production of material life conditions the social, political and intellectual life process in general. It is not the consciousness of men that determines their being, but, on the contrary, their social being that determines their consciousness'³

Marx's Historical Materialism however, shed more light into how a new society was developing within the old: such that contradictions implicit in the old society will inevitably give way to a new society. The contradiction inherent in the old society came in form of a class conflict that serves to facilitate major historical change and usher deeper causes of revolution that lie in the autonomous tendency for the productive forces to develop throughout history (Katz 1993:1). Marx maintained that the history of all hitherto existing society has been the history of class struggle that emanated out of the existing social relations to production:

Freeman and slave, patrician and plebeian, lord and serf, guild-master and journeyman, in a word, oppressor and oppressed, stood in constant opposition to one another, carried on an uninterrupted,

² See Karl Marx's (1843) book on 'A contribution to the critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right' available at <http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/sw/penguin/early-works.htm>

³ See Karl Marx's (1852) book title: 'The Eighteen Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte' available at <http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1852/18th-brumaire/ch01.htm>

now hidden, now open fight, a fight that each time ended, either in a revolutionary reconstitution of society at large, or in the common ruin of the contending classes. In the earlier epochs of history, we find almost everywhere a complicated arrangement of society into various orders, a manifold gradation of social rank. In ancient Rome we have patricians, knights, plebeians, slaves; in the Middle Ages, feudal lords, vassals, guild-masters, journeymen, apprentices, serfs; in almost all of these classes, again, subordinate gradations. The modern bourgeois society that has sprouted from the ruins of feudal society has not done away with class antagonisms. It has but established new classes, new conditions of oppression, and new forms of struggle in place of the old ones⁴.

Through Historical Materialism, human societies underwent myriads of stages-starting from primitive communalist society of hunters and gatherers, and later transformed into Asiatic type of society, feudal society and to capitalist society. These successions depict that in earlier societies; men carry on a struggle against nature and utilize nature for the production of material values not in isolation from each other, not as separate individuals, but in common, in groups. Marx noted that 'at a certain stage of human development, the material productive forces of society come in conflict with the existing relations of production, or - what is but a legal expression for the same thing - with the property relations within which they have been at work hitherto. These forms of development of the productive forces turn these relations into their fetters. Then begin an epoch of social revolution. With the change of the economic foundation the entire immense superstructure is more or less rapidly transformed. In considering such transformations a distinction should always be made between the material transformation of the economic conditions of production, which can be determined with the precision of natural science, and the legal, political, religious, aesthetic or philosophic - in short, ideological forms in which men become conscious of this conflict and fight it out. Just as our opinion of an individual is not based on what he thinks of himself, so can we not judge of such a period of transformation by its own consciousness; on the contrary, this consciousness must be explained rather from the contradictions of material life, from the existing conflict between the social productive forces and the relations of production'⁵

Marx regarded the material base of these societies as the productive forces and the corresponding social relations. The productive forces in this regard constitute the instruments of production wherewith material values are produced, the people who operate the instruments of production and carry on the production of material values and the labour-power (labour skill), while the productive forces are only one aspect of mode of production in these societies, another aspect of production in these societal mode of production, is the relation of men to each other in the process of production—men's relations of production, which Marx described as social relations of production⁶. Marx and Engel regarded participation in the social relations as important characteristics of human beings, and that the nature of these social relations in the mode of production of these societies is inherently in conflict with the further productive capacities. This generates internal inefficiencies, social contradiction and conflicts among classes which inevitably altered the balance of social relations, and will eventually give way to higher form of society (as primitive communalist give way to Asiatic societies, and Asiatic societies give way to feudal societies). However, Marx was interested in feudalism (feudal society) and how this mode of production ushered capitalism (capitalist society) to which he devoted most of his study on. Marx did not specifically analyzed terrorism but his focus on how class struggle and peasants revolution in feudal era gave rise to the creation of 'state' and how the ruling class (King, Aristocrat/feudal lords) used state to terrorise peasants (serfs) under feudalism, and how state as instrument of class rule was sustained and utilized in capitalist era to suppress the revolt from the working class, underscores the significance of Marx's Historical Materialism to terrorism studies.

This paper focuses on class, state and terrorism, and more attention will be given to feudal and capitalist mode of productions as these are important in explaining the emergence of state as instrument of class rule and terror. In feudal mode of production, the primary form of property is the possession of land in reciprocal contract relations: the possession of human beings as peasants or serfs is dependent upon their being entailed upon the land. Social relation of production is between the ruling class (noble or aristocrat) and the serf (lumpen class). Mick brooks (2002) argued that 'exploitation under feudalism is clear and unveiled. Freer peasants had land to till and had to pay a rent in kind. Others had an intermediate status, working small plots to gain their own subsistence and forced to pay labour services the rest of the time, on the lord's land. The peasants pay services in money, labour or produce to the lords. Everyone can see what is going on.

⁴ See the preface of Karl Marx's (1848) book 'Communist Manifesto' available at <http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1848/communist-manifesto/ch01.htm>

⁵ See Karl Marx's (1859) book: title: 'Preface to the critique of Political Economy' available at <http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1859/critique-pol-economy/preface.htm>

⁶ Productive forces comprise human labour power, technical know-how used in the means of production such as tools, equipment, buildings and technologies, materials, and improved land). While Social relations of production comprises the property, power and control relations governing society's productive assets, cooperative work relations and forms of association, relations between people and the objects of their work, and the relations between social classes.

If the lord is in a position to force the peasant to work four days instead of three on his land, then it is clear to both parties that the rate of exploitation has been increased⁷. This form of exploitation which occurs through reciprocated contract formed the basis of class struggle between the feudal lords (noble) and the serfs.

The resultant social explosion that bore out of these class struggles was the 1381 Peasants' Revolt in England. The effect of the social dislocation caused by the peasants' revolt compelled the ruling class (the King, nobles and Landlords) to establish state structure—bodies of armed men (which were mainly drawn from the ruling class) who had a monopoly of armed might. It was at this time that political and economic powers were in the same hands (the ruling class). 'Justice in the village was largely in the hands of the lords' manorial courts. The feudal lord and his men-at-arms were police, judge, and executioners all rolled into one'⁸. State was established at this time as an instrument of class rule, needed to protect the ruling class against the rebellious serfs. State is an apparatus created by the ruling class to protect private property and defend its interest. In other words, state is used by the dominant ruling class to suppress the agitation, grievances and revolt from below—the lower classes. If there is no class to be suppressed by the ruling class, then state is not needed. Therefore, the use of state terror (state terrorism) is an offshoot of class society orchestrated by the dominant class to suppress the other classes.

Despite the defeat of peasant's revolt and the resultant dispossession of land, feudal era marked a decisive stage in establishment of rational agriculture, and ushered a process of primitive accumulation by the merchants. The merchants (the future capitalists) began to turn their attention to the peasants half-employed on tiny plots of land. They began to 'put out' weaving to these households. The peasantry became more and more dependent on their weaving income. The merchants were able to move from just supplying raw materials and supplying sales outlets, to possession of the peasants, looms and even their cottages. Through their control over outlets they held the whip hand. This was another important process whereby the feudal peasantry was reduced to proletarian status. The new economic clout possessed by the merchants is constantly at class struggle with landowner and absolute monarchy who wants to keep the peasants on the land.

The class struggle between the merchants and the landowner brought to the fore the social contradiction within the feudal system that eventually give way to capitalism given the observation of Marx and Engel (1848) that:

The productive forces represented by the bourgeoisie rebelled against the order of production represented by the feudal landlords and the guild-masters. The result is known, the feudal fetters were smashed, gradually in England, at one blow in France. In Germany, the process is not yet finished. At a definite stage of its development, manufacture came into conflict with the feudal order of production, so now large-scale industry has already come into conflict with the bourgeois order of production established in its place. Tied down by this order, by the narrow limits of the capitalist mode of production, this industry produces, on the one hand, an ever-increasingly proletarianisation of the great mass of the people, and on the other hand, an ever greater mass of unsaleable products. Overproduction and mass misery, each the cause of the other - that is the absurd contradiction which is its outcome, and which of necessity calls for the liberation of the productive forces by means of a change in the mode of production. The means of production and of exchange, on whose foundation the bourgeoisie built itself up, were generated in feudal society. At a certain stage in the development of these means of production and of exchange, the conditions under which feudal society produced and exchanged ... the feudal relations of property became no longer compatible with the already developed productive forces; they became so many fetters. They had to be burst asunder; they were burst asunder. Into their place stepped free competition, accompanied by a social and political constitution adapted in it, and the economic and political sway of the bourgeois class. A similar movement is going on before our own eyes ... The productive forces at the disposal of society no longer tend to further the development of the conditions of bourgeois property; on the contrary, they have become too powerful for these conditions, by which they are fettered, and so soon as they overcome these fetters, they bring order into the whole of bourgeois society, endanger the existence of bourgeois property⁹.

The destruction of peasant proprietorship (in the form of ownership of land by individual farmers) was regarded by Marx as an essential ingredient in the expansion of capitalism — a process which neither should nor could be prevented. The capitalist society heralded a new social relations and new productive forces that is fundamentally more sophisticated and advanced than the previous societal mode of production (such as feudalism) because most of the profit or the surplus extracted from the labour of the working class is reinvested in industry, commerce, tourism, investments abroad, or other

⁷ See Mick Brooks' (2002) article on 'what is Historical Materialism? A study guide with questions, extracts and suggested reading' available at <http://www.marxist.com/historical-materialism-study-guide.htm>

⁸ See Karl Marx's (1867) *Capital: a critique of Political Economy*. Pp 694-809

⁹ See Karl Marx's (1867) *Capital: a critique of Political Economy*. Pp 671-713

forms of capital expenditure (Calhoun 2002:22). In this regard, Marx considered the capitalist class to be one of the most revolutionary in history, because it constantly improved the means of production, more so than any other class. This implies that the introduction of private property which capitalist mode of production fosters will sharpen class antagonism between the property owning class (capitalists) and working class. While revolutionising the productive forces of the society, the need to protect private property from class antagonism of the working class and future revolution will inevitably compel the capitalist ruling class to improve upon the state apparatuses and instruments of coercion and terror it inherited from feudal era.

Under capitalism, labour-power (the capacity of the worker to labour) is a commodity like any other, in that it is bought and sold on the market. It is sold by its owner, the worker, and bought by the owner of money; the capitalist. But labour-power is different from other commodities in this respect: it has the unique property of being able to create value. This is its usefulness to the capitalist; this is why the capitalist buys labour-power (employs workers). As labour-power is consumed in production (as workers are put to work) value is created far in excess of what the capitalist has paid (as wages) for the labour-power (Clarke 1998: 57-59). This is what Marx regarded as Surplus value. Marx believed that surplus value appropriated from labour is the source of profits, which the capitalists plough back part of it into the business for further economic growth, and spend the rest on luxury and private consumption. He concluded that the rate of profit would fall even as the economy grew and business expanded (Calhoun 2002:22). This fall in the rate of profit, of course, is due to the very expansion and excessive competition inherent in Capitalist mode of production. The fact that the capitalists have to spend more and more on what Marx called 'constant' capital (i.e. machinery, and buildings, etc) means that the ratio of the 'constant' to the 'variable' capital (i.e. the wages that are paid to the working class) has increased enormously in the course of the last few centuries. Marx believed that social contradictions that is inherent in capitalism will emerge when the accumulation of capital is no longer sustainable due to falling rates of profit in (real) production, thus produces systemic crises such as excessive expansion, over-production, under-consumption, overstretching of credit system and falling rate of profit would in the long run punctuate economic growth and deepened recurring and cyclical depressions leading to mass unemployment, financial crisis, and systemic crisis of immense proportion that will inevitably usher conflicts within the social classes in the capitalist mode of production that will inevitably (ibid). Marx argued that one social system is replaced by another social system when it can no longer serve to develop the productive forces, that is to say the means of life, the power of man over nature. Marx believed that these structural contradictions within capitalism will inevitably necessitates its end, thereby giving way to socialism or socialist mode of production through revolutionary process.

However, Marx did not specifically developed Historical Materialism as method and theory for explaining terrorism, this paper will draw form Marx's works in order to develop a coherent theoretical system in terrorism lexicon.

3. Theorizing terrorism

The exposition of Historical Materialism to terrorism studies was first articulated by Joseph Jonathan in his 2011's paper on *Terrorism as a social relation within capitalism*. Jonathan's suggestion of Historical Materialism as a critique of the post-positivist turn in critical approach was reviewed in my previous paper¹⁰ with the sole aim of developing Historical Materialism as a general frame for conceptualizing terrorism across societies. Few months after the publication of these papers, I review my position and that of Jonathan again, and I came to the realization that both views fail to acknowledge that terrorism assumes different aspects and run through different phases from country to country. Here I depart from Jonathan as his idea is nothing short of strengthening and fortifying critical approach that ignored class analysis. Then I begin to draw on how historical materialism is grounded in class analysis of terrorism. Therein, I assert that the root cause of present day terrorism is at the behest of the class antagonism inherent in the triumphant of global capitalism being practiced by each society. To this end, I developed '*a class theory of terrorism*'. The application of class perspective to terrorism discourse must first be limited to specific context and society that is crucial to the explication of the action that will be required to transform that context before venturing on terrorist acts elsewhere or making comparison.

Implicit in this theory is the awareness that terrorism cannot be understood without deepening of our knowledge about the social, economic and political conditions in the society, and the nexus between local specificity and global condition. Thus, the main ideas of the class theory of terrorism can be summarized in the following propositions:

- i. The existing capitalist social relations of production produce the irreconcilable class antagonism and tension among the classes in the society (ruling class, middle class, working class, and lumpen class).

¹⁰ See Ogunrotifa, 2012a

- ii. In ensuing class antagonism, the members of the lumpen class who were frustrated with the state of affairs formed or joined sectarian groups that later resort to the use of individual terrorism against the Ruling class and the state to express their grievances.
- iii. In order to protect its interest, the ruling class in power used the state institution to counter the individual terrorism of the combatant sect(s), and suppress the dissent from below—the working or lumpen class. This is known as state terrorism.
- iv. The wave of violence continues when the combatant sect(s) and the ruling class in power engages further in individual terrorism and state terrorism respectively to balance each other out in a reciprocal fashion.
- v. Terrorism becomes globalise when the local ruling class in power receive international solidarity and support from its foreign counterpart, and together engage in aggressive military onslaught (state terrorism) against the combatant sects until retreat or compromise is found.

However, these propositions avail us the appreciable ways of understanding the nature and trend of terrorism, by first deepening our knowledge of the world situation or International events, and to develop better policy to stem the tide by generating a working hypothesis like the one I seek to test in this study. This hypothesis which is derived from the empirical observation and theoretical propositions above, state that: *Individual terrorism is not just opposite of State terrorism but they are reciprocal and dialectical reactions that are expressed in terms of class interest, and will continue to shape each other in never-ending dominance of capitalist social relations.* The basis of this hypothesis is premised on the fact that the major bane of terrorism of all kinds is as a result of the internal contradictions of global capitalism that altered the balance of existing social relations among classes in the society, and as such produces Individual and State terrorism at the local or national level. From this hypothesis, it is clear that two types of terrorism exist—individual terrorism and state terrorism. These types of terrorism came as a result of the class antagonism among classes in the society. The ruling class and its allies always use state terrorism to protect its interest and make society unchanged and unchallenged, while the use of individual terrorism is usually synonymous with the sections of the lumpen class. Although, certain members of the ruling, middle, and working class do resort to the use of individual terrorism tactics to settle scores or challenge the state of affairs that is not in their favour. The numbers of people in these classes who use this tactics is quite less compare to the lumpen class, and often collaborate with the latter to cause havoc. Moreover, middle class and the working class often use protest, strike, picketing and other forms of trade union tactics to express grievances whenever their interest is at stake. They do not subscribe to the use of individual terrorism as that of the lumpen class.

With these propositions, it is my contention that being a ‘terrorist’ is not a fixed label as orthodox and mainstream theorists want us to believe. Being a ‘terrorist’ is only a temporary baggage that can change depending on the context, method and tactics any class used in protecting its interest or expressing grievances. This theory does not regard any group, organisation or institution (such as state) a ‘terrorist’, but they become a ‘terrorist’ whenever method and tactics of any types of terrorism (Individual and State terrorism) is used, and cease to be terrorist when the usage of such method and tactics of any of the types of terrorism is stopped or renounced. In other words, there is nothing like ‘terrorist’ or ‘terrorist groups or organisations’. What we have is individual, group and institution (like state) that use terrorism to achieve their specific objective. Both the state and non-state actors could be ‘terrorists’ depending on the context and circumstances. Therefore, terrorism is tactics of all classes in the society not only that of the suppressed lumpen class.

3.1 Methodology

The methodological foundation that underpins this study stems largely from its Marxist ontological orientation that emphasizes positivistic approach to social reality. In this sense, social world is a causal order that can be investigated through studying the underlying social structure that shape individual actions. Through this orientation, the social phenomenon can be understood by observing how social structures and institutions gave rise to the phenomenon under investigation through historical process. Terrorism in this case, can only be understood vis-à-vis historical process through which existing social structures and institutional features pave way for its occurrence in a prevailing mode of production. The methodological nature of this approach prioritizes the importance of careful empirical and historical inquiry through the use of explanatory hypotheses that can be rigorously developed in such a way as to explain and predict social outcomes.

3.2 Method

Through the review of literature, I discovered that non-state and state actors are identified as the cause of terrorism in both orthodox and critical terrorism studies literature respectively, and therefore decided to build on these typologies, albeit, in a different way. Due to my background in sociology, my own approach is to unravel the social basis of terrorism by looking

at the underlying structure and mode of production that paved way for state and non-state actor terrorism to thrive in global sphere. With this, I discovered that terrorism is rooted in the practice and operations of the contemporary capitalist system. Thereafter, I drew on historical method to unpack: the class basis, the historical conditions and processes that ushered terrorism. Rather than using non-state actor terrorism, I opted for individual terrorism because of its historical root in Trotskyism¹¹. I later conceptualized and defined terrorism into: *state terrorism* and *Individual terrorism*, while class was conceptualized and defined as: *ruling class*, *middle class*, *working class* and *lumpen class*. This thereby gave me the opportunity to use deductive approach to connect these two types of terrorism (state and individual terrorism) to my main argument in this paper. Through this, I was able to come up with aforementioned working hypothesis. After this, I began to source for a large number of contemporary historical studies (and secondary sources) in order to explain the phenomenon of types of terrorism in Nigerian context. However, the conceptual clarification below offered insight into the conceptual and operational definitions of terms and variables used in this study.

3.3 Conceptual clarification

These propositions represent a higher theoretical system through which analysis of terrorism in the contemporary era can be conceptualized. The ability to juxtapose these propositions with empirical reality hinge on the need to conceptually clarify certain terms and variables such as *class*, *sects*, *state terrorism*, and *individual terrorism* that will determine the set and choice of data to be collected.

- Class here connotes a group of people in society with the same relationship to the means of production and governance. The class which owns and controls the means of production rules society. In the contemporary world capitalist system, class crystallization within the society revolves around the *ruling class*, *middle class*, *working class* and the *lumpen class*.

-*Ruling class* here connotes the broad group of people who controls the economic and political powers of the state or society. They are the class of people who has most material wealth or who owns the means of production and exercise power or authority to shape the direction of a country. In other words, the ruling class comprises the economic elites (capitalist/business sector leaders) and Political elite¹² (the economic elites' representatives in government, political/power elites, the rich, politicians, and hired political managers)

-*Middle class* is the broad group of people who constitute the administrative bulk of the societal governance structure. It is a class that stood or fell socio-economically between the ruling class and the working class. Professionals like lawyers, doctors, nurses, teachers, policemen, armed forces, civil/public servants, engineers, managers, and others dominate this class. In this study, the nature and size of middle class depends on high educational status, holders of professional qualifications, and lifestyle that is tainted towards that of the ruling class.

-*Working class* is broad group of people who do not own the means of production or related to the administrative structures and governance of the state or society. They are group of people who sell their physical labour power to earn a living. They do not own mines, oil wells, and factories but they contribute directly to the production processes.

-*Lumpen class* here refers to a group of peasants, artisans, unemployed and other groups in the society that are regarded as parasites that live and feed on the sweat and work of other classes in the society. The members of the lumpen class are the majority of the population. They 'consist of the millions of teeming labourers, peasant farmers, jobless graduates, underemployed workers, criminals, beggars, prostitutes, the poor, aged and other social stratum that is outside the wage-labour system.

¹¹ See Leon Trotsky (1909)'s paper on Why Marxists oppose Individual terrorism. Available at <http://www.marxists.org/archive/trotsky/1911/11/tia09.htm>

¹² Political wing of the ruling class is divided into two types. The first is the ruling government—one that has held power or currently holding power and using it to the benefit of the clique that is loyal to its rulership in particular, and that of the whole ruling class in general; the second is the opposition—one that has not benefitted from control of the state and has been kept out of power for some time. They represent a very wide stratum of petty and in part medium clique of the ruling class, who have not yet matured but are energetically endeavouring to do so. Generally, whenever there is revolt from other classes the ruling government and the opposition clique become conscious of their class and unite to protect their interest against the revolting classes.

- Sect here are small group (gang) that are oppose to mass solution to the problems of society, but substitute themselves as fighters for the majority. They are non-state actors or a group of people forming a distinct faction within a larger group on the basis of shared beliefs and specific objectives. Sect here comprises: religious groups, ethnic militias, rebels, fascist organisations, and anarchist/insurgent groups. Sect targets members of the lumpen class for recruitment and membership. In fact, majority of sects' membership are the members of the lumpen class.
- State terrorism here is a form of terrorism practiced by a government against its own people¹³. It is a calculated use of violence (or threat of violence) against the people by instilling fear through the use of intimidation or coercion with a view of achieving specific goals and objectives. In other words, State Terrorism is a form of counter-terrorist acts and tactics used by the state to suppress: dissent, anti status quo, violent opposition to its rule amongst its citizenry. State terrorism comprises: the use of terrorism against weaker states, and the use of state institution to sponsor or provide logistics support for foreign combatant sects that engage in individual terrorism against their own state.
- Individual terrorism here is a form of terrorist act perpetrated by an individual or a group with a view to championing a cause or expressing grievances over a general state of affair, purposely to intimidate or coerce a government, individual or groups to modify their behaviours. It is a kind of terrorism carried out by sect(s)/ non-state actor(s) against the state and the ruling class, in order to attain certain objectives. They do not trust police, court and other state institutions, and whenever they feel aggrieved, they seek various means of airing their grievances including violence. Individual terrorism includes suicide bombing, kidnapping of key political figures, wanton destruction of lives and properties, assassinations and killing of individuals seen as oppose to their interests etc

The definitions of key terms and variables above help to form the idea about how to approach the data in theoretical and empirical way. Capitalism which fosters private property makes inequalities among the classes more entrenched, and further divides the society into have (rich and super-rich) and have-not (the poor). Henk Overbeek (2004) noted that 'these social relations of (re-)production are hierarchical and exploitative. They are furthermore guaranteed by the state: in the era of the dominance of *capitalist social relations*, they are guaranteed by the capitalist state'¹⁴. However, in the period of capitalist crisis and contradiction, the class antagonism among the classes becomes pronounced given the extreme polarisation and inequality between the rich and the poor. In the midst of economic meltdown, capitalism cannot continue to guarantee certain concessions such as social welfare scheme and economic package for employees and the citizenry. Therefore, the ruling class ekes the position of 'class war' by undertaken savage cuts in living standards and harsh economic reforms, purposely to save capitalism from imminent collapse and negation. The rich and other members of the ruling class are less likely to be affected by these cut in social spending than the middle, working and the lumpen classes. Therefore, the gap between the ruling class and the middle, working/lumpen classes become wider, and this will inevitably affects the prevailing social relations within capitalism.

Reformist measures such as less pay (wages) but longer working time, restriction of workers' rights, mass sacking of employees, poor working conditions, cut in social spending and harsh austerity measures will be implemented. Thus triggers social conflicts and class struggle among the classes. In this situation, there is potential that class struggle that will lead to strikes, protest and industrial disharmony between the middle/working class and the ruling class. As Alan Wood (2002) noted that 'most obvious and painful manifestations of the crisis of capitalism are not only economic but those phenomena that affect their personal lives at the most sensitive and emotional points: the breakdown of the family, the epidemic of crime and violence, the collapse of the old values and morality with nothing to put in their place, the constant outbreak of wars - all of this gives rise to a sense of instability, a lack of faith in the present or the future'¹⁵

These contradictions caused by the capitalist mode of production and the inability of the state (domination of ruling class) to provide for the lumpen class is recipe for anarchy. This stems from the fact that unemployed and others who cannot understand the series of frustration will be forced to response to the crisis one way or the other. Frustrated sections of the lumpen class are more likely to form or join criminal gangs, radical Islamic groups, sects, fascist organisations that were

¹³ State does not represent the general interest but the particular interest of the dominant ruling class. Therefore, state terrorism is an instrument by which the dominant ruling class exercises its domination over the other social classes.

¹⁴ See Henk Overbeek's (2004) working paper on Global Governance, Class, Hegemony: A historical materialist perspective. Pp.3 available at http://www.fsw.vu.nl/nl/Images/Global%20Governance,%20Class,%20Hegemony%20A%20historical%20materialist%20perspective_tcm30-42721.pdf

¹⁵ See Alan Wood's 2002 article on Civilisation, Barbarism and Marxist view of History available at <http://www.marxist.com/civilization-barbarism-history170702.htm>

established as a result of certain grievances and protests against the state of affairs. The desperation of the capitalist ruling class to defend private property, the market system and endless capital accumulation that are seriously in crisis, require more than a little political repression, police violence and militarized state control to stifle unrest.

Sectarian groups such *Al Qaeda*, Hezbollah, Al- Shabaab, Sunni Islamic extremist groups—such as Egyptian Islamic Jihad, some members of Al-Gama'at Al-Islamiyya, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, and the Harakat ul-Mujahidin, Salafi Group in Algeria, Hamas, Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), Boko Haram in Nigeria, and others were formed as organized group aiming to achieve a specific goal—economic, political or religious. They are the product of a society and are formed just like any other organisations in the west such as British Nationalist Party (BNP), Ku Klux Klan (KKK), English Defence League (EDL), Irish Republican Army (IRA), and Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA). These sectarian groups/organisations are generally regarded as *non state actors* who draw membership from the most frustrated members of the lumpen class in the society. Though most of these groups have supporters and sympathizers within the rank of the ruling and working class but due to their class position in relation to the means of production, they are relatively fewer than the lumpen class. The ability of these organisations to draw membership from the lumpen class depends on how on far its awareness campaign and ideology find an echo and support within the rank of the lumpen class especially in the period of economic crisis. Small nature of these sectarian organisations is due to fewer numbers of memberships at the initial stage. They became a political force when disenchanted and frustrated member of lumpen class who join these organisations in large numbers.

The cause and ideology of these sectarian organisations is diametrically opposed to that of the ruling class in power. The suppression of the pent-up anger and frustration by the government and the ruling class in power, gives these sects tendency to resort to the use of individual terrorism, as a response to the series of frustration and problems they faced, and second, to influence and change the behaviour of the ruling class and the state. This method of expressing grievances by the sections of the lumpen class is counter-productive, and is more likely to compel the ruling class and the state to engage in further state terrorist acts, capable of giving government and its foreign allies the excuse to clamp down on innocent citizens and suppress freedom, given the instrument of force and terror at its disposal. The use of state terrorist tactics as a revenge against any combatant sects will not make the latter abandon its campaign of terror as long as the condition that gave rise to the impasse is not address. Counter (state) terrorist tactics will only make the combatant sects to retreat for some time and re-emerge to cause much havoc than the previous. History has shown that in an instance where a combatant sect is crushed, remnants of the group usually spring up in another nomenclature and challenge the state as long as the problems remain. In this case, the trend of terrorism between the sect and the state continues. Therefore, terrorism is a reflection of social relations among social classes within modern capitalism such that the use of terror can be perpetrated by any of the classes whenever their interests, rights and privileges are at stake.

However, the extent to which lumpen class-induced individual terrorism will occur varies from countries to countries. Individual terrorism is more likely to occur in developing countries than in developed one. This is because in the developed countries, tensions among the classes are not so tense because the state can afford to offer some concessions such social security benefits, unemployment stipends, housing allowances, single mother benefits, scholarship and student loans, pension among others to the working and lumpen classes to cushion the effect of economic crises. This is possible because there is so much capital (wealth of the state) nurtured by over-exploitation of third world countries vis-a-vis taxes and incomes from multinational firms. Therefore, there are enough resources to soften the antagonism among social classes, and ensure that sections of the lumpen class are discouraged from forming or joining sectarian groups that will engage in individual terrorism against the state. But in developing countries, these forms of benefit are non-existent. This makes social antagonism and divides among classes to be sharper especially in the period of capitalist crisis. The sharper this antagonism between classes, the more the lumpen class becomes frustrated and aggrieved. The frustrated and de-classed members of the lumpen class who are angry with the state of affair become the willing tools in the hand of groups/organisations susceptible to the use of individual terrorism against the state.

4. Capitalism: The offshoot of terrorism in Nigeria.

When Europeans first came to area considered to be Africa in 1440s, they came as merchants seeking to trade with Africans. This was sequel to the national limitations to its economic expansion imposed on the European (capitalist) ruling class, who later resorted to imperialism as a way of strengthened it political and economic domination at home and oversea¹⁶. Between 1500 and the 1860s, European merchants and colonists introduced terrorism into Africa by forcefully

¹⁶ The desperation of European capitalists to industrialize, establish new markets for their goods and shut out their rivals culminated in competitive European quest for colonies that could be forced to provide raw materials and cheap labour as well as buy finished goods. This is one of the banes

shipping away millions of people from sub-Saharan Africa to Europe and America in connivance with the traditional rulers (feudal ruling class). The total number of Africans sent across the Atlantic is between 15 to 50 million (Rodney 1972:27), therefore making it the greatest forced migration of people the world has ever seen. The future impact of this forced immigration of people against their will, have a lasting effects of under-development, poverty, debt crisis and terrorism in the contemporary Africa in general and Nigeria in particular.

The history of terrorism in Nigeria is one which is closely linked with the development of capitalism since its birth in the 15th century. Inevitably, the history of terrorism in Nigeria can be attributed to the history of Nigeria itself. By extension, the history of Nigeria can be summed up as the history of using state terrorism by British state for forceful invasion and colonial occupation. Prior to the colonial rule, different ethnic groups and societies that make up today's Nigeria, lived in clans and empires. In the north, there exist Islamic Sokoto caliphates (of Borgu, Sokoto, Kano and Kanuri); while in the West and East exist different empires and communities. The European colonists met centralised state system (traditional) in some places in the North, West and part of the old Eastern region, where political authority revolved around kings and chiefs while in part of the east, there was no centralised state system. The existence of tradition state structure in these societies stems from the existence of social classes. In this regard, certain individuals or groups who have accumulated huge economic surpluses became more dominant and were made kings and chiefs in these societies. Over time, they established traditional state system to collect more taxes and tributes, and subject people to their control. The dominant (ruling) class used the apparatus and instrument of the state to hold the oppressive class into subjection and control. The traditional state structure that was prevalent in Sokoto caliphate in the north, Oyo and Benin empires in the west and some part of kingdoms in the east existed because there was an oppressive class to be held by the dominant class under tutelage. The conquest to extend influence and to accumulate more surpluses from the neighbouring towns and societies compelled the ruling (dominant) class—the kings and the chiefs to wage decisive war against other kingdoms and empires. That was the situation when the Europeans came to Nigeria.

The first task that the invading British did was to stop the war and established trade contact in order to prepare Nigeria for effective colonial capitalist accumulations. The British merchants capitalised on the existing class relations in the west and part of the east by signing treaties with local rulers and established Lagos colony and Niger coast protectorates in the south. In the north, the situation was a bit complex as the quest to expand imperialist influence and deepen capitalist development compelled the aggressive Europeans states to fall over themselves as to who to colonise part of Northern Nigeria until it was resolved in 1884/85 Berlin conference. Britain, France and Germany were laying claims to the ownership of upper and lower Niger. Prior to the Berlin confab, British merchants Tubman Goldie founded United African Company (UAC) in 1879 purposely to extend British influence along the River Niger and to protect British traders from aggressive competition from the French (Davis 2001: 301). The consequential acquisition of the lower Niger from French forces after the Berlin meeting provided an impetus for future colonisation of the Northern Nigeria. In 1886, a Royal charter was granted to Royal Niger Company—a subsidiary of UAC to secure the protection of those territories for British forces. To differentiate it from the western part of Niger (Benin and Niger Republic of today) under French rule, Flora Shaw (the future wife of Fredrick Lugard) suggested 'Nigeria' from Niger area to a British newspaper—London times in January 1897. Nigeria as a country name was accepted and adopted by the British state and the ruling class. Because of concern at French colonial expansion in territories bordering on Northern Nigeria, the British state commissioned Fredrick Lugard (a military officer) to raise a native military force to protect British interests in the region, thus, resulted into the formation of West African Frontier Force in 1900.

The use of state terrorism was further employed when Britain through conquest forcefully integrated different ethnic communities and kingdom under Lagos colony and Niger Coast protectorate respectively into Southern protectorate in 1900, and different emirates into Northern Protectorate in 1903 without the consent of the people in these territories. Direct colonial rule was established in southern protectorates with brute force and military coercions purposely to minimise and remove pockets of resistance from different ethnic nationalities (Salami 2009). However, highly developed Islamic Fulani emirates of Sokoto Caliphate offered strong resistance to colonial rule and posed serious problems to the invading British. The British colonial power under the leadership of Fredrick Lugard systematically subdued local resistance using military campaign when diplomatic overtures failed. Despite the military conquest, opposition and resistance to colonial rule was

of internal contradiction of capitalism. The early capitalism spearheaded by the European merchants in pre-colonial Africa where regarded as the national business interest, and were tied to respective European states' interest. Therefore, the European state apparatus was utilized to protect and advance national business interest abroad till the eve of colonisation. In this regard, the British ruling class used the instrumentality of the British state power to further imperialist interest abroad by ensuring that Colonies such as Nigeria became part of British imperial expansion that focused on exploiting raw materials, minerals, and foodstuffs important to Western industrial development. Britain tried to encourage tropical export crops in Nigeria and to stimulate demand there for British manufactured goods. These developments, along with the introduction of the pound sterling as the universal medium of exchange, encouraged export trade in tin, cotton, cocoa, groundnuts, and palm oil. Britain maintained its economic hegemony over the colonies through military power, strategic alliances, and the collaboration of indigenous rulers

more profound. The fear of possible future uprising compelled Lord Lugard (the Governor-General of Northern protectorates) to negotiate and coerce the emirs and the emirates of the North into accepting British rule, with an agreement that the consent of local rulers through a policy of indirect rule will be the basis of colonial administration in Northern protectorate.

Under this arrangement, the emirs retained their caliphates title and positions, became the executors of British policy in their respective domain, but they were responsible to British district officers, who had final authority. With indirect rule, caliphate officials were transformed into salaried district heads and became, in effect, agents of the British authorities, responsible for peacekeeping and tax collection in their respective domain without any formal power to initiate development projects to improve socio-economic development (Ozigi and Ocho 1981:41; Tibenderana 1988:67). The balance of power rest squarely with the colonial official (governor-General) who has the power to fire any erring emir at will. The successes recorded by the colonist in the Northern protectorates compelled them to introduce similar policy of indirect rule in the southern protectorate. However, the effort to implement indirect rule initially met brick wall owing to the loose traditional political structures among Igbo, Tiv and other ethnic nationalities in the southern protectorates. This was quickly resolved by appointing warrant chiefs. The act of colonial officials to coercively and unilaterally impose warrant chiefs without consent of the people reinforced the method of state terrorism that characterised the colonial rule. The traditional rulers and appointed chiefs were quickly integrated into the new ruling class with limited power while colonialism brought forced labour, loss of land and taxation into the peasantry (lumpen class).

It is clear that the agenda and motive of the British colonist is to: deepen imperialism that has succeeded in India and parts of Asia; extend capitalism to colonial Africa; and expand world capitalist economy, as the development evidence prior to the coming of the British revealed that the Northern and Southern protectorates were at a new stage that was markedly different from communalism nor reached a level of class-mature ridden feudalism (Rodney 1972:29).

When the British imperialist state conquered Northern and Southern protectorates, they were not absorbed by the native culture but completely shattered the old semi-feudal society that had endured for hundreds of years. Having gone through an industrial revolution and renaissance that gave them a technological and military advantage, the British invaders possessed a rather higher level of culture. The invading culture is more advanced and sophisticated than the invaded culture. This is because the capitalism that the invading British introduced represents a higher level of development and culture than either communalism or semi-feudalism they met in the two protectorates. Therefore, feudalism in both protectorates was transformed into the newly introduced primitive capitalism mainly to consolidate British colonial rule through the policy of divide and rule and to create subservient local elite. Capitalism modernizes and revolutionizes the productive forces by re-ploughing profit back into business, transformation through new techniques and new innovation, and new investment in machinery and expansion of credit systems and facilities than communalism or feudalism.

Therefore, the invading capitalist culture displaced semi-feudal culture they met in Northern and Southern protectorates, and altered the balance of existing social relations in the outmoded feudal system. Capitalism was able to break up the ancient conditions of life and labour in both protectorates. For instance, agricultural production which has been carried on a small basis by the independent peasant producers working on the land held in trust from the tribe or community were forced to produce enough food not for them but for sales in order to pay tax and to meet the cost of living in the new system. Thus, expose the peasants into the risky and exploitative world market. At the outset, social contradictions trailed the emergence of capitalism in the two protectorates. The feudalism under the auspices of traditional rulers (kings, chiefs, and emirs) is having perpetual conflict with merchant bourgeoisie (Royal Niger Company), who wanted to generate surpluses and profits through expansion of markets and maximization of export-oriented agricultural peasantry. Within short space of time, these contradictions faded away as the conditions that hold peasants under the forced tutelage of community landlords and monarchs changed. The British colonial state was able to smash the relics of feudalism by establishing pre-colonial Nigeria firmly on the basis of primitive capitalism. Drawing on Adam Smith's *Laizzes-faire* doctrine that the state is 'a spectator that steps in to correct the actions of the private sector when it commits error of commission or omission' the colonial officials in both protectorates were able to set the ball of capitalism rolling by providing transportation and communication systems, education and technology at cost of colonial tax payers money. Access road and railways were used to ship raw materials to British industry and to allow rapid troop movements, in order to checkmate native's resistance. The Colonial rulers had contemplated effective capitalist system where railroad lines will be able to transport tin from Jos Plateau and northern-grown peanuts and cotton to ports on the Lagos coast. But the drawback faced by capitalist expansion in the northern protectorates was the lack of access to the sea, and that Northern Protectorate had a budget deficits. The Colonial official under the leadership of Fredrick Lugard wanted to use the budget surpluses in the Southern protectorates to offset this deficit (Barkan and Gboyega, 2001) and hoped that amalgamation of the two protectorates into a single entity would help to ameliorate this problem, and make effective colonial administration easier. Trailing after this is the expansion of prison system that came into being in 1872 when the British Consul administering the Colony of Lagos opened the Broad Street Prison with a capacity for 300 inmates. By 1910, similar

facilities had been extended to Degema, Calabar, Benin, Ibadan, Sapele, Jebba and Lokoja. In the then Northern Protectorate, the Emir's existing 'Gidan Yari' were designated as Native Authority Prisons, and remained so until they were abolished by the Gowon administration in 1968¹⁷.

Western education was also introduced. More schools for the natives especially in Southern Nigeria were built to train them to become railway workers, doctors, clerks, teachers, local administrators, etc. who are the embryo of the coming Nigeria intelligentsia and proletariat (working class). While in the North, colonial rule under Lord Lugard was reluctant to permit missionaries the opening of schools in Northern Nigeria, in order not to offend the Emirs on whom the country's administration relied. Though, few schools were permitted, but this colonial decision legitimatised complete feudalisation of Northern Nigeria where the emirs and the local ruling class entrenched Islamic education in order to prevent opposition to their misrule and domination. The emir and colonial power feared that by introducing western education, the northerner youths would be liberated from the shackles of ignorance and backwardness that will allow them to challenge the status quo like their counterpart in the south.

The forceful amalgamation of Northern and Southern protectorates in to what today's known as Nigeria, in 1914 amounted to the furtherance of state terrorism tactics by the British colonial power¹⁸. The colonist did not seek the view or consent of Nigerians as to whether or not they favoured such an amalgamation (Salami 2009:4). In this regard, Nigerian state was founded on the basis of terrorism. In a bid to consolidate its economic grip on the amalgamated state, the colonial power introduced the policy of divide and rule. The colonists deliberately gave certain privileges to some tribes at the expense of others. Divide and Rule (tribal divisions) were encouraged and intensified by the most Christian European rulers. The British were especially skillful at this game. In Nigeria, the politics of divide and rule was first noticed when Lord Lugard and other colonial officials attempted to remove Nigeria's capital from Lagos to Zungeru or Kaduna because he felt the northerners are traditionally submissive (to their local leaders) and in total cooperation with the colonial rulership. When the decision failed, 'colonial state pursued its cardinal agenda of divide-and-rule policies that entrenched systems of ethnic segmentation and polarization. These included the 'Warrior tribe' policy of recruitment into the army and the police, the exclusion of Christians and southerners from the core north and their restriction to strangers' quarters, and the privileges accorded leaders of the major groups in the regions, all of which bequeathed a fatal legacy' (Osaghea 2011:17). The most condescending aspect of British colonial policy of divide-and-rule was discouragement of any official political contact between north and south until 1947, when politicians from the two regions sat together for the first time in the central legislative council.

The amalgamation that was imposed purely for economic interest, gave Foreign trading corporations and firms such as United Trading Company in West Africa, United African company (the subsidiary of Unilever and Lever Brothers) and others monopoly trading power to exercise complete control over the purchase of agricultural products and the sales of imported goods. The colonial capitalist economy became periphery and microcosm of the world capitalist economy. This marked the beginning of the imperialist phase of the exploitation of Nigeria such that the export of International finance capital to and of goods from Nigeria became the predominant feature. The advancement of primitive colonial capitalist accumulation came with the introduction of pound sterling as the universal medium of exchange, thus encouraged export trade in tin, cotton, cocoa, groundnuts, and palm oil and ensured that Britain maintained its firm economic hegemony over the colonial Nigeria. This however led to commodification and objectification of all aspects of economic and social relations, and the proliferation of wage labour and sustained through forced labour and taxation (Chizea, 1984 cited in Olutayo, 2009:3). The law of capitalist accumulation which requires that workers must be 'free' to sell their labour-power and they must be 'free' from the means of production, was laid bare in pre-colonial era, and further consolidated through cultivation system in the colonial period. To get the new currency, the cultivation system ensured that the lumpen class especially the peasants had to work for wages or produce cash crops for export. The cultivation system was a classic piece of colonial exploitation, with the main aim to increase forcibly the productive capacities of agriculture for the benefit of the British treasury. It was an outstanding success from the point of view of British capitalism, producing massive quantities of tropical export goods whose sale in Europe propped up Britain. The British capitalists were not interested at all in advancing the productive capacity of agriculture. The colonial authorities provided very little in way of capital investment,

¹⁷ See Nasir El-Rufai's article on Budget 2012: Paramilitary Nation available at <http://mobile.saharareporters.com/article/budget-2012-8-paramilitary-nation-nasir-ahmad-el-rufai>

¹⁸ The conquest and colonization of the coastal area of Lagos and its hinterlands took place between 1861 and 1897. The conquest of the eastern region and the declaration of the Niger Coast Protectorate occurred in 1894. Finally, a third wave of penetration led to the declaration of a protectorate over the northern areas in 1900. In 1906 the colony of Lagos and the Protectorate of Southern Nigeria (which included the former Niger Coast Protectorate) were joined together to become the Colony and Protectorate of Southern Nigeria. Finally, in 1914 the northern and southern protectorates were amalgamated to become the Colony and Protectorate of Nigeria, although both parts continued to be administered separately.

with virtually no improvement in the techniques of production and manufacture. This however corroborated Walter Rodney's argument that:

'The most convincing evidence as to the superficiality of the talk about colonialism having 'modernised' Africa is the fact that the vast majority of Africans went into colonialism with cutlasses and hoes and came back with hoes. Some capitalist plantations introduced agricultural machinery, and odd tractor found its way into the hands of African farmers; but the hoe remained the overwhelmingly dominant agricultural implement. Capitalism revolutionised agriculture in Europe, but it could not do the same for Africa'¹⁹

The peasants were required to cultivate, harvest and transport it to the factory (carrying the produce on their shoulders because of lack of vehicles and animals, and poor road conditions), and labour at the factory. The cultivation System also levied huge amounts of labour from the peasants for the construction of infrastructures deemed necessary for the operation of the Cultivation System, including, but not limited to, road and bridge building for crop transportation, improvement of port facilities, the construction of offices, residences for officials and factories and warehouses for the produce, the building of railways, and port systems, and even defense fortification. The exploitation of this system was almost unprecedented in the history of British occupation of colonial Nigeria such as half of what the peasants produced went to pay taxes to white officials. The real economic power was concentrated in the hands of foreign firms who have the monolithic power to set and regulate prices at which agricultural produce and mining products could be bought. In the most detailed account of this development, Tom Forrest observed that 'the foreign merchant Companies often combined together in the produce trade to regulate prices and to operate pooling arrangements under which the total purchase was divided among members according to previously agreed proportions. In this way, they increased their profits, discouraged new entrants and forced out newcomers from the trade. When African traders attempted to control markets and prices through combinations, they could be penalised'²⁰.

Trailing behind the domination of foreign corporations is the rise of national bourgeoisie and growth of indigenous capitalist enterprise. The local capitalist class comprises local merchants, middlemen agents and the new black elites. Nigerian local bourgeoisie made their fortunes from the sweat of the peasant farmers such that they 'bought cash crops at low price from the peasant farmers and sold to the foreign firms at high price. The product were then exported for processing and finished goods, and brought back to Nigeria, by these agents/allies, at exorbitant prices' (Olutayo, 2009:4). The colonial official and British imperialists use the state apparatus to protect local bourgeoisies from the demands (such as higher price for commodity goods) of the oppressed classes, while local bourgeoisies through control of the state provide monopoly conditions for imperialist expansion (Beckman 1981:2). The national bourgeoisie is too weak, and too dependent on imperialism, to tackle the most pressing problems of the masses. The new black elite went to smart British public schools where they learned to talk and think like the white wannabes of colonial days. They became shareholders in British and American companies that installed themselves in Nigeria and established a new kind of colonial dependency at the eve of independence. The new black bourgeoisie being the new political elite was just as rapacious as the British, but even more corrupt, inefficient and rotten. In effect, they were only the local office boys of the British and America imperialists.

These subtle colonial exploitations where agricultural produce and mining products were under-priced by the foreign trading companies under market-sharing agreement and price regulation provoked sharp response and strong opposition from the peasant farmers and small petty-bourgeoisie, and fuelled nationalist sentiment. It was observed that the 'native resentment of foreign firms within Nigeria was boiling over. By the late 1930s, one conglomerate alone controlled more than forty percent of the import-export trade. The government only strengthened these firms. For example, by law, any agent in charge of a mining lease had to be European. Working class and peasants joined the growing chorus for independence'²¹. The forms of social relations in this colonial capitalist economy made the material productive forces to come in conflict with the existing relations of productions with working class, and peasants. The relation of merchant capitalists to working class and the peasant farmers in the process of colonial production culminated into class struggle. Rather than engaging in Individual terrorism at that time, the peasants and other members of the lumpen class agitated for independence. This stems from the fact that the peasants in the colonial era are weak in terms of their class position in relation to the material forces of production than the working class. Since the peasants depend on merchant capitalists for economic survival, they could not take the risk in taking arms or wage war against the colonial state. This could mean brutal clampdown by the state apparatus, and forfeiture of previous concessions won from the state and the merchant capitalists.

¹⁹ Rodney (1972). Pp. 239

²⁰ See Tom Forrest's 1994 book on The advance of African capital: The growth of Nigerian private Enterprises, pp.15

²¹ See Wendy McElroy (2005) paper on West Africa and Colonialism, Part 2 available at <http://www.fff.org/freedom/fd0411f.asp>

The inherent class antagonism that was embryonic in the colonial capitalist relations became developed and radicalised following the twin-processes of 1929 stock market crash and the outbreak of Second World War. These developments accelerated the pace of class struggle that eventually forced the colonial power to consider political independence. The 1929 stock market crash in United States triggered a decade of great economic depressions of 1930s that resulted into untold effects on US, Europe and world economy. The decline in stock prices caused bankruptcies and severe macroeconomic difficulties including contraction of credit, business/factory closures, massive unemployment, bank failures, decline of the money supply, and other economic depressing events²². The colonial Nigeria like the rest of other African colonies was not spared from the contagion of global capitalist crisis given its position as the peripheral of the world capitalist system. The collapse in the price of primary products culminated into falling export demand that hit every segment or broad spectrum of the colonial Nigeria hardest in terms of fall in industrial production, downward pressures on wages, massive sacking of workers in public sector, dwindling profits of monopoly trading corporations, and peasant farmer's income. The determination of the British state and its ruling class to pull her economy out of the doldrums of global depression vis-à-vis her economy recovery policies is directly link to putting more burden on the working and lumpen class in her colonies (especially Nigeria) and to ensure that poor Nigerians pay for the global capitalist crisis. In response to global depression, the colonial authorities aggressively pursued a wide range of austerity policies such as pay cuts, retrenchments, aggressive revenue drive through taxation, and the suspension of public work couple along with direct money transfers to Britain, expansion of export crops and the implementation of price control measure in colonial Nigeria²³. The desperation of colonial authorities to expand revenue base culminated in the ransacking of towns, villages and Hamlets, and confiscation of food, livestock and property of tax defaulters in Idoma land²⁴. This aggressive strive at generating revenue from the grassroots caused food shortages and full-scale famines—famines devastated whole villages as the agent of an avowedly bankrupt state watched helplessly²⁵. The anti-people policies of the colonial powers such as retrenchments 'had a multi-prolonged unintended consequences as the retrenched workers congregated on tin mine compounds on the Jos plateau and on the railway, engaging in a wide array of criminal and subversive activities including the sale of children, child labour trafficking, stealing and vengeful sabotaging of railway track components'²⁶.

However, the response of the people to the capitalist crisis was expressed in terms of nationalist movement that had gained momentum. The brand of nationalism that emerged was that of bourgeois nationalism that was strictly controlled by the emerging national bourgeoisie. A national identity was created amongst the colonized people of Nigeria through common struggle against the oppressors. The colony of Nigeria, with land territory of 923,768 square km, more than 250 distinct ethnicities, and over 400 languages and dialects was united by a common history of British colonization. The first layer that articulated Nigerian nationalism was that of the young intellectuals who studied abroad and brought home with them the spirit of Pan Africanism led by Herbert Macaulay, Nnamdi Azikwe and others through the establishment of newspapers such as Lagos Daily News, West Africa pilot, and others were used to arouse political awareness among the people. The outbreak of the Second World War added an appalling burden on the shoulder of the beleaguered people who are still battling with the catastrophic crisis of 1930s global economic crisis. The skyrocketing cost of living, austerity programme and colonial continuation of anti-people economic recovery policies in the post war years stretched the already impoverished people especially the working class to the breaking point, that later crystallized into class struggle and general strike of 1945. The strike which lasted for 45 days was the last straw that broke the back of declining colonial capitalism. Lisa Lindsay (1999) observed that

Tensions leading to the 1945 strike had been building since at least 1941, when the government issued new salary scales for the civil service. After strenuous complaints from the press and the African Civil Service Association that wage levels were still too low, it withdrew the proposals and appointed A. F. B. Bridges to head a commission to investigate the cost of living in Lagos. The commission's report was not released until mid-1942, after months of agitation on the part of the African Civil Servants Technical Workers Union (ACSTWU), an umbrella group representing most government employees. When it finally emerged, the Bridges report called for increased minimum wages, a 50 percent boost in the cost of living allowance to civil servants, and the adoption by commercial employers of labour practices similar to those of the government. The administration accepted most of the recommendations, including the cost of living award. Governor Bernard Bourdillon also promised that, if inflation continued, a new cost of living adjustment would be made in the future. Prices kept rising as the war demanded manpower, limited imports, provided incentives for farmers to export their crops, and lured potential agriculturalists to the cities in search of work. The cost of living index had increased 74 percent

²² See Galbraith, J.K, *The Great Crash 1929*. Pp.26

²³ See Ochonu, M. 2009. *Colonial Meltdown: Northern Nigeria in the Great Depression*. Pp.7

²⁴ *Ibid*, pp.1

²⁵ *Ibid*, pp.16

²⁶ *Ibid*, pp.16

between 1939 and October 1943. The ACSTWU called for cost of living adjustment (COLA) revisions in 1943 and 1944, but Governor Arthur Richards, the more intractable official who had replaced Bourdillon, refused on the grounds that money was not available and that efforts were being made to control prices. This argument appeared to trade unionists and their supporters as disingenuous, given that the Nigerian government continued to increase the allowances paid to European civil servants. In May 1942, the administration had introduced the payment of 'separation allowances' to those whose wives did not live in Nigeria²⁷

The Nigerian Trade Union Congress led many workers unions under its affiliation to this tremendous strike demanded for upward review of salary of African workers in the public service in lieu of the rising cost of living and general inflationary trend. George Padmore (1945) observed that 'after the failure of protracted representations to the Government for salary increases to meet the very much increased cost of living, 150,000 clerical and non-clerical workers in the Nigeria civil service, came out in a general strike of all Government departments on 21st of June 1945'²⁸. Many other trade unions, unaffiliated and affiliated with the African Civil Servants Technical Workers Union of Nigeria²⁹, joined the strike and came out in support of the Nigerian Trade Union Congress which led this tremendous strike and put forward wage demands of their own.

In a detailed account, Robert Birchman (1945) reported that colonial government prepared for the strike by rushing through the repeal of the Defense Regulations act under which a number of Nigerian trade union leaders were imprisoned for four years during the war³⁰. The law stifled press freedom and empower the Governor to suppress any newspaper that publishes uncensored news or criticizes the Governor or his officials. The penalty for violation is a 500 pound fine or two years in prison, or both³¹. This attempt at relying on the use of state terrorism to suppress the agitation from below is a dangerous tactics of the ruling class to protect its interest and maintain the status quo. The colonial government and the ruling class used state terrorism against the working class in two ways during the strike. First, the Government threatened to withhold the wages of all strikers for the month of June and to cancel all their pensions, gratuities and contractual rights. When this intimidation failed, four railroad union leaders were arrested on trumped-up charges of participating in an illegal strike³². Second, armed soldiers with rifles were stationed at the railway locomotive yard at Ebute Metta and Oshodi to prevent sabotage of transport and communications systems, especially the derailing of trains at Oshodi, and cutting telephone lines connecting Lagos with the interior of the country which striking workers had been accused of³³.

Despite these threats and other tactics of state terrorism that were unleashed, the striking workers withstood all forms of official pressure and intimidation, and vowed never to return to work unless all their demands: pay the strikers for the period during which they have been on strike; guarantee their pensions and other rights; no victimization of strikers; immediate release of the arrested strike leaders; grant the original demand for a 2/6 minimum wage. After forty-five days, the colonial government on the instruction from British Labour colonial secretary, conceded to the workers' demand. According to Birchman (1945), Arthur Richard—the Governor of the colony 'broadcast a statement agreeing to comply with the strikers' demand for a minimum wage of 2 shillings, sixpence a day and promising to pay them full wages for the ten weeks. He also agreed to release all the arrested strike leaders: to re-employ all government civil servants; to lift the ban on the suppressed newspapers, the Daily Comet and African Pilot, assuring the editor, Nnamdi Azikiwe, security of life and property³⁴. The concession of the colonial government to the striking workers, the radicalisation of class consciousness of the people and the rising profile of national movement compelled the colonial power to hand over the leadership of the national independence struggle to the emerging national bourgeoisie which was tied hand and foot to imperialism. While the national bourgeoisie was inherently incapable of completing the task of national liberation, colonial government established regionalism, resource control and party politics as soft landing measures to preserve its economic dominance and usher political independence with least resistance in 1960.

²⁷ See Lisa Lindsay's 1999 paper on Domesticity and Difference: male Breadwinners, Working Women and Colonial Citizenship in the 1945 Nigeria General strike. Pp.5

²⁸ *ibid*

²⁹ Unions under the affiliations of African Civil Service Technical Workers of Nigeria includes the African Railway and Engineering, Workshops Workers, African Land and Survey Technical Workers, African Post and Telegraph Workers, Nigeria Electrical Workers, Nigeria Marine African Workers, Public Works Union, Lagos Town Council Workers, African Locomotive Drivers, Government Sawmill Workers, Nigeria Union of Nurses, African Inspectors Union, African Railway Topographical Workers, African Railway Station Masters, Government Press Technical Workers Union and Medical Department Workers Union. Workers on the privately-owned Elder Lines joined the strike at its beginning. The Elder Lines are a subsidiary of Elder Dempster and Co., Ltd., which has a virtual monopoly on all shipping to and from the West African colonies.

³⁰ See Robert Birchman's account of the class struggle in Nigeria, which is available at

<http://www.marxists.org/history/etol/newspape/fi/vol06/no10/birchman.htm>

³¹ *Ibid*

³² See Warren (1966)'s Urban Real Wages and the Nigerian Trade Union Movement, 1939-60. Pp 14

³³ See Robert Birchman (1945)'s Class struggle in Nigeria. Pp. 7

³⁴ *Ibid*

At the time Nigeria attained political independence in 1960; the country was divided into three big regions: Northern, Western and Eastern. The two South: East and West—regions had the Ibo and Yoruba as the political and economically dominated ethnic groups respectively, while the Hausa/Fulani was dominant in the North. The emergent Nigerian state is neo-colonial in nature, while the political elite of the ruling class who assumed leadership served the interest of the metropolitan capitalist class and that of its local beneficiaries (emergent petit bourgeoisie, the merchant class and the elite). This reflects the weak and embryonic nature of the Nigerian national bourgeoisie who depends on metropolitan bourgeoisie. As Abubakar Momoh noted, both economic and political wings of the ruling class benefited from the devolution of power to the regions in order to maintain their dominant class status on the new independent state in terms of getting government contracts, having access to credit and other accumulation-enhancing facilities (Momoh, 1996:3). They have shown little inclination or capacity to develop dynamic national economies and the people beyond what departing colonist left behind. Their policies and programmes are not fundamentally different from the same colonial policies of capitalist accumulation that consolidates neo-colonialism. Ehiedu Iweriebor observed that ‘the acceptance of economic philosophy of capitalism by the new ruling class couple with the socio-political structures they inherit and consolidate through bourgeoisie economic nationalism sharpens class antagonism—which is the dynamite of contradiction that were laid at the foundation of the newly independent states (Iweriebor, 1997: 27). The neo-colonial capitalist policies of the ruling class dashed the illusionary hope that people had on independence, while the anti-colonial and anti-imperialist campaigns by the Nigerian peoples - workers, peasants, women, students, the professionals and indeed the left were compromised (Momoh 1996:1). By corroborating the observation of Momoh, Crawford Young noted that ‘people were frustrated that the pledged accelerated development in the heyday of nationalist movement to young militants who provided muscles for nationalist movement in return for employment; the anticipated incorporation new intellectual class emerging from universities into the upper ranks of the state bureaucracy; and parents hoped that pledges of rapid school expansion, universal primary education, clinics, road and social infrastructure would be fulfilled were disappointed’ (Young, 2004:31).

Given the social disillusionment, the ruling class was increasingly divided and disoriented by the depth of a crisis they never expected and have no idea how to solve them. Suddenly, they find themselves unable to maintain control of society by the old colonial methods. Rather than showing leadership, the political elites of the ruling class resorted to the use of divide and rule, and ethnic/regional politics that thrived on strong patronage networks and rampant corruption. For instance, the regional government in Western Nigeria implemented a lot of progressive programmes such as free education, free health, industrial and infrastructural development and rural integration schemes. In the eastern region, industrial and infrastructural development was the major programme of the administration as this was calculated to strengthen its grips on commerce, trade and control of petroleum resources. Apart from industrial and infrastructural development programmes, the region did little in addressing diseases, illiteracy, malnutrition and other problems that were more rampant in the region compare to the rest of the country. In terms of education, the same colonial policy of forbidden western education was still in place in Northern Nigeria. This was deliberately maintained by the Northern ruling class to ensure complete feudalisation of the region so as to consolidate its aristocratic grip on her people. Rather than establishing western schools, more Islamic schools were established for poor and commoners while children of the rich have access to few western/missionary schools that ex-colonial power established. Paden (1986) reported that in 1964, the late Ahmadu Bello, the Sardauna of Sokoto and the Premier of Northern Nigeria, wanted to establish over two million Koranic schools scattered in all parts of Northern Nigeria. This was sequel to the British conspiracy with the local ruling class at the outset of the colonisation process (indirect rule) to shield the Muslim north from being exposed to Western education and culture (Coleman, 1986; Dudley, 1968; Ohadike, 1992; Sanusi, 2007: 181). This development led to the institutionalization of Almajeri system³⁵, deep contempt for western education among the people of the Muslim North and the influx and multiplicities of different religious sects³⁶ claiming to hold superior dominance of Islamic knowledge and how best to practice Islam.

Due to lopsidedness in the access to western education, the Northern region was deficient of quality professionals who can run its civil/public service, industrial and banking sectors. The influx and domination of civil service and other economic sector of the north by the Igbo people of eastern Nigeria added source of disaffection among the northerner ruling class. The latter thereby whipped ethnic sentiments by ‘northernising the Region Public Service so as to ensure that Northerners secure a reasonable proportion of all posts in all statutory corporations, public services and to increase the number of

³⁵ The “Almajeri syndrome” is where male children learning to read the Koran are forced to roam about the street and beg in order to earn a living for themselves and their teachers (Danjibo 2011:8)

³⁶ Different Islamic sects that emerged in Northern Nigeria includes the *Derika*, the *Izala*, the *Kaulu (Kablu)*, the Muslim brothers, the *Tijjaniya* and the *Quaddiriya*, the Shiite, the Muslim Brotherhood, and several other splinter groups such as Ahmadiyya and Sanusiyya.

Northerners in commercial, industrial, banking and trading concerns in the region' (Ankpe 1987). The ruling class in Western and Eastern regions soon followed suit (Ayeni-Akeke, 1988:4).

The divisions within the Nigerian ruling class are as deep as ever before the independence. Rather than building viable modern state, the division was expressed on ethnic and region line as to who get what and how as far as the national cake is concerned. The rampant corruption, ethnic marginalization and maladministration, made the already fractured split within the ruling class more profound. The intra-class conflicts that spiral following the manipulation of national census figures in 1964, alleged rigging of federal legislative election in 1965 and the attendant crises and riot that followed electoral crisis in Western house of assembly in 1966 made antagonism within the ruling class more irreconcilable. The aftermath was the bloody military take-over of government in January 1966. The military generals who become the new political elite of the ruling class continued with the same discredited policies, and were divided over whether Nigeria should practice federal or unitary system. The northern wing of the military dictatorship wanted the hitherto federal structure to be kept, while the eastern section wanted the unitary system. The irreconcilable antagonism within the military wing of the ruling class over system of government coupled along with the accusation that the military coup shielded the killing of top politicians from the East at the expense of the North and West snowballed into another bloody military coup in July 1966.

The coming to power of the northern military wing through the counter coup destroyed the fragile trust existing among the major ethnic groups and saw the country divided more than any time since the amalgamated period. The first crack within the military ruling class is the personality clash between the then Head of State—Lt. Colonel Yakubu Gowon and Lt. Colonel Ojukwu Odumegwu over who should be become Head of Nigerian state. The latter felt the former was his junior in the military and therefore, he should have been made the Military president of Nigeria. This personality clash couple with ethnic tensions that came in the aftermath of the military coup and counter-coup compelled the central military government to divide the country into twelve states from the original four regions in May 1967. This tactics of holding the country together in the last result did not go down well with the Eastern ruling class under the leadership of Lt. Colonel Ojukwu Odumegwu who felt they were not consulted by that unilateral act of states' creation. The inability of the ruling class to resolve the antagonism within its fold led to the Nigerian civil war (1967-1970). A decade after the civil war, Nigeria enjoyed much tranquility following the economic boom (increased earnings from oil revenues) that came due to the 1973 Arab–Israeli War that led to the disruption of Middle East oil supply. The military clique and the entire ruling class benefited from the oil boom but it did not develop the productive forces of Nigerian society nor strive to improve the socio-economic well-being of Nigerians. As oil production and revenue rose and accounted for nearly 80 percent of GDP, the Nigerian ruling class neglected other sectors such as agriculture and relied heavy dependence on export of primary products. Despite earning an estimated US \$320 billion from the export of crude oil between 1970 and 1999, there was fallen standard of living and rising poverty level as the boom did not have significant improvement in the lives of Nigerians.

However, the global economic crisis of 1980s led to the collapse of commodity price at the world market. The economy of an oil-based economy such as Nigeria suffered a recession due to deficit balance of payment, external debt crisis, instability and misallocation of scarce foreign exchange, fiscal indiscipline, corruption and weak external demand. The response of the ruling class to the crisis was to scale back the little concessions or social welfare that people enjoyed vis-à-vis austerity policies that eventually gave rise to the implementation of Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP). Prior to the implementation of SAP, Nigeria being a neo-colonial capitalist economy that enriched a few at the expense of the nation, still provides some safety nets for the masses. In fact, the Nigerian Government placed emphasis on the 'building of an egalitarian society in line with the extended family system of the African people. However, the introduction of the Structural Adjustment Programme which was instigated by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund ruined the Nigerian economy completely and destroyed the moral fabrics of the society. With retrenchment of workers, abolition of marketing boards, commercialisation of social services, sale of the assets of the nation, trade liberalization, currency devaluation and other dangerous components of SAP mass poverty became the order of the day. The middle class was wiped out while the manufacturing sector became extinct³⁷.

Gaffar Ijaiya (1998) observed that 'austerity measure put in place by the government between 1982-1986 has caused a lot of hardships to the people that subsequently resulted in a high scale of poverty³⁸. This was further corroborated by the World Bank report (1990) that the austerity policies of the Nigerian government had severe effects on the country's poor as consumption further plummeted in the 1980s than in 1950s (World Bank, 1990). The consequences of this increase in poverty include among others; increase in the number of destitutes, beggars, prostitutes, and paupers, and increase in the rate of crime in the society. World Bank figures for Nigeria's gross national product per showed that from a peak of US

³⁷ See Femi Falana (2012)'s paper on World Bank Responsible for Grand Corruption in Nigeria. Accessed at <http://saharareporters.com/article/world-bank-responsible-grand-corruption-nigeria>

³⁸ Gaffar Ijaiya, 1998, pp. 1

\$780 in 1981, GDP fell to an all time low of US \$220 in 1994³⁹. Similarly, surveys conducted by Nigeria's Federal Office of Statistics show that:

In a 16 year period that began in 1980 (the year the oil boom years of the 1970s began to go burst), the percentage of Nigerians living in poverty rose from 28 percent to 66 percent. Numerically, while 17.7 million people lived in poverty in 1980, the population living on less than US \$1.40 a day rose to 67.1 million by 1996. Within the same period the percentage of the rural poor increased from 29 percent to 70 percent, while the share of the poor in the urban areas rose from 18 to 55 percent. Those classified as the core poor (the poorest of the poor - living on about US \$0.70 a day), increased from six percent to 29 percent of the population. The geographical distribution of poverty showed that the percentage of the poor ranged between 55-60 percent in the south, in the north they ranged between 70-78 percent of the population⁴⁰.

Before the outset of global economic crisis and decline of commodity and oil prices in 1980s, there had been earlier warning sign—the 1979 oil crisis in the United States that occurred in the wake of the Iranian Revolution, and Iraq-Iran war of 1980s. The revolution which swept the former shah leaders out of power and pave way for Islamic theocracy disrupted oil production and accounted for four percent overall loss in Iranian oil supply in the world market. Apart from economic effect that Iranian revolution had, it also had religious effect as there was a surge of radical and fundamentalist activities especially among Muslim youths in Northern Nigeria. The Iranian movement emboldened many fundamentalist Muslim sects, notably the Maitatsine, Izala movement, the Muslim Brotherhood or Shiites to demand: purist Islam based on Sharia law; the eradication of heretical innovations; and, the establishment of an Islamic state or theocracy. These sects preached that Islamic republic based on Sharia law would eradicate poverty and other social vices. As a result of the hardship experienced by the Nigerians vis-à-vis economic crisis, these religious campaigns and preaching of these Muslim sects found echo within the frustrated sections of the lumpen class who had been badly hit.

Maitatsine, one of the notably Islamic sects became popular following its constant abusive and provocative preaching against established institutions like the emirate and the political class, whom the sect criticized as corrupt, and had corrupted and polluted Islam by modernization (Westernization) and the formation of the modern state (Danjibo 2009:6). According to Falola (1998), Muhammad Marwa—the founder of Maitatsine sect was 'a Quranic teacher and preacher who used forceful, persuasive and charismatic appeal: to rebel against many popular opinions among Kano Islamic circles, denounce certain parts of the Holy Qur'an and even criticized Prophet Muhammad. At one stage in his career, Marwa granted himself his most prestigious credential when he revealed himself to be an annabi; a prophet with divine power and a mission to save the world...He was alleged to have replaced the name of the Prophet Muhammad with his own in personal copies of the Qur'an...He was opposed to most aspects of modernization and to all Western influence. He decried such technological commonplace as radios, wrist watches, automobiles, motorcycles, and even bicycles. Those who use these things or who read books other than the Qur'an were viewed as hell-bound pagans'⁴¹.

Marwa exploited the dwindling economic situation and the *Almajeri* system to attract large followers amongst the lumpen class—commoners who were unable to afford the basic necessities of life. The majority of these followers later became die-hard patriots of the sect and Marwa himself. However, the activities of Maitatsine and his followers became a threat and a source of worry to the ruling class, to the extent that Governor Abubakar Rimi issued a letter on November 26, 1980 giving the sect two weeks to quit Kano state⁴².

The quit notice and ultimatum given is a calculated attempt of the ruling class to prepare for state terrorism which the sect were aware of. So, both are preparing for the showdown that may ensue. Barring few days to the expiration of the state ultimatum, Falola (1998) further observed that 'the Maitatsine group went to "Shahuci" (a popular open field) on December 18 1980, to preach when the police stormed the place to prevent the sect from preaching because they did not obtain a permit. Moreover, the public had always complained of harassment by the sect whenever it was preaching. Conflict ensued between the police and the sect. Obviously, the police underrated the strength of the sect and the two police units that went for the operation were soon over-powered by the members of the sect who appeared with bows and arrows, knives and Dane guns. The sect burnt down all the thirteen police vehicles, killed four policemen and injured the rest whom they stripped off their weapons'⁴³.

³⁹ See World Bank (2008) World Development Indicators, 2008

⁴⁰ See Federal office of statistics (FOS). Poverty profile for Nigeria: 1980-1996, and Federal office of statistics (FOS). National Consumer Survey. 1980-1996.

⁴¹ See Falola, 1998. Pp. 143

⁴² See Danjibo, 2009, pp.6

⁴³ Falola, 1998, pp. 153

The success recorded by the sects in daring the state through the act of individual terrorism, encouraged and emboldened the sect leaders and its member to declare all-out war against the government and the ruling class. Following the defeat of police, 'the sect marched in Kano city chanting 'Yau zamu sha jinni', meaning 'today we shall drink blood', in Hausa. By December 19, the sect took over strategic places in Kano city including the Fagge mosque, some schools, a cinema house and the Sabon Gari market. For eleven days, the police was unable to bring to control the sectarian riots. When the situation was getting out of control, ex-President Shehu Shagari had to invite the Nigeria Army to intervene. It took the army two days to dislodge the sect while their leader was killed in the operation. More than 1,000 members of the sect were arrested and detained in prison where they received agonizing treatment from the police. The crisis lasted for 11 days, claimed the lives of more than 4,179 people and hundreds of houses and shops were either torched or destroyed' (Okafor 1997; Isichei 1987; Danjibo 2009:9). The use of Individual terrorism by the Maitatsine sect is dangerous and counter-productive because the Nigerian government (that is being controlled by the ruling class) will use the superior arsenal and weaponry of the state at its disposal to defend its interest, and crush the aggression of the marauding sect. In this regard, the ruling class resorts to the use of state terrorism to carry out aggressive military raid and extra-judicial killings that left reminiscence of massacre, arson and crude brutality. Terrorism at the time was a form of class antagonism between the sections of the lumpen class led by the Maitatsine sect and the Nigerian ruling class.

After its seeming defeat, the remnants of the Maitatsine sect beat tactical retreat for two years and re-grouped under a new leadership that cause more violence especially in Kaduna crisis of 1982, Yola uprising of 1984 and Bauchi riot of 1985 (Ibrahim 1997: 511-512). The response of the Nigerian government in all these mayhem followed previous method of using state terrorism to repress the individual terrorism of the rampaging sect.

The depth of the economic crisis and the attendant corruption, economic mismanagement and political crisis that characterised the civilian regime was the springboard that gave rise to military coup d'état. The return of the military to power witnessed repression of media and opposition to its rule through various spurious military decrees especially from religious and ethnic sects, civil society and student movement that criticized it. After fifth year of the economic recession, the military oligarchy implemented the Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) under the dictate of World Bank/IMF. The socio-economic effect of the imposed policy added to economic hardship of the impoverished population and further scale back the only means by which most Nigerians benefit from the country's petroleum resource.

The magnitude of socio-economic consequences of SAP hit the Nigerians so hard across broad spectrum. Ehiedu Iweriebor (1997) observed that:

Two years of the relentless enforcement of SAP, involving the massive devaluation of the naira, trade liberalization, and the removal of all petroleum, agricultural and other subsidies generated industrial under-production, massive unemployment, increased cost of living, drastically reduced school enrollment, and reduced investment in health. The program has contributed to the revival of previously controlled diseases and has generally impoverished the people. In short, a rapid and steep decline in the already poor living standards of the people has been the fruit of SAP⁴⁴

The implementation of World Bank/IMF-imposed austerity measures by the Nigerian government met stiff and broad ideological, intellectual and political resistance of Nigerians as manifested in the popular protests of 1986, 1987, 1988 and 1989 against rising inflation, savage cuts and brutal attacks on the socio-economic livelihoods. The government's response was to use police and army to brutalise the people, and quell the social unrest generate by the policy of SAP. The general purpose of the repression is to create a silenced, disarticulated and prostrate citizenry especially civil society, religious and ethnic sects that may want to challenge the authority of the military dictatorship. Through the culture of intimidation, the military was able to sustain the tempo and maintain forced tranquility until its eventually relinquish power to democratic regime in 1999

4.2 Civilian rule: The return to individual terrorism in Nigeria

The end of the cold war indicates the absence of threat of communism. The United States and its allies abandoned African dictators that they supported previously, and converted to 'democracy' in the ex-colonial Africa because they find such democratic regimes much more reliable than the previous dictators. Washington's attention to the continent declined.

⁴⁴ Iweriebor, 1997, pp.131

Similarly, a number of former US clients lost power in the 1990s. Samuel Doe in Liberia, Hissene Habre in Chad, Said Barre in Somalia and Mobutu Sese Seko in Democratic Republic of Congo. This was because these regimes could no longer expect tacit support from the west as they were no longer seen as useful element for imperialism (Ogunrotifa 2011:99). There was intense western pressure on sit-tight African dictators to relinquish power. The Nigeria military dictatorship under the General Sani Abacha was pressurized to hand over power to civilian. While studying the Nigerian transition to democratic rule, James Long (1999) observed that:

Imperialism was prepared to tolerate Abacha, hoping that he would eventually agree to step down. But when it became clear that Abacha was planning to become president of a 'civilian' regime, imperialism moved to replace him. The fear was that a renewed protest movement would develop which could put the country's future at risk. Early last year these fears started to materialise. On 3 March 1998, widespread protests started against Abacha's plans, followed in April and May by a number of clashes in the major city of Ibadan. Then, 4 June saw the largest nation-wide protest since the 1994 oil workers' strike. Four days later Abacha mysteriously died and was replaced by General Abubakar. The following month, Abiola, the winner of the annulled 1993 election, also suddenly died. The Abubakar regime had kept him in detention because he refused to sign an undertaking giving up his claim to the presidency. These two deaths cleared Abubakar's way to begin a controlled retreat, introducing limited reforms from above to prevent revolution from below and, at the same time, trying to put in place mechanisms to control the inevitable efforts by working people to use the newly regained democratic rights in struggle⁴⁵.

The Nigerian ruling class under the dictatorship of its military wing (of Northern—Hausa/Fulani dominated cliques) understood, at least nominally, that they had to step back to prevent the country being possibly torn apart by an explosion from below. They conceded under pressure to relinquish power to civilian in May 1999. As the *Wall Street Journal* reported, 'General Abubakar has rigorously controlled the election process, banning independent candidates. The military is also refusing to publish a new constitution that will govern the civilian administration until after the elections. Critics say the army wants to see who wins the elections before deciding on what powers the president should have'⁴⁶.

The Military regime effectively chose the three parties which were allowed to run, and handed over power to the favoured wing of its civilian ruling class. The retired General Olusegun Obasanjo, a staunch member of the ruling class who had ruled Nigeria with jackboot authoritarianism between 1976-1979 was 'elected' as the new civilian president of Nigeria. The new ruling class under the civilian turncoat was increasingly divided and disoriented by the depth of rot they inherited from the military and have no idea how to solve them.

The economic analysis published by the Financial Time of London on Nigeria in March 1999 shows that:

In 1980 oil sold at \$40 a barrel, earning Nigeria \$25bn export revenue, but oil prices have tumbled and Nigeria's 1998 exports were \$9.3bn, a dramatic drop even before taking inflation into account. Annual per capita income for Nigeria's estimated 120 million people has fallen from \$1,000 in the early 1980s to \$213 in 1998. Officially 60% of the population lives in poverty. While for a time the severe drop in living standards had limited inflation, prices are now rising sharply again with annual inflation back over 16% and expected to reach 20% by the end of this year. By December 1998, Nigeria's limited manufacturing industry operating at 31% capacity, but much of this capacity is obsolete. In 1998 investment slumped by 66%, while the industrial workforce fell from 45,958 to 32,471. Most investment is by foreign companies. Many local companies are collapsing as what sales possibilities exist are taken over by imports or multi-nationals, who see Nigeria as a major market if not a manufacturing base. The industrial capacity utilisation has fallen from 60% in 1990 to 10% last year as market share of local manufacturing products dropped from 65% to 8%. Despite being the world's 12th biggest oil producer, Nigeria has been gripped by a severe fuel shortage for years and 'distribution of what little fuel exists is still in the hands of soldiers and their friends. The electricity supply is often non-existent, with long power cuts lasting days, weeks and even months in some areas. Each factory needs its own generator. In Lagos, the main city with seven million people which consumes 50% of the country's electricity, there are districts which have not had electricity for five months.

The capitalist crisis and the attendant problems that came in its aftermath such as falling standard of education and health care system, infrastructural decay, and other hydra-headed issues put enormous pressure on the civilian regime. Suddenly, the civilian regime finds itself unable to maintain control of society by the old military methods. The inability of the civilian ruling class to solve the problems gave rise to the insurgence of ethnic, sectarian and religious groups who had

⁴⁵ James Long (1999) Nigeria: A Democratic future begins. Socialist Today. Available at <http://www.socialistalternative.org/literature/npr/st39.html>

⁴⁶ See Wall street Journal on Transition to Democracy in Nigeria published on 23rd of February 1999

long been suppressed by the military dictatorship to openly demand for their share of the national cake. Sectarian groups such as Odua Peoples' congress, Afenifere, Ohaneze N'digbo, Arewa Consultative Forum, and other sectarian group sprang up. Rather than resolving the socio-economic problems bedeviling the country, the civilian regime from local, state and national level added an appalling insult upon injury and implemented avalanche of anti-people policies such as privatisation, retrenchment of workers, partial removal of subsidy, education commercialisation and others. Bribery and corruption became more entrenched and institutionalised as the access to state power become access to amass ill-gotten wealth. From North to South, the ruling class looted state fund in order to maintain patronage network in the polity. Since the bulk of resources and wealth belongs to the state, the social frustration and the extreme social-economic differentiation and inequalities in civil Nigeria compel all classes to look up to the State for the share of the national wealth. The dominance of societal wealth by the state therefore makes enormous pressure on the state possible, as the state structure became the only medium through which access to resources and wealth are guaranteed (Ogunrotifa 2011b:7)

The severity of the problems of under-development of capitalism, corruption, infrastructural decays and socio-economic problems highlighted above resulted in growing national tensions from the Nigerian masses especially the working class and the lumpen class who are fed up with the civilian regime. In a move that was seen as diversionary to the growing threat to its rule, the Northern wing of the ruling class announced in January 27th, 2000 that Sharia law will be introduced to their respective state laws. This divisive tactics was meant to sow the seed of religious illusion among Muslims, pacify radical Islamic sects in the north, divert peoples' attention from pressing socio-economic problems, and orchestrate confrontation stance against Christian dominated south, with a view to maintain their hold on society. From 2000 to 2002, twelve states in the Northern Nigeria have instituted Sharia legal code in their respective state/criminal laws.

However, the interest of the Northern ruling class is different from that of the sect's leaders. The ruling class wants to use Sharia law to get the support of the sects in order to achieve political and economic objectives while the religious leaders genuinely want Islamic law to be entrenched. This political Sharia was abandoned by the ruling class immediately after the election (Muogbo 2009). Having been disappointed that the type of Sharia that was introduced across some Northern states, the sects leaders believed that the Sharia law fell short of standards and this was attributed to the fact that either political elite were not serious Muslims or their Western education hindered their commitment (Adesoji 2010: 101). The shoddy way in which Sharia law was politically implemented coupled along with dwindling socio-economic situation culminated in the formation of Jama'atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda'awati Wal-Jihad⁴⁷ (also known as Boko Haram) in 2002.

While the debate rages between the legality and constitutionality of Sharia law in a secular country like Nigeria, the ruling class led by the civilian regime of Chief Olusegun Obasanjo (1999-2007) did little or nothing to address the worsening socio-economic problems in the country. Thus, culminate in the use and rise of individual terrorism methods by groups such as Movement for the Emancipation of Niger-Delta (MEND) that responsible for the spate of kidnapping, bombing, and disruption of oil production in the Niger-Delta region (between 2005-2010); and that of Boko Haram's insurgency in the Northern Nigeria.

5. Class theory and the wave of Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria

The religious illusions orchestrated by the ruling class to divide the people will only last as much as the socio-economic well-being of the people improves. Otherwise, such illusions will become a time bomb that will tear the society apart in the future. Acute poverty, unemployment, untold hardship and misery that were imposed by the military on Nigerians vis-à-vis Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) and unaddressed by the latter civilian regime are beginning to impinge upon the consciousness of ever-broader layers of the population. The layers of the society that was affected by the socio-economic crisis are the working class and the lumpen class, and these economic hardships find its expression more in the Northern Nigeria than the Southern part. The response to widespread disenchantment with the Nigerian State and its ruling class was exploited by the Boko Haram. Mohammed Yusuf—the founder of Boko Haram was an Islamic scholar and cleric who criticised Nigerian leadership (especially those from the North) for its failure to develop Nigeria and improve the socio-economic livelihood of the people. He specifically blames western education for training the Nigerian ruling class in the act of looting treasury. Boko Haram demonization of western education can be seen as a socio-political response to corruption and poverty brought by successive Nigerian leaders. Drawing its ideology from Quran, the Boko Haram leader believed that the enthronement of Islamic state on the basis of Sharia law remains the only solution to the attendant crises

⁴⁷ Jama'atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda'awati Wal-Jihad (which means People Committed to the Propagation of the Prophet's Teachings and Jihad) was formed by Mohammed Yusuf in 2002. It was later called Yussufiya movement (named after the founder). Yusuf was a secondary school drop-out who went to Chad and Niger Republic to study the Qur'an. While in the two countries, he developed radical views that were abhorrent to Westernization and modernization. Because of the sect's radical and provocative preaching against western education, it was nicknamed Boko Haram. Boko Haram is derived from two words in Hausa language "*Boko*" and "*Haram*". The '*Boko*' means 'book' or 'western education' while '*Haram*' means 'forbidden' or 'sinful'. Literally, it means 'western education is forbidden and sinful'

of corruption, unemployment, poverty, moral decadence and socio-economic problems in Nigeria. To enthrone Islamic state, Mohammed Yusuf posited that modern state institutions such as civil service, government departments, security formations—police, military and other uniformed personnel should be destroyed (Danjibo 2009:7). He then began his radical and provocative preaching against other Islamic sects, scholars and against established political institutions' (ibid).

Mohammed Yusuf and his Boko Haram ideology and teaching found an echo and appeal within the rank of frustrated members of the lumpen class in Northern Nigeria. He capitalised on the dwindling economic situation and the *Almajeri* system in order to attract large number of followers especially amongst the commoners (lumpen class). In Criminology, it is often said that when gangs emerge, they replace and fill vacuums society left uncovered. In a society like Nigeria where: police are corrupt and repressive, judiciary are corrupt and not independent, infrastructures are crumbling, politicians have made corruption official and the ruling class created over four decades of grotesquely unequal society vis-à-vis its backward neo-liberal capitalist policies, the alienated members of the lumpen class found solace in sectarian groups like Odua Peoples' Congress, Niger-Delta Militant group, and Boko Haram. These frustrated members of the lumpen class are alienated victims of the society rather than the exceedingly violent, opportunistic criminals they are called. In fact, the quest to maintain hold on society by the Northern ruling class, and the vacuum they created by not seeing education as a priority, was exploited by the Boko Haram. Mohammed Yusuf capitalised on existing resistance among the Muslims in the area to western education and well entrenched Islamic educational system, by establishing mosques and Islamic schools in which many poor Muslim families from across Nigeria and neighbouring countries enrolled their children (Ekanem, Dada and Ejue, 2012:233). This ploy was described by critics as recruiting centre for Jihad and Jihadists to fight the state or training school for fanatics, die-hard members, and future suicide bombers. By capitalizing on dwindling socio-economic situations in the northern part of Nigeria to swell its rank of foot soldiers, Boko Haram group grew in leaps and bound within the short space of seven years.

In the study of Boko Haram activities in Nigeria, Abimbola Adesoji noted that 'the sect was able to attract more than 280,000 members across Northern Nigeria as well as in Chad and Niger Republic⁴⁸. The sect's membership cut across the broad spectrum of society, but a preponderant number of members came from its poorest groups. Although the common denominator among all members was their desire to overthrow the secular government and to propagate Islamic law, the oratory prowess of Yusuf arguably contributed to their mobilization and participation (Adesoji 2010:100). Having built the group as a popular abode for jobless and frustrated youths who found hope and engagement, Boko Haram leader's populist support grew. As his followership grew, his confidence grew, and his intolerance of criticism from other Muslim sects grew as well. The Boko Haram intolerance was first exhibited when it engaged in the use of individual terrorism against other Islamic sects and villagers residing in Kanamma which was located about a mile from its original/traditional camp in December 2003. During the raid, the group attacked local government installations, and killed about 30 people, and kidnapped a number of villagers who refused to join the sect⁴⁹. The police in response carried out a raid on Boko Haram camp and arrested some of its members. In reaction, the sect conducted offensive raid and retreated to the city of Maiduguri. David Cook (2011) observed that after the initial defeat, Boko Haram widened its activities, attacked police and prison formations between January and June 2004 in order to rescue the arrested members. These operations fail as many members of the sect and that of police and prison died. Despite these defeats, the sect forged ahead in the use of individual terrorism by attacking the convoy of 60 policemen at Kala-Balge on Lake Chad in October 10, 2004. 12 policemen were kidnapped while the rest were killed⁵⁰. It is clear that this early attacks on police formations were designed to obtain weapon for future armed insurrections.

The sect continuous call for the creation of an Islamic state in northern Nigeria, and its constant use of individual terrorism against the police and other security forces became a threat to the Nigerian ruling class. What really alarmed the political establishment is the situation where students, especially in tertiary institutions in Borno and Yobe states, withdrew from school, tore up their certificates and joined the group. The Nigerian ruling class knew that daily increase in the number of lumpen class joining this sect is a time bomb that will undermine their interest in the future. Rather than addressing the crisis of capitalism that was making more frustrated members of the lumpen to join sectarian groups, the ruling class step

⁴⁸ Beside 'Almajiris that form the bulk of its foot soldiers, the sect also has as members some well-educated, wealthy and influential people such as university lecturers, business contractors and politicians who are the major financiers. Recently, the sect added bank robbery to its sources of funds for meeting different needs: helping the less privileged; sustaining the widows of those that died in the Jihad; giving alms to the poor and needy (Zakat); and for the prosecution of Jihad, among others'. The appalling conditions which Almajiris (currently about 9.5 million Almajiris, with over 80 per cent concentrated in northern Nigeria) live and study inevitably made them vulnerable to recruitment into extremist sects like the Boko Haram (Freedom Onuoha (2012: 3)

⁴⁹ See Integrated Regional Information Networks (IRIN), *Nigeria: Timeline of Boko Haram activity*, 7 October 2011, available at: <http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4e93ffa02.html> [accessed 25 June 2012]

⁵⁰ See David Cook (2011) Boko Haram: A Prognosis available at <http://bakereinstitute.org/publications/REL-pub-CookBokoHaram-121611.pdf>. Date assessed 25th June, 2012

up its repressive use of state terrorism strategy by arming police and other securities forces. The response of the Nigerian state to the orgy of violence and threats which Boko Haram's individual terrorism has created implies that the Nigerian ruling class is prepared to clamp down on the sect given the state instrument of terror at its disposal. From 2004 to 2009, the sect's trademark has been the use of gunmen on motorbikes, killing police, politicians and anyone who criticises it, including clerics from other Muslim traditions and a Christian preacher in some parts of Borno and Yobe States until July 2009 when it provoked a major anti-government revolt in Nigeria. In June 2009, members of the Boko Haram sect had a clash in Maiduguri with members of the Operation Flush, a joint security outfit of both the army and mobile policemen and in the process one of its member were killed. The sects had gone to bury the dead colleague, and were moving about in a very rowdy and lawless manner, which is often of commercial motorcyclist in Maiduguri. They were apprehended by the security forces and the ensuing fracas left a number of them dead and others injured. The use of state terrorism in the killing a number of Boko Haram members (about 14) during a funeral procession on the flimsy ground of not using a helmet by the Operation Flush, triggered the July 2009 uprising.

In the analysis of the origin of Boko Haram insurgency, Aliyu Tilde (2012) observed that 'the sect leader (Muhammed Yusuf) wrote series of letter to the Borno state government and the Borno commissioner of police. He called for the compensation of the family of those who were killed by the police during the funeral procession. He followed his letter with practical visits to the police but all appeal fell on deaf ears. He then called severally to the IG of police and the Yar'adua administration to intervene but to date; nothing was done to the culprits. He began to send threat to the government and the police. He castigated the Yar'adua government and called Yar'adua an oppressor and declared the government as unjust. For those Muslim leaders and scholar who opposed his threat against the government, he declared them as hypocrite and even declared some as unbelievers. He and his member began to arm themselves while receiving support from many who sympathized with them and had grievance against the jungle justice of the Nigerian police. He was said to have received sympathy even by some non Muslims who were alleged to have bailed him out on some occasions that he was detained by the police on the ground of perceived breach of peace due to his threats to the Yar'adua government'.⁵¹

The reciprocal conjecture of Boko Haram to engage in the use of individual terrorism as a response to the state terrorism of police and the Nigerian ruling class is a dialectical process that is shared through socio-class relations. While the material condition for Boko Haram to strike and embark on revenge mission is ripe, the catalyst for such mission must be linked to perceive threat to its leaders and members, and until that happen, the sect will remain in the background re-arming itself. As the sect is preparing for insurrection, the Nigerian government was aware and prepared to counter any aggression. The security information available to the government suggests that the sect might strike anytime and in order to prevent that, pre-emptive strike was launched at the 'sect's hideout at the Dutsen Tanshi area of Bauchi on 26 July 2009 by a joint security team, during which nine of its members were arrested and materials for making bombs and other weapons confiscated' (Adesoji 2010: 98). This led to reprisal attack on police and prison formations on the same day. The insurgency which started in Bauchi quickly spread to six northern state of Borno, Bauchi, Yobe, Gombe, Kano and Katsina, and left hundreds of people dead and several houses, churches and government properties burnt and destroyed. Danjibo (2009) noted that 'more than 500 members of the sect were killed by government security forces in Borno. In Bauchi state, 41 persons including a soldier and a police officer lost their lives while in Yobe state 43 persons lost their lives with greater casualty on the sect. By the time the violence was contained, between 1,000 and 1,400 people have lost their lives with inestimable damages to properties. The sect was said to have used propelled grenades, locally produced bombs and AK 47 rifles in carrying out the attacks'⁵².

Similar study by Freedom Onuoha (2012) observed that in the aftermath of five days revolt, 'over 3 500 people were internally displaced, more than 1 264 children orphaned, and over 392 women widowed. In addition, 28 policemen and five prison warders, as well as an undisclosed number of soldiers, had been killed. Properties destroyed include 48 buildings, three primary schools, more than 12 churches and a magistrate's court'⁵³. The Boko Haram uprising of 2009 was finally quelled when its founder—Mohammed Yusuf was captured by the Military and handed over to the Police for interrogation. He was summarily executed in police, though police and the Nigerian government denied claiming that he was shot when trying to escape from the police custody. This claim was faulted by the Al-Jazeera news agency who reported that his body was found in the street, still handcuffed, raising concerns that he had been the victim of an extrajudicial killing⁵⁴. However,

⁵¹ See Aliyu Tilde (2012) The new challenges of Boko Haram in Nigeria. Available at <http://www.nigeriavillagesquare.com/aliyu-u-tilde/the-new-challenges-of-boko-haram.html>

⁵² See Danjibo, N.D (2009) op cit in note

⁵³ Freedom C Onuoha, "The Islamist Challenge: Nigeria's Boko Haram Crisis Explained". *African Security Review* Vol.19, No.2 (2010), pp. 54 - 67.

⁵⁴ <http://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2012/01/20121974241393331.html>

documentary and video evidence made available by an online blog shows that Boko Haram leader and many suspected member of sects were extra-judicially executed by the security forces in the aftermath of the uprising⁵⁵.

The use of state terrorism in the extra-judicial killing of Boko Haram leader suggest that such gruesome murder is a deliberate attempt of the Nigerian ruling class, and worse than a crime. Though, the Nigerian government regarded his death as 'justice'. But justice has traditionally meant due process of law, where even a person accused of the most heinous crime is entitled to appear before a court, to have a hearing before a judge and jury, with a lawyer to conduct his defence, in other words, a fair trial. Mohammed Yusuf had no trial. He was just gunned down in the police station while the verdict was already decided in advance. If he was indeed guilty of treason, terrorism and other associated crimes, why not put him on trial? It is quite obvious that from the standpoint of the 'war against terror', the capture of Mohammed Yusuf would have been more advantageous because of the intelligence that could have been gleaned from interrogating him and his member (they were also killed). The reason the Nigerian establishment did not want him alive is because a trial (which would have to be in public) would have revealed some very uncomfortable and damaging information about his contacts and past links with the members of the ruling class in power and opposition especially state governors, politicians, and police and other security forces.

However, the 2009 uprising of Boko Haram, and the attendant military assault that left over 800 people dead shows a dialectical-reciprocal process that characterised the balance of individual terrorism with state terrorism on the basis of class interest, and expressed in a contest of power relations in a backward capitalist state like Nigeria. Despite the mistakes associated with the uprising and its handlings, it was clear that the use of individual terrorism has its own dark side. The use of individual terrorism to create or induce fear by any group or organisation in expressing grievances against the state is dangerous and counterproductive— as this will be countered and confronted by the state—who is better armed to engage in counterterrorism/ combatants operations against the perpetrators of individual terrorism. This was confirmed given the provocation, condemnation and global responses that characterised the unfortunate individual act of terror allegedly perpetrated by the Al-Qaeda on United States in 2001. That act of terror gave states the excuse to tighten their respective local laws, formulate harsh anti-terrorism act and restrict human rights (Kielsgard 2006:249-261), and perpetrated state terrorism (counter-terrorism) against certain groups/organisations linked to individual terrorism, in their watch lists. The War on 'Terror' that was spearheaded by the United States and western countries started by tightening and formulating enabling laws in their respective states, was extended abroad to Africa, Middle-East and Latin America. Joanna Macrae and Adele Harmer in their Humanitarian Policy Report (2003) observed that 'the US began building an international coalition against terrorism on 12 September 2001. For the first time in its 52-year history, NATO invoked the North Atlantic Treaty's mutual defence clause, declaring that the assault on the US could be considered an attack on the entire 19-nation alliance. The US held talks with a range of countries around the world, to gather military support, access to bases and over-flight rights. The British government published a set of 'Campaign Objectives', and European Union (EU) heads of state agreed to the introduction of a counter-terrorism Plan of Action, which defined over 60 objectives covering foreign policy, home affairs, judicial cooperation and financial and economic policy. Many European countries gave their police forces new powers of investigation and detention'⁵⁶.

Despite the harsh brutality associated with state terrorism, Boko Haram members went underground following the death of its leader. The group went dormant for more than a year before reemerging in 2010 with a series of assassinations. According to US House of Representative report, it was reported that 'in 2010, Boko Haram re-emerged radically more violent and determined to seek vengeance against the Nigerian state for executing its leader. Under the leadership of Imam Abubakar Shekau, who claimed to have assumed control of the sect following the death of Mohammed Yusuf, Boko Haram militants carried out violent operations against government targets in the north. The most notable include an assault on a Maiduguri prison that resulted in the release of 700 prisoners, including Boko Haram members, and a bombing in the city of Jos that killed more than 80 people'⁵⁷. The radical re-emergence of Boko Haram midwives latest wave of individual terrorist attacks on police stations, banks, military installations, and churches and mosques. From January 2010 to June 2012, Boko Haram militants had claimed responsibility for a series of bombings in Abuja and Northern Nigeria that left many military and civilian dead and wounded.

However, below are the chronicles of Boko Haram Bombing since September 2010

The Chronicles of Boko Haram insurgency since September 2010

⁵⁵ See http://wn.com/Extra_Judicial_Killing_by_Naija_Police for more details on Police brutality and Extra-judicial killings in Nigeria.

⁵⁶ See Macrae, J and Harmer, A (2003) Humanitarian Action and the 'global war on Terror: A review of trends and Issues. Humanitarian Policy Report. Available at <http://www.odi.org.uk/resources/docs/287.pdf>

⁵⁷ US House of representative report on Boko Haram. It can be found at

<http://homeland.house.gov/sites/homeland.house.gov/files/Boko%20Haram-%20Emerging%20Threat%20to%20the%20US%20Homeland.pdf>

7 th of September 2010	Gunmen attack a prison in Bauchi, killing around five guards and freeing numerous prisoners, including former sect members.
6 th of October, 2010	Gunmen assassinate two security guards outside a politician's home and, several hours later, assassinate ANPP leader Awana Ngala in Maiduguri.
9 th of October, 2010	Gunmen assassinate Muslim cleric Bashir Kashara and one of his students in Maiduguri. Separately, gunmen assassinate a police officer in Maiduguri.
11 th of October, 2010	Bombing/gun attack on a police station in Maiduguri destroys the station and injures three
28 th of December, 2010	Boko Haram claims responsibility for the Christmas Eve bombing in Jos that killed 38, and assassination of a senior police officer and two others at a hospital in Maiduguri.
3 rd of January, 2011	Assassination of a policeman in Maiduguri.
20 th of February, 2011	Assassination of a policeman in Maiduguri.
23 rd of February, 2011	Assassination of a policeman in Maiduguri.
28 th February, 2011	Attack of a police commander's home and kill two policemen.
2 rd of March, 2011	Assassination of two policemen in Maiduguri.
13 th of March, 2011	Assassination of a Muslim cleric Imam Ibrahim Ahmed Abdullahi in Maiduguri.
27 th of March, 2011	Assassination of an ANPP leader Alhaji Modu Gana Makanike in Maiduguri.
9 th of April, 2011	Bombings at polling places injure several and killing at least one person in Maiduguri.
22 nd of April, 2011	Boko Haram frees 14 prisoners during a jailbreak in Yola, Adamawa State
17 th of May, 2011	Assassination of a policeman in Maiduguri.
29 th of May, 2011	Bombings at an army barracks in Bauchi and Maiduguri; Zuba International Market at Abuja, and Zaria
6 th of June, 2011	Assassination of a Muslim cleric Ibrahim Birkuti in Maiduguri.
7 th of June, 2011	Bombing of church and police stations in Maiduguri, killing five.
16 th of June, 2011	Bombing of National police Headquarter in Abuja
26 th of June, 2011	Shooting and bombing of a bar in Maiduguri kills some 25 people.
10 th of July, 2011	Bombing of All Christian Fellowship Church in Suleja, Niger State
12 th of August, 2011	Prominent Muslim Cleric Liman Bana is shot dead by Boko Haram militants
26 th of August, 2011	Bombing of United Nations building in Abuja
4 th of November, 2011	Boko Haram claimed responsibility for the attacks on State police headquarter, government buildings, banks and churches in Damaturu, Yobe state
25 th of December, 2011	Christmas day bombing of churches in Madalla, Jos, Gadaka and Damaturu, killing more than 40 people.
20 th January, 2012	Bombing of prison and Police station in Kano, killing policemen and freeing all inmates.
8 th of February, 2012	Boko Haram claims responsibility for a suicide bombing at the army headquarters in Kaduna
16 th of February, 2012	Bombing of a prison in Central Nigeria, killing of a warder and freeing 119 prisoners
8 th of March, 2012	Killing of kidnapped Italian and British hostage (Franco Lamolinara and Christopher McManus) by Boko Haram

	splinter group.
26 th of April, 2012	Bombing of Thisday Newspaper office in Abuja
29 th of April, 2012	Bombing of Police chief convoy in Taraba.
30 th of April, 2012	Bombing of churches in Kano and Maiduguri, killing at least 15 people
31 st of May, 2012	Killing of a German hostage in gun shoot out with the Military
3 rd of June, 2012	Bombing of a church in Bauchi , killing 16 people
5 th of June, 2012	Assassination of Retired Police Chief in Kano
17 th of June, 2012	Bombing of three churches that killed at least 50 people in Zaria and Kaduna town.
25 th of July, 2012	Boko Haram gunmen killed two Indians in Maiduguri, and attacked police stations, a local government office and a factory owned by Indians
27 th of July, 2012	Boko Haram attacked JTF's patrol vehicles in the Maiduguri metropolis
30 th of July, 2012	Boko Haram suicide bomber attacked two police stations, and killed two policemen in Sokoto
4 th of August, 2012	Boko Haram suicide bombers killed 6 soldiers in Damaturu, Gombe and Maiduguri.
6 th of August, 2012	Boko Haram attacked and bombed police station in Sokoto.
4 th of September, 2012	Boko Haram razed down a primary school in Maiduguri
5 th of September, 2012	Boko Haram claimed responsibility for telephone mast bombing in Borno.

Sources: BBC news coverage on who are the Boko Haram Islamists?⁵⁸ and Wikipedia article on Boko Haram⁵⁹

The Nigerian government however intensified the pace of state terrorism tactics as a response to these spates of attacks vis-à-vis arrest of sect member, killing and military assault on sect's members and their hideouts. In most military assault and clamp down with the sects, many innocent Nigerians have been killed. Despite the increasing pace of state terrorism, the Nigerian ruling class is incapable of winning the war against individual terrorism of Boko Haram, as Nigerian army are ill-equipped to fight this sect⁶⁰. The Nigerian ruling class and their counterpart in the West are aware of this, and are formulating a joint strategy and response to tackle the Boko Haram insurgency. However, Boko Haram insurgency does not really constitute a danger to American interest, but constitute a real danger to western capitalist interest as far as the stability of West Africa is concerned. This was noted by David Cook (2011) who noted that 'if Boko Haram manages to establish a quasi-state in Northeastern Nigeria, such move would encourage other sectarian groups that have a long history of Muslim grievance against the West in the region (such as Cameroon, Niger and Chad) to engage in the same tactics that could pose a volatile combat in the future'⁶¹. Because of the danger that could be posed to the ruling class in power in west Africa (who are unrepentant stooges and allies of Western capitalist ruling class), Nigerian government announced the receipt of military aid in the training and re-training of military personnel, fixing of military jets, and acquisition of new boats, helicopters and technological devices that would be used in fighting Boko Haram⁶².

While counting the cost of Boko Haram on its interest, the Nigerian ruling class put enormous pressure on United States and European Union to list Boko Haram as Foreign Terrorist Organisation. Reprieve however came it way when American government designated three Boko Haram leaders (Abubakar Shekau, Abubakar Adam Kamar, and Khalid al-Barnawi) as global terrorists⁶³ under section 1(b) of Executive order 13224 rather than the group itself so as not to shift the group (or its splinter groups)'s posture towards labelling of US as enemy among the northern poor, and validate the more radical factions' analysis of outsider influence in Nigeria. This globalization of Boko Haram insurgency by the Nigerian

⁵⁸ See BBC news coverage on Boko Haram Islamists for more details at <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-13809501> Date visited 1st of July, 2012

⁵⁹ Wikipedia Article on Boko Haram available at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Boko_Haram Date visited 1st of July, 2012.

⁶⁰ See Nigerian Army chief admits that Army Ill-equipped to fight Boko Haram at <http://www.naijapals.com/modules/naijapals/nigeria?topic=112681.0> Date visited 1st of July, 2012.

⁶¹ David Cook, pp. 25. Op.cit.in note 48

⁶² See Voice of American news on Nigeria gets Foreign aids to fight Boko Harm available at http://www.voanews.com/content/nigeria_receives_foreign_aid_fight_boko_haram/1145279.html Date visited 1st of July, 2012.

⁶³ See Voice of American news on US designation of Boko Haram leaders as foreign terrorist. Available at <http://www.voanews.com/content/us-puts-boko-haram-members-terrorist-list/1216471.html>

government in order to receive international solidarity and support from its foreign counterpart seems to suggest that Nigerian ruling class and its foreign allies understood the danger posed to its class interest by the Boko Haram sect, and are prepared to fight aggressively to defend this interest. With this class interest at stake, the Nigerian ruling class and its foreign allies will together engage in aggressive military onslaught (state terrorism) to counter balance the individual terrorism strategy of the combatant Boko Haram sects until retreat or compromise (through dialogue) is found.

6. Theoretical discussion

The class perspective that has been offered in this paper demonstrates that analysis of terrorism cannot be isolated from the International event on one hand, and the socio-economic, political and cultural factors that conditioned it on the other hand. Therefore, investigating terrorism must be limited to specific context and society that is crucial to the explication of the action that will be required to transform that context. The findings however miserably weakened the logic and claim of psychological perspective that attribute individual terrorism to the personality trait and characteristics of the individual motivation⁶⁴ rather than the socio-economic, political and cultural factors that conditioned the sectarian group to use that terrorist tactics and act the way they do. However, certain individuals may have grievances with the state of affair like Norwegian bomber—Anders Behring Breivik about rising number of Muslims in Norway, his appearance and personality does not portray that of a ‘terrorist’ as psychological theorists would want us to believe. Apart from Anders Behring Breivik, individual members of the groups such as Boko Haram, *Al Qaeda*, Hezbollah, Al-Shabaab, Irish Republican Army (IRA), Hamas, and Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA) are not born ‘terrorist’ neither is the organisations they belong are ‘terrorist organisations’. They are regarded as ‘terrorist’ or ‘terrorist organisations’ because they employ the use of individual terrorism to express their grievances about socio-economic, and political situation in their respective societies.

Second, terrorism is an expression of class antagonism between the ruling class and the lumpen class. The findings of this study revealed that that the ruling class in power (government) used state terrorism to protect its interest, keep society in-check and ensure that the status-quo structure remain unchanged. The Nigerian government committed state terrorism by extra-judicially killing of Boko Haram leader in police station without due process of justice and adherence to the rule of law couple along with killings of innocent civilians in the affected trouble spot of the region. This gives similar credence to the killing of Osama Bin Laden by the American special forces in 2011, and drone bombing and killing of Al-Qaeda leaders and members, and that of innocent civilians in Afghanistan, Iraq, Pakistan and Yemen under the pretence of ‘war on terror’. Meanwhile, the lumpen class used individual terrorism to lash out at societal injustices, express grievances about state of affairs and challenge the ruling class and the authority of the state. The findings therefore fault the claims of realist theorists like Hoffman (1998), Laqueur (2001) Richmond (2003) and others who argued that terrorism is generally associated with lower classes and non-state actors only. In fact, this study thus confirmed the observation of Herring (2008) that terrorism is a tactic of all classes in class conflict, rather than just a tactics of a lumpen class.

Third, terrorism is always divided into individual and state terrorism, and both are shape by class basis that gave rise to them. From this study, it has been revealed that interest of ruling class and that of the lumpen class are diametrically opposed to each other, and none of the classes will freely surrender its interest without a fight. In as much as capitalist system continues to exist, the class interests that culminate into terrorist act between the two classes will continue. This however confirms the working hypothesis of this study that Individual terrorism is not just opposite of state terrorism but they are reciprocal and dialectical reactions that are expressed in terms of class interest, and will continue to shape each other in never-ending dominance of capitalist social relations. Therefore, terrorism is a reflection of social relations among social classes within modern capitalism (Jonathan, 2011).

Consequently, the findings of this study fault the typology of ‘old style terrorism’ and ‘new style terrorism’ proposed by Anthony Giddens. Giddens (2006: 879) had claimed that ‘old style terrorism is the kind represented by the IRA in Northern Ireland that is essentially local and concerned with creating a unified nation in Ireland. While the new style terrorism is much more global. It is in fact in large part a reflection of globalization. In new style terrorism, there are often networks stretching across many countries’. Interestingly, today’s terrorism is not fundamentally different from that of the cold-war era given the ideological underpinning of state and non-state actors terrorism and how this reflect the dynamics of unending class struggle implicit in the hidden structures of oppression and structured contradictions in the material world which global system of capitalism represents. Terrorism has always been in form of individual and state terrorism. The advancement of nuclear technology as well as access to these nuclear materials by both the state and the sectarian groups make the current sophistication level of terrorism more profound that the previous decades. In reality, IRA, Boko Haram,

⁶⁴ For more on Psychological research on terrorism, see Cooper (1977), Pearce (1977), Ferracuti (1982), Pearlstein (1991), Johnson & Feldman (1992), Ginges (1977) and Haroun (1999).

Al-Qaeda and other sects are not fundamentally different from each other in terms of method and tactics of expressing grievances and oppression. They are all sectarian group who used individual terrorism like those of their predecessor in the cold war era, against their respective home state. The media hype and the western government generalization of 'global terrorism' are baseless and unwarranted due to the fact that what we have is individual and state terrorism in a particular society that has generated international attention.

The collapse of Soviet Union heralded the final victory of the 'free market' and unipolar capitalist order. The extension and expansion of capitalism to Russia and Eastern Europe, Africa and Middle East in post-colonial era heralded several problems such as mass unemployment, malnutrition, poverty, ignorance, wars and epidemics which constantly afflict one third of humanity in the Third World. In a region where these problems are worst hit like Middle East witnessed the proliferation of sectarian groups who want to explore the contradictions of capitalism in the Middle-East such as extreme poverty, social inequality, injustice, unemployment and others as a justification to establish Islamic states that will abolish devastating effects of capitalist crises. The coming to power of Taliban in Afghanistan encouraged other sectarian groups in different countries in the Middle-East to use the same method. In order to prevent this, the United States and its western allies use every military tactics and diplomatic pressure to defend its oil interest by backing the decadent regimes against the peoples' aspiration and the combatant sects. As a result of its staunch support for the decadent regimes and its ruling class that are responsible for the crises bedeviling the region, the United States and its Western allies are deeply unpopular and hated by the people, and are more vulnerable to the terrorist attacks of the combatant sects than any other countries of the world. This is a local situation that is given unwarranted international attention by the western ruling class and its media.

7. Conclusion

This study has offered significant step towards operationalising the way in which the concept of terrorism has been analysed and understood, contrary to George Fletcher's argument that the concept of terrorism is indefinable (Fletcher, 2006). Though, previous studies by Jeffrey Simon (1994), Schmid and Jongman (1998) and Jeffrey Record (2003) has revealed that there was no consensus among scholars on the acceptable definition of terrorism, as there are more than 212 different definitions of terrorism in use (in government circle and other institutions) throughout the world. Yet the definition of terrorism used in this study is significant because it helps to operationalise terrorism in a workable way that can achieve desirable results both in policy and practice.

By developing class theory of terrorism on the basis of the study of Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria vis-a-vis historical method, this study has shown that the discursive frame of terrorism cannot be analysed and understood in isolation of its class nature and the socio-economic conditions that gave rise to it. In this sense, it was observed that terrorism is an inevitable consequence that will feature more prominently in the capitalist mode of production because the social contradiction (socio-economic crisis) that arises out of the conflicts between the social relations and productive forces will usher a continuous struggle within classes as Karl Marx's Historical Materialism affirmed. Consequently, this perspective locates the present root cause of all forms of terrorism (individual and state terrorism) at the behest of the antagonistic class struggle inherent in global capitalist system. Therefore, state terrorism emerged as a result of the triumphant of capitalism over feudalism, and was sustained through the unending dynamics of capitalist social formation. Like in Nigerian case, the emergence of state terrorism stems from the forceful incorporation of world capitalist system through colonialism, and sustained through capitalist accumulation and capitalist class formation. This study has revealed that state terrorism is in large part, the historical product of class antagonism between the ruling class and other classes in the society. While individual terrorism was and still generated by the very same historical process that sustained state terrorism: the development of capitalism.

The spread and triumphant of global capitalism was confronted with its internal/systemic crisis: deteriorating profitability, declining productivity, and stagnating demand, credit crunch, factory closures, massive unemployment and sacking of workers couple along with a regime of permanent austerity (cut in welfare and social spending) and attacks on living standards hit the broadest layer of the society very hard especially in developing countries. The responses of the people to the crisis culminated in class struggle among different classes in the society. Thus, makes class antagonism fiercer between the defenders of the capitalism (the ruling class) and the victims of capitalist crisis (the middle, working and lumpen classes) in the third world countries. While the Middle and Working classes engage in the use of strikes, protest, picketing and other methods in expressing grievances against the ruling class controlled state; the lumpen class expresses their grievance through coordinated and uncoordinated method of individual terrorism. The uncoordinated form of individual terrorism often results in the spontaneous rioting, arson, criminal activities. The coordinated forms of individual terrorism

are expressed when a section of the lumpen class join or form sectarian groups, and use it to unleash individual terrorism as a way of lashing out at societal injustice and express displeasure about the policies of the ruling class and the state.

The Boko Haram insurgency as typified in this study, arose out of long standing grievances with the class structure of the Nigerian capitalist state specifically in the Northern Nigeria where Hausa/Fulani Oligarchic ruling class failed to develop the region, encouraged and entrenched patronage corruption in governance, and place more emphasizes on favoritism in terms of access to qualitative western education by the rich kids at the expense of children from poor background. These symptoms of capitalist under-development in Northern Nigeria heralded long neglect of Almajeri poor street children couple along with widespread poverty and attendant corruption within the entire Nigerian establishment, thus, provides a fertile ground for Boko Haram's ideology to get support from the rank of lumpen class in society who is frustrated with the current state of affair.

From the study, it has been revealed that the moment the ideas and campaign of these sects found an echo and support from a sections of disenchanting and frustrated member of lumpen class, the more the latter are willing to join the sects in large number, and thus become a political force capable of challenging the state and the ruling class in power through the use of individual terrorism. This is relevant not only in Nigerian case but also in Arab world. In Middle East for instance, the profound socio-economic problems of poverty, malnutrition, unemployment and others represent the weakest link of the capitalist system being practiced in that setting (McLaren and Farahmandpur, 2005: 203). Interestingly, this gives room for sectarian groups like Al-Qaeda and others to agitate for the abolition of capitalism and establishment of Islamic state to tackle the staring effect of capitalist crises. Therefore, the present trend of Individual terrorism in Nigeria, part of Africa and Middle-East is as a result of long decades of participation in the process of global capitalism that breed antagonist class relations over time.

The use of individual terrorism by the sect(s) against the state as shown in this study will be resisted by the ruling class in power, who is better armed to engage in dangerous military assault against the former. In this regard, the use of state terrorism by the government (ruling class in power) will continue to be resisted by the combative sect until the latter retreated, defeated or compromise (dialogue and ceasefire agreement) are reached between the two actors. If compromises are not reached and the respective national government could not defeat the sects, the ruling class in power will be compelled to request for military assistance from foreign allies/government (who are equally a ruling class in their own society). The study of Boko Haram insurgency and the response of Nigerian government together with the support of foreign government, justify the critical theoretical argument that state also engages in terrorism against its own citizen (Gunning 2007; Silke 2009; Jackson, Smyth and Gunning 2009, Herring 2008).

It is likely that if Boko Haram insurgency is resolved either through military actions or dialogue, the use of individual terrorism by sectarian groups is likely to re-emerge in the future as long as the endemic socio-economic problems caused by global capitalism remained and unaddressed. In as much as the socio-economic crisis remain, aggrieved members of the lumpen class who could no longer tolerate the series of frustration they suffer will find solution in joining or forming sectarian groups and resort to the use of individual terrorism as a response to the state of affairs .

8. Policy Recommendation

Contrary to the policy directions of realist and liberal approaches that suggest aggressive and combative counter-terrorist strategies, and strengthening of criminal and anti-terrorism law respectively, policy recommendation from class perspective seems to differ from the aforementioned approaches, as it seeks to address what causes antagonism and tension among classes, why do members of the lumpen class form or join sectarian groups and engage in individual terrorism, and how can lumpen class be discouraged from engaging in individual terrorism or forming/joining sectarian groups that believe in the use of individual terrorism? The answers to these underlie the policy direction the class perspective might take in addressing problems posed by individual terrorism.

The real barrier to growth and crisis in capitalism is the private ownership of production that breeds greed, exploitation, insatiable wealth, corruption, poverty, misery and widening gap between the rich and the poor. This is the basis of tension and antagonism among classes in the society especially in the developing countries. In the developed countries, there are social welfare programmes put in place to reduce the tension among the classes but in the developing countries such programmes are absent and make class antagonism fiercer. With this development, the members of the lumpen class who have frustrated with the socio-economic problems will have no option than to respond one way or the other. The result has been the increasing trend of individual terrorism in the contemporary world.

However, the transformation of the members of the lumpen class into working class remains an appropriate social and public policy formulation that is needed to salvage the cyclical social dislocations orchestrated the global capitalist crisis, and to discourage the youth who are mostly member of the lumpen class from joining organised groups/organisations tainted with individual terrorism. This can be achieved through equitable distribution of wealth, and by taken all grievances seriously rather than resorting to police and military measures to address this problem. For Western capitalist states it is much easier to fight individual terrorism with military force, than introducing complex economic measures, such as an equitable redistributive mechanism in the global market. Without political will to implement these policy recommendations, individual terrorist tactics like that of Boko Haram, Al-Queada and others will continue to remain a recurring event especially in the regions that has suffered from the haemorrhage of poverty, unemployment, corruption and under-development.

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